THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY




n early work by Giddings, designed as a basis for statistical studies, which largely concentrated on the particular ethnic and racial characteristics of various national groups, this work was to prove his most important work

Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931) was an American sociologist. In 1894 he became professor of sociology at Columbia University, where he earned a reputation as a brilliant teacher. His explanation of social phenomena was based on the principle of "consciousness of kind" – his theory that each person has an innate sense of belonging to particular social groups. Giddings encouraged statistical studies in sociology. His most important works are The Principles of Sociology (1896), Studies in the Theory of Human Society (1922), and The Scientific Study of Human Society (1924).

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHINOMENA OF ASSOCIATION AND OF SOCIAL ORGANISATION

By
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S 453p

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

ISBN 81-307-0012-3

ASIATIC SOCIETY
CALCUTTA-700 016
No. 66768 DATE 1.08.05

Published by
COSMO PUBLICATIONS
Publishing Division of
GENESIS PUBLISHING PVT. LTD.
24-B, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,
New Delhi-110 002,
INDIA

Printed at
Mehra Offset Press

PREFACE

THE time has not come for an exhaustive treatise on sociology. Nevertheless the scientific description of society is well advanced, and there is no reason why it should remain inarticulate. There are principles of sociology, and they admit of logical organization. The present work is an attempt to combine the principles of sociology in a coherent theory.

Believing that sociology is a psychological science, and that the description of society in biological terms is a mistake, I have endeavoured to direct attention chiefly to the psychic aspects of social phenomena. Association and social organization I have attempted to explain as consequences of a particular mental state; namely, the consciousness of kind, which is defined on page 17 as "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." The consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it marks off species and races; within the race it marks off ethnical and political groups, and social classes: it is therefore the psychological ground of social groupings and distinctions. The consciousness of kind, again, continually moves men to act as they would not if they were governed altogether by considerations

of utility, fear, loyalty, or reverence; it continually prevents the theoretically perfect working of economic, legal, political, and religious motives: it is therefore the cause of the distinctively social phenomena of communities.

This truth discloses the boundaries of sociology and indicates the natural classification of the social sciences. For the sake of scientific completeness, and in order to meet the questions of advanced students of sociology, economics, and public law, I have in Book I. somewhat fully discussed the problems of classification and method. The general reader, and teachers who use this volume as a class-book with students who are unfamiliar with the subject, may wisely pass from Chapter I. of Book I. directly to the descriptive matter of Book II.

With many changes of expression and arrangement and some important changes of thought, I have incorporated in this work both a pamphlet on "The Theory of Sociology," which was published in July, 1894, as a supplement to Vol. V., No. I., of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, and also the substance of articles on social theory that I have from time to time contributed to periodicals.

I am under many obligations to my colleagues of the Faculty of Political Science for encouragement and assistance; to my ever kind and helpful friend Professor Simon N. Patten for valuable suggestions and especially for an opportunity to examine advance sheets of his monograph on "The Theory of Social Forces"; to Dr. Samuel M. Lindsay of the University of Pennsylvania for reading my proof-sheets; and to many of my former students, especially Miss Jane Louise Brownell, M.A., for-

merly Fellow in Political Science in Bryn Mawr College; Miss Bertha Haven Putnam, A.B.; Professor William Z. Ripley, Ph.D., of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Professor John Franklin Crowell, Litt.D., of Smith College; all of whom have rendered me important assistance in various ways.

My heaviest obligation, however, is to Miss Brownell, who has helped me at every stage of my work, from the collection of material to the verification of references and the revision of manuscript.

New York, February, 1896.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

THE publication of a third edition of this book offers an opportunity for saying a few words in further explanation of the sociological views that are here presented. I have not at any time supposed that these views would immediately be adopted. Every scholar who is competent to discuss sociological theory has himself arrived at carefully matured conclusions which he must not hastily modify or abandon. Any conceptions or conclusions of mine that differ from those of other writers must, with theirs, remain in controversy until impartial criticism sifts what is true and useful in them all from what is untrue or worthless.

The central doctrine of this book is that the consciousness of kind distinguishes social from non-social phenomena, and is the principal cause of social conduct. Four objections have been made to this thesis. They are, namely: First, that the phrase, "the consciousness of kind," is only another name for "fellow-feeling," and that, therefore, no new discovery has been made in sociology; second, that the consciousness of kind is a biological rather than a sociological fact, and that it therefore does not differentiate sociology from biology; third, that the consciousness of kind is only a metaphysical notion; and fourth, that even if the consciousness of kind is a social

fact of some sort, it is at any rate not a social force, and is therefore not a true cause of social phenomena.

To the first of these objections it is a sufficient reply to recall an article in which, a year before this volume was published, I said: "This consciousness of kind is the elementary, the generic social fact; it is sympathy, fellow-feeling in the literal as distinguished from the popular sense of the word."[1] At the same time I intimated that there was more to be discovered in fellow-feeling than previous writers had observed. If I had not believed that the facts called for a new description, I should have put into my first chapter a paragraph contending that Adam Smith was the true founder of sociology, because it was from Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments" that I derived the suggestion which presently grew into my conception of the consciousness of kind. Were I now re-writing the sketch of the development of social theory, I think that I should indeed claim for Adam Smith the first place among sociologists. The recently recovered notes of Smith's lectures on "Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms" show that Smith had sketched a complete system of social science. The system is structurally weak, however, because this great but always cautious philosopher was evidently never quite sure in his own mind whether the prime cause of social relations should be sought in that generic sympathy which is discoursed of in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," or in the advantages of mutual aid which are

[1] "Sociology and the Abstract Sciences; The Origin of the Social Feelings," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 5, March, 1895, p. 750.

described in "The Wealth of Nations." In the years that have passed since Adam Smith's death, thought has been busy with the logical organization of the social sciences, and it is possible for us now to shun some errors that he did not avoid. The most important claim, then, that I make for the sociological theory that is here presented, is that I have throughout insisted that fellow-feeling is a cause in social phenomena, and that mutual aid is an effect. It is upon this fundamental position that I find myself in disagreement with those who hold that mutual aid is primary. Rightly or wrongly, I believe that the true point of departure for sociology is found in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments" rather than in "The Wealth of Nations." The stone that the builders of political economy rejected, will, I believe, become the head of the corner for sociology.

From the first, however, I have supposed that the consciousness of kind, as I conceive it, contains some elements that were not present in Adam Smith's notion of "sympathy," and for this reason I have not thought that I ought to credit the central idea of my book to him. This consideration brings me to the three remaining objections to my thesis.

I cannot admit that the consciousness of kind is merely a biological fact. Differences and likenesses of kind are legitimately facts of biology, but a *consciousness* of difference or of likeness must be called a fact of psychology or a fact of sociology, if these sciences are recognized. So much I think will be admitted to be reasonably clear. To discriminate sociology from psychology is perhaps more difficult. All the phenomena of mind are found

in individual minds. Certain phases of the individual consciousness, however, have for many generations been known as social, and other phases have been known as anti-social, states of mind. The social states of the mind, the conduct that results from them, and the relations of individuals to one another that have been established by social conduct, may collectively be called the social phenomena of mind. In the broadest sense of the word, psychology is the science of all mental phenomena, including social conduct and relations. In a narrower sense, it is the science of the states, only, of the mind itself. In actual scientific research and exposition, psychology is restricted to the narrower field, while the conduct that is caused by social states of mind and the relations among individuals and groups of individuals that are created by habitual conduct, are handed over to sociology. To give scientific precision to this demarcation, it is necessary to define a social state of the mind, which is the phenomenon that psychology and sociology have in common. According to the argument of this volume, the simplest known or conceivable social state of the mind is a sympathetic consciousness of resemblance between the self and the not-self. Consequently, a consciousness of *difference* between the self and the not-self is a fact of psychology only; while a sympathetic consciousness of *resemblance* between the self and the not-self is both a fact of psychology and a datum of sociology. In other words, the apprehension by the self of its own image in the not-self seems to me to be the natural point of departure of sociology from psychology, if there is, indeed, a branching of the one science from the other

which it is desirable to recognize by the use of these two names.

The attempt to confound the consciousness of kind with sexual reproduction, which has here and there been made, hardly calls for serious consideration. The consciousness of kind is different from sexual instinct, and normally controls it. Living creatures do not commonly mate with individuals of other than their own species. White men do not usually marry black women; gentlemen do not habitually wed their cooks or ladies their coachmen. In fact, upon the common testimony of mankind, there is no sphere in which the consciousness of kind is on the whole more tyrannous than it is in that of the sexual relations. It permits or encourages the union of individuals who are in some degree different or unequal, but it rigorously fixes the permissible degree, and regards the union of those who differ in excess as symptomatic of degeneration.

Not more deserving of consideration is the opposite assertion that the consciousness of kind is only a metaphysical abstraction. A sufficient demonstration of its concrete reality is afforded in the proof that it is also a socializing force. I could not adopt Adam Smith's word "sympathy," or the familiar term "fellow-feeling," as a name for the primary social phenomenon, because it was necessary to recognize the element of perception. At the same time I wished to avoid any exclusion of the element of feeling, and so I could not choose the phrase "perception of kind" or "idea of kind." The consciousness of kind, then, as I conceive it, is at once perception and feeling. To deny that there is a reality correspond-

ing to this conception is to deny such tremendous social facts as race hatreds and class prejudices. But a consciousness of kind that includes feeling with perception is dynamic. It is a power, as real as that consciousness of disciplined strength which fights victorious battles, or as that consciousness of weakness and demoralization which hastens inglorious retreat. As I understand it, then, the consciousness of kind is both a differentiating mark of social phenomena and a true socializing force.

The methods of its action, however, are often extremely subtle, and are usually complicated. I am well aware that I have made only a mere beginning in the work of understanding and explaining them. The trouble is that the consciousness of kind is an ever-changing state of mind. It is not to be once and for all identified with the consciousness of species, or of race, or of class, or of similarity of moral nature, although at any given moment it may, in fact, be identical with any one of these. It is a thing of degree, and like all phenomena of degree it loses somewhat of intensity as it expands, and it becomes intense as it becomes exclusive. The shifting elements of circumstance and the varying moods of personality must be taken into account before we can tell how the consciousness of kind will form itself and will direct action in any concrete case. An artistic temperament, for example, may be strongly attracted by like temperaments in another nation, or even race, than its own. A philanthropic enthusiast may be more strongly drawn to kindred natures among the destitute, than to acquaintances of his own social rank.

Forming and acting under varying conditions, the con

sciousness of kind thus assumes protean modes which may be called the social forces. My analysis of these in Book IV. is a very slight and possibly only a provisional contribution to the study of social dynamics. It was especially to this part of sociology that I referred in the first sentence of my first preface. I hope ultimately to complete a much fuller account of social law and cause. At present I wish only to say that I think it would be helpful if we could agree to make a distinction between *socializing* forces and *social* forces. The designation, "socializing forces" I would apply to all forces that act towards social ends, — that create association, perfect social organization, and develop a social nature. They may arise outside of society or within it. Soil and climate, for example, and the appetites and passions of individuals are often socializing forces. The designation "social forces" I would apply only to forces that originate in society, but to them I would always apply it, whether they act towards social, or towards non-social, or even anti-social, ends. The attitude of the crowd towards the individual, for example, is a social force, so is public opinion, so is a popular ideal. The original and valuable writings of Professor Ward and of Professor Patten seem to me to be for the most part studies of "socializing" forces; while those of Professor Durkheim, Professor Le Bon, and Professor Ross are more strictly studies of "social" forces.

I do not at present wish to modify the account that I have given of "The Social Mind," or to substitute a new nomenclature for the terms that I have employed. As long as everybody talks about "public opinion," the

"popular conscience," the "sovereign will of the people," and so on, nobody need be deceived by such terms as "the social consciousness," "the social mind," "the social memory," and "the social will." No careful reader of these pages will suppose that I believe in a social Ego, a social sensorium, or a transcendental somewhat over and above individual minds. My view of the whole subject is made perfectly clear, I hope, when I say that by the social will I mean nothing more and nothing less than the concert of individual wills. It is desirable, however, that the nomenclature of sociology should be much enriched, and a technical use of the terms "social influence," "social ascendency," and "social control," which has been suggested by Professor Ross will, I think, be very helpful. The phrase "social control" is especially valuable because it is comprehensive. A purposive action of the social will is only one of the modes of social control, and the phrase "the social will" is therefore too specific and definite to become a good general term.

The method of this book is avowedly and without apology deductive as well as inductive. I do not admit that science can get on without speculation. It cannot, as a distinguished scientific thinker said the other day, even get on without guessing, and one of its most useful functions is to displace bad and fruitless guessing by the good guessing that ultimately leads to the demonstration of new truth. Strictly speaking, all true induction *is* guessing; it is a swift intuitive glance at a mass of facts to see if they *mean* anything; while exact scientific demonstration is a complex process of *deducing* conclusions from the induction and then testing the deduced

conclusions by the observation of more facts. This is what has been going on in the study of natural selection, for example, since Darwin's death. Darwin himself carried his own investigations through all three of the normal stages of scientific method. The one imperative obligation resting on the scientific writer is to use language that will clearly reveal to the reader how much of the study in hand is still in the guesswork stage, how much of it is in the deductive stage, and how much of it has arrived at verification. I hope that most of the readers of this volume will be able to see that much sociology is as yet nothing more than careful and suggestive guesswork; that some of it is deductive; and that a little of it, enough to encourage us to continue our researches, is verified knowledge.

NEW YORK, October, 1896.

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Book I

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL THEORY

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IDEA

WITHIN that broad grouping of animal species which is known as geographical distribution there is a minor grouping of animals into swarms, herds, or bands, and of human population into hordes, clans, tribes, and nations. These natural groupings of conscious individuals are the physical basis of social phenomena. Society, in the original meaning of the word, is companionship, converse, association, and all true social facts are psychical in their nature. But mental life in the individual is not more dependent on physical arrangements of brain and nerve cells than social intercourse and mutual effort are dependent on physical groupings of population. It is therefore in keeping with the nature of things that the word "society" means also the individuals, collectively considered, who mingle and converse, or who are united or organized for any purpose of common concern. Furthermore, from these concrete ideas we derive the abstract notion of society as the union itself, the organization, the sum of formal relations, in which associating individuals are bound together.

Combining these ideas we find that our thought of society is already somewhat complex. Yet it would remain still inadequate if we failed to take account of the interdependence of temporary and of enduring forms of association; of momentary converse and of permanent

organization; of free agreement and of obedience-compelling power; of artificially formed unions, and of those self-perpetuating communities, the tribes, cities, and nations, within which the minor phenomena of association have place.

For the purposes of political science the distinction between "natural" and "political" society has a formal importance. Bentham's definitions of these forms, in the "Fragment on Government," are perfect of their kind. "When a number of persons (whom we may style subjects)," he says, "are supposed to be in the habit of paying obedience to a person, or an assemblage of persons, of a known and certain description (whom we may call governor or governors), such persons altogether (subjects and governors) are said to be in a state of political society." "When a number of persons are supposed to be in the habit of conversing with each other, at the same time that they are not in any such habit as mentioned above, they are said to be in a state of natural society."[1] Nevertheless, the difference is one of degree only, as Bentham goes on to show. "It is with them as with light and darkness: however distinct the ideas may be that are, at first mention, suggested by those names, the things themselves have no determinate bound to separate them." Sooner or later converse develops from within itself the forms of government and of obedience. Association passes by insensible gradations into definite and permanent relations. Organization, in its turn, imparts stability and definiteness to the social group; the psychic life and its physical basis are evolved together.

Thus our idea of society becomes the thought of a vast and intricate natural phenomenon, the conception of a cosmic fact, marvellous and fascinating. We perceive that it is in a minor sense of the word, only, that society is merely converse, or merely a number of individuals

[1] Chapter I. Paragraphs X and XI.

associating for any purpose. In the larger and scientifically important sense, a society is a naturally developing group of conscious beings, in which converse passes into definite relationships that, in the course of time, are wrought into a complex and enduring organization.

Exact knowledge of society as thus conceived is among our latest acquisitions. Besides society, nothing else in nature, except the mystery of life itself, has so deeply impressed the human imagination, and with nothing else but life itself has imagination played so freely. No image has been too fantastic, no speculation too mystical, no belief too absurd, to enter into the description and philosophy of society.

The beginnings of a scientific observation and classification of social facts, and of true generalization from them, are preserved for us in the "Republic" and the "Laws" of Plato, and in the "Politics" of Aristotle, but they are beginnings only. In these works, however, society is interpreted in its integrity, as organized in the city or the state, while under the Roman Empire, during the Middle Ages and after the revival of learning, all scientific studies of social phenomena were but fragmentary. Some were economic, some were legal, some were ecclesiastical, and some were political. No one attempted to describe association and social organization in their completeness; no one tried to comprehend the concrete, vital whole. Only in the present century, have scientific methods been systematically applied to this larger task. But, once applied, in the study of society as in other departments of research, scientific methods have been richly rewarded with substantial additions to the sum of truth. Already we are in possession of a rapidly enlarging body of verified and reasoned knowledge of social relations. It is not too much to claim that we have now, at length, a sociology, which may be defined as the systematic descrip-

tion and explanation of society viewed as a whole. It is the general science of social phenomena.

The word "sociology" was first used by Auguste Comte in the "Cours de philosophie positive," as a name for a comprehensive social science, conceived as a part of a positive or verifiable philosophy, and it was Comte who first saw clearly the importance of separating the elements of such a science from irrelevant materials, ideas, and methods, and who first put together in one conception all the really necessary elements. Plato and Aristotle had neither separated politics from ethics, nor the science of politics from the art. In eighteenth-century discussions political science had been hopelessly confused with the revolutionary spirit. Neither Hobbes nor Montesquieu, nor the economists, had studied society in all its aspects, and notwithstanding the influence of Hume, to whom Comte was indebted for whatever is true in his notions of causation,[1] social explanations were still to a great extent theological and metaphysical.

It was Comte, then, who first turned a rationalistic search-light upon the confusion, who insisted that society must be viewed as indivisible and organic, and who sought, therefore, to found a science of social phenomena in their coördinated entirety,—a science positive in its methods, based on a wide observation of facts, and, as a science, separated once for all from political art and from revolutionary purpose. Accordingly, sociology, as he understood it, was to be exactly equivalent to social physics, for the task of sociology should be to discover the nature, the natural causes, and the natural laws of society, and to banish from history, politics, and economics all appeals to the metaphysical and the supernatural, as they had been banished from astronomy and from chemistry. Comte believed that by following the positive method sociology

[1] See Huxley: "Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews"; "The Scientific Aspects of Positivism."

could become in good measure a science of previsions, forecasting the course of progress.

Since Comte, sociology has been developed mainly by men who have felt the full force of an impulse that has revolutionized scientific thinking for all time to come. The evolutionist explanation of the natural world has made its way into every department of knowledge. The law of natural selection and the conception of life as a process of adjustment of the organism to its environment have become the core of the biology and the psychology of to-day. It was inevitable that the evolutionary philosophy should be extended to embrace the social phenomena of human life. The science that had traced life from protoplasm to man could not stop with explanations of his internal constitution. It must take cognizance of his manifold external relations, of the ethnical groups, of the natural societies of men, and of all the phenomena that they exhibit, and inquire whether these things also are not products of the universal evolution. Therefore, we find not only in the earlier writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer, but also in those of Darwin and Professor Haeckel, suggestions of an evolutionist account of social relations. These hints were not of themselves a sociology. For this, other factors, derived directly by induction from social phenomena, were needed. But such hints sufficed to show where some of the ground lines of the new science must lie; to reveal some of its fundamental conceptions; and to demonstrate that the sociologist must be not only historian, economist, and statistician, but biologist and psychologist as well.[1] On evolutional lines then, and through the labours of evolutionist thinkers, modern sociology has taken shape. It is an interpretation of human society in terms of natural causation. It refuses to look

[1] This does not mean that he is to construct sociology as a mosaic of biological, psychological, economical, and historical principles, a procedure that would imply a totally false conception of the science and its method.

upon humanity as outside of the cosmic process, and as a law unto itself. Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution.

It is hardly necessary to say that the most important endeavour in this direction is contained in Mr. Spencer's system of "Synthetic Philosophy." In that great work the principles of sociology are derived from principles of psychology and of biology. Social development is regarded as a super-organic evolution. It is a process in which all the organic and psychic phenomena of human life are combined in larger forms of intricate yet orderly complexity. Mr. Spencer's conception of society as organic is more definite than Comte's. In Mr. Spencer's view, society is an organism, not in mere fanciful analogy, as in the "Leviathan" of Hobbes, but really; and not morally only, but physiologically as well, because, in its constitution, there is a division of labour that extends beyond individuals to groups and organizations of individuals. There is a sustaining system, made up of industrial groups; a distributing system, made up of commercial activities; and a regulating system, made up of political and religious agencies. Mr. Spencer takes much pains to show that the ethical progress and happiness of mankind are conditioned by this functional organization of society, but he does not expand as fully as we could wish the thought of Plato, who found in the social division of labour the basis and the true type of the ethical life, and so prepared the way for a conception of society as a means to the perfection of human personality.

If Mr. Spencer fails in some degree at this point, he leaves little to be desired in the perfect definiteness with which he correlates social organization with universal physical processes. Most of the writers who have passed judgment on Mr. Spencer's sociological doctrines have

failed to inform themselves upon the underlying principles from which his conclusions have been drawn. They have sought his sociological system in those of his books that bear sociological titles, while, in fact, the basal theorems of his sociological thought are scattered throughout the second half of the volume called "First Principles," and must be put together by the reader with some labour. These theorems, taken together, are an interpretation of social changes in terms of those laws of the persistence of force, the direction and rhythm of motion, the integration of matter and the differentiation of form, that, together, make up Mr. Spencer's well-known formula of universal evolution. Society, like the material world and the living organism, undergoes integration and differentiation. It passes from the homogeneity and indefiniteness of non-organization to the heterogeneity and definiteness of organization. The ultimate cause of all these changes is the universal equilibration of energy. Comte used the term "social statics" in a merely rhetorical way, as a name for social order, and "social dynamics" as a name for progress. Mr. Spencer, more scientific, adheres to precise physical notions. Social statics is for him an account of social forces in equilibrium. Perfect equilibrium is never reached in fact, because of disturbing changes, themselves a consequence of an equilibration of energy between society and its environment. Actually, however, the static and the kinetic tendencies are themselves balanced, and the result, in society, as in the solar system and in the living body, is a moving equilibrium.

All this, obviously, is a physical explanation of social forms and metamorphoses, and Spencerian sociology in general, whether formulated by Mr. Spencer, or by other writers under the influence of his thought, is to a large extent a physical philosophy of society, notwithstanding its liberal use of biological and psychological data.

Nevertheless, such physical interpretation is not the

whole of evolutional sociology. For not only does sociology insist upon a recognition of the unity that underlies all the various phases of society that are investigated by special social sciences, it insists also that one fundamental logic underlies the objective or physical, and the subjective or volitional explanations of social phenomena. These two explanations contended with each other in economic and in political philosophy through many centuries. Beginning with the "Politics" of Aristotle, there was developed through Bodin, Montesquieu, and the physiocrats, an objective explanation in terms of race, soil, climate, heredity, and historical conditions. Through Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, there was developed a subjective interpretation in terms of human nature, utility, ethical imperatives, and ideals. But the two explanations were never brought fairly face to face. The limits of thought that never were broken over by attempts to investigate the unity of society itself, likewise were undisturbed by any really scientific attempt to arrive at unity of interpretation.[1] The nearest approach to such unity in fact was made, quite unconsciously on the part of its author, in the incomparable political writings of Burke. In systematic sociology only do we find a distinct recognition of both social volition and physical evolution and a conscious grappling with the problem of their scientific reconciliation.

As the objective interpretation, extremely crude in the philosophy of Comte, has undergone rapid development in later thought, so too has the subjective interpretation, though unfortunately not in anything like the same degree. Comte believed that scientifically trained statesmen could reorganize society and guide its progress. In Mr. Spencer's philosophy, the thought has become par-

[1] The Hegelian may take exception in the name of his master if he likes. For myself, I do not think that Hegel's knowledge of physical science was sufficient to be entitled to consideration.

tially negative. The statesman cannot make society better by his art, but he can make it indefinitely worse. In the writings of Mr. Lester F. Ward[1] the thought has again become wholly positive. Society can convert the natural process of evolution into an artificial process. It can volitionally shape its own destiny. It can become teleologically progressive. In the elaborate works also of Lilienfeld,[2] Dr. A. Schäffle,[3] and Professor Guillaume De Greef,[4] whose habits of thought are naturalistic but whose studies have included a patient examination of the claims of socialism, there is a full recognition of the social will. Finally, in the critical essay of M. Alfred Fouillée[5] there is a detailed review of the historical relations of idealism and naturalism in social philosophy, and a brilliant attempt to demonstrate the identity of physical and volitional phenomena, which M. Fouillée conceives as phases of a process of evolution by "idea forces."[6]

Upon a close examination of these comprehensive works, however, it is found that their explanation of society in terms of volition has not been worked out with that scientific precision which characterizes their explanation in terms of physical law. In fact, in the method that has been followed by some of the most eminent expounders of sociology, there is a serious error that has brought unmerited discredit upon their science. The objective explanation has systematically been carried out, after having been reduced to its lowest terms in the formula of physical evolution, but the subjective explanation has not in like manner been carried through the whole range of social phenomena. Much less has it been reduced to

[1] "Dynamic Sociology" and "The Psychic Factors of Civilization."

[2] "Gedanken über eine Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft."

[3] "Bau und Leben des socialen Körpers."

[4] "Introduction à la sociologie."

[5] "La science sociale contemporaine."

[6] Cf. Fouillée, "La Psychologie des idées forces" and "L'Évolutionnisme des idées forces."

terms of a single motive or principle, uniquely characterizing the conscious individual as a social being, and determining all his social relations in so far as they are volitionally created. Instead of an attempt to find such a principle, to deduce from it all its consequences, and to organize about it the conditioning motives or circumstances that should be taken into account, there has been a tiresome endeavour to enumerate all the motives that actuate man in his varied relations, and in the satisfaction of all his wants, as if all motives were of coördinate importance to sociology.[1] The result is not the reasoned knowledge that is science.

This method is remarkable for two reasons. It reverses the method that has been used effectively in the physical interpretation of society. It reverses the method that has been applied successfully to subjective interpretation in politics, and especially in economics. Political economy does not construct its doctrine of conduct by inventory, but by abstraction. Taking the form of a pure theory of utility, economic science has recently undergone a remarkable development. The purely abstract analysis begun by Cournot, Jevons, and Professor Leon Walras, and continued by Austrian and American economists, has shown that the phenomena of economic motive and choice, and consequently the economic activities and relations that are determined by choice, can be formulated not only scientifically, in a qualitative sense, but even mathematically. If sociology expects to attain scientific precision it must follow this significant example of the value of consistent method.

It must be admitted, then, that much important work in sociology is fairly open to the scientific criticism that has

[1] The text-book writers, Small and Vincent, nave gone even so far as to say that "Sociology in its historical and analytical department, or descriptive sociology, is the organization of all the positive knowledge of man and of society furnished by the sciences and sub-sciences now designated or included under the titles, Biology, Anthropology, Psychology, Ethnology, Demography, History, Political and Economic Science, and Ethics." "An Introduction to the Study of Society," page 62.

been urged against it by disbelievers in the possibility of a general science of society. Sociology, if judged by such work, has started out to explain society as a whole and itself has failed to attain unity of method. It has given the impression that social science is catholic but not coherent, that it can depict society in its wholeness only by enumerating its parts, and that it must necessarily fail to demonstrate the underlying unity alleged.

It might be thought that sociology could meet this criticism by surrendering all subjective explanations to other sciences, and by confining itself to an elaboration of the objective explanation. But this would be to abandon entirely the claim to the unity of social phenomena. The volitional process is obviously essential. If there is no unity here, there is none anywhere in society; apparent unity is a circumstance of the physical basis only. Plainly, a true sociology must combine the subjective and the objective interpretations. It must reduce each to its lowest terms, and must consistently trace the fundamental principles of each through all social relations. Then it must unite them, in no merely artificial way, but logically, as complementary doctrines, and show how they condition each other at every step.

That able sociologists have failed to accomplish this difficult task is no condemnation of sociology itself. Sociology can be dismissed as not a true science only if its critics can prove that it cannot be constructed in accordance with strictly scientific requirements, or that it shows no tendency to develop on strictly scientific lines. To men of scientific temper the argument from impossibility is itself impossible, and it may be dismissed without consideration. Of the present tendency of sociology to seek unity of subjective interpretation there is abundant evidence in the work of its younger students. Everywhere they are asking what characteristic it is that stamps a phenomenon as social, and so differentiates it from phenomena of every

other kind.[1] When this question is answered the sociological postulate will be disclosed. For a characteristic is always the outcome of a process. If we find the general characteristic and the fundamental process we find the principle of interpretation.

Economic thought has been responsible, in no small measure, for a popular notion that mutual aid and the division of labour are the distinguishing marks of society. In fact, however, mutual aid and the division of labour obtain among the cells and organs of vital organisms as well as among the members of society, while social intercourse is often without any trace of coöperation. Until the fallacious notion that social differentia could be found in organic or economic facts was discredited in scientific minds there could be no real progress. It has been effectually discredited now by the attempts of several able inquirers to get deeper into the problem. Professor Ludwig Gumplowicz[2] has tried to demonstrate that the true elementary social phenomena are the conflicts, amalgamations, and assimilations of heterogeneous ethnical groups. M. Novicow,[3] generalizing further, argues that social evolution is essentially a progressive modification of conflict by alliance, in the course of which conflict itself is transformed from a physical into an intellectual struggle. Professor De Greef,[4] looking at the question in a very different way, finds the distinctive social fact in contract, and measures social progress according to the displacement of coercive authority by conscious agreement. M. Gabriel Tarde,[5] in an original and fascinating study, which has made an enduring impress on both psychological and sociological thought, argues that the primordial social fact

[1] "Avant tout il convient de s'entendre sur le caractère propre et distinctif des phénomènes sociaux." Tarde, "La logique sociale," page v.

[2] "Der Rassenkampf" and "Grundriss der Sociologie."

[3] "Les luttes entre sociétés humaines."

[4] "Introduction à la sociologie."

[5] "Les lois de l'imitation" and "La logique sociale."

is imitation, a phenomenon antecedent to all mutual aid, division of labour and contract. Professor Emile Durkheim,[1] dissenting from the conclusions of M. Tarde, undertakes to prove that the characteristically social process, and therefore the ultimate social phenomenon, is a coercion of every individual mind by modes of action, thought, and feeling that are external to itself.[2]

Of all these writers, M. Tarde and Professor Durkheim unquestionably have most nearly succeeded in the attempt to discern the essential nature of social phenomena and to state the first principle of sociology. They have failed to understand each other, but nothing could be plainer to the impartial reader of both than that they are looking at different aspects of phenomena which, to say the least, are closely correlated; Professor Durkheim, at the impression which many minds make upon any one mind; M. Tarde, at the imitative response of many to the suggestive inventiveness of one. If these phenomena are not absolutely original or fundamental, in social relations, they are very nearly so. Perhaps this is more evidently true, however, of imitation. Phenomena of every kind, as M. Tarde points out,[3] can be known only because they repeat themselves. In physics we study repetition under the forms of undulation or vibration; in biology, under the form of heredity, or the transmission of life and characteristics from cell to cell; in sociology, under the form of imitation, or the transmission of impulse, feeling, and idea from individual to individual, from group to group, and from generation to generation.

[1] "De la division du travail social" and "Les règles de la méthode sociologique."

[2] Besides the works mentioned in the text, the student should consult: Vanni, "Prime linee di un programma critico di sociologia"; Mackenzie, "An Introduction to Social Philosophy"; Sales y Ferré, "Tratado de sociologia"; Simmel, "Über Sociale Differenzierung," Lestrade, "Éléments de sociologie"; and Bouglé, "Les sciences sociales en Allemagne."

[3] "Les lois de l'imitation," Chap. I.

Nevertheless, there is a decisive reason for rejecting the final generalizations of both M. Tarde and Professor Durkheim. Neither has perfectly discriminated the social fact, closely as each has approached to that achievement. Their formulas include too much. There may be an impression of one mind by another mind or by many minds which neither is nor can be developed into association. There may be imitation which has in it no germ whatever of society. The serpent impresses the startled bird with paralyzing fear, and then strikes it with swift death. The catbird imitates the call of the robin, but not with social intent or result. The elementary social fact, therefore, although, without doubt, intimately related both to impression and to imitation, is yet in itself neither imitation nor impression. We must look for it in some phenomenon that is coextensive with potential society, and with nothing else.

A sufficient account of the purpose and scientific character of sociology, originally and at the present time, has now been presented. It is a science that tries to conceive of society in its unity, and attempts to explain it in terms of cosmic cause and law. To accomplish such explanation it must work out a subjective interpretation in terms of some fact of consciousness or motive and an objective interpretation in terms of a physical process. These two interpretations must be consistent, each with the other, and must be correlated. The subjective process and the objective process must be shown to be inseparable, each being at all times conditioned by the other.[1]

Whatever may be the future progress of the physical

[1] This is not to be construed as a doctrine of philosophical dualism. The idealist may resolve the physical process into terms of thought; the materialist, if he can, may resolve the subjective process into terms of energy. For the purposes of science the two processes are modes, merely, in which reality is perceived. Psychologically they are but antithetical forms of perception. Sociology must work out its explanations in terms of both modes, or forms, and of their correlations.

sciences that have made such marvellous advancement in the century that is now closing, it is certain that in the social sciences work already recorded is but a promise of results to be achieved. Sociology has been (let us confess it) a substance of scientific things hoped for, but the realization of its logical possibilities is at least a little nearer now than it was when Mr. Spencer wrote his awakening chapter on "Our Need of It."[1] There is, indeed, every reason to believe that the time has come when its principles, accurately formulated and adequately verified, can be organized into a coherent theory.

No new principle of objective interpretation need be looked for. The physical process, in society as in the desmid or the star, is that of formal evolution through the equilibration of energy. There is much work to be done, however, before the ramifications of this process through all our human relationships will be fully understood.

But in the subjective interpretation it will be necessary, as we already know, to start from that new datum which has been sought for hitherto without success, but which can now no longer remain unperceived in the narrowing range of inquiry. Sociology must go right from this time forth, as Mr. Spencer says that humanity does in the long run, because it has tried all possible ways of going wrong. Since contract and alliance are phenomena obviously more special than association or society, and imitation and impression are phenomena obviously more general, we must look for the psychic datum, motive, or principle of society in the one phenomenon that is intermediate. Accordingly, the sociological postulate can be no other than this, namely: The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind.* By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself. Such a conscious

[1] "The Study of Sociology," Chap. I.

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ness may be an effect of impression and imitation, but it is not the only effect that they produce. It may cause contract and alliance, but it causes other things as well. It is therefore less general than impression and imitation, which are more general than association. It is more general than contract and alliance, which are less general than association. It acts on conduct in many ways, and all the conduct that we can properly call social is determined by it. In short, it fulfils the sociological requirement; it is coextensive with potential society and with nothing else.

In its widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate from the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it next marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of rules of intercourse, and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and rationally different from our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves.

Again, it is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distinguishes social conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political, or purely religious conduct; for it is precisely the consciousness of kind that, in actual life, continually interferes with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, the political, or the religious motive. The workingman who, in pursuing his economic interest, would take the best wages that he could get, joins in a strike which he does not understand, or of which he does not approve, rather than cut himself off from his fellows to be a scab among scabs. For a similar reason, the manufacturer who questions the value of protection to his own industry, yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund. The southern gentleman who believed in the cause of the Union none the less threw

in his fortunes with the confederacy if he felt himself to be, on the whole, one of the southern people and a stranger to the people of the North. The liberalizing of creeds is accomplished by the efforts of men who are no longer able to accept traditional interpretations, but who strongly desire to maintain associations which it would be painful to sever.

In a word, it is about the consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, that all other motives organize themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy. Therefore, to trace the operation of the consciousness of kind through all its social manifestations is to work out a complete subjective interpretation of society.

Such, respectively, are the objective and the subjective postulates of sociology. They correspond to ultimate modes of the external force and the internal motive, that endlessly play upon one another in social evolution. The theory of their reactions, which it is the object of sociology to formulate and to demonstrate, must necessarily remain imperfect in many points of detail for a long time to come. In broad outline, however, I venture to think, it must take some such form as this:

Social aggregations are formed at first by external conditions, such as food supply, temperature, and the contact or conflict of individuals or stocks; and because of the segregating action of all incident forces, aggregations as a rule are composed chiefly of like units. So far the process is physical.

But presently, within the aggregation, a consciousness of kind appears in like individuals and develops into association. Association, in its turn, begins to react favourably on the pleasures and on the life chances of individuals. Individuals become aware of this fact, and the volitional process begins. Thenceforward the associated individuals deliberately seek to extend and to perfect their social relations. Accordingly, individual and

social choices become important factors in social causation. Among scores of social relations and activities that are accidentally established, tried, or thought of, some appeal to consciousness as agreeable or desirable, while others arouse antagonism. The associated individuals select, endeavouring to strengthen and to perpetuate some relations, to make an end of others. In all this process, association, social choice, and social will are determined by the consciousness of kind.

Now, however, the physical process reappears. Choices have various consequences. Judged broadly, in their bearing on the vigour, the development, and the welfare of the community, choices may be ignorant, foolish, and harmful, or enlightened, wise, and beneficial. Here, then, is a new and almost limitless field for natural selection to work in. In the struggle for existence, choices, no less than individuals, may or may not survive. The choices and the resulting activities and relations that, on the whole, are baneful are terminated, perhaps through the subordination or the extinction of individuals, perhaps through the disappearance of whole societies.

Thus the cycle of social causation begins and ends in the physical process. Between beginning and completion is the volitional process of artificial selection or of conscious choosing as determined by the consciousness of kind. But this is by no means a substitution of an artificial for a natural process, as Mr. Ward contends. It is merely an enormous multiplication of the variations on which natural selection finally acts.

Accordingly, the sociologist has three main quests. First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine mere aggregation and concourse. Secondly, he must try to discover the law that governs social choices, the law, that is, of the subjective process. Thirdly, he must try to discover also the law that governs the natural selection and the survival of choices, the law, that is, of the objective process.

CHAPTER II

THE PROVINCE OF SOCIOLOGY

SUCH being the sociological idea, its perfect unfolding as a science will depend chiefly upon its inherent truth. Limiting conditions, however, are imposed by the division of labour that is already established in scientific research. A living science, holding the allegiance of practical investigators, is likely to be something less or something more than an organic part of a philosopher's system of knowledge. Comte invented the word "sociology" and built up a sociological theory, because he felt that the "philosophie positive" would be but a sorry fragment if left without a body of humanist doctrine to supplement biology. Mr. Spencer, with the results of a later and most brilliant half-century of discovery at his command, adopted the word and remoulded the doctrine, because he realized that a complete account of universal evolution must explain the origin and structure of human societies no less than the genesis of species and the integration of star-dust. But now the question must be raised, How much of this doctrine belongs properly within any one science? A social philosophy of Comtist or Spencerian dimensions ought at the outset to determine its province by defining its relation to other branches of knowledge; first to psychology, and secondly to those narrower sciences that have been dividing among themselves a patient and fruitful study of no small portion of observable social phenomena. We ought not to assume, without further analysis, that the natural interpretation of society is not a part of

systematic psychology, or that it is the function of one single, all-embracing sociology. Psychologists have made many of the most valuable sociological studies, and the particular social sciences have not been altogether devoid of the positive character.

From the point of view of the subjective interpretation of social phenomena the province of sociology is easily defined. An obvious deduction from the first principle that was stated in the preceding chapter is that sociology, while subsumed under psychology, is clearly differentiated from it. Psychology studies the genesis of the different states of consciousness. Sociology studies the phenomena that are consequent upon one state in particular, namely, the consciousness of kind. In like manner, the subordination of the special social sciences to sociology is another necessary conclusion from our first principle. The consciousness of kind undergoes integration and differentiation. Sometimes its differentiated forms conflict among themselves, or with the parent form. They then often appear as motives wholly distinct from the consciousness of kind, though in fact they are derived from it. Again, when so disguised, they may combine with motives that have originated in the direct relation of the individual to physical nature, or in his consciousness of his separation, as an individual, from kindred of every sort. The economic motive is a good example: the desire for wealth originates in physical needs, but it is powerfully reinforced by the consciousness of kind in the form of a mastering wish to emulate, to impress, or to command one's fellow-beings. These complex motives, in which the consciousness of kind appears as a real, though perhaps a disguised and modified element, are the postulates of the special social sciences, for example, political economy, and the science of the state. The special social sciences therefore are subordinate to sociology.

But these are *a priori* conclusions. Do they corre-

In the other case differentiation is real, but it stops short of extreme variation. Resemblance remains more conspicuous than unlikeness. Accordingly, we ought to say that psychological phenomena are differentiated *from* biological phenomena, but that physiological and morphological processes are differentiations *of* a biological process. In like manner we must regard sociological phenomena as differentiated *from* psychological phenomena, but emotional and rational processes we should think of as mere differentiations *of* the psychological process in general. Finally, economic, political, and cultural phenomena are only differentiations *of* social phenomena; they are not so unlike the more general phases of association that we can speak of them as differentiated *from* social phenomena.

Now when one class of phenomena is differentiated *from* another class, there will be little or no disposition to question the propriety of assigning the two classes to distinct sciences. Biology and psychology, psychology and sociology, are easily separated. But when phenomena that are mere differentiations *of* a general process are distributed among several special sciences, the question at once arises, whether anything then remains of the general science, or, if the particular sciences have been developed first, whether then a general science of all the phenomena in their unity can be constructed.

This question has given sociologists much trouble. It states the whole problem of the relation of sociology to the special social sciences, and expresses the disbelief of those who do not admit the necessity, or even the possibility, of any other sociology than that which is found in the social sciences collectively. Therefore in any attempt to determine the province of sociology it is necessary to examine this question with some care.

One group of social studies, known collectively as the political sciences, includes political economy, the philosophy of law and the theory of the state. Another group

includes archæology, comparative philology, and the comparative study of religions. Is the subject-matter of sociology other than that which is examined by these sciences? Apparently it cannot be, inasmuch as these sciences together cover nearly or quite the entire field of social phenomena. If the subject-matter then is the same, does sociology include these various departments of investigation? If it does include them, is it anything more than a collective name for the sum of the social sciences? Assuming that it is more than a collective name, does it set aside the theoretical principles of the special social sciences, or does it substitute others for them, or does it adopt and coördinate them?

According to the Spencerian conception, political economy, jurisprudence, the theory of the state, and such branches of knowledge as comparative philology, are differentiated parts of sociology, and are therefore sufficiently distinct though coördinated sciences. In the view of Comte they are not true sciences at all. Comte's disparaging notion of political economy is too well known to need quotation. The life of society he conceived as indivisible; he believed that legitimate science could study it only as a whole. It is the Spencerian view that one encounters in modern discussions, accompanied, however, more often than not, by plain intimations that only the subdivisions of sociology — the specialized social sciences — are of much concern to serious scholars. Regarded as a whole of which the parts are definitely organized sciences that already are grown to such magnitude that the best equipped student can hardly hope to master any one of them in a lifetime, sociology is too vast a subject for practical purposes. One might as well apply to it at once Schopenhauer's epigrammatic description of history — "certainly rational knowledge, but not a science."

Yet the word "sociology" will not be put by. A writer no sooner resolves that he will not take all social knowl-

edge for his province than he tries to find a substance for the disembodied name. So it turns out that every social philosopher creates a sociology in the image of his professional specialty. To the economist sociology is a penumbral political economy — a scientific outer darkness — for inconvenient problems and obstinate facts that will not live peaceably with well-bred formulas. To the alienist and the criminal anthropologist it is a social pathology. To the ethnologist it is that subdivision of his own science which supplements the account of racial traits by a description of social organization. To the comparative mythologist and the student of folklore it is an account of the evolution of culture.

A living science is not created in this way. It grows from a distinct nucleus. It becomes every decade more clearly individuated. It makes for itself a plainly circumscribed field. Its problems are unmistakably different from those of any other department of investigation.

These limitations seem to have been perceived more clearly by some other people than by the sociologists themselves. A suggestive disagreement of opinion between two eminent educators in the University of Brussels has put the matter in the strongest possible light. Professor Guillaume De Greef, in the preface to the "Première Partie" of his "Introduction à la sociologie," written in 1886, made an earnest plea for the creation of chairs and even faculties of sociology, which should impart instruction in accordance with a certain classification of social phenomena that Professor De Greef makes very important in his system. This classification is one of the all-comprehending schemes. It includes everything, from the husbanding of corn and wine to electioneering contests in the Institute of France. At the opening of the university, on October 15, 1888, the rector, M. Van Der Rest, took "La Sociologie" as the theme of his discourse, which was a critical examination of the philosophical relations of the

social sciences. Sociology was characterized as "a badly determined science, that presents no well-defined line of demarcation from the moral and political sciences, and that touches the most varied questions, all of which, nevertheless, are comprised within the limits of the studies of existing chairs."

The rector's own view of sociology was summed up as follows: "I adopt the word but simply as the name of a concept of the human mind. Accepting the meaning that has been given to it, I would mean by it the science of social phenomena. But I would add that if we go beyond the domain of abstraction, the science so defined can be understood in one of two ways only: either it will have for its object a study of men united in society, including all the facts that it can find in social life, disengaging their laws and connecting the social present with the past and the future — in which case the science cannot be constructed, and will be nothing more than the *ensemble* of our political and moral sciences bound together in a chimerical unity; or it will consist only of general views on social progress, and then it seems to me impossible to make out the line of demarcation that separates sociology from a much older science, the philosophy of history."[1]

We need not accept M. Van der Rest's conclusion that a concrete sociology must be either the *ensemble* of the moral and political sciences or a philosophy of history, but we may agree with him that if it is an indefinite, badly determined thing, it cannot be a university study. Sociology cannot be taught as an organon of the social sciences, or yet as a mass of unrelated facts left over from other researches.

Clear thinking and a discriminating use of terms will create order from the confusion and will establish sociology in its rightful place, where it can no longer encroach on the territory of other sciences or be crowded out of the

[1] "La sociologie."

spond to distinctions that have become established in scientific experience? The claim of sociology to rank as the master science of society is important enough to justify a patient consideration of this question. We will test these *a priori* conclusions, therefore, by looking at the actual differentiation of scientific thought at the present time.[1]

It is necessary first to examine the relations of sociology to psychology. Whatever else a society is, it is a phenomenon of conscious association, and the field of sociology is certainly not marked out until we know whether in the nature of things as interpreted by psychology, there is any reason for classifying the psychological phenomena of society apart from those of individuals.

According to accepted views, biology and psychology are studies of life as influenced by environment. In biology we study an adjustment of the physical changes within an organism to external relations that are comparatively few, simple, and constant. In psychology we study an adjustment of the conscious changes within an organism to external relations of wide extent in time and space and of the utmost complexity.[2]

Among the conscious changes those that enter into the

[1] The recent interest in this question is reflected in numerous contributions to periodicals. Cf. Worms, "La sociologie et l'économie politique," *Revue International de Sociologie*, Vol. II., No. 6, June, 1894, and "La sociologie et le droit," same review, Vol. III., No. 1, January, 1895; Small, Patten, and others, "The Relation of Sociology to Economics," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol. X., No. 3, Supplement, March, 1895; Powers, "Terminology and the Sociological Conference," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 5, March, 1895; Bentley, "The Units of Investigation in the Social Sciences," same journal, Vol. V., No. 6, May, 1895; and Ward, "The Place of Sociology among Sciences," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I., No. 1, July, 1895.

[2] Spencer, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. I., Part. I., Chap VII., § 54, and Part III., Chaps. IV. and V.

phenomena which we call social are obviously more complex and special than some others. For a time possibly, at the very dawning of consciousness, the environment of sentiency is physical and organic, but not social. At all times, certainly, a great part of the outward world to which consciousness must adapt itself, is physical and organic, rather than social. Moreover, while social conditions are complex and variable, physical conditions are comparatively simple and are constant; they are also universal. It is through contact with them that permanent associations of ideas are established, and that the mind arrives at notions of cosmic law.

Psychology, then, whether or not it includes a study of social relations, is undoubtedly concerned with the genesis and with the combinations of the elements of mind. How sensations are blended in perception; how perceptions are combined in imagination and in thought; how thought, feeling, and impulse are coördinated in that marvellous composite, the individual self-consciousness, these problems at least are for psychology to state, and, if it can, to solve.

Nevertheless, the phenomena of conscious association do not end with the appearance of the individual mind. They are then only engendered. Individual minds, as units, become the elements of that vastly more extensive and intricate association of animal with animal, of man with man, and of group with group which creates the varied relations of social life.

The natural demarcation here revealed is quite as obvious as that which separates psychological from biological phenomena. If it is legitimate to make psychology a science distinct from biology, it is no less legitimate to mark off sociology from psychology, by restricting psychology to a study of the phenomena of the individual mind and by assigning to sociology the investigation of the more special and complex phenomena of minds in association with one another. If this is done, psychology, dealing with

phenomena that are on the whole more general than the phenomena of society, must rank as a science precedent to sociology. Psychology is the science of the association of ideas. Sociology is the science of the association of minds.

This differentiation is made more definite by certain further considerations. The association of minds creates external forms and relations. Minds react on their own modes of association, and association, thus characterized by definite modes and conforming to organized forms, becomes for each individual a social environment, a medium lying between consciousness and external nature. Thenceforth the direct adaptation or adjustment of mental life is to society. Adjustment to the wider world beyond is indirect, through society. Society becomes, in short, a special and most important part of the "outward states." More rapidly and thoroughly than any other part of the environment it produces favourable "inward states" in the associated individuals. It creates sympathy and the moral nature, the capacity for pleasure, and the power of abstract thought and of speech. In their turn these powers of mind react upon society. Conscious that their social relations are their most important means of defence, succour, pleasure, and development, individuals endeavour to conserve and to perfect them. Society becomes a consciously cherished thing, and to an increasing extent a product of conscious planning. Out of thoughts and feelings grow those forms of association that are deliberate or of purpose. More and more, therefore, social activities and relations come to be outward products of inward states.

Here is found the deeper reason for the broad distinction which, for purposes of scientific investigation, and therefore for a classification of the sciences, should be observed between a study of conscious phenomena that is properly psychological and one that is properly sociological. In

both biology and psychology phenomena within the organism are regarded as effects, and relations in the environment as causes. On turning to social phenomena it is discovered that activities within the organism have become conspicuous as causes. They have created a wonderful structure of external relationships, and have even modified the fauna and the flora and the surface of the earth within their environment. The progressive adjustment between internal and external relations has become reciprocal.

Psychology thus is the science of the elements and of the genesis of mental phenomena, as determined by physical and organic relations. Sociology is the science of mental phenomena in their higher complications and reactions, and of the constructive evolution of a social medium, through which the adaptations of life and its environment become reciprocal.

In their philosophical relations, therefore, biology, psychology, and sociology are sciences corresponding to a gradation of phenomena. Biology is the general science of life, but it surrenders to psychology a study of the wider adjustments of the organism in space and time, through the evolution of mind. Psychology is the general science of mind, but, in its turn, it surrenders to sociology a study of the interaction of minds, and of the reciprocal adjustments of life and its environment through the evolution of a social medium.

In examining now the relations of sociology to the special social sciences, it is necessary to observe a distinction that is rather refined, and which, for that reason perhaps, is too often overlooked. Phenomena may be described as differentiated *from* phenomena that are more general than themselves, or as differentiations *of* more general phenomena. In the one case variation goes so far that the unlikeness of the derived phenomena to the parent phenomena becomes more conspicuous than the resemblance.

associate. As much as this political economy admits by its procedure, for in all its further discussions — of co-operation and the division of labour, of combination and competition, of exchange and distribution — political economy assumes at once the whole social *milieu*. The benefits flowing from the economic forms of association react favourably on association in general, but they are not the first cause of association. They could not have come into existence before association itself was established.

In like manner, in political science as it has been written, there have been, since Aristotle's day, long prefatory accounts of the origins of human communities, usually mere elaborations of the patriarchal theory. But the greatest step forward that political science has made in recent years, has been its discovery that its province is not coextensive with the investigation of society, and that the lines of demarcation can be definitely drawn. In his important work on "Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law," Professor Burgess has not only sharply distinguished the government from the state, but for the first time in political philosophy he has clearly distinguished the state as it is organized in the constitution from the state behind the constitution. "A population speaking a common language and having ideas as to the fundamental principles of rights and wrongs, and resident upon a territory separated by high mountain ranges or broad bodies of water, or by climatic differences, from other territory,"[1] such is the state behind the constitution. It "presents us with the natural basis of a true and permanent political establishment." It is "the womb of constitutions and of revolutions." Political science studies the state within the constitution and shows how it expresses its will in acts of government. It inquires how this state within the constitution is created and moulded by the state behind the

[1] "The American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I., No. 1, March, 1886, p. 13.

constitution, but beyond this political science proper does not go. The state behind the constitution, or natural society as we should otherwise call it, is for politics, as for political economy, a datum. The detailed study of its origins and evolution falls within the province of sociology.

Passing now to subjective interpretations, or the explanation of social phenomena in terms of motive, it appears that here, also, the special social sciences assume certain premises, which, on further examination, are found to be sociological truths, neither simple nor elementary.

We will begin, as before, with political economy. Economists have lately gained new insight into the nature of the premises of economic theory. They are no longer content to describe their science as concerned merely with material wealth. The psychological nomenclature that is finding its way so rapidly into current economic discussion is significant chiefly of new points of view and of an important change of perspective. The purely mental phenomena of wants and satisfactions are brought into the foreground. The production of material commodities is no longer placed first in exposition; for it is seen that certain laws of economic choice govern the whole process of production and exchange. Many years ago President Walker described consumption as the dynamics of wealth, and we are now just beginning to understand how much the term may mean. Desires, it is evident, are the motive forces of the economic world. According to their varying numbers, intensities, and forms are shaped the outward activities of men and the myriad phases of industry and trade.

But what, then, of the origin of desires themselves? What conditions have determined their evolution from those crude, primitive wants of a purely animal existence, that the savage shares with baboons and wild gorillas, up to those of the "good gorilla," as Renan has called him, the man of gentle instincts and cultivated tastes? These are interesting questions, but the economist does not answer

them. He takes desires as he finds them, save in so far as he finds it necessary, in working out the dynamic phases of his subject, to observe the reactions of economic life itself upon desire. But in general, desires are for him the premises of an intricate deductive scheme, and nothing more.

How is it with the theory of the state? Political science, too, finds its premises in facts of human nature. The motive forces of political life, as of economic life, are the desires of men, but they are no longer merely individual desires, and they are no longer desires for satisfactions that must come for the most part in material forms. They are desires massed and generalized; desires felt simultaneously and continuously by thousands, or even by millions of men, who are by them simultaneously moved to concerted action. They are desires of what we may call the social mind in distinction from the individual mind, and they are chiefly for such ideal things as national power and renown, or conditions of liberty and peace. Transmuted into will, they become the phenomenon of sovereignty — the obedience-compelling power of the state. Political science describes these gigantic forces of the social mind and studies their action; but it concerns itself with their genesis no more than political economy concerns itself with the genesis of individual desires. It simply assumes for every nation a national character, and is content that the political constitution of the state can be scientifically deduced from the character assumed. It takes the fact of sovereignty and builds upon it, and does not speculate how sovereignty came to be, as did Hobbes and Locke and Rousseau. It starts exactly where Aristotle started, with the dictum that man is a political animal.

There is a group of sciences that are concerned with various special phases of the social mind. The foundation of these is comparative philology, which Renan, writing in 1848 of the future of science, with clear vision and with happy phrase described as "the *exact* science of things

intellectual." On this science have been built the sciences of comparative mythology and comparative religion, and materials are even now accumulating for a science of comparative art. Of all these sciences, as of economics and politics, the postulates, not always distinctly stated but always implied, are human desires; for aspiration is but desire blending itself with belief and rising into the ideal. Unlike economics and politics, however, these sciences of culture do to some extent deal directly with the genesis of the mental states that are their postulates. But they study them only in very special phases and with a narrowly specific purpose. Upon the broad question of the evolution and ultimate causation of desires in general they have no occasion to enter.

Thus it would appear that there is no one of the recognized social sciences which investigates the origin of the motives that are assumed to account for all that occurs in the social life of mankind. Yet the origin is not hidden. The causation has not been analyzed because it has been thought that so simple a thing could not need an explanation. Association, comradeship, and coöperation have converted the wild gorilla into the good gorilla and have brought it to pass that, in the quaint words of Bacon, "there is in man's nature a secret inclination and motion towards love of others, which if it be not spent on some one or a few, doth naturally spend itself towards many, and maketh men become humane and charitable, as it is seen sometimes in friars." Or to drop the figure — for it is nothing more, since the human progenitor must have been a social and companionable sort of ape, and no gorilla at all — it has been the rubbing together of crude natures that has made fine natures. It has been the well-nigh infinite multiplication of sensations, experiences, and suggestions, due to the prolonged and intimate gregariousness of human hordes in those favourable environments where population could become relatively dense,

field by them. Sociology is a general social science, but a general science is not necessarily a group of sciences. No doubt the word will continue to be used as a short term for the social sciences taken collectively. Again, in a synthetic philosophy like Mr. Spencer's it can always be legitimately used to denote an explanation of social evolution in broad outlines of abstract truth. But the sociology of the working sociologist, and of the university, will be a definite and concrete body of knowledge that can be presented in the class-room and be worked over in the seminarium. These last conditions are crucial for the existence of the science; for when sociology has as distinct a place in the working programme of the university as has political economy or psychology, its scientific claims will be beyond cavil. But that will be only when educated men have learned to conceive of sociology as distinctly and concretely as they conceive of other sciences. The word must instantly call to mind a particular class of phenomena and a definite group of coördinated problems.

That such distinct, concrete conceptions will, in time, displace the vague notions now afloat, is beyond reasonable doubt. By methods of sound logic, and with guidance from the history of other sciences, sociology can be definitely marked off from the special social sciences. Whenever phenomena belonging to a single class, and therefore properly the subject-matter of a single science, are so numerous and so complicated that no one investigator can hope to become acquainted with them all, they will be divided among many particular sciences; yet there may be a general science of the phenomena in their entirety, as a class, on one condition, namely, the general science must deal with attributes of the class that are common to all of its sub-classes and not with the particular attributes of any sub-class. Such common attributes are elementary. General principles are fundamental. A general science, therefore, is a science of elements and first principles.

General biology affords the most helpful analogy. The word "biology," first used by Lamarck', was adopted by Comte, who proposed "sociology," and he used both the one and the other for like reasons. He believed in a science of life as a whole, as in a science of society as a whole. But "biology," like "sociology," had no vogue until Mr. Spencer took it up. All but the youngest of our scientific men can remember when it began to creep into college and university catalogues. ¶ Neither the word nor the idea obtained recognition without a struggle. What was there in general biology, the objectors said, that was not already taught as "natural history," or as botany and zoölogy or as anatomy and physiology? The reply of the biologists was, that the essential phenomena of life — cellular structure, nutrition and waste, growth and reproduction, adaptation to environment, and natural selection — are common to animal and plant; that structure and function are unintelligible apart from each other; and that the student will therefore get a false or distorted view of his subject unless he is made to see the phenomena of life in their unity as well as in their special phases. He should study botany and zoölogy, of course, but he should first be grounded in general biology, the science of the essential and universal phenomena of life under all its varied forms. This view of the matter won its way by mere inherent truthfulness and good sense. General biology became a working laboratory science, conceived and pursued as a groundwork of more special biological sciences.

The question about sociology is precisely similar and must be answered in the same way. What aspect of social life is not already brought under scrutiny in one or more of the economic, political, or historical courses already provided in well-organized universities? Perhaps none; yet, as the sociologist sees it, this is not the real question. Is society after all a whole? Is social activity continuous? Are there certain essential facts, causes, or laws in society,

which are common to communities of all kinds, at all times, and which underlie and explain the more special social forms? If we must answer "yes," then these universal truths should be taught. To teach ethnology, the philosophy of history, political economy, and the theory of the state, to men who have not learned these first principles of sociology, is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion. An analysis, then, of the general characteristics of social phenomena and a formulation of the general laws of social evolution should be made the basis of special study in all departments of social science.

Therefore while sociology in the broadest sense of the word is the comprehensive science of society, coextensive with the entire field of the special social sciences, in a narrower sense, and for purposes of university study and of general exposition, it may be defined as the science of social elements and first principles. Because of the limitations of the intellectual life, and therefore of all true scientific work, the general sociologist must be content to study exhaustively the elementary and generic phenomena of his vast subject, and to leave the endless forms of combination to other investigators. Moreover, sociology is the inclusive and coördinating, only as it is the fundamental, social science. So far from being merely the sum of the social sciences, it is rather their common basis. Its far-reaching principles are the postulates of special sciences, and as such they coördinate the whole body of social generalizations and bind them together in a large scientific whole. Not concerned with every aspect and grouping of social phenomena, fundamental sociology is intermediate between the organic sciences on the one hand, and the political and historical sciences on the other hand. Sociology is differentiated from psychology, as psychology is differentiated from biology. The special social sciences are differentiations of sociology.

Yet, after all, have we not overlooked an important possibility? May it not be that the fundamental social science, granting that there must be one, is no new and unfamiliar knowledge, but is simply one of those older sciences that we have called special; politics, for example, or political economy?

The fundamental social science, whatever it is, must not take for granted social data that admit of scientific explanation by reduction to simpler terms. If either political economy or the theory of the state, or any other social science, builds on assumptions that are, demonstrably, deductions from more elementary social truths, such a science has no claim to logical precedence.* Whether its interpretations are objective or subjective in form, the ultimate social science must reduce its subject-matter to primary social phenomena, or to incipient social motives.

So far, then, as the objective interpretation is concerned, neither political economy nor politics can pretend that it goes back to primary facts in the social category.

Both frankly assume without explanation the phenomena of human association.

It is true that systematic works on political economy have usually included discussions of the Malthusian theory of population, and of the hypothesis of the diminishing returns of land, and have thereby put forward partial explanations of the interaction between population and its environment. But these discussions are not logically parts of political economy proper. Many of the text writers have long since recognized that they are merely data, the constructive study of which, on their own merits, must ultimately fall within sociology. Further, even if we include them in political economy, they do not account for association. Population may increase at any possible rate, and, on account of the unequal returns from land, the increase may be distributed unevenly, sparsely here and densely there, but people do not therefore necessarily

that has created the human mind and filled it with the innumerable wants that impel to ceaseless effort and to tireless questioning of the unknown. That as "iron sharpeneth iron so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend," was the earliest and the greatest discovery ever made in sociology.

If the foregoing account is logical and true to fact, no one of the particular social sciences is the primary science of society, either as an objective or as a subjective explanation.

Remaining to be considered, however, is the question whether this conclusion holds good of the relation of sociology to certain abstract sciences, which, though not properly social sciences, are nevertheless concerned with phenomena that are not only psychical but also social in character.

Sociology is not an abstract science,[1] though like every other true science it employs abstraction; both in discriminating the phenomena that it studies from phenomena of other kinds, and in following out the operations of the particular force or motive by which the phenomena of this given class are, in fact, differentiated from phenomena of other classes. An abstract science is one that thus traces the extension or the working of a single principle, force, or motive, through all its manifestations, and attempts nothing more. A concrete science is one that does all that an abstract science does, and then studies the ways in which the manifestations of the particular force or motive that it has discovered are combined with the manifestations of other forces or motives to create the

[1] "There is no abstract science of sociology which leaves out of sight the special complications arising from the interaction of concrete, actually existing communities. Any such abstract science is a mere figment of the imagination. . . ." Fiske, "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy," Vol. I., p. 213.

concrete groupings of the real world. And such, exactly, is the scope of sociology. Like biology and psychology it occupies itself with concrete groupings of phenomena. The first principles of social evolution that it formulates are concrete truths.[1] It is a descriptive, historical, and explanatory account of society, regarded as a thoroughly concrete reality. In like manner, the special social sciences also, as differentiations of sociology, are concrete studies.

Admitting, then, that political economy as usually defined and taught is a special social science, which is logically a differentiation of sociology, an objector may claim that we now have an abstract or pure economics, which consists of theories of subjective utility, subjective cost, and subjective value, and which, so far from being a part or branch of sociology, is logically antecedent to all branches.

From another quarter may come a similar objection, that abstract ethics, also, regarded as a science of ideal right, is an analysis of social motives, and is therefore antecedent to sociology.

These objections not only are inherently plausible, but they may seem to derive support also from the conceded necessity of subjective interpretations in the social sciences generally. If choices are not capricious, are they not governed by considerations of utility and of right? Are not subjective utility and ideas of right therefore logically and developmentally antecedent to society? Though there were no society, would not the individual who lived in contact with nature enjoy subjective utility every time he ate his food or lay in the sun? Might he not have notions of right and wrong? If so, are not the theories of utility and of right precedent to sociology?

Without entering here upon a discussion of any theory

[1] Cf. "Sociology and the Abstract Sciences," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 5, March, 1895, p. 95.

of choices, it may be conceded at once that the mere beginnings of utility are psychical phenomena antecedent to society, and, at the same time, it must be maintained that all subsequent developments of utility presuppose social relations.

In the modern theory of subjective utility, as formulated by Bentham, Gossen, Jevons, and later economists, a distinction is made between initial and marginal[1] utility. By initial utility is meant the satisfaction due to the consumption of a first necessary portion, or increment, of any useful commodity, as, for example, the thirsty man's enjoyment of a single glass of water. By marginal utility is meant the satisfaction derived from a final increment; as from the last half glass of water offered, or from a final mouthful of food. This distinction has been regarded hitherto as purely analytical and abstract, and as valuable for economic theory only. In fact it is concrete and historical, and it is of the first importance for sociology.

No argument is necessary to demonstrate that a rudimentary consciousness of initial utilities precedes social relations. Living creatures capable of recognizing each other are capable of distinguishing food objects, and are therefore capable of recognizing initial utilities.[2]

With marginal utility the case is wholly different. In proof of this assertion it is necessary first to expose a fallacy of definition. There has been in recent economic writing a tendency to use the term "subjective utility" as if it meant merely pleasurable feeling, however slight, and nothing whatever in addition to pleasure, or in combination with it. If this usage is not abandoned, economists will find themselves involved in hopeless difficulties. The

[1] Jevons uses the word "final." "Marginal" is the better American usage.

[2] Cf. "Utility, Economics, and Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 3, November, 1894; cf. also Patten, "The Beginning of Utility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 2, September, 1894.

pleasure element in subjective utility must be more than infinitesimal. It must be of sufficient magnitude to have importance for consciousness, and to admit of appreciable distinctions of more or less. Besides, pleasure is not the only element. Subjective utility is pleasurable feeling combined with knowledge that the pleasure is consequent upon an external condition or thing, namely, an objective utility.[1] *It is pleasure attributed to an external cause.* Unless this intellectual factor is included, the whole theory of utility, which has been constructed with so much labour, falls into ruin, for the theory has always tacitly assumed, as its minor premise, that varying states of feeling are accompanied by some measure of knowledge of the qualitative or quantitative changes in external conditions to which the states of feeling respond. Initial utility, accordingly, is an appreciable pleasure consciously attributed to an external cause, and marginal utility is an appreciable pleasure consciously attributed to a final or marginal activity of an external cause. In addition to a difference between initial and final feeling, merely as feeling, marginal utility involves a perception of a difference between an initial and a marginal action of the same cause.

If this criticism is accepted, the question about marginal utility and social evolution, becomes as clear as the question about the precedence of initial utility. If it is certain that an incipient consciousness of initial utility is antecedent to association it is not less certain that association is antecedent to a discrimination of marginal from initial causation, and therefore to a consciousness of marginal utility. Three different reasons support this assertion. First, merely as a matter of fact the psychical beginnings of association are observed in the lowest known forms of

[1] For the technical distinction between subjective and objective utility, see "The Concepts of Utility, Value, and Cost," read at the Washington Meeting of the American Economic Association, in December, 1890. *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol. VI., Nos. 1 and 2, January and March, 1891.

animal life,[1] while perceptions of marginal utility are discovered only in more highly developed organisms. Second, and in partial explanation of these facts of observation, we know that association multiplies conscious experiences; if it has played the part in mental evolution that is attributed to it in the present volume, it has been a chief agent in differentiating and increasing pleasurable feeling, and in developing the intelligence that perceives the relation between states of feeling and their objective conditions. Third, and in further explanation of the observed facts, the survival of animal life in the struggle for existence depends on high fertility, or on the mutual aid inherent in association, or on mental resources. High fertility is antagonistic to mental evolution and mental evolution is at the expense of high fertility.[2] It was association that ensured survival during the transition from survival by a physiological process to survival by a psychological process. Without association conscious life could never have arrived at that stage of development in which a perception of marginal utilities is possible.

Subjective cost is a mental phenomenon yet more complex than marginal utility, since it involves the perception of a double set of relations, namely, first those constituting subjective utility itself, and second, a further relation existing between subjective utility and effort, or between subjective utility and some other mode of pain.

More complex yet is subjective value. Even more absurd than the identification of subjective utility with mere pleasure has been the identification of subjective value with pleasure.

[1] See especially Alfred Binet, "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," and C. Lloyd Morgan, "Introduction to Comparative Psychology."

[2] Spencer, "The Principles of Biology," Part VI., and Brownell, "The Significance of a Decreasing Birth-Rate," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 1, July, 1894.

Only the briefest account of the subject can be given here.[1] When a variety of objective utilities has been attained, and a range of choice is thereby presented to each individual consciousness, a comparison of utilities with one another, and with their respective costs, is made. Utilities and costs are pictured in imagination before they are actually experienced, and different judgments are formed about them. The effective utilities, in particular, are estimated. By these are meant the relative capability of like kinds and quantities of commodity to afford satisfaction under varying conditions of want. The effective utility of a ton of coal is not the same in July as in February. For comparative estimates of effective utilities we use the term "valuations." Subjective value is an estimate of an effective utility that is still prospective. It results from a comparison of different utilities and different costs. Obviously these mental operations are not simple and they are not performed by creatures, if such there are, that can be said to owe nothing to association. Subjective value appears only in a society.

The whole conclusion, therefore, in the simplest terms, is that, from the beginning, pleasurable and painful feelings within and association without have been inseparably bound together. Initial utility is antecedent to association, but association is antecedent to marginal utility, to subjective cost, and to subjective value. The subjective interpretation of society in terms of these latter conceptions cannot possibly take us all the way back to social foundations in analysis, or to social beginnings in time. Social evolution is antecedent to all refinements of utility. When, in the course of social evolution, the refinements appear, they enter as new factors into the process, and

[1] For the technical presentation of this subject, see "The Idea and Definition of Value," read before the American Economic Association at Chautauqua, August, 1892. *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol. VIII., No. 1, January, 1893.

are thenceforth antecedent to many of the higher or more complicated social developments. These latter, therefore, but these only, admit of the subjective interpretation in terms of any utilitarian theory that goes beyond an account of the merest initial utility.

Returning now to the previous question, it is plain, I think, that in so far as we can determine the matter by an examination of the sequences of phenomena, an entire science of abstract economics cannot be regarded as precedent to sociology as a whole.

By a similar argument, it could be shown that abstract ethics does not precede sociology as a whole, although portions of sociology presuppose ethical theories. Whether or not notions of right and wrong begin to dawn in consciousness before any social relations are established, their development is a result of association.

Even if such relations of sequence among social, economic, and ethical phenomena could not be shown in detail, there is a psychological sequence in the evolution of knowledge which cannot be ignored, and which conclusively determines the relation of abstract economics and abstract ethics to a concrete sociology. The abstract sciences have not been developed in an intellectual vacuum. All abstract science presupposes concrete science.

That this perfectly obvious and familiar truth has been ignored by the writers who have put economics and ethics before sociology, must be accounted for by a perplexing difficulty which it seems to present. If all abstract principles presuppose the descriptive and historical matter of concrete science, and if the explanatory parts of concrete science presuppose abstract principles, is not the unity of every science destroyed? If parts of economics presuppose parts of sociology, and parts of sociology presuppose parts of economics, have we either economics or sociology? If mathematical principles were derived from

astronomy, and if astronomy now presupposes mathematics, have astronomy and mathematics ever been sciences at all?

Confusion like this frequently results from attempts to state complex relations as if they were severely simple. That is what has been done in the classifications of the sciences.

Comte's well-known classification arranges all the sciences in a serial order. Comte believed that knowledge advances from the general to the special, from the abstract to the concrete, and from the simple to the complex. Accordingly, he put mathematics first in his hierarchy, and then, in the order named, astronomy, terrestrial physics (including chemistry), biology (including physiological psychology), and sociology.

Mr. Spencer demonstrated, with a wealth of historical illustration, that no merely linear arrangement can represent the evolution of scientific knowledge.[1] The newer sciences are continually making contributions to the older ones. New knowledge enlarges all knowledge, and this fact is not less true of the relation of concrete knowledge to abstract knowledge, than it is of the relation of concrete to concrete, or of abstract to abstract knowledge. The mind moves from the concrete to the abstract, but it then applies its generalizations to the further interpretation of concrete phenomena.

Mr. Spencer exposed also the fallacy that lurks in the word "general," which betrayed Comte into confounding the general with the abstract. "Abstractness means *detachment from* the incidents of particular cases; generality means *manifestation in* numerous cases."[2] It will occur to the reader that the word "special," also, has more

[1] "The Classification of the Sciences"; "Recent Discussions," p. 63; "Essays," Vol. II., p. 74.

[2] "The Classification of the Sciences," pp. 7, 8; "Recent Discussions," pp. 66–70; "Essays," Vol. II., pp. 78–81.

than one meaning. The special may be the particular case; it may be the unusual or the exceptional, or it may be the minute or the detailed. Obviously, therefore, when we are told that knowledge advances from the general to the special, it is well to ask, from what general to what special. We certainly do not know the abstract before we know the concrete. We do not know manifestation in numerous cases before we know the manifestation in a particular case. Yet we do know the usual before we know the unusual, and we acquire a knowledge of outlines before we become familiar with details.

On the whole, knowledge does advance from acquaintance with relatively simple phenomena that are everywhere to be observed, to an understanding of complicated phenomena that are comparatively infrequent. But in this advance concrete description and abstract formulation play back and forth, one upon the other. Therefore we cannot put abstract and concrete sciences into the same series.

Mr. Spencer, accordingly, makes one distinct group of abstract sciences, a second group of abstract-concrete sciences, and a third group of concrete sciences.* The abstract sciences, of logic and mathematics, are accounts of relations. The abstract-concrete sciences, of molar physics, molecular physics, and chemistry, are accounts of properties. The concrete sciences, of astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, and sociology, are accounts of aggregates.

The unnecessary and confusing part of this classification is the abstract-concrete group. An account of properties or forces is as truly an abstract science as is an account of relations. In all science we must do one of two things. We may fix attention on an actual group of relations, properties, and forces, together constituting a perfectly concrete aggregate, and try to understand and explain it as a whole. This is the method of concrete science. Or

we may fix attention on a relation, a property, or a force, or on a class of relations, properties, or forces, and follow it through all the aggregates in which it is found. This is the method of abstract science. But neither method can be completely carried out without help from the other. Abstraction presupposes concrete knowledge, but the abstraction when attained must be turned back upon concrete knowledge as an organizing principle before we can perfectly understand any aggregate.


It is therefore more accurate to class a science as abstract if it is concerned chiefly with relations, properties, or forces and only incidentally with aggregates. Molar and molecular physics are abstract sciences. A science is concrete if its chief aim is to explain aggregates as such, though it deals also with properties and forces and uses the methods of abstraction. Chemistry is on the whole a concrete science.[1]

Thus, instead of one linear series of sciences there are two distinct orders of sciences, so related to each other as to make cross classifications in every part of the intricate domain of knowledge.[2]

Arranging the concrete sciences in order along the line *oy*, and the abstract sciences along the line *ox*, perpendicular to *oy*, we get their true relations as follows:

[1] The concrete sciences are synthetic in aim though they may and do freely employ analytical, that is inductive, methods. The abstract sciences are analytical in aim though they may and do employ synthetic, that is deductive, methods. It is not enough to say that a science is "analytical," or "synthetical," without adding "in aim," or "in method." The two things are not the same.

[2] Cf. "The Relation of Sociology to other Scientific Studies," *Journal of Social Science*, November, 1894; "Sociology and the Abstract Sciences," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 5, March, 1895; and "The Relation of Sociology to Economics," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol X., No. 3, Supplement, March, 1895.



The concrete or y sciences are descriptive, historical, inductive. The abstract or x sciences are hypothetical and deductive. The concrete become explanatory only because they are traversed, or crossed, by the abstract sciences; that is to say, in so far as they get beyond mere description and history they do so by appealing to the hypothetical principles of the "pure" or deductive sciences. On the other hand, the abstract sciences are not abstractions from nothing. They are abstractions from concrete phenomena. That is to say, they presuppose and

take for granted the descriptive and historical matter of the concrete sciences.

Accordingly, the field of the physical sciences is *opqr*. On their descriptive side they are known as chemistry, astronomy, geology, and biology, according to their concrete subject-matter. On their explanatory side all are mathematical and physical. The fields of psychology and sociology are *psut* and *svwu*. On their descriptive side they presuppose the concrete physical sciences. On their explanatory side they are mathematical, physical, economical, and ethical; every one of the abstract sciences contributes principles of interpretation to concrete psychology and to concrete sociology.

Historically, too, the concrete sciences are older than the abstract. The abstract have been derived from the concrete, *ox* has rotated from *oy*. Thus, mathematics and physics have been derived by abstraction from the concrete natural sciences. Pure economics and abstract ethics have been derived from the concrete psychical and social sciences; economics, for example, from concrete political economy.[1]

If the foregoing scheme of classification is scientific it is entirely right and consistent to say that the theories of pure economics and of pure ethics presuppose some portions of descriptive sociology, while the explanatory portions of sociology assume and appeal to the theories of pure economics and of ideal right. Referring to the figure, the reader will observe a section of the field of soci-

[1] It will be observed that the names of all the concrete sciences end in *y*, and those of all the abstract sciences in *cs*. This is neither a result of conscious agreement, nor a mere accident. It is a consequence of those subtle associations of ideas that so often influence us without our being aware of the process at the time. Another curious fact, to which Professor Hadley has called my attention, is that in names which have nearly disappeared from use, we have a record of the transition stage in which the differentiation of the abstract from the concrete sciences was taking place. Thus physics was natural philosophy; biology was natural history; economics was political economy; ethics was moral philosophy

ology $s'v'w'u'$, which is also a portion of the field of pure economics. From the concrete studies of this section have been derived our abstract economic theories. Such theories having been formulated, we can go on to the profitable study of a further section of the sociological field, namely, the ethical, $u'w'w''u''$. In this field there are two subsciences corresponding respectively to subjective and to objective studies. The subjective study is ethics proper. The objective study is the analytical jurisprudence the foundations of which were laid by Austin. Ultimately, no doubt, we may see the development of an abstract politics, or pure theory of social forces, in the field $u''w''wu$.[1]

Thus by its own unity of aim and method clearly distinguished from these abstract sciences, yet traversing them all and traversed by them; restricting itself to inquiries more general and more fundamental than those which constitute the special social sciences, yet projecting and differentiating itself in them; differentiated from psychology, yet carrying principles of psychology into the interpretation of the most complicated phenomena that present themselves to human observation, sociology has a province as definite as that of any science, and yet is in perfect continuity with every science in the indivisible whole of knowledge. In the scientific division of labour the sociologist has a distinct work, but his success in doing it will be indifferent unless he maintains an intelligent coöperation with fellow-workers in other fields, and unless they keep touch with him.

[1] Since this page was written Professor Patten has published "The Theory of Social Forces."

CHAPTER III

THE METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY

THE definite limitation of its field having been recognized as one necessary measure towards making sociology a workable science, attention must next be given to its methods of investigation. The field that has been marked out is one in which a plurality of causes has full play. The general phenomena of society which the sociologist has to classify and explain have been described as elementary, but, like many of the elementary phenomena of matter, they are not to be analyzed and understood without the aid of the most effectual methods that science has at her command.

In explaining the purpose of sociology and in defining its province, it has already been necessary to speak of its methods, because validity of method is essential to the constitution of a would-be science, and because methods, no less than subject-matter, differentiate the sciences from one another. Such incidental discussion, however, is not sufficient. The subject has received by no means the treatment that its preëminent importance demands. Before sociology can be freed from those injurious misconceptions of its character that have hindered its development hitherto, its methods must be critically reconsidered and must, if possible, be formulated in some systematic way.

Mill's chapters on the logic of the moral sciences[1] will remain the solid foundation of sociological method, but there is reason to fear that they have not been mastered

[1] "A System of Logic," Book VI.

by all sociological theorists, and late developments of scientific thought have made some slight additions necessary.[1] We must therefore look at the methods of sociology from two points of view: first, from that of their validity and proper use as means of discovery and explanation; second, from that of their agreement or disagreement with the conditions and the habits that now prevail in scientific and in educational work.

In describing sociology as a concrete science, descriptive, historical, and explanatory, I have in a general way characterized its method. A concrete science uses all methods; observation and retrospection, classification and generalization, induction and deduction. Neglect of any is a destruction of certitude that makes the most diligent employment of the others a waste of effort. The wearisome contention that has been going on for a generation over the relative values of historical and *a priori* methods in the social sciences deserves to be included in Hood's list of the negations that would make up a world in which there should be "no other side the way." History without deductive illumination is chaos. Deduction without verification is undoubtedly the very "light that never was, on sea or land."

Nevertheless, when a combination of methods is employed in any science, some one method will attain preeminence, and some general order of precedence will be found to be more suitable than another, and will be itself an important part of the whole method of the science. Either it will be more profitable to proceed as a rule by direct deduction and then to seek for the verification from specific experience, or it will be more advantageous to proceed as a rule by generalization from observed facts, and then to verify by deduction from a principle and by the further agreement with experience. Either of these

[1] Cf. Schiattarella, "Note e problemi di filosofia contemporanea," essay on "La riforma del metodo in sociologia."

combinations is what Mill calls the deductive form of the inductive method, or what Jevons calls the complete method of a true science.

Experience has fully demonstrated that deduction confirmed by observation, or the direct deductive method, is the legitimate general order in the abstract sciences, and that generalization interpreted by deduction, or the indirect deductive method of Mill's nomenclature, is the feasible and fruitful general order in the concrete sciences. As a concrete science, therefore, sociology, like biology and psychology, must usually begin its investigations with observation and must conclude them with deductive confirmation and interpretation. In its results, description and history will keep well in advance of explanation.

There could be no worse mistake, however, than to construe this broad rule with a narrow precision. The only strict rule is that in every investigation in any science whatsoever the deduction and the appeal to experience must be combined, in the one order or in the other. Beyond observance of this principle, and a due regard to the order that is most advantageous on the whole, there is no requirement, and variability of plan is essential. At any given step it may be easier to proceed by indirect deduction in an abstract science or by direct deduction in a concrete science; in either we may reason now from cause to effect, now from effect to cause.[1] Moreover, each process itself, when analyzed, is found to involve the other. Not only have we no need to exclude deduction from the preliminary processes of observation, or to exclude observation from the final interpretation, but we could not so exclude if we would. Even in the every-day affairs

[1] Professor Patten's able discussion of methods in his paper on "The Failure of Biologic Sociology," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. IV., No. 6, May, 1894, does not sufficiently recognize, I think, the exceeding complexity of the methods of concrete science. The biologist does not always reason from effect to cause, neither does the historian.

of life we habitually guide observation by simple deductions from familiar principles. In the more skilful use of such deductions by the man of scientific training is the whole difference between his systematic observation and the haphazard observation of the blunderer. Reversing the process, the abstract thinker finds his way through labyrinths of deductive reasoning by means of hints that crowd upon his mind through observation. He cannot cut himself off entirely from the world of perception, and the great difference between the clear, penetrating mind that "thinks straight" and the fantastic mind of the visionary is one of sensitiveness to the guidance of observation. Our general rule of sociological method, therefore, can mean no more than this, that on the whole those investigations in which deduction plays the less important part should precede those in which it plays the more important part.

This rule will not only keep description and history in advance of explanation, it will also keep description in advance of history, — the study of the coexistences in social phenomena in advance of the study of the sequences. Retrospection, the method of history, is a more complex process than observation, the method of description. It presupposes observation and makes a freer use of deduction. It may be described as a critical imagination of things vanished, which is based upon a systematic observation of those signs,[1] marks, or effects of former things, that have endured into present time. It involves three processes, none of which is simple. First, there must be the critical observation of the existing signs or effects. Second, there must be an extensive observation of phenomena in which similar signs or effects are now associated with existing things or with causes still in operation. Third, there

[1] The word "signs" is used here with the broadest meaning, and should be understood to cover documentary records, as well as paleontological and archæological remains.

must be a valid inference that such signs and such things signified such effects and such causes were associated in exactly similar ways in times past. Historians have seldom analyzed their methods. Few of them, it is to be feared, have seen that retrospection is a method with distinctive canons. Even the modern study of historical criticism has hardly gone beyond an examination of the first stage of research, that, namely, of the critical observation of existing signs or effects of former things. Little attention has been given to the reasoning processes that must supplement all such preliminary work.

Does the general rule of method in sociology suggest for the strictly theoretical division of the science also, an order of procedure corresponding to the expedient order in the descriptive and historical parts? Is it necessary or expedient to explain the coexistences in social phenomena before we try to explain the sequences, as it is to keep description in advance of history? An affirmative answer seems to be given by the traditional division of sociology into social statics and social dynamics. But Comte, as we have seen, used these terms loosely. His social statics was little more than description; his social dynamics little more than history. Not having made any systematic attempt to separate the analysis of social causes from the description and the history of effects, he naturally accomplished little in the study of the causes. If, then, sound method prescribes acquaintance with concrete effects before we attempt the abstract analysis of causes, our present question is not the one already answered, namely, whether we should describe the existing activities and relations in society before we try to determine in what concrete order social changes have followed one another in the past; it is the question whether we must formulate the abstract laws of equilibrium among social forces before we undertake to formulate the abstract laws according to which given

compositions of social forces of given magnitudes must necessarily produce given social changes and rates of change.

The statement of this question is enough to show how absurdly the terms "social statics" and "social dynamics" have been used by those who have confounded social statics with a mere descriptive analysis of social order, and social dynamics with a mere history of progress. Technical physical terms have no rational meaning in sociology except in connection with the physical interpretation of social causation.

But even as thus restricted the terms now under consideration are used in ways that reveal profound misconceptions. One of the most subtle and misleading errors, that of confounding social statics with an account of social structure, and social dynamics with an account of social function, has been effectively exposed by Mr. Ward.[1] Functions are normally in equilibrium; and function, as long as it undergoes no change, is a statical phenomenon. In fact, it is the equilibrium of functions that maintains stability of structure. Only when function is modified and structure is transformed have we non-statical phenomena in the organic world or in society. In biology both anatomy and physiology are statical studies so long as they investigate structures and functions as unchanging. They go beyond statics only when they take up the phenomena of variation and transformation.

This criticism brings us naturally to another. The further use of "dynamics," in a sense that has been abandoned in physics, is without excuse. Why do we so naturally conceive of function as a dynamic phenomenon? Because, in truth, it is dynamic, though it is also static, and is not kinetic. We know force only through motion, or resistance to motion. We know laws of equilibrium

[1] "Static and Dynamic Sociology," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X., No. 2, June, 1895.

only through laws of motion. The whole study of forces, therefore, whether they are conceived as in equilibrium or as producing motion, is in the last analysis a study of motion. It is all, therefore, a dynamics — not less in the secondary than in the primary meaning of the word. Dynamics is coextensive with physics, and is not a division of it. It includes all studies of motion and of resistance. Statics is a division of dynamics and is not coördinate with it. It includes all studies of motions and resistances that do not change in rate or in direction, and all studies therefore of function and structure conceived as unchanging. The other division of dynamics is kinetics. It includes all studies of motions that change in rate or in direction, or in both, and all studies, therefore, of modifications, variations, and transmutations of function and of structure. If, then, we must have two divisions of social physics, we should designate them by terms that have some justification in sense and usage. We should not say "social dynamics" when we mean social kinetics.[1]

But do we need so to divide the subject? Let us look a little further into it. Kinetics includes three classes of problems. In one class we study the changing motion of a particle. In another class we study the changing motion of a rigid body. In the third class we study the changing motions of a variable system of n particles

[1] The discrimination is not merely formal and pedantic. Failure to make it will betray the most cautious thinker into serious error. Thus Mr. Ward, in the article referred to above, having shown with beautiful clearness that function is a static phenomenon, immediately throws his whole argument into confusion by setting feeling over against function, not only in the sense in which the subjective is opposed to the objective, but in a very different sense, by identifying feeling exclusively with what he calls dynamic, in distinction from what we all agree in calling static, phenomena. Now feeling is unquestionably dynamic: it is power. But it may have either static or kinetic manifestations. It is the motive power in normal social function, no less than in the transforming movements of revolution and reform.

or bodies that are subject to the action of both internal and external forces. The solar system, for example, is a variable system, in which the mutual attractions of sun, planets, and satellites are the internal forces, and upon which the attractions of the fixed stars act as external forces.[1] Obviously the kinetic problems of this class are the most complex that can be conceived.

A variable system in which the internal forces remain in approximate equilibrium, but upon which external forces act so as to prevent the internal equilibrium from becoming perfect, is called a moving equilibrium. All aggregates of matter that are undergoing evolution, as Mr. Spencer has demonstrated, are moving equilibria.[2] The most complex examples are found in living organisms and in societies. The physical interpretation of an organism or of a society is the solution of a problem in the static-kinetics of a variable system.

When all the implications of this rather formidable truth are seen it will be apparent that we have a mixed answer to our question.

The impossibility of handling the more complicated problems of dynamics before their elements have been mastered compels the investigator to study many cases of unchanging motion before he attempts to explain the cases of changing motion. The statical principles of any concrete science, of astronomy or geology, of biology or sociology, are always developed in advance of its kinetic principles, as description is developed in advance of history. It was not accidental that the static biology of Cuvier preceded the kinetic biology of Lamarck and Darwin.

But certainly it is not necessary on this account to group all the statical investigations of an evolutional science systematically by themselves, to follow them out

[1] Ziwet, "Theoretical Mechanics," Part III., p. 210.

[2] "First Principles," Part II.

with systematic completeness before we take up any of the kinetic problems, and then, in like manner, to group together all the kinetic investigations, so leaving the theory of the subject, in its final form, sharply divided into two parts. To do that would be to relinquish all hope of solving the most characteristic problems of the science; problems that are not static merely, or kinetic merely, but that are static-kinetic. It would be to stop short of any real attempt to explain the one equilibrium that we most desire to understand, because it is the final resultant of all forces, that, namely, between the static tendencies on the one hand and the kinetic tendencies on the other hand. For convenience, or of necessity, we may at any stage of investigation separate the static from the kinetic inquiry. But such a separation is only a means to an end. The end in view is the synthesis of static and kinetic principles. Until that synthesis is achieved the dynamic theory of any concrete science of evolutionary phenomena is incomplete.

The conclusion of the whole matter, therefore, seems to be that while investigations of the static phenomena of society must, to some extent, precede studies of the kinetic phenomena, somewhat as observation must go before retrospection, sociological theory in its final form cannot be divided into social statics and social kinetics.

Such being the rules that should govern the partition and the order of research in sociology, there remain to be examined certain rules that should govern the various processes of investigation. It is not necessary to dwell further on observation and retrospection,[1] but critical attention must be given to the methods of classification, of generalization, and of deduction.

Much laborious work in sociology has been unfruitful

[1] Excellent suggestions on the scientific observation of social facts will be found in Durkheim's "Les règles de la méthode sociologique."

because of mistaken classifications, which have repeated errors that were made in natural history before the doctrine of descent with variation had corrected the earlier conceptions of natural groups. Though that doctrine has become a vital part of scientific thought, nearly all sociological classifications at some point ignore the principle of development. Two different forms of this error may be noticed.

Many social habits are common to animals and to men. Many customs, laws, and institutions are common to savage tribes and to civil communities. Some sociological categories must be broad enough to include the cannibal and the diner out. Some must be broad enough to include the wise man and the ant. Yet it is notorious that philology and ethnology have had to contend for years against the fatal facility with which generalizations are made from too inclusive classifications. Historical political economy has been a protest against classifications that have merged the manor in the market, — the rent customary in the rent Ricardian. Historical jurisprudence has rendered its great service to scholarship through its criticism of groupings like that which confounded the legal liability of the Englishman or of the American, which is grounded in social utility, with the legal liability of the Saxon or of the early Roman, which was grounded in simple devices to modify the direct modes of vengeance.[1] In all such illegitimate groupings the error consists in a failure to separate those characteristics of a phenomenon that appear only at a certain stage of evolution from characteristics that are found at all stages. Liability, for example, is found in all communities, and all modes of liability may be put into one class for comparison with phenomena equally general; but the earlier and the later liability must not be merged for comparison with phenomena that appear only with liability in its later forms. The family, in a certain sense

[1] See Holmes, "The Common Law," Chap. I.

of the word, is found in animal as in human societies. Animal and human families in one class may be compared with other phenomena that are common to animal and human communities. If, however, family organization is compared with phenomena that did not appear until after family relationships had been reflected upon, and had been instituted and sanctioned by the social mind, human families must be classed apart. The clan is found in tribal societies that trace descent through mother names, and in a modified form it persists in societies that have begun to trace descent through father names. In studying the universal phases of tribal organization, both types of the clan may be put into one class; in studying certain special phases that are of late origin, the clan that is associated with relationships through women must be excluded.

The second form in which the characteristic error of sociological classifications appears is that of the overworked biological analogy. Mr. Spencer's essay on "The Social Organism"[1] made a lasting impression. At present the greater part of sociological literature is written in terms of a biological nomenclature. In Mr. Spencer's own atlases of "Descriptive Sociology" the largest and most systematic collection of sociological material that has been made is arranged under the heads "structural" and "functional," and is sub-grouped as "operative" and "regulative." The example has been influential. All the classifications in Dr. Schäffle's voluminous treatise are biological in name and in idea. In works of less importance such terms as "social anatomy," "social physiology," and "social organs" are constantly met with.

Sociology will have to discard this classification and nomenclature as chemistry and physiology had to discard impossible groupings and terminologies a generation ago. The analysis is too general. In certain fundamental things social organization is like vital organization, but in all

[1] *Westminster Review*, New Series, Vol. XVII., January, 1860.

that justifies Mr. Spencer's own phrase of "super-organic evolution" it is peculiar, and not to be classed with organisms. Were this not true, sociology would be a mere division of biology. Every distinct science must have its own classifications and its own names for phenomena which however they resemble the phenomena studied by other sciences, are yet different, and are the subject matter of a separate science only because they are different.

The errors of classification that spring from a neglect of development can be avoided in sociology, as they are in biology, by attention to a single distinguishing mark of evolution, namely, differentiation. Differentiation is the reconciling phase between those two aspects of natural groups that Whewell called respectively "type" and "definition." Whewell's account of types and Mill's account of kinds were foreshadowings of that complete view of nature which Mr. Spencer was the first to attain, in his conception of a universal evolution through integration and differentiation. That is a true class in which objects or individuals are grouped by some characteristic that normal differentiation has produced. Unless this genetic test is applied, temporary or adventitious relations of phenomena are constantly mistaken for permanent and essential relations. It affords also the only sure guidance in classifications by series. The chronological sequences of history may be obscure, the "higher" and the "lower" in the scale of life may be uncertain as long as structures and functions are compared without any reference to genetic relationships, but if degrees of differentiation can be ascertained, the natural order of subordination in the series is revealed. Only by consistently following the rule that classification should be by degree of differentiation can the investigator in sociology hope to distinguish primary from secondary characteristics, or to mark off the general from the special. If he wishes, for example, to divide a population into social classes, or if he wishes to group societies by types,

he will succeed only if he fixes his attention upon the marks and the processes of social differentiation.

Empirical generalizations in sociology may be made by two methods, namely, the comparative and the historical. Both are forms of what is known in logic as the method of concomitant variations. Each is a systematic observation of coherences among phenomena, combined with an inference that phenomena that persist together, or that change together, are cause and effect, or are effects of a common cause. The comparative method is an observation of identical coherences of social phenomena in two or more places, or in two or more populations; for example, the coherence of ancestor worship with paternal authority, wherever ancestor worship is found, or the coherence of polygamy with the social inferiority of women, wherever polygamy is found. The historical method is an observation of coherences through periods of time. The comparative and the historical methods may become precise when they can become statistical. Statistical investigation is a systematic observation of coherences among social phenomena that admit of numerical statement;[1] the coherences, for example, of marriage rates with the prices of bread, or of emigration from Europe with business prosperity in the United States. As all coherences are distributed in space or in time, the statistical method cannot be regarded as a third distinct form of the method of concomitant variations. It is but a quantitative form of the comparative and the historical methods.

The validity of any method of empirical generalization in sociology depends on the number of the facts that can be compared, and on the legitimacy of a preliminary elimination of possibly coöperating causes. When, for instance, Mill demonstrated that neither by the method of agreement, nor by the method of difference, nor even

[1] Cf. Mayo-Smith, "Statistics and Sociology," p. 9.

by the method of variations, could it be proved that free trade is a controlling cause of prosperity, he imagined a comparison made between only two countries alike in no circumstance, or different in no circumstance, or varying together in no circumstance but commercial policy.[1] This hypothetical case is not fairly typical, however, of comparative or of historical studies. It fails absolutely to represent statistical studies. Prosperity is the effect of a bewildering plurality of causes, but among them not half a dozen are commensurate with any great, sudden, or long-continued increase of material well-being. All others may be eliminated at the outset. Then, if it is found that in scores of instances quantitative variations in some one of the supposed causes cohere with variations in prosperity, while variations in the remaining causes cohere but infrequently with the same variations in prosperity, there is a strong presumption that the chief cause has been discovered. The degree of probability may be ascertained by comparing the number of coherences found with the number to be expected according to the logic of chance.

Empirical generalizations, however, even when made according to the most cautious statistical methods, and from abundant statistical data, are only probabilities. They must be verified by deduction, and among the methods of sociology that are yet imperfect are those by which deductions from subjective premises are compared with generalizations from observed facts.

For years a radically unscientific procedure has been followed in the social sciences. After resolving human nature into abstractions, the attempt has been made to verify, *singly* and *severally*, all manner of deductions therefrom by a direct comparison with statistics and history, as if these concretes could correspond to deductive truths until the latter had been combined in complex wholes.

[1] "A System of Logic," Book VI., Chap. VII.

Of a score of illustrations that might be cited, we may take the once familiar economic dogma, that if a labourer does not pursue his interest, his interest will none the less pursue him, against which President Walker effectively marshalled the facts of industrial life.[1] As a single abstract truth, that mischievous dogma was a valid scientific conclusion. It is legitimate to separate an abstract principle of human nature from all other abstract principles and to draw logical deductions from it. The fallacy entered when the single truth was taken for a synthesis of truths; when the part was made to do duty for the whole. If besides the premise that a man may be conceived abstractly as a competitor with his fellow-man for economic advantage, economists had made use of the further premise that he may also be conceived abstractly as an instinctive combiner with his fellow-man for maintaining class power and privilege, they would have drawn not only the deduction that employers will compete with one another in building up industries, but the further deduction that, as far as possible, they will refrain from competing with one another in buying labour, and will never fail to stand together in shaping the social and the legal conditions under which labourers must sell their work. The two deductions put together would have made a resultant truth not unlike the generalizations of history and statistics.

The deductive process in sociology must therefore be developed into a constructive method which may be called the method of psychological synthesis.[2] The sociologist must train himself to habits of constant attention to the psychical possibilities of the great world of human struggle. He must be ever on the watch for neglected or unperceived factors in human action, as the chemist is for unknown elements. Using the faculty of scientific

[1] "The Wages Question."

[2] "Sociology as a University Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VI., No. 4, December, 1891, p. 652.

imagination, he must then ideally put all factors together, and must try to discover the conditions and the laws of their combination. Not until he has done this is he ready to bring deduction to the test of comparison with historical facts and statistical tabulations.

We are come finally to the question whether the methods of sociology can be perfected under the actual conditions of scientific research and of university education. The successful pursuit of any modern science requires a broad range of intellectual sympathies. In some degree every science is dependent on many other sciences for both concepts and methods. Its devotees cannot be wholly unfamiliar with the instruments or with the modes of reasoning that are employed by their co-workers in other fields. All this is preëminently true of sociology. Yet the specializing tendencies of modern research are due quite as much to mental limitations as to the distinctness of the inquiries pursued. Possibly this subjective fact, rather than any objective feature, is more and more determining the classification of the sciences for university purposes. Subjects are grouped together in schools or departments if they call for the same or similar aptitudes, and if they are pursued by the same or similar methods. If, then, a science is allied by its subject-matter to knowledge of one kind while by its method it is allied to knowledge of a different kind, its chances of winning the favour of students are small. If sociology is of interest chiefly to students of the economic, the legal, and the political sciences, but must be developed by methods with which they are little familiar, any hope of establishing it securely as a university study may as well be abandoned.

There is nothing in these considerations that should disturb either the student or the teacher of sociology. If the methods of sociology present peculiar difficulties to students of political economy or of politics, or of any histori-

cal science, the methods of that science, and not those of sociology, are grievously at fault. The students of every social science should be perfectly familiar with the comparative and the historical methods in their qualitative and in their statistical forms. So much all will admit. The only question that can be raised relates to the deductive process. Can students of the economic, the legal, and the political sciences be expected to master the method of psychological synthesis?

In answer it is not too much to say that there is no other one thing in the whole range of their possible studies which it is so imperatively necessary that they should master. The young man who is to-day entering upon the special researches of economics or of public law will soon discover that he must become a critical observer of the psychological assumptions underlying those sciences if he expects to keep pace with their future progress. The prolonged controversy over the respective merits of deductive and historical methods is approaching an issue that no one foresaw. Those who, a dozen or fifteen years ago, expected almost unlimited additions to knowledge from the application of historical researches to political and economic questions, have been disappointed not a little. There is an unmistakable reaction toward the freer employment of analysis and deduction. But these methods can never again be used in quite the old way. The basis of investigation must be widened; innumerable facts that were once ignored must be taken into account. It is significant that while this conclusion has slowly been forced upon scientific attention, a new life has been infused into theoretical studies by men who have approached them from the psychological side. Unquestionably to their reëxamination of the psychological premises of political economy we owe the fresh impulse that is making itself felt in every department of economic speculation. Much the same thing may be affirmed of comparative jurisprudence. But here again

the new view is not like the old. Historical researches having shown the essential relativity of all systems of right, the inquiry is now concerning the subjective or psychological basis of the historical systems. No doubt the doctrine that will emerge will be unlike eighteenth century notions, but, be that as it may, the conviction is gaining ground that the further progress of the sciences of public law will depend greatly on a more thorough study of the psychology of law. And public law and economics are but two of many sciences that are grounded in social psychology. They all build on psychological assumptions, and the assumptions are either true or imaginary. The phantasms and symbols of an imaginary psychology have ruled the social sciences long enough. Whether we like it or not, we must now throw over our illusions and must learn to substitute for them the truths of a rational sociology.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY

It remains to inquire what investigations or problems the student will have to take up as work of detail in sociology if he accepts that conception of the science which has been explained and defended in the foregoing pages. It is not enough that the boundaries of sociology can be marked, and that the territory so defined can be explored by exact methods. Sociology is but a nominal science unless its domain includes a multitude of logically related subjects of research. It is necessary, therefore, to know whether the social elements and first principles are numerous and intellectually fruitful, and to know also whether would-be inquiries about them are definite and manageable.

A brief survey of the problems of sociology in the order of their systematic arrangement will be a sufficient proof that the content of sociology is inexhaustible and real. Sociological problems are definite, and they admit of endless subdivision.

The order of their arrangement has been indicated in the conclusion that description and history must precede theory; that it is impossible to study with profit the general questions of law and cause until much has been learned about the concrete particular aspects of things and of events; that before we generalize we must be familiar with the constituent elements of our phenomena, with the manner of their action, with the forms that they assume in combination, and with the conditions under which the combinations occur.

Observing, then, the scientific order of arrangement that was explained in the preceding chapter, we must class the problems of sociology as primary and secondary. In the first class belong the problems of social structure and growth. In the second class belong the problems of social process, law, and cause. The primary problems, in turn, fall into two groups. One group consists of problems of description. The elements and the present organization of society are their subject matter. The other group consists of problems of history, namely, problems of the origins of society, and of its evolution to the present time.

In the first or descriptive group of primary sociological problems there are first of all problems of the social population. These include problems (1) of aggregation, (2) of association and of coöperation or mutual aid, (3) of the social character of the population, and (4) of the classes into which population is differentiated.

Social relations presuppose an actual coming together of the individual elements of a social aggregate. So far from being a simple phenomenon, however, concourse depends strictly upon definite conditions, and it assumes a variety of forms, which are related to each other in curious and intimate ways that are of great significance for social theory. Concourse develops into intercourse, the chief aspect of which is the interchange of thought and feeling by means of language, and the chief consequences of which are the evolution of a consciousness of kind and of a nature that is intellectually and morally fitted for social life. The development is unequally accomplished in different individuals, and, accordingly, a number of classes appear in the population. These are, first, the social, — the positive and constructive element in society, — characterized by a high development of the consciousness of kind; second, the non-social, in which the consciousness of kind is as yet imperfect but not degener-

ate, — a class from which the other social classes are differentiated; third, the pseudo-social or pauper, in which the consciousness of kind has become degenerate; and fourth, the anti-social or criminal, in which the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction.

Thus the influences that determine the aggregation and the intermingling of population elements, their coöperative activities, their mutual modification, their resulting characteristics and differentiation, present many interesting points for study, both on their own account and in their relation to other features of the social system.

Next in order come problems of the social consciousness, or social mind, including its content of common memories and ideas, its aspirations and its volition. The sociologist will not follow these into the details of archæology, mythology, and comparative religion, or into those of law and institutions, in all of which the social mind finds expression. But he should understand the constitution, the genesis, and the activity of the social mind itself.

Following these, finally, are problems of the social structure. In the various attempts that have been made to organize a systematic sociology, the problems of social structure, or organization, have received the larger share of attention. There are several ambitious works that deal with little else Much, however, remains to be done, not only in minute examination, but also in the broader grouping of parts. By social structure many writers mean the ethnographic grouping of population into tribes and nations. Others understand by the term the organization of state and church and the innumerable minor associations for particular purposes. Both views are right, within their range, but neither is complete. Social structure includes both ethnographic grouping and purposive organization. What, then, is the essential difference between them; and does the one in any way limit or determine the other?

The answer is that the social mind, acting upon spontaneous, unconscious, or accidental combinations of individuals, evolves two different forms of alliance, which may be called, respectively, the social composition and the social constitution.

By social composition is to be understood a combination of small groups into larger aggregates, when each of the smaller groups is so far complete as a social organism that, if necessary, it could lead an independent life for a time. Family, clan, tribe, and folk, or family, township, commonwealth, and nation, are names that stand both for elements and for stages in social composition.

By social constitution, on the other hand, is to be understood a differentiation of the social aggregate into mutually dependent classes or organizations, among which there is a division of labour.

The social composition is like the composition of living cells into a large organism. The social constitution is like the differentiation of an organism into specialized tissues and organs.

Aggregation, association, and resulting changes in the character and activity of the population are the first stage in a synthesis of social phenomena. The evolution of the social mind is the second stage. The third stage is the social composition; the fourth is the social constitution.

Roughly corresponding to the four stages of social synthesis are four stages of sequence. These present the second, or historical, group of the primary problems of sociology.

Most of the forms of concourse, intercourse, and mutual aid have their beginnings in animal society. By means of them animal life is developed into its various types. Therefore this stage of association may be characterized as zoögenic, and the study of it, as it is exhibited in animal communities, is zoögenic sociology.

The development of the social mind and the genesis of a varied tradition mark the transition from animal to man. It is the anthropogenic stage of association, and its investigation is anthropogenic sociology.

The social mind acting on spontaneous forms of alliance creates the family, the clan, and the tribe, and later the folk and the nation. This is the ethnogenic stage of social evolution, and to it corresponds ethnogenic sociology.

Finally, the integration of tribes and petty nations into territorial and national states makes possible a magnificent development of the social constitution, a wonderful extension of the division of labour, a high utilization of resources, a rapid multiplication of population, and a democratic evolution of the social mind. This, then, is the demogenic stage of social evolution, and the study of it is demogenic sociology.[1]

A survey of social growth and structure will probably have convinced the investigator of the reality of social evolution. But whether evolution is in any sense a progress, and, if it is, then in what sense, are questions still unanswered. The idea of progress must be examined. What does the word "progress" legitimately mean? If it has a rational meaning, are there any facts and generalizations, disclosed by sociology, that correspond to the idea? If this question, again, is affirmatively answered, the

[1] Dr. John Franklin Crowell, recently Fellow in Sociology in Columbia College, in a forthcoming work on "Sociological Types" uses the admirable terms "sociality," "propriety," "institutionality," and "ideality" to designate qualities of the social nature, and stages of social development. I should add the term "conventionality," and the five terms would then correspond to stages of historical evolution. Through Zoögenic association there is an evolution of sociality. In Anthropogenic association there is an evolution of conventionality, *i.e.* of the use of conventional signs in communication, and of conventional ceremonies in social intercourse. In Ethnogenic association there is an evolution of propriety, *i.e.* of the habits, usages, and properties that seem to be appropriate to a particular society. In Demogenic association there is an evolution of institutionality and of ideality.

sociologist must inquire into the nature of progress. He must attempt to resolve the conception into simpler terms and so far to explain it.

Such are the primary sociological problems, which must be thoroughly worked over before the more complex, and in every respect more difficult, secondary problems can be mastered. Yet the secondary problems have often been attacked first, without the slightest perception of their scientific relation to the sort of inquiries that have just been outlined. They are more momentous, and involve a relatively large proportion of pure theory. On this account, perhaps, they have received the larger share of attention.

First among them are the exceedingly intricate problems of the interplay of social forces and motives. If in studying the historical evolution of society we are led to affirm the reality of progress, we shall inevitably find that it involves some continuing change in the magnitude of the psychical factor in society, and in its relative importance, as compared with the physical factor, in the forward social movement. It will be necessary, therefore, to examine next the social process. By this term we must be careful to understand not the successive phases of social growth or evolution, which present primary problems of sociology, but rather the process itself, from which the phases of evolution result. The problems of social process are concerned with successive steps in the interaction of physical forces and conscious motives. They involve a study of the nature and forms of volitional association, and of its reactions upon social character and activity.

Obviously, the sociologist has come by this time to problems of law and cause. The question over which controversy has so long been waged, whether there are any true natural, or cosmic, laws of social phenomena, cannot be avoided, but it is not to be answered by mere argument about the possibility or the impossibility of law in the

world of conscious human affairs. It must be met by showing that social laws exist, and by demonstrating their operation. The law of social choices which, I have claimed, is one of the sociologist's main quests, must be formulated, and likewise the law of social survivals. When this has been done, attention must be given to the further questions of cause. Since volition has been recognized as one cause of social changes, the sociologist must decide whether he should regard it as an independent, original cause, or as secondary and derived. He must decide, further, whether or not he finds in physical nature the sole original source of social energy.

Not until all these studies have been made, will the sociologist be qualified to deal with those final questions that have so often been placed at the very beginning of sociological exposition. What is a society? Is it an organism, or is it organic and something more? Is it essentially a physical thing, or is it a complex of psychical relations? Has it a function, or purpose, has it an intelligible destiny, or end? In adequate answers to questions like these will be found the true scientific conception of society and, as well, the rational social ideal.

Book II

THE ELEMENTS AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL POPULATION

ALL the elements of society are conserved in its physical basis, the social population. With a study of population, first in its outward or physical aspect, and second in its conscious activities and moral qualities, the descriptive analysis of society must begin.

In the study of population on its physical side the facts of aggregation or grouping are the first to claim attention. The distribution of animal and human life over the surface of the earth is no uniform dispersion of solitary individuals. With few exceptions, living beings are disposed in groups which here are loose and scattered, and there are massed in dense aggregations. Some degree of aggregation is the indispensable condition to the evolution of society. That there may be communication, mutual aid, and companionship, there must be propinquity and contact.

The conception of nature as "red in tooth and claw" is very dear to moralists and politicians, but, unhappily, moralists and politicians do not know nature intimately. A world of living creatures that fear and hate, shun and attack one another without restraint, is not a fact of observation. It is a pure *a priori* creation of the "pure" reason.

In the real world of nature animals generally are social. Of all the species of mammals and birds, comparatively few individuals lead isolated lives. Many even of the lower vertebrates are social, and a large proportion of invertebrate life goes on under conditions of association.

The societies of mammals that may be observed now,

after centuries of gunpowder civilization, are but débris, as M. Kropotkin says,[1] of the immense aggregations of old. In the mighty forests beyond the Alleghanies less than a century ago there was a teeming animal life that seems now almost incredible. The pioneer hunters found broad roads through the wilderness, worn by countless generations of bison. At the salt licks they saw the ground about them so trodden by herds of bison, elk, deer, and wolves, that "there was not as much grass left as would feed a sheep; and the game trails were like streets or the beaten roads round a city."[2] They observed the black and the gray squirrels gathering in immense companies to migrate over mountain and river, and saw clouds of pigeons "that hid the sun and broke down the branches on their roosting grounds as if a whirlwind had passed."[3] Siberia, in like manner, when the Russians took possession of that wonderful land, was so densely peopled with gregarious animals of many kinds that its subjugation "was nothing but a hunting expedition which lasted for two hundred years."[4]

And even now, after so much necessary and wanton destruction, there still roam over the vast plateau of central Asia great bands of wild horses, wild donkeys, and wild camels. The steppes and Alpine tracts of Europe, and the mountain regions of the New World, are still the home of herds of deer and antelopes, of gazelles and fallow deer, of wild goats and wild sheep. On the flat lands of all the great continents there are still countless colonies of mice, ground squirrels, marmots and other rodents, and the colonies of beavers are not yet quite extinct. The forests of the lower latitudes of Asia and Africa are still the abode of numerous bands of elephants and rhinoceroses, and of

[1] "Mutual Aid Among Animals," *Nineteenth Century*, Vol. XXVIII., September and November, 1890, p. 702.

[2] Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," Vol. I., p. 156.

[3] Ibid., p. 123.

[4] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, p. 702.

numberless societies of monkeys. In the north the reindeer still aggregate in herds, and yet farther north survive herds of musk-oxen and countless bands of polar foxes. The coasts of the ocean are enlivened by flocks of seals, and its waters by shoals of sociable cetaceans.[1] Is it surprising that M. Kropotkin exclaims, "How trifling, in comparison with them, are the numbers of the carnivores!"

Neither in savagery nor in civilization do men normally live in isolation.[2] The wandering hordes of Blackfellows in Australia, of Bushmen in Africa, of Fuegians at the extremity of South America, and of Arctic Highlanders in Greenland are small and unstable, but they are none the less groups, composed each of several families. In fact, only in civilization is safe and comfortable life possible to an isolated household, and there it is possible in appearance more than in reality, because means of communication have annihilated distance. And even apparent or partial isolation is a product of highly special circumstances, and always has a tendency to give place to aggregation. The pioneer's cabin or dug-out is a vanishing form. The farmhouse that is not a unit in a "neighbourhood" or "district" is exceptional, and sooner or later is abandoned. Nowhere in the world has a relative isolation of families been so frequent as in the United States, but even here it is a rapidly disappearing condition. Already nearly one-third of the people of this country live in cities of eight thousand or more inhabitants each, and in the North Atlantic division about one-half of the population is urban by this census standard. According to the enumeration of 1890, there were then in the United States 28 cities, each of 100,000 or more inhabitants; 96 cities of 25,000 to 100,000

[1] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, p. 702.

[2] For an account of such exceptions as the cave-dwelling Indians of Mexico, see Lumholtz, "Cave Dwellers of the Sierra Madre," "Memoirs of the International Congress of Anthropology"; and for a description of the habits of the ancient Welsh, see Seebohm, "The Tribal System in Wales," pp. 46, 47.

inhabitants; 324 cities of 8000 to 25,000 inhabitants; 1074 boroughs and villages of 2500 to 8000 inhabitants, and 2193 villages of 1000 to 2500 inhabitants.[1]

Among all species, and in every stage of evolution, the extent of aggregation and its place or position are determined by external physical conditions. Even when men have become united by sympathies and beliefs, the possibility of perpetuating their union is a question of the character and resources of their environment. The distribution of food is the dominating fact. Animals and men dwell together where a food supply is found, or may be certainly and easily produced. Other physical circumstances of the environment, however, such as temperature and exposure, surface and altitude, which make life in some places comparatively easy, in others difficult or impossible, exert an influence not to be overlooked.

Swarms of locusts are a familiar example of aggregation conditioned in place and extent by food supply. Certain sea creatures sometimes form enormous bands on account of the temperature of the water, the direction of the currents, and the abundance of their aliments. Such are the polycistines, the medusæ, the ctenophores, the nautilli, the molluscs, and many crustaceans.[2] Birds live together where their favourite foods are found, or near sheltered springs,[3] or where nesting-places are favourable. The groupings vary because not all places are equally attractive to all species. The tops of high trees in inaccessible places are crowded with crows' nests; hedges, with the nests of smaller birds. Farm-houses and barns give shelter to colonies of swallows, and old towers are the refuge of hundreds of nocturnal birds. Wolves and wild dogs hunt

[1] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part I.

[2] Espinas, "Les sociétés animales," p. 461.

[3] Abbott, "A Naturalist's Wanderings about Home," p. 166, and chapter on the "Migrations of Inland Birds."

in packs that are held together by the attraction of their prey. Squirrels have separate nests, yet, "The inhabitants of the separate nests remain in a close intercourse, and when the pine cones become rare in the forests they inhabit, they emigrate in bands." Black squirrels of the West, when they have exhausted the food capacity of a region, assemble in great bands and move southward, devastating forests, fields, and gardens, while foxes, polecats, falcons, and nocturnal birds of prey follow their thick columns and live upon the individuals that fall behind. Horses commonly live in numerous associations made up of many studs, each consisting of a number of mares under the leadership of a male. When a drought is burning the grass in the prairies, they gather in herds of sometimes 10,000 individuals strong and migrate.[1]

Scarcity of food compels the Bushmen to break up into small bands. It strictly limits the hordes of the Australian Blackfellows, who wander over barren wastes in search of any eatable root, worm, or insect; of the degraded Shoshone (Ute) Indians of the Rocky Mountain regions, who eagerly devour pine nuts and berries, snakes and lizards; and of the Fuegians, who have roamed the shores of their island searching for shell-fish until "in the course of ages their shells, with fish-bones and other rubbish, have formed long banks above high-water mark."[2] It might seem from these examples that the food supply is in such cases only a disintegrating and not at all an aggregating agency, but that would be a mistaken inference. The group is maintained at a certain size, as it is prevented from growing larger, chiefly by the quantity of the available food. Berries, nuts, honey, insects, easily captured fish and animals, are ordinarily found in quantities more than sufficient for two or three individuals, but not sufficient for many scores. The

[1] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, pp. 700–706.
[2] Tylor, "Anthropology," p. 207.

discovery of such supplies by one or two individuals, or by a family, attracts others as surely as the discovery of a good fishing or hunting ground attracts sportsmen, and the number of individuals cohering in a society is normally as many as can find adequate subsistence at each camping-place. This relation of cause and effect is more clearly shown when any unusual change in the food supply occurs. Innuit villages enlarge or dwindle, are occupied or deserted, as the walruses multiply or disappear, or change their haunts. In Australia, when a dead whale is cast on the seashore, fires are lighted and hordes gather from every direction, until many hundreds of persons are congregated for days of repletion.[1]

Societies in which a relatively numerous population coheres for many generations, and in which the development of social activities and relationships is carried far beyond anything seen in the lower hordes, are found always in relatively bountiful environments. An examination of the geographical distribution of existing or recent tribal societies verifies this generalization. The great tribal societies of North America and of South America were in occupation of magnificent habitats. The Iroquois held possession of a territory of unsurpassed resources and of an ideally perfect geographical unity. The Algonquin tribes, maintaining communication from beyond the St. Lawrence on the north and east to Virginia on the south and the lands of the Dakotahs on the west, were equally favoured on a large scale. The mound-building tribes of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, the Aztecs of Mexico, the Zuñi of the Southwest, the Mayas of Yucatan, and the Incas of Peru, offer other striking confirmations. On the other hand, the Shoshones of the interior basins and the numerous tribes beyond the Sierras, which occupied fragments of barren territory between which communication was for the most part extremely difficult, were low in the

[1] Grey, "Northwest and Western Australia," Vol. II., pp. 276-278.

scale of development and small in numbers. Like evidence is afforded in great abundance by the tribal societies of Africa, Asia, and Australia. Only bountiful and easily traversable areas permit those aggregations of men which can develop into large tribal societies.

In the distribution of the civilized and semi-civilized populations of the world the relation of aggregation to environment is seen on a magnificent scale. The first really dense massing of human population was in that wonderful valley, six hundred miles long with an average breadth of seven miles, over which every summer from immemorial time the Nile has spread the rich black silt of the Abyssinian hills. The valley of the Euphrates, which for thousands of years was Egypt's only rival, was hardly less fertile. In the modern world the dense populations are in the valleys of the Ganges, the Yellow River, the Po, and the Rhine.[1] Contrast with these regions the Saharan sands of Africa, which have never been subjugated to human use by the civilizations that have environed them on the east, north, and west since the dawn of history; the vast central desert of Asia, the home of the nomad, which divides the agricultural millions of India and of China from the agricultural and industrial millions of Europe, and the desert of western Australia, which "seems to constitute a great wilderness which can never be subjugated by the singularly enterprising people who have occupied its southern and eastern boundary."[2]

These phenomena have been repeated in every variety in the peopling of North America. In that swarming of men westward, which has borne the centre of population in the United States from a point east of Baltimore in 1790, to a point midway between Cincinnati and Indianapolis in 1890, there has been no indiscriminate scattering. Certain centres of attraction have dominated the movement.

[1] See Gerland, "Atlas der Völkerkunde," Karte II.

[2] Shaler, "The United States of America," Vol. I., p. 16.

So far as climate is concerned, nearly every part of this continent could be inhabited by man, but not in every part can he easily obtain subsistence. North of a line extending from southeastern Labrador to near the head of Lake Superior, thence to the southern end of Lake Athabasca, and thence to the mouth of the Frazer River, is a region of delightful summer warmth and not unendurable winter cold; it is covered with primeval forests that are the home of moose, musk-oxen, and reindeer, and of many fur-bearing animals, and abounds in rivers and lakes that are well stocked with fish, — a region in many ways attractive, but grainless. It will "remain a wilderness, unsought as the dwelling-place of civilized man, but it is likely that it will become the seat and stronghold of the native Indians, who there may find a refuge from the debasement and final extinction which menaces them in all parts of the continent which are suited for the uses of our race."[1] Besides this northern wilderness there is south of its western half an arid region which is the fourth great desert of the world. It lies westward from the one-hundredth meridian to the coast ranges of the Pacific, and stretches from the Canadian border, where it is nearly a thousand miles wide, into Mexico, where it is three or four hundred miles wide.[2] Irrigation may yet make this region the seat of great and prosperous communities, but as yet its population is less than two inhabitants to the square mile.

In wonderful contrast is the region east of the one-hundredth meridian. Here the rainfall is greater than is necessary for agriculture, and the fertility is of a degree almost unknown elsewhere outside of the tropics. In no other land of equal extent does the soil bring forth so great a variety of products fit for human use, and nowhere else are drought and flood so narrowly localized by topog-

[1] Shaler, Vol. I., pp. 11–12.
[2] Ibid., pp. 15–17.

raphy and by the direction of atmospheric currents as to make a general failure of the harvests so nearly impossible.[1] Within this region population has increased from 3,929,214 in 1790 to 59,594,637 in 1890.

Within this region, however, is a great variety of conditions and resources to which the local distribution of population conforms. Thus in 1890 the coast swamps had a population of 21.5 to the square mile; the Atlantic plain 74.4, the Piedmont region 69.5, the New England hills 40.7, the Appalachian mountain region 49.8, the Cumberland-Alleghany plateau 59.3, the interior timbered region 44.3, the Lake region 25.1, the Ozark mountain region 22.8, the Alluvial region of the Mississippi 23.6, and the prairie region 28.3.[2] Altitude and temperature, as well as resources, have had their effect. The average altitude of the United States is about 2500 feet above sea-level, but more than three-fourths of the population live below the level of 1000 feet above the sea and more than nine-tenths below that of 1500 feet. Three-fourths live between the isotherms of forty-five and sixty degrees.

Aggregation is itself a condition favourable to further aggregation; because it affords protection to individuals, and because it normally is followed by social evolution. The distribution of civilized populations, especially, is affected by artificial conditions that supplement natural conditions. The strictly primary means of subsistence are edible fruits, grains, roots, fish, and game in their natural state. Foods preserved and stored up are a secondary means of subsistence which enable men to engage in other than extractive industries. The accumulation of secondary means of subsistence in great cities, and the multiplication there of special forms of occupation, are powerful attractions. Methods of commerce also, and of industry, have an im-

[1] Shaler, Vol. I., pp. 18–19.

[2] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part I., p. lxi

portant influence. Throughout the present century steam power has concentrated manufacturing operations and factory populations. In the twentieth century inexpensive electric motors may to some extent scatter them.

A population and its environment are in constant interaction. The population converts the resources of the environment into vital energy, which is the source of all social activity. The evolution of energy, and therefore the magnitude of possible achievement, depends in part upon the inherited qualities of the population, but largely also upon the characteristics of the environment, as appears when the unequal achievements of the same race in different parts of the world are compared. In Europe, for example, the Northmen have made the nations of Scandinavia, France, and England. In the northwestern commonwealths of the United States they are growing rapidly in numbers, wealth, and power. In Iceland they have hardly held their own in the unequal contest with a climate that seals the resources of the land. Other things being equal, a dry atmosphere, an alternation of cold with heat, and a varied topography which tempts the population to move freely between lowland and table-land, sea-coast and mountain valley, are the conditions most favourable to energetic life. The diversified lands of the north temperate zone, though they do not spontaneously bring forth food products in the profusion of the tropics, are the home of the conquering and persistently progressive populations.

A great part of the energy of an animal group or of a human population is necessarily expended in finding and capturing, or in producing, food. The possibility of any change in the aggregation depends on a surplus of energy that may be left over from merely life-sustaining activities.

The first normal expenditure of surplus energy is in an increase of numbers. A birth rate in excess of the death rate is in all species a rough measure of vitality. Every

population that increases by its birth rate necessarily undergoes also a degree of evolutionary change. The life struggle is intensified, and natural selection is furthered. As a rule, therefore, the increasing groups are growing in power through an improvement in the quality of their component individuals as well as by the mere multiplication of their numbers. Consequently the increasing groups usually survive, and the non-increasing groups usually disappear. Consequently, also, a majority of the groups or populations that exist at any particular time are increasing in numbers. For centuries all of the European populations that are descended from the masterful Germanic invaders of the Roman Empire have been increasing in numbers year by year, with only rare exceptions, like that presented now by the stationary population of France.

Among the consequences of a natural increase of population, that one which is of immediate sociological interest is the evolution of a particular form of aggregation. To give it a technical name, it may be called genetic aggregation. It is a group of kinsmen that have lived together in one locality from their birth. On the smallest scale it is merely a natural family, composed of parents and their children of the first generation. On a larger scale it is an aggregation of two or three generations of descendants of a single pair. On a scale yet larger and more complex it is an aggregation of families that may have been related or not at some former time, but that now are undoubtedly of one blood through mating or marrying in-and-in.

The great colonies of social insects — ants, bees, and wasps — are genetic aggregations of a simple sort. Unfortunately it is impossible to know how far the schools of fish, the flocks of birds, the herds or bands of gregarious mammals are merely genetic aggregations. It is certain that to some extent they are of mixed origin.

The tribal societies of mankind are the most perfect of

all examples of genetic aggregation. Their whole scheme of social organization, presently to be explained, is based on kinship.

In civilization each nation, and within the nation each town and hamlet, is in great degree a genetic aggregation. The population of England, so far as it is of English blood, the population of Ireland, so far as it is of Irish blood, the population of Hungary, so far as it is of Magyar blood, are in a broad sense of the term genetic aggregations.[1] Local communities somewhat isolated tend to become almost pure genetic aggregations. Such, for example, are the Swedish settlements on the Aroostook in Maine, the smaller Quaker hamlets of Pennsylvania, not a few of the Pennsylvania Dutch communities, the Acadian settlements of Louisiana, many of the Mormon villages of Utah, many of the Scandinavian villages of the Northwest, and many of the Canadian French hamlets of the province of Quebec.

The second normal expenditure of the surplus energy of a population is in wandering. The vitality that furthers aggregation by the multiplication of numbers limits it by dispersion. Detachment from the parent group results from an increase of animal energy as commonly and as certainly as does procreation. Dispersion may be by individuals or by groups. Among animals and primitive men it is usually by groups. Flocks and herds in any given habitat have a normal size, which is a phase of the established equilibrium of nature, and which is maintained, as numbers increase by birth, by throwing off small bands that seek new feeding grounds and become in time aggregations as large as the parent group. Among the lowest men, — the Veddahs, the Bushmen, the Fuegians, and the Innuit, — families with the utmost freedom detach them-

[1] Cf. Kendall, "Natural Heirship: or, All the World Akin," *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. XVIII., October, 1885.

selves from one camp to attach themselves to another, or to form a new one The separation of Lot with his flocks and herdsmen from Abraham was an incident that has been endlessly repeated in the patriarchal groups of many lands. Individual emigration is a habit of civilized man. Of the natural increase of the population of the United Kingdom, by births in excess of deaths, 32.7 per cent emigrates to other lands. The corresponding percentages for other countries are: Germany, 20.1; Italy, 22; Sweden, 50; Norway, 55.4; Switzerland, 34.1; Denmark, 22.2; France, 5.1.[1]

Dispersed groups and individuals, adjusting themselves to new habitats, take on new characteristics through natural selection. If they continue long in the new environments they become new varieties. Close observers of animal life easily detect the differences in insects, birds, or mammals of the same species that haunt different localities. In the United States natural selection is rapidly producing new types of men and women from almost every European nationality. In a new home natural selection goes on far more rapidly than in an old home. Because of the inability of a large proportion of the immigrants to adapt themselves to new conditions of food and climate, and to new ways of life, the death rate for a time is high. These phenomena may be studied among the American Irish, the American Germans, or the American Italians.

Emigration, which thus disperses population and produces new types, subsequently causes concentration. From more or less widely separated groups go forth new streams of individuals that from time to time converge upon particular points, which, for any reason, are centres of attraction. The sociologically interesting consequence is a form of aggregation that differs essentially from genetic aggregation, and which may be called congregation, or congregate grouping. It is an aggregation of individ-

[1] Longstaff, "Studies in Statistics," p. 49.

uals or of families that have not been living together from their birth, and that therefore come together as partial or entire strangers. They may be related, but usually are not, in near degree. They may not have been dispersed widely, or they may have been; but in either case their environments have been in some degree different, and have produced characteristics more or less unlike.

The congregating of insects, fishes, and the smaller birds may be witnessed in endless combinations of mode and circumstance, and to one who loves to study in humble things the origins of greater things, it is full of fascinating interest. It may be observed in the meadow to which the bees and butterflies resort, at the pool where the dragonflies swarm, at the feeding and spawning grounds where the fish gather, in the copses where a dozen varieties of song-birds may always be found, and on the marsh which the water-fowl frequent. The congregating of the mammalia is governed in part by the distribution of such necessaries of their lives as water and salt. Probably the most remarkable of all congregations, however, is the enormous aggregation of migrating birds and animals in high northern latitudes during the short arctic summer.

The congregate massing of men at centres of attraction is seen in every stage of barbarism and of civilization, and in every region. In savagery there is always a pressure from all directions towards the best hunting and fishing grounds, which brings unacquainted or unrelated bands into contact, and causes chronic hostility. The frightful struggles between Algonquin and Iroquois tribes were an incident of their convergence upon the valley of the Mohawk. The valleys of the Delaware, the Ohio, the upper Mississippi, the Columbia and the Colorado rivers were repeatedly the centres of similar converging movements, and the scenes of exterminating wars. Among more advanced peoples congregation has usually been the initial step in their history; as when Semitic, Hamitic,

and Aryan tribes pushed into Palestine, or as when Germanic tribes invaded England. Of the congregation due to individual emigration there have been no instances more significant than some of recent occurrence. It is enough to mention the movement of families from every eastern state into the oil fields of Pennsylvania in 1860; the mushroom growth of Leadville in 1877; the rush of "boomers" from every quarter into Oklahoma in 1889, when 50,000 people poured into that territory in a single day, and again in 1893, when the scene was repeated by 90,000 people, and finally, the magic growth of Johannesburg, a cosmopolitan city of 50,000 inhabitants, sprung up in seven years on the almost desolate steppe of the Transvaal, in the heart of the gold-bearing region of Africa.[1]

Congregation may be temporary or permanent. In either case it may be primary or secondary. In primary congregation the individuals or families that come together as strangers are remotely related. They are, that is, of the same stock or nationality; at least of the same race. In secondary congregation there is a contact of different stocks or races. It is secondary because the unlike stocks that come together are themselves always products of a preliminary congregation of elements less unlike. There is no great nation which is not a product of secondary congregation; none in which secondary congregation may not now be observed. In all the historical studies of sociology the distinction between primary and secondary congregation is important.

Thus it appears that an aggregation of animals or of human beings may be a consequence of either of two processes or of both combined. The place and the extent of aggregation are determined by external conditions, as has been shown; but the aggregation itself is caused by birth or by congregation. The group may be made up of those

[1] Vincent, "Actual Africa," p. 308.

descendants of a single individual, pair, or family, that have not yet separated. Or it may have assembled from many quarters near and far, — an aggregation at first of strangers, drawn or driven together by some powerful attraction or pressure.

For many centuries the first of these two possibilities found expression in political philosophy in the patriarchal theory. The second might have been made the basis of the doctrine of the social contract, but was not. Neither Hobbes, nor Locke, nor Rousseau seems to have doubted that the "state of nature" in which men were supposed to have lived before political covenants were thought of, was an abiding in propinquity, though not in love, of the descendants of a first father. Nor has social theory in later years been much disposed to question the sufficiency of a genealogical explanation of social origins. This is not remarkable. The tribes and nations of men have commonly accounted for their own beginnings in that way. The myth of the ancient omnipresence of the patriarchal family has been dissolved, to be sure, by the discoveries of Bachofen, Morgan, McLennan and others, but for the purposes of a genealogical account of society, a first ancestress, or a feminine clan, is quite as good as a first father.

Yet the sociologist has but to look about him to see that a community often begins as an aggregation of strangers. The commonwealth of California, for example, does not revere a progenitor, male or female. It has been too hastily assumed that the sort of social genesis which has been witnessed in our western states since the first great waves of migration swept over the Alleghanies, and more recently in the European colonies of Africa and Australia, is something peculiarly modern. Probably it is on the contrary more ancient than man himself, for, as we have seen, it is certainly not peculiar to human communities in contrast to animal bands. The forces that distributed a white

population over the Mississippi valley had been at work for unnumbered ages upon the abounding animal life of its forests and prairies, and for centuries, at least, upon the aboriginal population of red men, causing groupings that were different, indeed, from those of to-day, but that were by no means merely genetic aggregations.

Normally, however, genetic and congregate aggregation develop together, and the normal group is a product of complicated processes. Intermarriage and propagation go on among the congregated; emigration and congregation go on among the propagated. Genetic aggregations receive accessions of strangers; they are broken in upon and modified by congregation.

The complication is a result of endless adaptations and survivals in the evolution of life. Not only has congregation apart from genetic grouping no self-perpetuating power, but probably genetic aggregation could not continue if it were never reinforced and modified by congregation. The vicissitudes in which isolated groups may perish are many. There is also reason to believe that without some intermingling of unlike elements and occasional interbreeding, the line of descent would end through physiological degeneration.

Cultures of no less than twenty different species of infusoria, made with extreme care by E. Maupas, of Algeria, "were maintained during periods of time varying in different cases from two weeks to between four and five months. He found that after from fifty to one hundred generations had been produced by fission, there was clear evidence of a physiological decline, which seemed to indicate the approaching extinction of the culture. He withdrew some of the infusoria from the culture and allowed them to mix with others of a different origin. With these they conjugated, and their full vigour seemed restored. If, on the other hand, they conjugated among themselves, observation showed that decline was so far advanced that

the culture was doomed."[1] The evidence that close interbreeding is injurious to animals and to men is familiar, and is generally accepted as conclusive. It is certain that natural selection, on the whole, favours stocks that have been produced by the crossing of elements different but not widely unlike.

This does not mean that the congregation which mixes with genetic grouping must be of individuals wholly unrelated through a common ancestry. In modern stock-breeding new varieties are frequently produced from a single parent pair, and the successive generations of progeny are perfectly vigorous. But in these cases breeding from males and females of the same parentage is not usual after the first generation. Subsequent generations are produced by the union of individuals that have become somewhat remotely related, and are living apart, under more or less unlike conditions of food and care.

Because genetic and congregate aggregation must develop together a population always has a demotic composition. By this is meant an intermingling of elements bred of different parent stocks, and reared in different situations, and having, therefore, unlike qualities and habits.

Such a thing as a purely homogeneous population was never known.

In the lowest savage hordes an intermixture of elements is kept up, not only by the restless wandering of families from camp to camp, but by the habitual stealing of women, and by the frequent desertion of women from one band to another. Mr. Lumholtz, while living recently among the Blackfellows of northern Queensland, a people whose culture he thinks "must be characterized as the lowest to be found among the whole genus *homo sapiens*," observed

[1] Gardiner: "Weismann and Maupas on the Origin of Death"; "Biological Lectures Delivered at the Marine Biological Laboratory of Wood's Holl, 1890," p. 121.

all of these various modes of intermingling, as others had observed them among hardly less degraded savages elsewhere. "When a camp is broken up," he says, "those who wish to follow, do so; those who prefer to go somewhere else or to remain, take their choice."[1] "The robbery of women, who also among these savages are regarded as a man's most valuable property, is both the grossest and the most common theft; for it is the usual way of getting a wife."[2] At the "borboby," a meeting where the blacks assemble from many "lands" to decide their disputes by combat, an interchange of women is always an important incident. "The women gather up the weapons, and when a warrior has to engage in several duels, his wives continually supply him with weapons. The other women stand and look on, watching the conflict with the greatest attention, for they have much at stake. Many a one changes husbands on that night. As the natives frequently rob each other of their wives, the conflicts arising from this cause are settled by the borboby, the victor retaining the woman."[3] "There was not much sleep that night," he writes of one such occasion in particular, "and conversation was lively round the small camp-fires. As a result of the borboby several family revolutions had already taken place, men had lost their wives, and women had acquired new husbands."[4] Yet, subject to the will of her husband as the Australian woman usually is, "many instances are still to be found where she has refused to submit to her fate and has taken flight. She may also have some one whom she adores, and a woman frequently runs away to a person she loves, although she risks punishment; she may even be maimed by her husband if he ever gets hold of her again."[5]

In the more highly organized tribal societies marriage

[1] Lumholtz, "Among Cannibals," p. 177.
[2] Ibid., p. 126.
[3] Ibid., p. 124.
[4] Ibid., p. 127.
[5] Ibid., p. 162.

usually is between persons of different clans. Another cause of intermixture in these societies is the frequent adoption of captives.

When a population that has become attached to a particular territory is overwhelmed by invaders intermixture usually takes place. The conquered are rarely exterminated, but survive side by side with the conquerors, at first often as their slaves or serfs, but ultimately as their equals, with whom they mingle and intermarry. Sometimes, however, the conquered survive but do not mingle with the dominant race. There are still in the United States, mostly on reservations, 248,253 Indians.

It is the ceaseless emigration of individuals, however, that creates in modern civil communities a demotic composition on the greatest scale. In the United States there were in 1890, 9,249,547 foreign-born inhabitants. Since 1820, 15,427,657 immigrants, drawn by the life opportunities that are here offered, have come to this country from England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Italy, and other lands. Besides all these diverse elements the United States has 7,470,040 negroes.

In the distribution of native and foreign born elements no peculiarity of situation, industry, government, or faith prevents the normal intermingling. Thus in Utah it was found in 1880 that 69.5 per cent of the population of that territory was born within the United States, that 13.7 per cent had come from England, 5.4 per cent from Denmark, 2.6 from Sweden, 2.2 from Scotland, 1.7 from Wales, .9 from Ireland, .8 from Norway, .7 from Switzerland, .7 from British North America, .6 from Germany, and 1.2 from other countries.[1]

Every local community as well as every country shows this heterogeneity of population, and every great city

[1] Tenth Census, Part I., pp. 492–495. I use the figures of 1880 instead of those of 1890, because at the earlier date the population was still under normal Mormon influences, undisturbed by anti-polygamy legislation.

shows it conspicuously. In each 1000 inhabitants of London, 630 are natives of that city; 307 are from other parts of England and Wales; 21 are from Ireland; 21 are from foreign countries; 13 are from Scotland; 7 are from the colonies, and 1 is from the islands in the British seas.[1] But no demotic composition, modern or ancient, can be compared with that of New York City. Within that part of New York City which is included in New York County (the census division) the composition of the 639,943 foreign born is as follows: natives of Canada and Newfoundland, 8398; of South America 471; of Cuba and the West Indies, 2202; of Ireland, 190,418; of England, 35,907; of Scotland, 11,242; of Wales, 965; of Germany, 210,723; of Austria, 27,193; of Holland, 1384; of Belgium, 626; of Switzerland, 4953; of Norway, 1575; of Sweden, 7069; of Denmark, 1495; of Russia, 48,790; of Hungary, 12,222; of Bohemia, 8099; of Poland, 6759; of France, 10,535; of Italy, 39,951; of Spain, 887; of China, 2048; of Australia, 342; of European countries not specified 3664; born at sea, 135; natives of all other countries, 1890.[2] Next after New York, Chicago, perhaps, contains the most interesting admixture of nationalities. A map of the region bounded by Polk, State, Twelfth, and Halsted streets, prepared by the residents of Hull House, shows eighteen nationalities living in 1894 within that district, one mile long by one-third of a mile wide.[3]

Nevertheless, all communities except colonies and new cities in the first or second generation of their existence are perpetuated mainly by their birth rates rather than by immigration. A population or a group, therefore, is normally autogenous. By far the larger proportion of the 63,000,000 inhabitants of the United States have been born within her territorial limits. By far the greater proportion of

[1] Longstaff, "Studies in Statistics," p. 174.

[2] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part II., pp. 604, 605.

[3] "Hull House Maps and Papers."

them have in their veins some admixture, at least, of the blood of the colonists and of those Europeans who came to America before 1821. In like manner, while there is an increasing mobility of population from state to state, from country to city, and from town to town, each local community is perpetuated mainly by its birth-rate. New York City had in 1890, 875,358 native-born inhabitants to overbalance her 639,943 foreign-born.[1] The population of Greater London was increased during the ten years 1871–80 by 574,385 births in excess of deaths, and by 306,635 accessions from without in excess of emigration.[2] The same relation of natural increase to immigration is true of other cities, of smaller towns, and of all countries, though the proportions, of course, vary indefinitely. It is true of barbarous and savage tribes and of animal herds.

A true conception of aggregation as the physical basis of natural society has now been disclosed. An enlarged family which includes no adopted members is not properly to be called a society, in the broad sense of the word; neither is a temporary congregation of unrelated individuals. In the population of the true natural society there must be genetic aggregation and congregation; there must be an admixture of elements and a self-perpetuating power, demotic composition, and autogeny.

Aggregation is always supplemented by association if the assembled individuals are not too unlike in kind.

Aggregation is but the physical foundation of society. True association is a psychical process that begins in simple phases of feeling and perception, and develops, through many complications, into activities that ultimately call forth the highest powers of the mind.

It is unnecessary to prove that social intercourse is a mode of conflict. All activity is a clash of atoms or of

[1] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part I., p. 564.

[2] Longstaff, "Studies in Statistics," p. 177.

thoughts, and the scientific man does not need to waste his time in disputing with those who look for the elimination of strife from human affairs. It is desirable, however, to examine the special forms of conflict that enter into association.

From the point of view of evolution the modes of conflict must be distinguished as primary and secondary. Primary conflict is conquest. It is a conflict violent enough to overcome the independent motion, and often to destroy the cohesion, of one, at least, of the conflicting bodies. Secondary conflict is contention. It is a conflict relatively so slight that the conflicting bodies only modify each other's motions and states. Evolution begins in a primary conflict, the effect of which is integration, and completes itself in a secondary conflict, the effect of which is differentiation.

When, for example, freely moving masses of matter come within range of a more potent mass, they are irresistibly drawn to it, as meteoric bodies to the earth, and forever lose their identity in it. The phenomenon is primary conflict and integration. The energy liberated by the collision expends itself in minor conflicts and rearrangements among the disturbed molecules of the enlarged mass and between the mass and environing bodies: in its swift course through the air the meteorite becomes incandescent, and it is partly or wholly resolved into chemical elements which enter into terrestrial combinations. This phenomenon is secondary conflict and differentiation. Obviously the secondary conflict can occur only in consequence of the primary.

Organic evolution affords yet better examples. The organic matter of an animal body is composed of the substance of vanquished organisms which were engaged, throughout their little day, in a life and death struggle with other organisms, until at last they met their own conqueror and were devoured and assimilated. Animal

life continues but by consuming life, and from this law there is no deliverance. Yet, from the primary conflict of conquest and death, follow the secondary and minor conflicts that constitute development, and from which emerges consciousness, with its states of pain and pleasure. Pain is the concomitant of injury and dissolution in the primary conflict, or of over-stimulation in either conflict. Pleasure is the normal concomitant of the mild stimulation of the secondary conflict, and of its resultant adaptations.

Primary conflict is possible only between bodies that are unequal in energy. Among organic bodies it normally occurs only between organisms that are unlike in kind, because inequalities of strength are on the whole proportional to differences of organization. (Therefore the active relations of aggregated individuals of the same species are normally those of the mild secondary conflict, and normally they are pleasurable) Yet, since the secondary modes of conflict are consequences of the primary modes, social intercourse is possible only to a race that keeps alive the instincts and the habits of conquest. Therefore all social intercourse, however gracious and refined it may be, is shadowed by potential tragedy, and will be shadowed by it to the end of time.

All conflicts, whether primary or secondary, consist of two factors. There is an impact or attack. There is a counter-impact or counter-attack. Each of the conflicting bodies acts as the other acts, because the action of each is determined by the action of the other. When two billiard-balls strike together, each necessarily strikes back as it has been struck. When a boy is hit by an angry playmate, he instantly hits back unless the motor impulse is inhibited by fear or by conscious will. The action is largely reflex, and to that extent it is essentially like the reimpact of the billiard-ball, although the mechanism and the process are immeasurably more complex. When one person says to another: "You lie," he may get a drubbing,

but the probabilities are that he will first get the reply, "You lie yourself." When two men contend, each instinctively copies the blows of the other: if one varies the blows, it is by accident or by the intervention of reason. When two armies contend, each repeats many manœuvres of the other. A conscious repetition by one individual of any act of another individual is imitation. Imitation, consequently, is a part of every conscious conflict. Similarities of action, necessarily produced by the incidence of physical forces, are the physical basis of imitation, and are an essential part of all conflicts.

It is now plain why imitation cannot be regarded as the distinctively social phenomenon, although it is a factor of all social activity.[1] Imitation is a part of the primary conflict between animals or men that fight to the death, no less than of the secondary conflict which continues among the animals or the men that are united in social relations.

If similarity of action is maintained long enough, however, it creates a similarity of structure in conflicting bodies. Similarity of structure, in its turn reacting upon activity, modifies conflict. The relatively mild modes of conflict become yet milder. Imitation has thus a socializing tendency. Although it cannot be identified exclusively with association, it often prepares the way for association by creating a basis for the consciousness of kind among individuals that originally were much unlike. Because of this modifying action of imitation all conscious conflict that is long continued is self-refining. In social intercourse imitation continues indefinitely. Therefore although social intercourse will always in some degree reflect the ruthless egoism of the primary conflict on which it depends, the evolution of social intercourse is on the whole a progressive refinement of the secondary modes of conflict.

[1] Cf. *ante*, page 16.

A scientific account of association must begin with a reference, at least, to the psycho-physical phenomena of meeting, or encounter. The unexpected meeting of long-parted friends has sometimes caused death. Such occurrences prove that meeting is a nervous shock, that it is beyond question a mode of conflict. Ordinarily the conflicts of molecules and of feelings that constitute the sensations and perceptions of meeting are infinitesimal in magnitude, but, even then, they often determine the permanent character of association. Touch may cause a thrill of pleasure, or a shudder. Odour may please, or offend. The image of another on the retina may delight or pain. The voice from a distance may charm, or it may irritate. It is extremely improbable that the first sensations of acquaintance are ever eradicated.

Perception begins in impressions of unlikeness. Likeness can be distinguished from absolute identity only through perceptions of difference, and therefore cannot be known until after some degree of unlikeness is apprehended. Moreover, consciousness itself exists only where there is a disturbance of equilibrium in the sensitive matter of its physical basis, and the disturbance can be caused only by differences among stimuli.

The sociological consequences of these elementary facts of psychology are of no small moment. The evolution of the consciousness of kind can go on only as fast as discriminations of differences of kind are made; the sense of difference therefore is first present in the mind to be overcome by any growing sense of similarity. Impressions of unlikeness are apt also to be more profound than impressions of likeness, because, within limits, the greater the nervous disturbance the more distinct is the consciousness; therefore living creatures that are unlike one's self, by their approach and contact create a psycho-physical disturbance that is greater than that which is produced by creatures that are like one's self.

From these conditions of mental life it follows that attention is at all times much occupied with the differences between one's self and one's fellow-beings, and with the non-resemblances among one's own and other species, and that, in any first meeting of animals or men, any real unlikeness does not fail to make an instant impression. Among animals the appearance of the stranger creates excitement. The human sojourner in a strange land at first exaggerates the differences between himself and the people with whom he mingles. A first walk through the East-side streets of New York or the West-side streets of Chicago leaves only a painful impression of seemingly irreconcilable differences of nationality, which yields but slowly to the perception of a common humanity. In a nation that has an admixture of many races and nationalities in its demotic composition the strong sense of dissimilarity long remains as an obstacle to complete assimilation.

If impressions of unlikeness were never converted into impressions of likeness, all the psychological phenomena of aggregations would be dispersive, and there could be no society. It is, therefore, of deep interest to know how generally the possibility of forming impressions of likeness of kind exists; to ascertain how far down in the scale of animal life the first impressions of dissimilarity are habitually converted, through further discriminations and combinations, into impressions of similarity of kind whenever sentient organisms that are in fact alike, are brought into contact.

There is no animal species that makes conscious discriminations of any kind in which both sets of impressions have not made their appearance. While in the order of psychogenesis difference is known before similarity, and while possibly in most individuals and in most species the impressions of unlikeness are slightly more pronounced than those of likeness, the sense of likeness has been ac

quired by the time that the external evidences of any power of discrimination have become apparent to the observer.) The amœba, the lowest creature known, a mere bit of structureless sarcode, without stomach, limbs, or organs of sense, has its favourite foods, and makes curious selections. It draws into itself a diatom shell containing a living diatom, but knows and refuses an empty shell. It appropriates not only diatoms, desmids, and other forms of vegetable food, but also such animal forms as rotifers, but it does not devour its fellow-amœbæ. It shows in many ways that it knows the difference between fellow-amœbæ and other objects.[1]

This knowledge, the beginning of those discriminations from which social relations are evolved, is not difficult, I think, to account for. The amœba projects its body substance in pseudopodia, and, in so doing, assumes endless varieties of form. The pseudopodia grasp and draw in food objects. Frequently they come in contact with each other. Instantly a double feeling arises: the simultaneous feeling of touching and of being touched. The creature thus learns to associate a certain touch with itself. It knows the "feel" of external contact with its own substance. This feeling it does not associate with nutrition, because, even if one pseudopodium coalesces with another, a body cannot nourish itself by absorbing itself. Accordingly, when, at a subsequent time, it comes in contact with another amœba, and experiences feelings of touch like those experienced in touching itself, it recognizes the creature as an object like itself and therefore as not food.

In like manner the earthworm, by doubling and coiling upon itself, learns to know the "feel" of its own substance, and to know the difference between fellow-creatures of its own kind and all other things; and in-

[1] See Joseph Leidy, "Fresh Water Rhizopods of North America," *United States Geological Survey*, Vol. XII.

sects, through the contact of their legs and wings, and particularly of their antennæ, acquire the same knowledge.[1]

It is possible that the amœba's acts of apparent discrimination are essentially physiological rather than psychical phenomena. But if so they are at least actions that are shading into psychical phenomena, and the similar actions of creatures a little higher in the scale are unquestionably psychical. The only point that I wish to insist on is that at whatever stage in organic evolution true discrimination of any sort begins, a recognition of kind begins. No other discrimination of sociological significance is of equal generality, and this is the conclusive proof of the truth of my contention that the consciousness of kind is the primordial subjective fact in social phenomena.

Even among the higher animals that can distinguish their own and other species by sight and hearing, and among mankind, touch survives as a fundamental test which is over and over again resorted to in obedience to an unconquerable instinct or habit. Horses, cattle, sheep, and dogs perfect acquaintance by touching and rubbing one another. The embrace, the hand-clasp, and the kiss are survivals of the primitive way of making and renewing acquaintance among men and women. They survive because, as Guyau profoundly observes: "Le toucher est le moyen le plus primitif et le plus sûr de mettre en communication, d'harmoniser, de *socialiser* deux systèmes nerveux, deux consciences, deux vies";[2] because it is "par excellence, le sens de la vie." And Guyau very truthfully adds that the mother's passionate pleasure in the caress of her babe is more than her love of a frail and

[1] I first put forth this hypothesis of the origin of the consciousness of kind in the paper on "Sociology and the Abstract Sciences: The Origin of the Social Feelings," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 5, March, 1895.

[2] Guyau, "L'art au point de vue sociologique," p. 3.

helpless thing with which Mr. Spencer identifies it; it is her sense rather of the "profound harmony" of its body with her own.

In a majority of instances the impressions of meeting are confused. Impressions of difference and impressions of likeness are so mingled that the mind is left in doubt about the degree of resemblance, and desires a more perfect knowledge. This is the original motive of all communication.)

The expression of conscious states by means of attitude, muscular movement, and utterance is a language common to animals and men. In the presence of a fellow-being all physical manifestations of feeling undergo involuntary change in accordance with the internal attitude of aggression or of shrinking. The quick interpretation of such changes is the judgment of kind in its first stage. Among the more highly endowed animals, this preliminary judgment is at once verified or corrected by a more deliberate and varied communication, as when two strange dogs, before concluding to fight or to make friends, eye and sniff each other, show teeth, growl, and express perhaps a dozen changing shades of feeling and conviction by movements of the head and neck, haunches and tail. A very dog-like communication sometimes occurs between human beings. Describing an amusing encounter between two Bowditch Island boys, Mr. J. J. Lister writes: "I saw two boys quarrelling, which was not an uncommon event. The matter did not come to blows. They stood perfectly still some distance apart, looking at one another under lowering brows for several seconds. Then a quick threatening movement on one side would be responded to by a defiant one on the other, and then followed another spell of mutual inspection. These became longer and longer, and the threatening movement less and less energetic, until each went his own way and the

whole was over. The whole was conducted in perfect silence."[1]

Usually, however, human communication exhausts the resources of speech before the basis of association is finally established. It extends to a comparison of genealogies, of personal experiences, tastes, beliefs, and ambitions. We cherish the illusion that we converse because we care for the things that we talk about, just as we cherish that most delightful of all illusions, the belief in art for art's sake. The truth, however, is that all expression, by the dolt or by the artist, and all communication, from the casual talk of acquaintanceship to the deepest intimacies of a perfect love, have their source in the elemental passion to impress and to know one another, and to define the consciousness of kind.

When communication is indefinitely continued, association may fairly be said to be established. Association implies that communication has satisfied the meeting individuals that they are too much alike for either to attempt to conquer the other. But it does not necessarily imply that the secondary conflict which must continue among them will always be sympathetic and pleasurable. In a population of mixed elements, such as congregation often brings together, contention is liable to be harsh or even bitter during a long period of assimilation.

It is the factor of imitation in the conflict that gradually assimilates and harmonizes. Characteristic modes of thought and action spread from each individual, as waves from a centre of disturbance, and for a like reason. The undulation of a group of particles is a blow that sets adjoining particles in motion. They in turn necessarily set yet other particles in motion, and so the wave is propagated until it is shattered by a counter-wave or is com-

[1] "Notes on the Natives of Fakaofu," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXI., p. 49, August, 1891.

bined with a synchronizing wave. In like manner, any act or expression is a stimulus to the nerve centres that perceive or understand it. Unless their action is inhibited by the will, or by counter-stimulation, they must discharge themselves in movements that must more or less closely copy the originals. Thus one individual necessarily imitates another, and a third necessarily imitates the imitator, and so on until the will or an interference of imitations brings the process to an end. This, however, will not normally happen if the action imitated is pleasurable and is obviously conducive to development and survival. It then will be consciously repeated, and for thousands of years conscious imitations may extend through populations numbered by millions. Modern civilization is the continuing imitation of Greece and Rome; an imitation that was established in Germanic Europe by Charlemagne, that was carried to England by William the Conqueror and to America by Columbus, and that now is being spread by Russia and England throughout Asia, Australia, and Oceanica.[1]

Undulations from centres of strong disturbance overcome or harmonize the undulations from lesser centres. The imitation of examples in any way remarkable always tends to overcome or to combine all lesser imitations. It is a struggle for existence among imitations. For example, the first use of any newly discovered food or stimulant is imitated, but in each population a majority of such imitations die out or become occasional, while one or two become almost universal. The Scotch consumption of whiskey, the German of beer, and the Chinese of opium, are good illustrations. Yet better, because more special, are the Spanish devotion to the cigarette, the German to the large pipe, the Irish to the clay pipe, and the American to the cigar. In like manner certain patterns and colours of clothing, certain methods of building, certain

[1] Cf. Tarde, "Les lois de l'imitation," p. 23.

forms of speech, particular amusements, beliefs and observances, and even peculiar crimes, show an astonishing power to fascinate. They spread and persist while other forms are quickly forgotten.

In every population, therefore, there is always to be observed a general approach to certain persistent types of action, expression, and character. This is the socializing process in its most subtle and efficacious mode. It is this that ultimately blends the diverse elements of the most heterogeneous population into a homogeneous type. It creates a common speech, common modes of thought, and common standards of living. By destroying or softening many original differences of speech, belief, and practice it promotes intermarriage. It is this that will gradually assimilate all the foreign-born elements in the population of the United States to a persistent American type.

Imitation, nevertheless, while it softens old conflicts creates new ones.

Imitations are never perfect. Like waves of light, they are refracted by their media.[1] A word adopted from one language into another is never quite the same word that it was in the original. Grimm's and Raynouard's laws are laws of the refraction of imitation. Myths also, and religions, laws, and arts are modified as they pass from one race or nation to another. On a lesser scale imitations are modified as they pass from individual to individual. Like all things else in the universe, therefore, imitations become differentiated.

Consequently it happens that in every individual mind, as in every individual population, there is a conflict of imitations. Sometimes the conflict is a conquest, or, as M. Tarde calls it, a duel, and one of the antagonistic imitations is destroyed. But sometimes the conflict results in a combination, as when two synchronous waves unite

[1] Cf. Tarde, "Les lois de l'imitation," p. 24.

in a complex and stronger wave. This, as M. Tarde has shown,[1] is the essence of invention. It is the creation of a new idea and a new practice, by a combination of familiar ideas and of current practices. It is the psychological phenomenon that is analogous to the union of parent elements in a new organism that differs from both parents.

Thus new examples are all the while coming into existence to struggle against the established imitations. Imitations that have come down from the past M. Tarde calls custom-imitations. The best examples are found in the simpler arts of utility, in language, and in law. The imitations of new examples he calls mode-imitations. Fashions, "crazes," fads, revivals, and revolutions are mode-imitations.[2] Between custom-imitations and mode-imitations there is a ceaseless struggle. Mode-imitation begins with an impression made by an individual upon the mass of individuals. As it sweeps through the population it becomes an impression of the mass upon every one. The influence of an individual upon a susceptible crowd M. Tarde describes as hypnotic; the influence of a crowd upon a susceptible individual he describes as intimidative.[3] Between the individual who would fascinate the community with a new example, and the community that would follow ancient customs; between the crowd that would intimidate with a craze and the individual who would sanely resist, there is perpetual conflict.

Therefore, while imitation on the whole harmonizes a population and broadens the consciousness of kind, it also to some extent differentiates and antagonizes.

[1] "Les lois de l'imitation," pp. 26–36, and "La logique sociale," Chap. IV.

[2] Ibid., pp. 267–279.

[3] "Études pénales et sociales," Essay on "Les maladies de l'imitation," pp. 357–365.

In every population, then, there remain persistent causes of antagonism. First of all there are the instincts of conquest, which are kept alive by the necessity of destroying life to maintain life. Secondly, there are original differences of nature and habit that have not yet been blended or neutralized by the processes of assimilation. Thirdly, there are the secondary differences that continually arise through the conflict of imitations.

To these must be added an occasional cause that at times operates with terrible effect. Ordinarily the food quest of any group is a rivalry or competition among the members of the group and not a direct aggression upon one another. Ordinarily the perils that beset one are not to be avoided by sacrificing the life of another. But sometimes dangers are encountered from which only the unscrupulous escape; and sometimes the agony of hunger goads even the feeble, who are sure to be repulsed and slain, into attempts to rob or to kill and eat their fellows. Probably cannibalism has everywhere originated in starvation.

Antagonism, however, is self-limiting; it necessarily terminates in the equilibrium of toleration. The very strong kill off the very weak. The very strong, if antisocial, are overborne by the numerical superiority of the individuals of average power, and are either killed or driven into exile, as happens, for example, among rooks and crows,[1] in herds of wild cattle[2] and wild elephants, and in every tribe of savage men.[3] The majority are too nearly equal in strength for one to hope to vanquish another. The equilibrium of strength is nevertheless tested from time to time, and so is maintained, by frequent acts of aggression and revenge, phenomena which may be witnessed not only among animals and savage men, but also,

[1] Romanes, "Animal Intelligence," pp. 322–325.

[2] MacDonald, "Criminology," p. 20.

[3] For a typical example see Lumholtz, "Among Cannibals," p. 45.

unfortunately, so frequently in civilized communities that examples would be superfluous. Toleration and justice thus originate in force, and have their permanent basis in force, not in moral feeling or in the conscious calculation of expediency, which in civilization have become such conspicuous factors of justice as to obscure the original element. This truth is now fully recognized by all writers on ethics and law who are familiar with the results of comparative jurisprudence.[1]

As soon as toleration is established coöperation and alliance are possible. Mutual aid begins unconsciously, in accidental helpfulness and protection. Natural selection preserves it, and at length, when its benefits are perceived, it is consciously perpetuated.

At first, mutual aid, whether in animal or in human communities, is a simple and momentary direct coöperation. Beetles among the invertebrates, rats and mice among vertebrates, often aid each other in moving objects too heavy for one to manage.[2] Weak birds protect each other in nesting time.[3] Among eider ducks several females sit on the same nest of eggs.

Frequently these simple forms of coöperation are systematic. Fishing bands of pelicans form a half-circle across a bay and drive the fish in shore.[4] Wild pigs form a circle about their young to resist the attacks of wolves.[5] Much of the coöperation among men is of the same simple form. In sudden danger the Australian Black can count on the aid of every member of his horde.[6] At regular

[1] See, *e.g.*, Spencer, "The Principles of Ethics," Vol. II., Part IV., Chaps. I., II., and III.; Letourneau, "L'évolution juridique," Chap. I.; Holmes, "The Common Law," Lecture I., on "Early Forms of Liability"; and Stephen, "A History of the Criminal Law of England," Vol. II., pp. 81, 82.

[2] Romanes, "Animal Intelligence," pp. 226, 227, 360, 361.

[3] Coues, *Bulletin of the United States Geological and Geographical Survey of Territories*, Vol. IV., No. 7, pp. 562, 571.

[4] Romanes, *op. cit.*, p. 319. [5] Ibid., p. 339.

[6] Curr, "The Australian Race," Vol. I., p. 62.

times in the autumn the Similkameen Indians of British Columbia assemble for hunting. With their dogs they scour the country for miles, and drive the herds of deer into some mountain *cul-de-sac* for slaughter. Equally good examples from civilization are the log-rollings, the house-raisings, and the corn-huskings of backwoodsmen.

In time such coöperation becomes complex through a development of coördination and subordination.

Cranes and parrots post sentries to watch while the flock feeds and is attentive to their warnings. Before starting to plunder a corn-field a band of white cockatoos in Australia "send out a reconnoitring party which occupies the highest trees in the vicinity of the field, while other scouts perch upon the intermediate trees between the field and the forest and transmit the signals. If the report runs 'all right,' a score of cockatoos will separate from the bulk of the band, take a flight in the air, and then fly towards the trees nearest to the field. They will also scrutinize the neighbourhood for a long while, and only then will they give the signal for general advance, after which the whole band starts at once and plunders the field in no time."[1]

Reindeer, roebucks, fallow-deer, antelopes, gazelles, and ibexes show great watchfulness for the safety of the herds from attacks of carnivora. They have leaders and sentinels, as do also bands of elephants, buffaloes, horses, and monkeys. The leader of a herd of elephants has been seen to reconnoitre a pool of water, then cautiously to station five sentries in the neighbourhood, and finally to collect and bring up the herd of eighty or a hundred elephants.[2] A band of baboons under the direction of a grey-headed male will collect large stones and other missiles and hurl them down the mountain side with such violence as to repulse a party of twenty hunters.[3]

[1] Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, p. 353. [2] Romanes, *op. cit.*, p. 401.
[3] Ibid., p. 483.

Among savage men coördination is usually somewhat more developed than it is among animals, although exceptions may be found. Among civilized men it is as spontaneous as is mutual aid.

Communication, developed imitation, toleration, and alliance are the essential activities of association. Each characterizes some important group of social phenomena, and together, therefore, they are the antecedents of much social differentiation. Imitation is the chief social factor of economic life. Combined with individual factors it is the foundation of diversified desires and of diligent industry. Toleration is the foundation of justice. Mutual aid is the foundation of economic organization and of political alliance.

Association is not perfect, however, until it is pleasurable and sympathetic. Only when association has become so pleasurable that a powerful stimulation of purely individual gratifications would be necessary to overcome the counter-attraction of the social excitement, does true sociality exist.

It is through the observation of activities that hitherto have been but little studied that the genesis of social pleasure and of the higher forms of association is to be understood. When the social group, however it has originated, holds together for successive generations, the modes of expenditure of energy are multiplied. In both adults and young, but in a much greater extent in the young, expenditure takes the form of play. Festivity, or the combination of amusement with the gratification of appetite, comes later, and perhaps is oftener enjoyed by adults. In play and festivity, which at first are the spontaneous overflow of surplus energies, there come into existence true social forces, products of a social condition, which, in turn, contribute to the evolution of a higher social condition. They are powerful enough to mould individual

nature; they begin to operate on the individual at the most impressionable age, and they continue to act long enough to accomplish permanent results.

Play has been the chief educational agency in animal communities. Young birds born and reared within each other's sight and hearing, and many kinds of young mammals, spend literally all their days until maturity in ceaseless frolics. "Life in societies does not cease when the nesting period is over; it begins then in a new form. The young broods gather in societies of youngsters, generally including several species. Social life is practised at that time chiefly for its own sake — partly for security, and chiefly for the pleasures derived from it."[1]

"The villages of the prairie-dogs in America are one of the loveliest sights. As far as the eye can embrace the prairie, it sees heaps of earth, and on each of them a prairie-dog stands, engaged in a lively conversation with its neighbours by means of short barkings. As soon as the approach of man is signalled, all plunge in a moment into their dwellings; all have disappeared as by enchantment. But if the danger is over, the little creatures soon reappear. Whole families come out of their galleries and indulge in play. The young ones scratch one another, they worry one another, and display their gracefulness while standing upright, and in the meantime the old ones keep watch. They go visiting one another, and the beaten footpaths which connect all their heaps testify of the frequency of the visitations. In short, the best naturalists have written some of their best pages in describing the associations of the prairie-dogs of America, the marmots of the Old World, and the polar marmots of the Alpine regions."[2]

In like manner, among human beings, it is in the play-day of childhood that social sympathy, a social sense, and a social habit are evolved. Later, periodical festivities

[1] Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, p. 701.
[2] Ibid., p. 705.

and more or less elaborate amusements become important supplementary means of social education.

Take out of savage life its feasts and dances and the remaining social activity will be slight indeed Dancing originates in an overflow of energies as spontaneous as the frolics of animals, but, unlike animal frolics, this human diversion is soon reduced to conventionalized forms. Imitation works the transformation. The crudest savage dances are imitations of animals and of familiar occurrences. The Tasmanians in their dances imitated especially the kangaroos and the thunder and lightning.[1] The South Australians carry such imitation so far as to represent animal hunts or battles.[2] A favourite dramatic imitation among the Carib Indians of Brazil represents an agouti in a pen and the attempts of a jaguar to get him out.[3] The dancing of the Eskimo is often a burlesque imitation of familiar birds and beasts, accompanied by songs and pantomimes. Sometimes the women of savage tribes have private dances representative of occurrences in their own lives.[4] The dances of children are everywhere more impromptu than those of adults.

Most of the games that are known in civilization are found also in savagery and barbarism. Wrestling, throwing or shooting at a mark, hide and seek, are universal. Often the sports of savages and barbarians display an astonishing degree of ingenuity and dexterity. New Hebrides boys tie stones to one end of cotton-tree sticks and, standing on the beach, together throw their weighted sticks beyond the line of surf. The stones are just heavy enough to keep the sticks upright in the water but not to sink them. The stick that remains bobbing outside of

[1] Bonwick, "The Daily Life of the Tasmanians," pp. 28–40.

[2] Matthews, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXIV., November, 1894, p. 189.

[3] Thurn, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXII., February, 1893.

[4] Bonwick, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

the breakers after all the others have lost their stones or have been washed up on the beach is the conqueror.[1]

Nearly all games make much of rivalry and the incidents of combat. One of the best examples is the spear play of the Napo Indians of the Amazon valley. Two parties, consisting of about a score of warriors on each side, deliberately aim and hurl their spears in rapid succession at one another, while with amazing skill they catch the flying weapons of their adversaries.[2] An example significant of the primitive relations of the sexes comes from Woodlark Island, New Guinea. By moonlight the women make a great sand-hill on the beach. Seating themselves on the hill they sing and defy the men to pull them off. One by one the men appear and build a similar sand-hill. The numbers of men and women must be equal. For a while both parties sing. Suddenly one of the men makes a dash and seizes a woman. All her companions try to rescue her while all the men assist the aggressor. A general wrestle follows, which usually ends in serious injury to some one.[3]

In the social enjoyments of human beings two elements are found that, so far as we know, are not intentionally employed by the lower animals. Next to rivalry, chance is the chief element in games, the world over. Gambling is a universal passion. Indulgence in stimulation is all but universal. There are few tribes that do not use intoxicating drinks or narcotics.[4] Deplorable as are the consequences of both gambling and drunkenness, the truthful scientific observer is forced to admit that in the early stages of social development these vices have served a

[1] Somerville, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXIII., May, 1894, p. 393.

[2] Tyler, *Geographical Journal*, Vol. III., June, 1894, p. 479.

[3] Tetzlaff, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XXII., May, 1892, p. 485.

[4] See Letourneau, "La sociologie d'après l'ethnographie," Liv. I., Chap. IV.

useful function, and that this doubtless is the explanation of their astonishing vitality. They have been the crude excitants of social feeling in crude natures.

Moreover, among rude men intoxicants and narcotics have unquestionably helped to convert the physiological function of eating into the social function of festivity. In every savage and barbarous tribe that has learned to drink or to smoke, festivity is the commonest of social pleasures and is a strong social bond.

Spontaneous play, conventionalized dancing, games, feasting, and intoxication are combined in systematic festivities which are periodically repeated. Such occasions are of great importance in counteracting the many causes of antagonism in savage life. The korroboree of the native Australian was perhaps the most important means by which a friendly communication was kept up between tribes. This was especially true of the kobongo korroboree which was held once a year. For days before the festival, parties assembled from near and far, bringing with them great quantities of wild honey, kangaroos, opossums, emus, and wild ducks. The festivities lasted several days and ended in a peculiar dance, celebrated by moonlight, and continued until the performers were exhausted. The renewal of friendly intercourse between two tribes that had been at war was always marked by a korroboree.[1]

While the social pleasures of civilization are marked by greater variety and refinement than those of savagery and barbarism, they are not essentially different. Dancing, from the impromptu polka of street children to "assemblies" and masked balls; dramatic representations, from amateur theatricals to grand opera; games and contests, from pavement marbles to yacht-racing and prize-fighting, gambling, from "craps" and policy buying to roulette and "book-making"; and festivity in all its degrees, are the

[1] Curr, "The Australian Race," Vol. I., pp. 89–92.

universal amusements. Their influence upon the growth of social feelings cannot be overestimated. According to their good or evil character they unite or demoralize the population. Their effects are most conspicuously seen where civilization is in the rough, or where it is just beginning to reach an undeveloped class. They were a chief factor in the evolution of the western communities of the United States. "A few of the settlers still kept some of the Presbyterian austerity of character as regards amusements; but, as a rule, they were fond of horse-racing, drinking, dancing, and fiddling. The corn-shuckings, flax-pullings, log-rollings (when the felled timber was rolled off the clearings), house-raisings, maple-sugar-boilings, and the like were scenes of boisterous and light-hearted merriment, to which the whole neighbourhood came, for it was accounted an insult if a man was not asked in to help on such occasions, and none but a base churl would refuse his assistance. The backwoods people had to front peril and hardship without stint, and they loved for the moment to leap out of the bounds of their narrow lives and taste the coarse pleasures that are always dear to a strong, simple, and primitive race."[1] If the heterogeneous masses of population in the tenement-house wards of our great cities are ever socially organized, it will be after they have been brought under the influence of more healthful social pleasures than those to which they often instinctively resort.

Association reacts upon the associating individuals and modifies their natures. In all that pertains to mental and moral life association is a more important influence than the physical environment. Through psychical changes that react on the nervous system, and in various other ways, association affects the bodily organization also.

The intellectual powers of voluntary attention, general-

[1] Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," Vol. I., p. 176.

ization, abstract thought and invention, are developed chiefly by association.[1] They presuppose in the individual a consciousness of himself as a subject, and that consciousness is an effect of his observation and imitation of individuals like himself.[2] After self-consciousness arises scientific thought about the environment is possible. It presupposes a perception of uniformities. This presupposes a perception of long sequences, which, in turn, presupposes association long continued and the art of transmitting observations from one generation to another. Originality of thought presupposes the modifiability of belief, which is due to the varied experience that can be had only in association.[3]

It is not necessary here to demonstrate the social origin of the moral qualities of love of approbation, sympathy, fortitude, courage, truthfulness, and good faith. Lewes[4] and Mr. Spencer[5] have presented such demonstrations at length, but no one has ever gone more directly to the heart of the matter than Adam Smith in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." "As nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned," wrote Smith, "so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of spectators." On these two efforts (that of the spectators to enter into the feelings of the principal, and that of the principal to enter into the feelings of the spectators) are founded two sets of virtues, one the soft, gentle, and humane, the other the great, the awful, the respectable — virtues of self-denial and self-government.[6]

[1] Cf. Lewes, "Problems of Life and Mind"; Spencer, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., Part VIII., Chap. III.; Ribot, "The Psychology of Attention"; and Baldwin, "Mental Development in the Child and the Race."

[2] Baldwin, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[3] Spencer, *op. cit.* [4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., Part VIII., Chap. V.

[6] "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," third edition, pp. 28–30.

Association thus moulds the natures of individuals, and adapts them to social life. It creates a social nature.

The true social nature is so far susceptible to suggestion and so far imitative in respect of all matters of material well-being that its possessor desires and endeavours to live at least as well as the average, fairly successful, fairly well-to-do members of the community. The desire to enjoy what others enjoy, and the imitative tendency to act as others act, are strong enough in the social individual to impel him to pursue his material interests as diligently as most other individuals pursue their interests. This combination of desire and diligence is the basis of what economists call a standard of living. It is the foundation of wealth and of all individual advancement.

The social nature is tolerant. The social individual refrains from active interference with his fellows in their life-struggle. It is only after the practice of toleration has become confirmed and certain tastes have become established, that the tolerant nature can be said to exist. The members of the community must be beyond the first discovery that, after the exceptionally weak have been killed off by the strong, and the exceptionally strong have been killed off by their own rashness or by a combined resistance of individuals of average power, further conflict, among individuals nearly equal in strength, is useless. They must have lost the appetite for each other's flesh and must have become satisfied with kinds of food and other material means of life that are sufficiently abundant to meet the requirements of the whole society. Antagonism within the community can disappear only as fast as tastes that are exclusive make way for tastes that can be enjoyed by many, a truth which the sociologist can cordially recommend to those social reformers who expect to make the world better by rearrangements of industry irrespective of human desires. Still other changes in consciousness

are necessary before the tolerant nature is perfect. Toleration must be not only endurable but also agreeable. There must be a growth of association of presence as an habitual phase of feeling. There must be a feeling of pleasure in the mere presence of a fellow-creature.

The social nature, finally, is helpful, sympathetic, and companionable.

The results of association are not equally shared by all individuals. By no combination of circumstances could it happen that all should start in life with equally good heredity, or that all should afterwards get equally good nourishment. The processes of selection go on because of these differences. Quite as impossible is it that all should share equally in the mental growth and moral modification that takes place. Inequality, therefore, in physical, mental, and moral power, and varieties of disposition, are among the inevitable characteristics of a social population.

A population is therefore always differentiated into classes. Population classes are of three fundamental or primary orders, namely: vitality classes, personality classes, and social classes. Classes of all other orders, such as political, industrial, and economic classes, are secondary, and are highly special products of advanced social evolution. Primary and secondary population classes are continually confounded in current discussions and even in statistical investigations, because of the failure to observe the rule that classifications of evolutionary phenomena must be made with reference to the genetic order in which differentiations appear.[1] Differences of vitality, of personal constitution, ability, and character, and of social nature, are immediately created by association. Differences of political status and of occupation

[1] See *ante*, page 63 ; *cf.* also "Is the Term Social Classes a Scientific Category," read at the twenty-second annual session of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, New Haven, May, 1895. "Proceedings," pp. 110–116.

are mediately created by association, through the evolution of a social constitution. Differences of wealth and poverty are yet more remote consequences of association. They are among the latest and most special phenomena of progress. The secondary population classes are of interest to students of the special social sciences. The general sociologist is concerned only with the primary classes.

The vitality classes are the simplest direct results of association. They spring from the combination of different elements in the inheritance and circumstances of each individual. The combination is governed by association, and especially by the consciousness of kind. The indices of the vitality classes are the ratios of their death-rates to their birth-rates. The high vitality class has a high birth-rate and a low death-rate. In modern communities it roughly coincides with the rural landowning population. The medium vitality class has a low birth-rate and a low death-rate. It approximately coincides with the business and professional classes of the towns. The low vitality class has a high birth-rate and a high death-rate. It approximately coincides with the impoverished lower working class of the towns.[1]

The personality classes, like the vitality classes, are created by the combinations of inheritance and of circumstance as determined by association, and are namely: the geniuses and talented; the normally endowed; the defective. The beginnings of a scientific study of the first two of these classes have been made by Sir Francis Galton,[2] by Professor Cesare Lombroso,[3] and by a few other less well known investigators,[4] but as yet there is little exact statistical investigation of either normal or remark-

[1] See Hansen, "Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen." This subject is further discussed, *supra*, pp. 337, 342.

[2] "Hereditary Genius" and "Natural Inheritance."

[3] "The Man of Genius."

[4] See MacDonald, "Abnormal Man."

able personality. The defective have long been studied by statistical methods. In all enumerations of the defective should be included the crippled, the blind, the deaf and dumb, the inebriate, the epileptic, the imbecile, the insane, and the suicidal.

The social classes, distinguished by differences of social nature, are created partly by the combinations of inheritance, and partly also by the educational influence of association, which continues to act on the unequally endowed personal elements in the population. It moulds some individuals into a perfect adaptation to social life. In a less degree it modifies others. Social pressure and discrimination also, which increase as population becomes dense and active, have important consequences. Normally organized individuals react upon them healthfully, and become more and more social, while those defectives that have become degenerate react morbidly until they become wholly unfit for social life or even antagonistic to it. Obviously these are differentiations not only of personality but also of sociality.

The true social classes are: the social, the non-social, the pseudo-social, and the anti-social.[1] The social class is composed of those in whom the consciousness of kind is highly developed and whose dispositions and abilities impel them to make positive contributions to the sum of helpful relations. As ability and willingness to entertain with refinement and with charm is the test which polite society applies to men and women who seek recognition and preferment, so ability and willingness to devote life and means to the defence and amelioration of the existing social order is the test of positively social qualities in the larger sense. The social class therefore is the class that

[1] One of my former students, Mr. Oscar Woodward Zeigler, suggests a more elaborate division which, for some purposes, would be convenient. See *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. VI., No. 2, September, 1895, pp. 147–149.

Harrington, developing the thought of Aristotle, called the natural aristocracy among men.[1] Without this class, composed of those who help, inspire, and lead; of the unselfishly enterprising; of the philanthropic and self-sacrificing; of reformers of the sane and patient sort; and of those who voice the common aspiration, no community, whether its government be monarchical or democratic, whether its wealth be small or great, can survive and prosper.

The non-social class is composed of those who cling to a narrow individualism. The consciousness of kind in them is normal, but it is only partially developed. They will neither accept favours nor often give them. They ask only to be let alone. This is the primordial social class, from which the other three social classes are directly or indirectly generated. It contains in germ all social virtue, all social vice and crime. It is simply neutral, waiting to be reached and impelled upwards or downwards by the resistless currents of social life.

The pseudo-social class is composed of congenital and habitual paupers. Their consciousness of kind is degenerate. They simulate the qualities of the social, and invariably pose as victims of misfortune. In reality they have not even the virtues of the non-social. They desire only to live as parasites. Among those whom the law classes as paupers, however, there are always some true victims of misfortune, who therefore do not belong to the pseudo-social class.

The anti-social class is composed of instinctive and habitual criminals,[2] in whom the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction, and who detest society and all its ways. They make no pretence of social virtues and pre-

[1] "Oceana," p. 44.

[2] For a description of the true criminal nature, the reader is referred to the works of Lombroso, Garofalo, Féré, Laurent, Ellis, and MacDonald.

fer to live by open aggression upon the social. They do not desire the coöperation of the social in maintaining their rights or interests, and prefer to avenge personally any real or fancied wrongs that they suffer. Among those who are by law classed as criminals there are many who have not become altogether anti-social, and who could be saved from the anti-social class.

Wherever the secondary sources of subsistence are abundant and permanent, — that is to say, wherever there is surplus wealth, the pauper and criminal types are developed into great population classes Animal societies have criminal members.[1] They have also their pauper individuals which follow the band in its food quests and live on the fragments of the food that the stronger majority procure: but they have not, like human societies, a pauper class, because surplus food is too inadequate in amount and the conditions of life in general are too severe for pauper endurance; they have no criminal class because criminal individuals are expelled or put to death.

As social aggregation begins where natural supplies of food are found, so criminal and pauper aggregation begins and continues where the artificial surplus supply is accumulated. "The frontier," says Roosevelt, "in spite of the outward uniformity of means and manners, is preëminently the place of sharp contrasts. The two extremes of society, the strongest, best, and most adventurous, and the weakest, most shiftless, and vicious, are those which seem naturally to drift to the border. Most of the men who came to the backwoods to hew out homes and rear families were stern, manly, and honest; but there was also a large influx of people drawn from the worst immigrants that perhaps ever were brought to America — the mass of convict servants, redemptioners, and the like, who formed such an excessively undesirable substratum to the otherwise excellent population of the tide-water

[1] MacDonald, "Criminology," pp. 19–21.

regions in Virginia and the Carolinas Many of the southern crackers or poor whites spring from this class, which also in the backwoods gave birth to generations of violent and hardened criminals, and to an even greater number of shiftless, lazy, cowardly cumberers of the earth's surface. They had in many places a permanently bad effect upon the tone of the whole community. . . . In the backwoods the lawless led lives of abandoned wickedness; they hated good for good's sake, and did their utmost to destroy it. Where the bad element was large, gangs of horse thieves, highwaymen, and other criminals often united with the uncontrollable young men of vicious tastes who were given to gambling, fighting, and the like. They then formed half-secret organizations, often of great extent and with wide ramifications; and if they could control a community they established a reign of terror, driving out both ministers and magistrates, and killing without scruple those who interfered with them."[1]

The history of the English Poor Law is one long record of the increase and diminution of pauperism with the rhythmical rise and fall of a maudlin sentimentalism that desired to bestow in alms and parish aid the augmenting wealth of the kingdom. All modern experience of poor relief is an overwhelming demonstration that any community can have all the pauperism and criminality that it cares to pay for.

At the present time the great centres of secondary sources of subsistence are the cities, and it is there that the pauper and criminal population is most rapidly increasing. During the year ending October 31, 1892,[2] no less than 45,777 criminals and misdemeanants were convicted in the courts of New York City. In 1890 the

[1] "The Winning of the West," pp. 130, 131.

[2] "Annual Report of the Secretary of State on Statistics of Crime in the State of New York," 1893.

same city, with a population of 1,515,301,[1] through its municipal outdoor-poor department, relieved 25,212 adults and 1324 children, and provided 8340 families with coal. The same department buried 2042 paupers. The almshouse at Blackwell's Island in the course of the year cared for 5337 indoor paupers.[2]

In the study of the genesis of the population classes we have the key to the scientific arrangement of those interesting questions that are often spoken of as the problems of practical sociology. Just how the study of crime, pauperism, and vice, of poverty, insanity, and suicide, could be logically connected with the propositions of theoretical sociology, has been a puzzling question to many students, and sociological writers generally have fallen back upon the familiar expedient of dividing their subject into theoretical and practical, or theoretical and applied sociology, or the science and the art. I confess that I have never had much respect for this expedient. It is the easy device of incomplete or baffled thinking. Some of the facts that a science deals with are more practical than others because our daily lives are in more immediate contact with them; but as knowable facts they admit of explanation; the explanation is a theory, and if we do not see it to be a coördinate part of the larger theory of our subject in its entirety, the reason is that we have not yet fully worked out the logical

[1] As given by the Federal Census.

[2] "Thirty-first Annual Report of the Commissioners of Charities and Correction." I give the figures of 1890-92, as being more fairly representative than later ones, because the distressful winter of 1893-94 and the bountiful and widely advertised relief brought an unusual influx of vagrants and criminals. Mr. Charles D. Kellogg, General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society, estimates the number of the non-resident poor in the city that winter at 20,000, the whole number of idle, able-bodied indigent at 60,000, and the total population that was cared for by special exertions at 200,000. "Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction," Twenty-first annual session, p. 23.

subordination of its particular theorems. More adequate views of the great issues of practical sociolcgy may be looked for if we can effect a scientific arrangement of the problems. If association necessarily modifies the physical, mental, and moral nature, but not equally in all individuals, and if unequal degrees of adjustment to the social conditions of life are therefore inevitable, we have an explanation of the differentiation of the population into classes, with well-marked differences of physical, mental, and social nature. Therefore it may be that in a true theory of social evolution we shall yet find an interpretation that will create a scientific order in the maze of facts of practical sociology.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL MIND

THE mental and moral elements of society are combined in products that are called by such terms as the common feeling, the general desire, the moral sense, the public opinion, and the general will of the community, and which it is convenient for the sociologist to name collectively the social mind. The primary result of association is an evolution of the individual mind. The secondary result is an evolution of the social mind.

The first writer to formulate a scientific conception of the social mind was Lewes, who has given an excellent account of what he calls the general mind. "The experiences of each individual," he says, "come and go; they correct, enlarge, destroy one another, leaving behind them a certain residual store, which, condensed in intuitions and formulated in principles, direct and modify all future experiences. The sum of these is designated as the individual mind. A similar process evolves the general mind — the residual store of experiences common to all. By means of language the individual shares in the general fund, which thus becomes for him an impersonal objective influence. To it each appeals. We all assimilate some of its material, and help to increase its store. Not only do we find ourselves confronting nature, to whose order we must conform, but confronting society, whose laws we must obey. We have to learn what nature is and does, what our fellow-men think and will,

and unless we learn aright and act in conformity, we are inexorably punished.[1]

". . . Each new generation is born in this social medium, and has to adapt itself to the established forms. Society, though constituted by individuals, has a powerful reaction on every individual. 'In the infancy of nations,' said Montesquieu, 'man forms the state; in their maturity the state forms the man.' It is thus also with the collective experience of the race fashioning the experience of the individual. It makes a man accept what he cannot understand, and obey what he does not believe. His thoughts are only partly his own; they are also the thoughts of others. His actions are guided by the will of others; even in rebellion he has them in his mind. His standard is outside. That is true which all men affirm, and no experience contradicts: *consensus gentium*. If a man cannot see this truth, he is pronounced to be an anomaly or a madman. If he does not feel what all feel, he is thrown out of account, except in the reckoning of abnormities.

"Individual experiences being limited and individual spontaneity feeble, we are strengthened and enriched by assimilating the experiences of others. A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of the individual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond is the medium of a fish: through this it touches the outlying world, and is touched by it; but the direct motions of its activity are within this circle. The nation affects the sect, the sect the individual. Not that the individual is passive, he is only directed; he, too, reacts on the sect and nation, helping to create the social life of which he partakes."[2]

Lewes did not distinguish between the general mind of a particular society and the general mind of humanity. It will be convenient to observe the discrimination. Each

[1] "Problems of Life and Mind: The Study of Psychology," p. 161.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

community or tribe, each nation, has its own social mind, which is more unlike the social mind of any other society than the physical appearance of one nationality is unlike that of another. Yet all communities have feelings and thoughts in common: there is a human mind.

We must carefully avoid associating false conceptions with the terms social mind and social consciousness. They do not stand for mere abstractions. The social mind is a concrete thing. It is more than any individual mind and dominates every individual will. Yet it exists only in individual minds, and we have no knowledge of any consciousness but that of individuals. The social consciousness, then, is nothing more than the feeling or the thought that appears at the same moment in all individuals, or that is propagated from one to another through the assembly or the community. The social mind is the phenomenon of many individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment and perhaps act in concert. It is, in short, the mental unity of many individuals or of a crowd.[1] It is therefore a product of what M. Tarde has called a social logic,[2] which binds the products of individual logic into more complex wholes.

In its simplest form the social integration of feeling and belief is effected imitatively and sympathetically. A wave of feeling may surge through a crowd, and expend itself in an almost purely reflex act, as when an audience bursts into applause. Again, perceiving the same facts, feeling about them in the same way, and observing in one another the same outward signs of similar inward states, all the members of a social aggregation may, without discussion or deliberation, be simultaneously moved to like action. To take a definite example from animal life, this is what

[1] Cf. Le Bon, "Psychologie des foules," p. 14. [2] "La logique sociale."

happens when wildly excited elephants, with heavy blows of their trunks, drive off a stranger elephant that attempts to take refuge among them, — a sight often witnessed in India.[1] It is what happens when animals or human beings flee in panic from sudden danger, or gather with dread and curiosity at the scene of an accident. It must be by some such process that bands of hundreds or thousands of birds, squirrels, buffaloes, or horses come together and conduct an orderly migration.

The imitative and sympathetic integration of feeling and belief, manifesting itself in more or less violent reflex or instinctive action, is seen on a large scale in popular fads or crazes, panics, emotional revivals, mobs, lynchings, riots, and revolutions. The character of the outbreak depends partly upon the temperament, partly upon the nervous condition, and partly upon the social nature of the population. The greater the proportion of criminality, degeneration, and morbid feeling in the population the more violent is the disturbance. On June 28, 1895, at Jackson, Kentucky, one Thomas Smith, the murderer of eight men, was baptized and then hanged, in the presence of an immense throng. People were encamped along the river all night, awaiting the event. Excursion trains were run and hundreds of mountaineers arrived on foot and on horseback.[2] That such a population should be subject to spasms of lawless frenzy is in no way remarkable, and one need feel no surprise to read that only six months before this occurrence an Ohio judge had refused to grant a Kentucky demand for extradition, on the ground that the number of lynchings in Kentucky created a presumption that the prisoner, if sent back, would die without legal process.[3] Excitable, sanguine populations are more subject than others to emotional epidemic.

[1] Tennent, "Sketches of the Natural History of Ceylon," p. 114.

[2] *New York Evening Post*, June 28, 1895.

[3] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X., No. 2, June, 1895, p. 374.

Southern nationalities are more apt than northern to act impulsively. Revolutions in South America; anarchical outbreaks in Sicily; rioting in the streets of Madrid, like that in which a mob of military officers wrecked newspaper offices on March 16, 1895;[1] or in the streets of Budapest, like that of the students on the occasion of Kossuth's funeral,[2] — these are occurrences to be expected in the ordinary course of events.

Among the contributory causes of unreasoning social impulse must be included all those that have long been recognized as factors of individual criminality and folly. Heat, for example, sends up the curve of revolutions, seditions, and riots, as it does that of crimes against persons, and that of disorderly conduct in jails, prisons, and insane asylums.[3] Density of population, the transition from agriculture to industrial employment, stress of competition, and alcoholism, have a like unfavourable effect.

The chief condition, however, of passionate and violent social action is the massing of men in crowds. Crowds are subject to a swift contagion of feeling,[4] they are sensitive to suggestion, they think in images and are subject to hallucinations,[5] they go wild over the catchwords and formulas that happen to be popular fetiches.[6] The crowd is devoid of a sense of responsibility, because while in the crowd, the individual loses his own feeling of responsibility and acquires a sense of invincible power, and so gives way to impulses which, if he were alone, he would control.[7] Like the savage and the child, the crowd is intolerant of anything interposed between its desires and their realiza-

[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X., No. 2, June, 1895, p. 383.

[2] Ibid., Vol. IX., No. 2, June, 1894, p. 371.

[3] See Lombroso et Laschi, "Le crime politique et les révolutions," Vol. I., Chaps. II. and III., and Plate I.

[4] Le Bon, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[5] Ibid., pp. 29–30.

[6] Ibid., p. 89 *sq.*

[7] Ibid., p. 18.

tion,[1] and it always manifests a tendency to carry suggested ideas immediately into action.[2] Crowds therefore are mobile, and with changing excitants they are generous or cruel, heroic or pusillanimous.[3]

A more perfect integration of the elements of social consciousness and a complex organization of the social mind is effected deliberatively, through rational discussion. The essential steps of the process are, the genesis of social self-consciousness, the evolution of social memory, and the evolution of social values. The result is rational social choice, by means of which a society that is conscious of itself as a community is able, in a measure, to shape its career.

Discussion and social self-consciousness are but different phases of the same phenomenon, or, rather, one is process and the other is result. As social consciousness in its more general modes consists of thoughts that appear simultaneously in many individual minds which are acting upon one another, so the social self-consciousness consists of similar self-conscious states, which simultaneously exist in many individual minds that are in active communication. In a true social self-consciousness, which must be described rather than defined, — the distinctive peculiarity is, that each individual makes his neighbour's feeling or judgment an object of thought, at the same instant that he makes his own feeling or thought such an object; that he judges the two to be identical, and that he then acts with a full consciousness that his fellows have come to like conclusions, and will act in like ways.

Through such comparisons of one man's knowledge or opinion with another's, a community is able to perceive what otherwise it could only feel. For example, a community feels, it does not perceive the fluctuations of sup-

[1] Le Bon, *op. cit.*, p. 26. [2] Ibid., p. 20. [3] Ibid., p. 25.

ply and demand in the market so long as there are no systematic records and comparisons of prices, but the moment that quotations are generally exchanged, or that statistics are published, the feeling is converted into a perception.[1] In like manner, some form of wrong or evil may be felt as a depressing influence long before it is really perceived; because it is diffused, and no one knows its extent or its phases, or just how it is affecting other persons than himself. But when experiences are compared, and when each man begins to know all that his fellows know, and all that they think, about the matter, then the trouble stands forth clearly as an object of perception to the social consciousness, which rapidly comes to a judgment upon it. Such is the genesis of a true public opinion, which may be defined as the judgment of a self-conscious community upon any subject of general interest.

The genesis of public opinion obviously depends upon intellectual contact and communication. Where intercourse is as nearly non-existent as it is among the Cumberland mountaineers of Tennessee, there is no public opinion. Where it is as perfect as it was in rural New England a generation ago, public opinion may reach its highest development. Notwithstanding a scattering distribution of the population, every family, by means of the church, the town-meeting, the lyceum, and the newspaper, kept itself intelligently informed upon all events of interest in the nation and in the world. As a rule, however, a high development of public opinion is found where population is relatively dense. Of not less importance is the right of all classes to initiate discussion. Where public meetings can be convened only by administrative process there is no true public opinion.[2] Therefore in

[1] Cf. De Greef, "Introduction à la sociologie," deuxième partie, p. 345.

[2] Cf. Jephson, "The Platform." The great value of Jephson's work lies in the clear distinction that he has made between the political dis-

societies that are politically organized true public opinion is dependent upon the maintenance of liberal constitutional government. It is dependent also upon the general diffusion of education, and upon such relations of justice and sympathy between the well-to-do and the poor that ingenuous expression can be the natural habit of all classes. The spirit rather than the form of republicanism is necessary. True public opinion is more highly developed in England than in France. Fatal to it is the semi-criminal democracy that has disgraced and misgoverned American cities.[1]

Yet, however republican in spirit a community may be, and however intelligent its members, its public opinion is moulded in some degree by a few leading minds. In the local community these are not now always the parson, the squire, and the doctor, who still controlled rural thinking in this country a generation ago. In many places they have been overshadowed by the business man, — not always for the better. A public opinion of larger dimensions is organized by public meeting and the press; but these are guided by a few thoughtful, or manipulated by a few clever, men. Probably we underestimate the social influence of the thoughtful man, although in these days of reaction against hero-worship and idealism there is a common belief to the contrary.

The press became an important organ of public opinion during the anti-slavery agitation in the United States. The popular notions, that the press has now submerged all individual influence beneath its daily deluge of imper-

cussion which any individual faction or interest can now initiate in a country like England or the United States and the political discussions which only a century and a half ago could be initiated only by governmental authorities.

[1] For the best account of public opinion in the United States, see Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," Part IV. Cf. also Jenks, "The Guidance of Public Opinion," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I., No. 2, September, 1895.

sonal advice, and that it has superseded the platform and the pulpit, are demonstrably erroneous. The press has made its deepest impression upon public opinion when it has been the mouthpiece of a commanding personality, — a Garrison, a Greeley, a Bowles, or a Curtis. Besides, the public does not realize that behind the curtain, in the newspaper office, the man of ideas who is unknown to the world is known to all his fellows of the craft, and stamps his individuality upon their thought and their work.

The press, moreover, is the chief organ of public opinion only in quiet times. In the excitement of a political campaign that earlier organ, the platform, renews its activity. The pulpit has doubtless ceased to make itself felt in public affairs under ordinary circumstances, but it will probably long continue to be what for many centuries it has been, the organ of reserved power for moral emergencies. New York City, aroused to civic duty by the preaching of one earnest divine, is a proof that it is not yet too late in human history to witness on occasion that power of the pulpit which was witnessed in the days of Savonarola, of Luther and of Calvin, of Whitefield and of Wesley, of Parker and of Channing.

In its self-consciousness a community has a living bond of union. The mutual aid and protection of individuals, operating in an unconscious way, are no longer the only means that preserve social cohesion ; the community feels and perceives its unity. This feeling of unity must be destroyed before rupture can occur.

But even self-consciousness in any given manifestation is only a momentary bond. In this respect it is inferior to the bond of mutual aid. It acquires continuity, however, through the development of another phase of the social mind, namely, — the social memory. The social memory is that sum of transmitted knowledge and beliefs

which is known as tradition. In tradition, the relations, the ideas, and the usages that have sprung up unconsciously and because of their intrinsic usefulness have survived, are consciously defined and memorized. The garnered experience of the past has become the common possession of all individuals. (Tradition is thus the integration of the public opinion of many generations.

The whole body of tradition is differentiated into three great orders of traditions, and these are differentiated into particular traditions, which correspond to the varied interests of life. The primary traditions are: the economic, or the tradition of utilization; the juridical, or the tradition of toleration; and the political, or the tradition of alliance, homage, and obedience. These primary traditions are the record of experiences of the tangible world. The secondary traditions are: the animistic or personal, the æsthetic, and the religious. They are the record of impressions of an intangible world; a world of personal consciousness, and of the shadows, images, and echoes of tangible things. The tertiary traditions are the theological, the metaphysical, and the scientific. They are the record of conceptual thought.

The fundamental primary tradition is the tradition of utilization. It grows out of the relations of superiors to human, animal, vegetable, or inorganic inferiors that are appropriated and enjoyed by the superiors, or are pressed into their service. It is accordingly the tradition of subjective and objective utilities, and of the methods of increasing utilities. It is not to any great extent a conscious analysis of these things. The tradition is on the whole concrete; but in the concrete there is a scale of comparative values. Ideas of food, shelter, sexual pleasure, ornaments, and offspring are its simplest elements, and the ones that are found in the greatest number of individual minds. Then comes the knowledge of such things as implements, clothing, gifts, trade, labour, coöpera-

tion and methods of producing and using objective utilities. All this economic tradition has its centre in the household, but in the civilized world it extends to that elaborate organization of manufactures and commerce which has been differentiated from household industry.

Second in importance among the primary traditions is the tradition of toleration, which grows out of relations to antagonistic equals. It has been shown that the effective sanction of toleration is vengeance. The modes of vengeance and the phases of toleration that are suitable to different circumstances, are named and described in rules of custom, which formulate those enjoyments and immunities that are habitually allowed. Collectively these rules of objective and sanctioned right form the jural tradition, — the substance of the common law.

The third primary tradition is that of alliance in its political form. It grows out of relations to allies and superiors. Alliance simply as a fact presupposes some of the elements of subjective utility and some actual toleration. On the other hand, the traditions of utility and of toleration, as distinguished from their respective phenomena, presuppose actual alliance in simple and perhaps unconscious forms. But again, the conscious development of alliance, or its extension, to bring two or more bands, hordes, or tribes into one larger aggregation, presupposes traditions of utility and of toleration. Purposive alliance is the elementary political fact. Its motive is the desire to strengthen the traditions of utility and of toleration by an obedience-compelling power, and to extend their application. The political tradition, therefore, is wrought out of the economic and jural traditions, and in its evolution it is closely interwoven with them.

Some slight beginnings of the primary traditions, especially of the economic tradition, may be observed in animal societies. It is probable that much "instinct" consists partly of tradition; that it is knowledge which is con-

sciously imparted to the young by their elders, in distinction from aptitudes that are transmitted in the nervous organization independently of individual observation and practice. To be sure that such arts as the nest-building of birds and the hill-building of ants are wholly instinctive it would be necessary to remove young ones from their parents and from all other adults of their species for successive generations, and to see if they then continued to build in the usual way without deviation from ancestral patterns. That within two or three generations new knowledge may become a permanent possession of an entire species seems to be demonstrated by the altered habits of birds since the advent of telegraph and electric-light wires, and by the ingenuity of hunted animals in baffling the new devices of sportsmen.[1] If the economic knowledge of animals is partly traditional, it is possible that among a few species of ants certain rules of toleration and alliance also are traditional.

The economic tradition is found in all human societies. In even the lowest savage bands it is a considerable body of knowledge of edible and medicinal plants, of the habits of many species of animals, and of the humbler economic arts. The component elements of the legal and the political traditions also are found in savagery. The traditions themselves are well developed in barbarism, but they are elaborately developed only in civilization.

In animal societies there is no trace of the secondary traditions, but they are found in all human societies. The personal, or animistic, tradition is the sum of man's beliefs about himself as consisting of body and soul. Among savages many inanimate objects also are conceived of as personal, and beliefs about their supposed habits and powers constitute a large part of the animistic tradition. Among the civilized the tradition of personality consists largely of beliefs about the spiritual

[1] Tylor, "Anthropology," p. 51.

nature, the worthiness, and the probable destiny of the conscious self. The æsthetic tradition consists of beliefs about sounds and images, as means of personal expression. The savage regards the shadow or image as a veritable spiritual essence, the echo as the audible voice of an unseen soul. The civilized man has ceased to regard sounds and forms as living things in any such crude sense, but through them, in music and in the plastic arts, he expresses and he reads the subtlest moods of the spirit. The religious tradition is the sum of beliefs about the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body, and about invisible personal powers, from ghosts to gods, which are supposed to govern natural phenomena and to control human destinies. Savages think that the world is peopled with spirits of the dead. They are regarded with fear, and beliefs about them are a confused web of superstition. To the barbarian, spirits are of various ranks, from inferior and contemptible ghosts to powerful gods, who usually are the ghosts of great chieftains, or the animating spirits of awe-inspiring natural objects. In civilized lands the ignorant still believe in ghosts, and a majority of the people believe in the existence of personal gods or of one omnipotent God. They are mistaken who think that the religious tradition is disappearing.

The traditions of conceptual thought — the tertiary traditions — are found only in civilization. The oldest is the theological tradition, which was created by an elaborate process of reasoning and speculation upon the materials furnished by popular religious beliefs. It is the sum and record of attempts to demonstrate the existence of a personal God, to explain his nature and purposes, and to prove that he created and providentially governs the world and man. Metaphysical tradition has been derived from the theological. It refines the theological explanation of the universe by interposing "secondary causes," laws, and

principles between phenomena and their ultimate cause, the fiat of God. The scientific tradition is the sum of our actual knowledge of the world and of man, as distinguished from our conjectures about them. It is the sifted record of observations, experiments, and classifications. Making no attempt to penetrate the final mystery of existence, it explains the constitution of the world only to the extent of showing how one thing is related to other things, in sequence and in coexistence.

Traditional belief is ever being modified by new thought; there is an integration of tradition with current opinion. The results are variously known as standards, codes, policies, ideals, tastes, faiths, creeds, and "isms."

The combination of economic traditions with current economic opinions is the general standard of living of the community. This term has been used loosely by economic writers. For example, the articles that a labouring class consumes are not its standard of living; they are merely an index of its standard. Still less is mere desire a standard. The labour demagogue has not necessarily a higher standard of living than his followers have if he voices an ineffectual longing for the earth, which they do not feel. The real standard of living is a certain conception of economic life, which regulates desire and controls conduct.[1] It is constituted of traditional beliefs and of new ideas in varying proportions, and changes as these factors change. The Hungarian standard of living in the coke-burning districts of Pennsylvania is not lower than the American standard because the Hungarian is satisfied with food and lodging that would disgust the American, but rather the Hungarian is so easily satisfied because his standard of living is lower.

The combination of jural tradition and new law is the legal code. To what extent the public opinion of the

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 335.

hour, not yet enacted into statute, is an element in new law, is a question upon which jurists disagree. It is admitted that public opinion influences the interpretation of law, and, in a republic, public opinion is the real law-enforcing power back of all nominal powers. For the purposes of legal theory and practice, all authoritatively declared law must be held to be law until it is repealed, but as a phenomenon of the social mind it is doubtful whether any rule that public opinion will not enforce is really law.

The combination of political tradition and current political opinion is policy, — a plan or programme of legislation and administration. In quiet times, when a party or a government has been long intrenched in power, the element of tradition predominates. For twenty years after the Civil War in the United States was over, the Republican party lived on war issues, and it was finally defeated because of its inability to vitalize its policy with fresh issues. In times of disturbance or when new interests clamour for attention, the predominating element in policy is current opinion.

New thought in combination with the tradition of personality creates an ideal. The product of the æsthetic tradition and current criticism is taste. The product of traditional religious beliefs and current religious ideas is a faith. The modification of the theological tradition by current conceptions is a creed. The modification of the metaphysical tradition by current speculation is an "ism." The modification of the scientific tradition by fresh discoveries has and needs no special name, for science makes no compromises between the old and the new. Whatever of the old is verified by later research is retained; whatever is disproved is discarded, and the net result is truth.

These products of tradition and opinion exist only in individual minds. Professor Durkheim's argument that because they can be committed to writing they are inde-

pendent objective realities is a fallacy;[1] the written page is meaningless apart from the knowledge of the living reader. But at any given moment they exist in a multitude of interacting minds, and are therefore objective as well as subjective to each individual. Upon each mind as it unfolds they are imposed from without, and are sanctioned by penalties for disregard or disobedience, that range from ridicule, disapproval, and boycotting to collective force or vengeance.

Through the channels of its standards, codes, and policies; of its ideals, tastes, and faiths; of its creeds, "isms," and investigations, the mental life of society flows in an ever-changing distribution. One generation is absorbed in political concerns, another in business affairs. At one time society is religious, at another time creative and artistic, at yet another time scientific. Always, however, a tendency towards the establishment of a normal equilibrium may be observed. At any given moment traditional beliefs and current opinions assume unlike forms in different parts of the population. The products of the social mind are mutually dependent. This is the social logic in its highest manifestation.

Public opinion, tradition, and the combinations of opinion with tradition, are intellectual products of the social mind. In constant interaction with them are the ever-changing moods of desire. In combinations of the intellectual products with desires, therefore, there is a final integration of the elements and products of the social mind. The resulting final products are the social estimates of things that are socially important. They are social values, and are analogous to the subjective values of the individual mind.

The consciousness of kind being the psychological basis of social phenomena, it follows that the supreme object

[1] "Les règles de la méthode sociologique," Chap. I.

of social value is the kind itself, or the type of conscious life that is characteristic of the society. Each nation supremely values its own characteristic qualities, and it is this social self-valuation that we call national prejudice. It is the essence of the Briton's love of things British, of the American's pride in things American. To some extent the physical and the moral traits of the social type are valued separately. The Greeks took an especial pride in the lines of the Greek form, the Hebrews an especial pride in the righteousness that exalted their nation. As in each politically organized nation, so in each race, nationality, local community, family, class, clique, and circle, it is the kind or type that is chiefly valued.

Next to the type in social value is the social cohesion. The existence of a society depends on its unity, and when its integrity is threatened the community shows itself ready to make any sacrifice that may be necessary to save union. The most splendid examples of social feeling have been the patriotic enthusiasms that have been aroused by the threatened disruption of nations. As a bond of cohesion, loyalty is socially valued in every community in which social feeling is normally developed. Where spontaneous loyalty fails a high value is attached to such makeshifts as bribery, patronage, and coercion.

Third in the order of social value are the distinctive possessions and proprieties of the community. First among these is territory, which is regarded with feelings that range from mere pride in the extent and resources of a national domain, to an abiding affection for a fatherland. In strongly religious societies, and especially in those that have not emerged from barbarism, sacred places are devoutly valued. The holy mountain, — the Sinai or Olympus, — the sacred river, the pool of divine healing, are held in veneration. Among the most prized possessions of every nation are its leaders, heroes, saints, and gods. Hardly less valued are its ceremonies and costumes, its

manners and morals, its laws, worships, and amusements. The Greek's pride of possession in the Olympic games, the Hindoo's in the law of Manu, the Israelite's in the law of Moses, the Roman's in the Twelve Tables, and the Englishman's in the common law, are among the best examples of social values. It is unnecessary to show in detail that the social valuation of common possessions and proprieties is but a manifestation of the consciousness of kind. Gods and heroes are members of the community and are the best exemplifications of its typical moral qualities. Ceremonies and costumes, manners and morals, are distinguishing marks and habits of the type. Laws, worships, and amusements are the enduring expressions of its character.

Last in the order of importance and of evolution are the social values attaching to certain abstract conditions that are favourable to social integrity and development, and to certain modes of effort that are intended to extend or to perfect the social type. The conditions are liberty, equality, and fraternity. As Fitz-James Stephen has brilliantly demonstrated,[1] these three conditions are to some extent incompatible. Perfect liberty and perfect equality cannot coexist. When they are equally valued, the value of each must be rigorously subordinated to higher values, or the result will be the anarchy of revolution. Generally, however, they are not equally valued. For the sake of social cohesion and of the homogeneity of the social type, liberty is partially sacrificed to certain modes of equality — or to equality in respect of certain things; while for the sake of progress other modes of equality are sacrificed to liberty. The modes of effort are missionary effort, philanthropy, and education. These characteristic manifestations of the modern spirit are an expression of the passion of the highest social types to extend themselves among the lower races, and among the poor, the unfortunate, and the ignorant.

[1] "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

The order in which the social values have been named is the normal scale of their relative importance, but the actual valuations made by the social mind are often aberrant. Social utilities are often wrongly placed in the scale. Among social utilities there is a relation which corresponds to the relation of producers' goods to consumers' goods in business values. All objects of social value, except the social type, are but means to an end. The type is the end for which social cohesion, social possessions, and conditions are maintained; as consumers' goods are the end for which the instruments of production, the mechanism of exchange, the organization of labour, and certain necessary legal conditions, are maintained. But as men of inferior mental powers easily fall into the habit of valuing producers' goods — especially money and credit — for their own sake, and so create false systems of political economy, so do many classes in the community habitually value social possessions and institutions as ends in themselves. This is a feature of all conservatism. It is exemplified in the jurist's apotheosis of law, in the politician's sacrifice of patriotism to partisanship, and in the ecclesiastic's tendency to regard his church as the end for which the divine economy exists.

Social values are the grounds of rational social choice. They determine the social will in so far as its action is deliberate.

In recognizing the deliberate action of the social mind I am of course by implication rejecting the conclusion of those who hold that the social mind never acts rationally, or that its action at the best must be less rational than is that of individuals. M. Le Bon argues that unconscious action, passion, and sentiment predominate in the crowd, because individuals differ less in feeling than in intelligence.[1] His conclusion is beyond doubt true of crowds

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

in the usual English meaning of the word, but M. Le Bon gives a wide extension to *foule*, and makes it cover not only a number of persons congregated in one place, but also any class of persons that communicate about their common interests. Of associations in this latter sense his conclusion will not always hold good. In the prolonged deliberations of a group of men that alternately meet and separate, or that communicate without meeting, the highest thought of the most rational mind among them may prevail.

Alternate meeting and separation is, in fact, the one essential condition of true social deliberation. For the social mind is far from being, as M. Le Bon attempts to prove,[1] very unlike the individual mind in its operations. It is astonishingly like the individual mind, and in no respect more so than in its rational processes. When the individual deliberates he permits new ideas to interpose themselves between suggestion and act, or between hypothesis and judgment. He diverts his attention, as he says, which simply means that he breaks the continuity of idea and impulse by opening the mind to new influences. Time and new associations are necessary to deliberation. If the social mind would deliberate it must follow a similar course. The spell that holds the crowd must be broken. The orientation of its thought must be disturbed; the catch-word fetiches must cease to hypnotize. To this end the crowd must disperse; the assembly must adjourn; the legislator must now and then go back to his constituents. When this is done the social mind may deliberate as rationally as the individual mind.

That it does so deliberate in fact, we have positive proof in the scores of examples of popular decisions arrived at after years of agitation and discussion, such as the repeal of the corn laws in England in 1849, the abolition of slavery in the United States in 1865, the anti-polygamy legislation of 1862 to 1887, the divorce legisla-

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 15 *sq.*

tion of France in 1884, the repeal of the Federal election laws in 1894, and the steady progress of civil service reform.

The importance of time and of new points of view in social deliberation is the scientific justification of the checks and balances in our system of government; especially the independence of the judiciary and the constitution-interpreting power of the Supreme Court. Checks and balances have no merit in themselves, but they are a successfully working mechanism to secure the deliberate instead of the passionate action of the social mind.

In its deliberate action the social mind not only imposes its standards, codes, policies, faiths, and creeds upon individuals; it acts also upon the groupings of individuals which have grown up more or less unconsciously and upon various relations of mutual aid. Sanctioning some groupings and relations, opposing others, it shapes the social organization.[1]

[1] Cf. Bosanquet, "The Reality of the General Will," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. IV., No. 3, April, 1893.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION

In the organization of society by composition individuals of both sexes are first combined in small groups. The small groups are combined in larger groups, and these in groups yet larger. Each complete small group, and therefore every larger group, contains individuals of more than one generation. The childless union of male and female is an incomplete group, — socially no less than physiologically abortive. Accordingly each group is in a measure a product of genetic aggregation, It might, therefore, live independently of other groups, perpetuate itself, and grow to larger dimensions. Whether small or large, each group is composed of elements that are less like each other than any one group as such is like any other group of similar composition. For example, father, mother, and child in any given type of the family are more unlike than are two families of the same type. The inhabitants of any given town in which are found different nationalities, different ages, different abilities, characters, and tastes, are more unlike than are neighbouring towns. The inhabitants of each commonwealth of the American Union differ more among themselves than do the commonwealths. Thus each group has, on the whole, the same characteristics and lives in much the same way as any other group of similar composition and dimensions. Therefore such groups mutually aid and supplement each other only in power and mass, not by division of labour.

The groupings of the social composition are natural products of the physiological and psychological activities of individuals, supplemented by natural selection. They arise unconsciously, and their prevailing forms are established by unconscious adaptation to the conditions of life before the social mind begins to reflect upon them. All this is true of both animal and human groups. Presently, however, in human society the social mind reflects upon the composition and form of the natural groups, and discovers that it prefers some arrangements to others. Conscious selections and adaptations follow. All human groupings, therefore, have to adapt themselves not only to physical conditions but also to the social mind. They are still natural products of individual habits, but they are artificially modified by the social self-consciousness which chooses and sanctions.

Not much social composition is found among animals below the birds. Nearly all birds, however, live in families. The male helps the female in building the nest, in protecting the offspring, and in providing food. In his enthusiastic admiration of their affectionate domestic life, Brehm declared that genuine marriage could be found only among birds.[1] Not all mammals form family groups, though maternal affection is strongly developed in all species. In some of the more sociable species, however, the male continues to live with the female as provider or protector after the birth of the young. This is true of whales, seals, and hippopotami; of squirrels and moles; and of reindeer, gazelles, and some other small antelopes.[2] It is among the quadrumana, however, that animal family life attains its highest development. All observers testify that the family instinct of the orang-

[1] "Thierleben," Bd. IV., p. 20.

[2] See Westermarck, "The History of Human Marriage," p. 12, and the authorities there cited.

utan, the gorilla, and the chimpanzee is of almost human strength.

All human beings, from the lowest savages to civilized men, live in family groups. The simplest form of the human family is a pairing arrangement of relatively short duration. One of the best examples is found among the Mincopis, where the father lives with the mother until after their child is weaned, and then seeks another wife.[1] A somewhat more stable but seldom lifelong pairing family is found among the Blackfellows of Australia,[2] the northern Eskimo of Greenland,[3] the Amazonian Indians of Brazil,[4] and in various other low savage tribes. Among savages generally, desertion, divorce, and remarriage are extremely frequent.

The polyandrian family, in which a woman has several husbands, is found in very many parts of the world, usually in tribes that have passed beyond savagery into barbarism. Polyandry is of two well-marked types, which are known among ethnologists as Nair polyandry and Tibetan polyandry. In Nair polyandry, as found in southeastern India, a woman's husbands are not related to one another. In Tibetan polyandry the husbands are brothers. Tibetan polyandry is the commoner form. Polyandry existed until recently in Ceylon; it has but lately disappeared from New Zealand; it existed not long ago in New Caledonia and elsewhere in the Pacific islands; it is found in the Aleutian islands; among the Koryaks north of the Okhotsk, and among the Saporogian Cossacks. Humboldt observed it among the Indian tribes on the Orinoco; it was common in the Canary islands; in Africa it has been found among the Hottentots, among

[1] Belcher, *Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London*, New Series, Vol. V., 1867, p. 45.

[2] Lumholtz, "Among Cannibals," pp. 127, 162.

[3] Personal statements made to me by members of Peary expeditions.

[4] Spix and Martius, "Travels in Brazil," Vol. II., pp. 246–248.

the Damaras, and among mountain tribes of the Bantu race. Traces of it remain among the Hovas of Madagascar. That it formerly prevailed among the Picts and Irish is certain, and there are many evidences of its former occasional existence in other Aryan stocks, and throughout the Semitic and the Hamitic races.[1]

A form of the family that was common in the Hawaiian Islands when they were first invaded by whites, is called by its Hawaiian name, punaluan. It is constituted by the marriage of a group of brothers to a group of sisters, each woman being a wife to all the men and each man a husband to all the women. This form still exists among the Todas of India.

The polygynous family, constituted by the cohabitation of one man with two or more wives or concubines, is even more general than polyandry. It is seldom, however, the only family form in any tribe or nation. Depending, as it does, upon the ability of the husband to support a large domestic establishment, it often coexists with other arrangements, the well-to-do classes being polygynous, while the poorer classes are obliged to content themselves with monogamy or with polyandry. Polygyny is by no means confined to savage and barbarian communities. It flourishes in China and in Turkey, and it has only recently ceased to be a legal form of marriage in one of the territories of the United States. Illegally and secretly, it exists in every American commonwealth and in every European state.

The only form of the family that is now legally sanctioned in Christian nations is monogamy, which is the union of one husband and one wife, in the expectation and promise that the marriage will be of lifelong duration. Actually, however, divorce is nearly everywhere allowed for various causes, and the monogamous family is often unstable. In recent years, divorce has been

[1] McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," pp. 97 *sq.*

rapidly increasing in the United States and in Europe. Reasons for believing that the phenomenon is temporary, and that a more stable form of the monogamous family is developing, will be presented in another chapter.[1]

Human societies composed of families combined in larger aggregates are of two types, — the ethnical and the demotic. Ethnical societies are genetic aggregations; a real or fictitious blood-kinship is their chief social bond. Demotic societies are congregate associations. They are groups of people that are bound together by habitual intercourse, mutual interests, and coöperation, with little or no regard to origins or to genetic relationships.

Among ethnical societies must be classed all communities from the smallest savage hordes or bands up to but not including the civil states that have become permanently established on a defined territory and have entered upon that extensive development of the social constitution which is associated with a systematic and diversified commerce, a multiplication of industrial arts and vocations, and a division of the population into well-marked social classes. At present every form of social composition may be studied comparatively in actually existing communities.

The existing ethnical societies may roughly be disposed in three great classes, according to the degree of social composition to which they have attained.

In the lowest class are small hordes, each of which is composed of a few families, and comprises usually not more than from twenty-five to one hundred persons. No such horde is found living beyond the reach of communication with other similar hordes of the same race, language, and culture. Under the influence of excitement or fear, or to share an unusual food supply, or for the purpose of migration, such hordes may temporarily congregate in

[1] See *supra*, p. 414 *sq.*

large numbers. But they do not permanently combine with one another under the leadership of a common chief for military or political action, nor is there any organization, religious or industrial for example, that binds them together in a larger whole.

In the second class are all societies in which several hordes have become welded into a larger and more definitely organized community, occupying a defined territory, speaking one language or dialect, and conscious of its unity; or in which a single horde, grown to many times its original size, has become differentiated and organized. The smallest united and organized society which is composed of lesser social groups that are themselves larger than single families, is a tribe.

In the third class are all coherent aggregations or confederations of tribal communities which have not yet developed the social constitution on the commercial, industrial, and intellectual side, and have not yet become civil societies — that is, municipal or national states. A coherent aggregation or confederation of tribes is a folk, or ethnic nation.

It is necessary to distinguish between two very different types of ethnical organization, one of which is obviously much older than the other. The older may be named the metronymic. In a metronymic group all relationships are traced through mothers; paternal relationships are ignored. Every metronymic social group is named from some class of natural objects, such as a species of plants or of animals, which is thought of as feminine in gender, and from which the group is supposed to have sprung.[1] A class of objects so regarded is known among ethnologists as a totem, which is approximately its American Indian name. The totem is worshipped as a protecting being and is itself protected by the group from harm. The later type of social organization may be called patro-

[1] See Frazer, "Totemism."

nymic. Each patronymic group is named from a real or fictitious male ancestor, and relationships are traced in the male line, through fathers. Each of these group types, again, may be observed in an early and simple form, in which a single tribe is the largest social organization, and in a later, compound form, in which several tribes are confederated and at length are consolidated into a folk.

Of groups or clusters of hordes that are not yet compacted into tribes, but which sustain to each other relations that modify the character and constitution of each horde. there are examples in the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Mincopis of the Andaman islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Australian Blackfellows, the Bushmen of South Africa, the Fuegians of Tierra del Fuego, the Innuit of the northeastern and northwestern coasts of North America, the Utes of the Rocky mountains, and the Indians of the Amazonian forests.

Of these, the Mincopis live in migratory societies of thirty or forty persons each, but they are capable of combining in considerable numbers to attack strangers. The Bushmen are scattered over a large area and are divided into wandering societies of from ten to fifty or one hundred persons each. The Fuegians include a total population of some 2000 individuals. They live in hordes of thirty to forty persons each, formed by the union of a few families. Darwin says[1] that these hordes have no governments and speak different dialects. The Innuit live in very small settlements of a few igloos each (an igloo containing sometimes several families) and totally devoid of any kind of government.

The Australian hordes are not larger than those described above, but they seem to have more intercourse. For generations each horde has obtained wives by capture from other hordes. The hordes are therefore practically

[1] "Journal of Researches," Vol. III., p. 236.

exogamous. Relationship is traced through mothers, and totemic signs bind together considerable numbers of men and women who, ignoring kinship on the father's side, regard themselves as of the blood of the mother. These totemic kindreds are strictly exogamous. All the men and women of such a kindred regard themselves as brothers and sisters, and a man may not marry his totemic sister. Yet they are not always, if ever, composed exclusively of real kindred, actual relatives in blood. With mystic rites a stranger may be adopted into the kindred.

Inasmuch as women are constantly being stolen or are voluntarily going from one horde to another, and as descent is reckoned through mothers, it follows that each local horde contains representatives of many totemic kindreds, and that the members of each totemic kindred are scattered through many local hordes. In fact, not a few of the kobongs, as they are called,[1] may be traced from one end of the continent to the other.[2] The members of a kobong are bound to defend and redress each other, and therefore when a quarrel breaks out men in the same local group are arrayed against each other.[3]

Each horde is thus heterogeneous. In some cases members of a single kobong strongly predominate in a particular horde. In either case the horde is by this differentiation into exogamous kindreds very greatly modified in composition from such an almost undifferentiated horde as that of the Arctic highlanders; and the modification is due to the warlike or peaceful intercourse of horde with horde.

Of the metronymic tribe, which is a united, coöperating group large enough to be the result of a consolidation of several hordes, — such a group as would be formed if

[1] Starcke, p. 22.

[2] Robertson Smith, "Kinship in Arabia," p. 226.

[3] McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," pp. 90 *sq.*

several Australian hordes should draw together and develop a permanent organization, — the best examples were found until recently among the North American Indians. The Indian tribe was differentiated into exogamous totemic kindreds. If the same totemic kindred was represented in more than one tribe, it indicated some historical relationship of the tribes, usually a splitting of one original tribe into two or more later tribes. Each totemic kindred was related to all other totemic kindreds in the tribe. Each had certain governing arrangements, including a council, a sachem, or peace officer, and a war chief. Sometimes the offices of sachem and chief were united in one person. The tribe had also a governing council, consisting of the chiefs of the totemic kindreds.

A tribe usually claimed a large territory, within which its members might roam in hunting and fishing, and within which they lived in small villages that were usually placed on the shore of a lake or bay, by a waterfall, or at the mouth of a creek which flowed into a larger stream.

Even the smaller tribes often included several villages. For example, the small Algonquin tribe of Wepauaugs or Potatucks, which in 1639 claimed the Housatonic and Naugatuck valleys of western Connecticut, from Long Island Sound to the Massachusetts line, were settled at that time in three places, namely, where now are the towns of Milford, Stratford, and Derby; and probably also at other places farther to the northwest, including Weantinock and Metichawan, where New Milford is now, and Scatacook in Kent; for the latter settlements were found when the whites first penetrated to that region. After selling their lands at Stratford and Milford, the Indians of those villages moved up the Housatonic valley and established at least four villages in the region between Derby and New Milford; namely, Wesquantook, now Squantuk, Potatuck in Huntington, Potatuck in Newtown and Pomeraug in Woodbury.

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Within this region, and farther to the north and west, bands were continually migrating from one settlement to another, and back again to the first; but the signatures on deeds of land conveyed to the whites prove that they all belonged to one tribe, and that they spoke the same dialect and acknowledged the military authority of one head chief, whose seat, in the earlier period, was the "Great Neck," at the junction of the Naugatuck and Housatonic rivers, and in the later period was Metichawan at the junction of the Still and Housatonic rivers.[1] The Potatucks were thus an admirable and a typical example of a true tribe, as distinguished from a mere horde or band.

Other Algonquin tribes, as the Narragansetts or the Delawares, exhibit the principle of distinction equally well, as do also such Dakotah tribes as the Sioux, the Omahas, the Poncas, and the Crows, and such Athabascans as the Apaches and Navajoes.

Wentworth Greenhalge, who made an adventurous journey westward from Albany through the Iroquois country from May 20 to July 14, 1677, found the Mohawks living in five villages. The smallest contained but ten houses, the largest thirty. One consisted of twenty-four houses and each of the remaining two of sixteen houses. The Oneidas had but one settlement, of about one hundred houses, but it must be remembered that the Oneidas were a new tribe split off from the Mohawks. The Onondagas had one large settlement of one hundred and forty houses and a smaller one of twenty-four. The Cayugas had three villages about a mile apart, comprising in all one hundred houses. The Senecas had four villages: the largest contained one hundred and fifty houses; the next in size, thirty miles distant, contained one hundred and twenty houses. Four or five miles distant from each of these

[1] Orcutt, "The Indians of the Housatonic and the Naugatuck Valleys."

was a smaller village, one of thirty, the other of twenty-four houses.[1]

Examples of metronymic tribes in other parts of the world are the two tribes of the Damaras in South Africa,[2] the Congo tribes of West Africa,[3] the Inland negroes,[4] the Kasias of Bengal,[5] the Tahitians[6] and Tongans[7] of Polynesia, and the Hovas of Madagascar.[8]

Examples of the metronymic folk, or tribal nation, are afforded by the Tongans, the Malagasy, and the Iroquois tribes above mentioned.

The Iroquois confederacy included the five tribes named, and later a sixth, the Tuscaroras, but it was never co-extensive with the Iroquois race, which included also the Hurons, now the Wyandottes, who lived between lakes Huron and Ontario, the Eries, the Neutral Nation west of the Niagara river, the Susquehannocks and the Conestogas on the lower Susquehanna, and perhaps the Cherokees on the upper Tennessee. The seat of the Tuscaroras was in Virginia until they came north to join the confederation. The confederacy treated the Eries, the Susquehannocks, and the Neutral Nation as enemies, and waged a war of extermination against them. In organization the confederation was a consciously formed league

[1] "The Documentary History of New York," Vol. I., pp. 15–16. I have given these details about the village composition of Indian tribes because so high an authority as Major J. W. Powell in his article on the North American Indians, in "Johnson's Universal Cyclopædia," new edition, Vol. IV., p. 545, makes the astonishing statement that "every tribe lived in a village and every village constituted a distinct tribe."

[2] Andersson, "Lake Ngami," p. 221.

[3] Bastian, "Afrikanische Reisen," p. 70.

[4] Allen and Thompson, "Narrative of Expedition to River Niger in 1841," Vol. I., p. 325.

[5] Hooker, "Himalayan Journals," Vol. II., pp. 274-276.

[6] Ellis, "Polynesian Researches," Vol. II., p. 346.

[7] Erskine, "Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the Western Pacific," p. 158.

[8] Ellis, "History of Madagascar," Vol. I., p. 164.

for united aggression and defence. A grand council of fifty sachems, equal in rank and authority, was invested with supreme power over all matters pertaining to the confederacy. The tribes remained independent in all strictly tribal matters. The council of any tribe could convene the council of the confederacy, but the council of the confederacy had no power to convene itself. Back of this consciously devised constitution, however, were facts of common lineage and language, and, above all, of intricate kinship ties which made confederation nothing more than a formal integration of tribes that were essentially one people. The same totemic kindreds extended through all the tribes of the confederacy, and thus bound them together. This relationship was a consequence of the origin of the tribes from one tribe. When a tribe split into two, as for example when the Mohawks separated from the Oneidas, members from each clan in the parent tribe went into the new tribe.[1]

The tribes of the Tonga islands were united in a metronymic monarchy with a double organization, religious and political. The Tooi-Tonga, who was supposed to be a descendant in the female line of the chief goddess of the Tongans, was the religious chief of the whole group of islands. The highest dignitary in the secular order was the king or head chief. Originally the king was a descendant in the female line from the family in which the office of Tooi-Tonga was hereditary, but a usurping dynasty afterwards came into power through military success. All relatives of the Tooi-Tonga family, however, were higher in blood than the king, and he showed reverence to the humblest among them. Everywhere descent and rank passed in the female line. If a man married a woman of superior rank, the children inherited the mother's rank and he showed deference to her and to them. If the wife was of

[1] For the best account of Iroquois social organization, see Morgan, "Ancient Society."

inferior rank, mother and children were obliged to show deference to the father.[1]

The Malagasy are a kingdom created by the consolidation of many tribes under the hegemony of the Hovas. The total population is 4,500,000. The tribes are subdivided into numerous villages, and the relations of tribes and clans are complicated, on account of the large population and the extreme subdivision of the original tribes, and the dispersion of clans in local settlements. Until very recently the eldest son of the king's nearest female relative was the legitimate heir to the throne.[2]

There is no doubt that many of the patronymic tribal nations were originally metronymic. "In the thirty-third year of Ptolemy Philadelphus metronymy was still the law of Egypt; parties to a suit appeared in public documents as the sons of their mother, the father's name not being mentioned. The newly married man even dropped his own name to take that of his wife (Revillon, "Papyrus demotique"), gave up to her all he possessed to provide for her future family, and reserving nothing for his own private use only asked to be supported until the end of his days, and then suitably interred."[3] Kinships were originally reckoned through mothers among the Germans[4] and probably among the Greeks.[5]

A very good example of the most archaic type of patronymic tribes is afforded by the Santals of the western mountains of Lower Bengal.[6] They number one and a

[1] Wood, "The Uncivilized Races of Men," pp. 981–983 and cf. Letourneau, "La Sociologie," p. 388.

[2] Waitz, "Anthropologie der Naturvölker," Bd. II., p. 432; Ellis, "History of Madagascar," Vol. I., p. 164; and Drury, "Madagascar," p. 247. [3] Reclus, "Primitive Folk," p. 157.

[4] "Lex Salica," Cod. 1, Title XLIIII., "De Reipus," §§ 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; and Title LVIIII., "De Alodis," §§ 1, 2, 3, 4.

[5] Cf. McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," "Kinship in Ancient Greece." [6] Hunter, "Annals of Rural Bengal," Vol. I., p. 185.

half to two million persons, and occupy a strip four hundred miles long by one hundred broad. This population is divided into seven, some say twelve, tribes, and these are subdivided into kindred groups. Relationship is always reckoned through fathers. Consistently with this system, and in contrast to the plan and the description of metronymic tribes, the tribes are believed to be descended not from some mother animal or plant, but from seven sons of the first parent of the race. In like manner each of the kindred groups into which a tribe is subdivided is supposed to consist of the descendants, through males, of a male ancestor from whom the group has taken its name. These kindred groups are exogamous. No one is permitted to take a wife from his own kindred on the father's side. The group, therefore, theoretically should include all the sons and all the daughters of any former male member of the group, but never the sons and daughters of female members. These would belong to the kindreds of their fathers. But, in fact, the kindred is never quite so strictly constituted. Like the totemic kin in the metronymic tribe, it contains members by adoption, whose kinship is therefore fictitious; and members, whether by birth or by adoption, may be banished as outcasts in punishment of serious offences. When a girl marries, she must give up her kindred and its gods for those of her husband.[1]

It will be seen that in all respects, save two, the organizations of kindred within the Santal tribes are like those within the American Indian, the Damara, the Tongan and other metronymic tribes. The bond of union is not totemic, but is paternal kinship, and women on marriage lose the kinship of their birth altogether and become by fiction of the kindred of their husbands.

It is better to use the generic name clan for all forms of kinship organization larger than the family and differing from the family by including only the relatives, real

[1] Hunter, "Annals of Rural Bengal," Vol. I., pp. 146–217.

or nominal, in one line of descent. If the clan is metronymic, it should be called a totem-kin if it is desired to emphasize its totemistic character, or an enatic clan if it is desired to emphasize the maternal relationship. If it is patronymic, it should be called the patronymic, the agnatic, or the patriarchal clan. The γένος of the Greek tribes and the *gens* of the Romans were substantially identical in organization with the patronymic clan of the Santals, just described, and ethnologists have used the word *gens* to designate a clan organization of any kind. It is better, however, to employ it for the specific purpose of designating the Roman clan only.

The governmental organization of a tribal community, which admits of much more perfect development in the patronymic than in the metronymic tribe, is remarkably well exemplified in the tribes of the Ostyaks who inhabit the dreary northern country on the banks of the Obi and its tributaries.[1] The tribes have each a head chief, who is the judge of the most serious offences. Each tribe is constituted of clans, and each clan is a community, numbering several hundred houses, and presided over by an elder, who judges small offences. The clan communities are so far independent of each other that travellers often speak of them as tribes, but they are exogamous and are bound together for defence and other purposes in the larger organization of the true tribe, which is endogamous

In South Africa the Kaffirs, the Bechuanas, and the Hottentots, unlike their neighbours, the Damaras, have patronymic tribal organizations.[2] The Kaffirs are associated in many large tribes. Each tribe is composed of many villages and is constituted of exogamous clans. Each tribe has its subordinate chief. The wandering tribes of Hottentots are subdivided into villages, com-

[1] Latham, "Descriptive Ethnology," Vol. I., p. 454.

[2] Waitz, "Anthropologie der Naturvölker," Bd. II., p. 341; and Kolbe, "Description du cap de Bonne Espérance," Vol. I., pp. 264, 265

munities, or kraals, of from two hundred to four hundred people each. These kraals are endogamous. Litakum, the chief settlement of the Bechuanas, shows how the villages of a tribe may draw together and grow into a town. Burchell, writing in 1812 of Litakum,[1] said that it had an area of more than one and a half by two miles, but was built without the least regularity of arrangement. "Such a town may be considered as a collection of little villages, each under the superintendence of its own chieftain." "A considerable space of unoccupied ground generally separates the division of one chieftain from that of another; though sometimes they adjoin. The number of such divisions, or clusters of houses, appeared . . . to be between thirty and forty. The whole number of dwellings was nearly eight hundred and the population was estimated at five thousand."

The composition of demotic societies requires but little description. As in ethnical societies, the unitary group is the family. Families are combined in neighbourhoods, hamlets, or villages. In New England, villages and outlying homesteads compose the town; in the middle and western states, the township. In England, they compose the parish; in France, the commune. Elsewhere in Europe they compose local divisions of various names, but like the commune or the parish in organization. All large cities are composite. Greater London includes the ancient City and thirty-nine once independent parishes. New York has absorbed Chelsea, Greenwich, Bloomingdale, Harlem, and many smaller villages. Greater New York will include Brooklyn and nineteen or twenty large towns. American townships and English parishes are combined in counties. American counties compose the commonwealth; English counties, the kingdom, which was once seven kingdoms. French cantons formerly

[1] "Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa," Vol. II., p. 512.

composed the kingdom; they now compose the departments, which compose the republic. American commonwealths compose the federal nation of the United States. The ancient kingdoms of England and Wales, Scotland and Ireland, compose the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The United Kingdom, the federal dominion of Canada, the states of India and Australia, and various minor states compose the British Empire. The German Empire is composed of twenty-five formerly independent kingdoms, principalities, and free cities. Switzerland and Mexico are federal republics; Italy is a composite kingdom; Austria and Russia are highly composite empires. Modern demotic societies are thus doubly and trebly, and in many cases more than trebly, compound.[1]

A further partial integration is seen in such arrangements as the Triple Alliance and in the diplomatic relations of the treaty-making nations that bind themselves by obligations of international law.

The provincial divisions of demotic societies are not merely administrative. They usually correspond to original differences of manners and customs and of thought and conversation, among independent communities. Many such differences persist, and it is plain to the trained observer that they antedate the characteristics that the provincial divisions have in common.

All degrees of social composition beyond the family and the horde imply the self-consciousness of the social mind. The federation of tribes or of states is effected by the deliberate action of the social mind under the pressure of external necessities, especially those of defence and aggression. When integration has been accomplished, a certain internal necessity obliges the social mind to maintain the union after its original purpose has been achieved. The consciousness of kind is the compelling

[1] Cf. Spencer, "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., Part II., Chap. X.

power. The social mind puts its own impress on each component group, and moulds it into conformity with a certain type. Thus in a given community every variety of the family may have existed at the outset, or may from time to time appear; but the social mind gives approval and sanction to some one type, for example, the monogamic or the polygynous, and prohibits or discountenances all others. In like manner, in the commonwealth each component town, and in the federal state each component commonwealth, is compelled to conform to a type or standard.

Thus the social composition is a psychological rather than a physical fact. Viewed as a psychological phenomenon, it may be described as a mutual toleration and alliance among the unlike individual elements of a society, supplemented by an alliance of the like, and non-toleration of the unlike, among its component groups.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION

THE constitution of a society is the organization of its individual members into specialized associations for achieving various social ends. For example, a town has a municipal government, churches, schools, industrial corporations, labour organizations, literary and scientific societies, and social clubs. These associations, harmoniously correlated, are the social constitution of the community. Collectively, they carry on the diversified social activities. Thus the constituent associations of society are purposive. Each association has a defined object in view, which its members are supposed to be aware of, and for the attainment of which they are expected to put forth effort.

A purposive association may include both sexes in its membership, but only for other objects than marriage and reproduction. Consequently, membership in the social constitution is not, as in the social composition, an incident of birth. New members are admitted into a purposive association only by their own consent and by the permission of members. Where members seem to enter it by birth, as in a church which claims the children of members, it is not kinship, it is a claim, consciously made and allowed, that is the true ground of the membership relation. Therefore purposive associations have no independent existence. They depend on one another and they presuppose the social composition. They are found only within a comprehensive autogenous society.

The individuals that compose a purposive association are more alike with reference to the purpose that unites them than are any two associations. If the members of

a given trade-union were not more alike in ideas and interests than are any two equally accessible and efficient unions, the differing members would join other organizations. No two churches resemble each other so closely in feeling and belief as do the actually coöperating members of any given church. The members of trade-unions collectively, or of churches collectively, resemble each other more than trade-unions in general resemble churches in general. The members of business corporations collectively, or of scientific societies collectively, resemble each other more closely than the scientific societies resemble the business corporations.

As each association in the social constitution does a specific work, it may be said to have a social function; from this point of view purposive association may be described as functional association. The combination of purposive associations is therefore a coördination, and their mutual aid is not limited by a mere increase of mass and power; it is effected also through a division of labour.

The coöperation of animals in fishing, hunting, and defence is a functional association, but it is not sufficiently differentiated or regular to be regarded as a social constitution. Perhaps the permanent and systematic social organization of some species of ants is an exception.

Likewise there is no true social constitution in the lowest bands of savage men, although there is much coöperation in such communities and the family is becoming in some degree an artificial brotherhood through the inclusion of adopted members.

In tribal societies purposive association is so far developed that it may be regarded as an elementary social constitution. The tribal constitution, however, is not separated from the social composition. Certain groups in the social composition and certain derivative organizations serve also as purposive associations. Thus the

domestic group is both a family and a household. As a family it is a unit in the social composition. As a household it is an economic purposive association, engaged in obtaining and preparing food, and in manufacturing clothing, tools, and utensils. The clan, which is derived from the family by a process which will be described in the chapter on Ethnogenic Association, is a purposive association that enforces rights and obligations and cherishes the juridical tradition. The organization and functions of an Iroquois clan as described by Morgan[1] were representative. Each Iroquois clan had an elected sachem, whose duties were essentially those of a petty justice. He interpreted and administered the juridical tradition of the clan. The clan had also a council which discussed and determined all matters of policy. All clansmen and clanswomen had the right to vote in electing or deposing the officers of the clan. All were forbidden to marry within the clan. All were bound by the obligation to help and defend a fellow-clansman and to avenge his injuries. All shared in the right to bear the clan's totemic name, to inherit the property of deceased members, and to adopt strangers into the clan. All participated in the common religious observances and all had rights in the common burial-place. The tribe always is essentially a military organization ruled by a council of chieftains who have been the successful leaders of war-parties, or perhaps by a single chief. In addition to all these organizations there are usually in tribal communities many secret associations which have religious functions.[2]

[1] "Ancient Society," Part II., Chap. II.

[2] The secret societies of the Zuñi have been studied by Mr. Frank Cushing, Mrs. M. C. Stevenson, and Mr. Walter Fewkes; those of the Navajoes, by Dr. Washington Matthews; those of the Moquis, by Captain R. G. Bourke; those of the Dakotahs, by Miss Alice Fletcher and Rev. J. O. Dorsey; and those of the Alaskans, by Dr. Franz Boas. See Peet, "Secret Societies and Sacred Mysteries," "Memoirs of the International Congress of Anthropology."

In civil societies the social constitution is completely developed and in the main is separated from the social composition, although the separation is never complete at all points. Always, however, in civil society the social composition is subordinated to the social constitution, while in tribal society the social constitution is but incidental to the composition.

The chief purposive organization of civil society is the state, the organization through which the social mind dominates the whole autogenous society, prescribes forms and obligations to all minor purposive associations, and shapes the social composition. Coördinating all activities and relations, the state maintains those conditions under which all its subjects may live "a perfect and self-sufficing life."[1]

Subordinate to the state, which touches every interest and action of its members, are private purposive associations of narrower range and with more specialized functions. "Imagine a great circle within which are lesser circles combining in a thousand ways to form the most varied figures without overstepping the limits that enclose them; this is an image of the great association of the state and of the particular associations that it embraces."[2]

The private associations are of four classes. Those of one class are directly concerned with political interests. Independent of the government, they make governments and unmake them. In a second class are private organizations that assume juristic functions, usually but not always in violation of law; the Vigilance Committees, the Ku Klux Klans, and the White Caps. In the third class are the various organizations of industrial society, which provide for the physical needs of life and adjust the changing relations of want and satisfaction. In the fourth class are all organizations that occupy themselves

[1] Aristotle, "The Politics," III. 9.

[2] Fouillée, "La science sociale contemporaine," p. 13.

with matters of feeling, thought, and conduct; the cultural associations, whose object is to foster spiritual development and to promote happiness. They include the church and its allied organizations, philanthropic societies, scientific and educational associations, and innumerable organizations for social pleasure.

Every purposive association has not only a function, but also a composition and a constitution, which are adapted to the performance of the function.

In the composition of associations individuals are combined as persons and by categories, — for example, the categories of employer and employees in the composition of an industrial group. The composition of associations must be studied with reference to the common trait or interest that unites their members.

The constitution of a purposive association is the organization of its membership. The categories of individuals that compose it are combined in accordance with some principle of subordination or coördination, and the entire membership may be divided into sub-societies, bureaus, or committees.

The organization of a voluntary purposive association has further to be described as secret or open. Secrecy and a rigorous exercise of authority over members are conspicuous features of purposive association in savage tribes, and hardly less so in the great oriental empires of China, Farther India, and Persia. In mediæval days they marked the social organization of western Europe, but they are now exceptional there and are rare in the United States if the whole number of organizations is taken into account. Perhaps no more interesting contrast than this exists in the social systems of America and China. America is sociologically a vast plexus of free associations, most of which are perfectly open in their objects and methods. China is a social network of oath-bound secret societies, whose members are under

threat of mutilation or death if they reveal the mysteries of their fraternities.[1] There is probably some close connection between such a contrast and the relative predominance of economic association in the West, and of religious, fraternal, and defensive association in the East.

The detailed study of the state belongs to political science. General sociology is concerned only with the main features of political organization and with some of the relations between the state and minor associations.

Much confusion in political theory might have been avoided by a careful study of the composition of the state. Does the state include all the members of a natural society? In answer Professor Burgess says that "the state is all comprehensive. Its organization embraces all persons, natural or legal, and all associations of persons. Political science and public law do not recognize in principle the existence of any stateless persons within the territory of the state."[2] It is as subjects, however, that all individuals are included in the state. Between subjects of the state and members of the state, there may be a momentous difference. All are subjects of the state over whom the state asserts authority. They only are members of the state who share in its consciousness, and who by their loyalty and their willing aid contribute to its authority and its power. The rebel, the traitor, the recalcitrant, are in the state, but they are not of it.

Therefore in the composition of the state individuals are combined by categories. These categories are, — the subjects of authority, the makers of general authority, the makers of legal authority, and the agents of legal

[1] "Secret Societies in China," *Saturday Review*, Vol. LXXII., September 19, 1891, p. 331.

[2] "Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law," Vol. I., p. 52.

authority. All who share in the consciousness of the state, and freely contribute their thought and effort to it, are makers of authority in a general sense. It is this general authority which is ultimately embodied in law and in the political organization. But not all who help to create the general authority actually help to convert it into legal forms. The makers of legal authority are those who legally exercise the franchise and by their votes authorize the legal acts of the state. The electors of a state are thus a very definite purposive association within an association that is larger and less definite; and, as in all other purposive associations that are definite in form, new members are admitted to the electorate only by the consent of members.

The agents of legal authority are those whom the electors authorize to put their will into final form and execution. Collectively, the agents of legal authority are the government.

In the constitution of the state the most important subordinate bodies are the public corporations. The state first incorporates itself, defining its territory and its membership, describing its organization, and laying upon itself the rules of procedure by which it will systematically conduct its affairs. It next in like manner incorporates the local subdivisions of society, such as counties, townships, and cities, and assigns to each certain rights, duties, and powers. The remaining subordinate organizations of the state are found within the public corporations. They consist of parliamentary and legislative bodies to initiate the formulation of law; of courts to complete the formulation of law; and of executive bureaus, boards, and commissions.

The functions of the state are usually discussed with reference to some theory of what they ought, or ought not, to be. The sociologist is concerned with them as they are. Actually, the functions of the state are co-

extensive with human interests. There is no state in Christendom which does not add to its functions of defence and arbitration various economic and cultural activities.

The primary purpose of the state is to perfect social integration. To this end it maintains armies and carries on diplomacy to protect the nation against aggression or to enlarge its territory and population; and it maintains tribunals and police to enforce peace within its own borders. The first business of legislatures, courts, and executives is to combine, defend, and harmonize social groups, classes, individuals, and interests.

Inevitably, however, the performance of this work carries the state into economic activities. All modern states coin money and interfere with the value thereof; the power to "regulate" the value of money exists only in written constitutions. Credit and banking-operations are to a very great extent controlled by governments. States interfere with value also by legislation and taxation, sometimes on a vast scale, as in the complicated protective tariff systems of the United States, Germany, and France. All states put the chief means of communication, namely, the postal system, under the management of the government. In European states the telegraph also is a governmental institution. As yet the railroad system of the world is operated chiefly by private, or, as some perhaps would prefer to say, quasi-public corporations. In all states, however, the business of railroads is being more and more closely regulated by the government. Most states have made experiments in the governmental management of railroads. In the United States all such experiments have been disastrous failures, and they have been nowhere really successful, except possibly in Germany and Austria. The operation of street railroads by municipal corporations is perhaps more promising. All states are to some extent producers of goods. The official

products of the United States at present consist of fire-arms and silver dollars. The staple official products of Europe are munitions of war and French tobacco.

Not less inevitable is it that states should assume cultural functions. The members of the state see that social cohesion is a spiritual union rather than an external compulsion, and that it depends upon the ideas of individuals. They believe it to be as necessary to guide the minds of men as it is to suppress crime and insurrection. Rightly or wrongly, they believe also that the guidance will be inadequate or pernicious unless the state itself is the supreme guide. Every state, therefore, maintains either institutions of religion, like the Greek Church of Russia, or an elaborate system of secular education, like that of the United States or of France. Occasionally a state, like England or Prussia, succeeds in maintaining side by side a state religion and a state instruction, but it is generally recognized that such a policy creates a condition of unstable equilibrium. Every state in these days recognizes obligations to literature, science, and art, and undertakes to discharge them by supporting universities and such institutions as the French Academy and the numerous scientific bureaus of the United States, and by maintaining libraries, museums, and galleries of art. European states care also for the beauty of their cities and sometimes for those remnants of natural beauty that have survived a century of ruthless industrialism. Whether the politician-ridden people of the United States will ever get beauty at the hands of their officials, is a question that cannot yet be answered. There is reason to fear that the originality of our street architecture, with its patriotic scorn of such foreign qualities as harmony of colouring, suitability, and proportion, cannot be wholly credited to the Boss. The people themselves are wasting the natural beauty of a marvellous continent with an insatiate relish for destruction that has hardly been witnessed before in

human history. It remains to be seen whether the mind to which an ancient pine is wood pulp and the Palisades are Belgian blocks is "the true American type."

The assumption that the state has only functions of defence and arbitration is not more erroneous than the common assumption that voluntary organization has only economic and cultural functions. The most important of all voluntary organizations are political associations.

In the composition of political associations men of like views and like interests are allied. On the whole, however, it is the consciousness of kind rather than any purely intellectual agreement that is the bond of union. A monarchist knows that another monarchist is in instinct like himself, and that a republican is not. Most men adhere to the political party in which they have been reared, not from conviction but from liking. No one fact in American history is so significant as the persistency with which Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans have contemplated themselves as a different kind of human beings from Democrats. The fatal weakness of the Democratic party has always been the instinctive segregation of the boss-adoring rank and file from an idealistic and theorizing minority that has cared for principles. Even some mugwumps, if the truth be told, have been mugwumps less because of their independence, than because they have liked to keep the company of gentlemen. Belief and interest are nevertheless important factors of political association. No political party is as homogeneous as it would be if the consciousness of kind were its sole animating power. In every political association there are men of unlike natures who are united by identity of belief or by community of interest. The heterogeneity of political association is further increased by the necessary combination of leadership and following.

The constitution of voluntary political associations

assumes the forms of secret societies, non-secret but exclusive clubs, and open associations. Secret societies and cabals are characteristic of states in which liberty is imperfectly developed and in which therefore all criticism of the government and all private political initiative are dangerous. Political agitation in Russia and the Danubian states to-day is carried on largely through secret societies, as it was in France during the Revolution and in England in the seventeenth century. In lands where freedom of discussion is upheld by law, secret association in politics is resorted to only by criminals, revolutionists, and other men who fear to fight in the open. The anarchistic agitation in Europe and America has naturally been conducted through secret societies. The most astonishing development of secret political association in modern times has been the growth of the American Protective Association in the United States, an organization that is devoted to resisting the influence of the Roman Catholic Church upon American life. It was organized at Clinton, Iowa, in 1887, and has extended throughout the country. It has influenced several local elections.[1]

Non-secret but exclusive clubs which combine political with social functions, like the Union League clubs that were founded in the larger American cities during the Civil War, the Reform and the City Reform clubs of New York, and the Reform, the Conservatives, and the Marlborough clubs of London, have long been a favourite form of private political organization. Their prototype was the Rota, which was established at London in 1659. The first political club on the continent of Europe was the Club Politique, founded at Paris, 1782. The oldest existing political club is the Civil Club of London, which was founded in 1669.

In countries that enjoy freedom under constitutional

[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X., No. 2, June, 1895, p. 371, and "World Almanac," 1895, p. 115.

guarantees the active work of politics is carried on chiefly by open associations, to which all voters desiring in good faith to join them are welcomed. The great political parties of England and the United States are the largest; they are also the most mobile and efficient of voluntary organizations. Each includes among its adherents men of every degree of mental evolution, of almost every nationality, and of every pursuit. Each is so perfectly distributed over a vast area that it counts voters in every local hamlet of the national domain. It is exceptional when either of the leading parties of the United States fails in a presidential election to poll one-quarter of the total vote of any commonwealth.[1]

A great political party represents no single interest. It stands for a general way of looking at public affairs and of dealing with them. Any attempt to identify it continuously with a particular policy is hopeless, because it is always controlled by class feeling, and the interests of a class do not remain unchanged throughout a long term of years. Thus the Democratic party of the United States is commonly spoken of as the party of strict construction, but it has never been consistently faithful to strict constructionist principles. It was long the party of slavery, but it could not have continued to be that; for silent economic changes were surely undermining slavery when the Civil War precipitated its downfall. The same party once prided itself on its opposition to internal improvements, but Andrew Jackson signed more bills for internal improvements than any other President. Before the war this party stood for hard money; after the war it became the party of inflation. It has been constant to only one thing; namely, that alliance between the landowning interests of the agricultural sections and the proletarian interests of the industrial centres which has been a con-

[1] See "The Nature and Conduct of Political Majorities," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VII., No. 1, March, 1892.

spicuous feature of every civilization.[1] Thus the Democratic party, from first to last, has been the American counterpart of the Conservative party of Great Britain. The American planter and farmer and the Tory squire have voted with and for the wage-earner from identical motives. On the other hand, the Federal, Whig, and Republican parties of the United States and the Liberal party of Great Britain have always been the organizations of commercialism and capitalism. It was not more a rational calculation of interests than a blind consciousness of kind that arrayed Toryism in sympathy with the South and Liberalism with the North in the gigantic struggle of 1861.

Accordingly there never have been and there never can be more than two great political parties in a nation. Accordingly also the policy of each party on particular issues will waver. Often on great public questions the parties may even change places, and nothing can be more farcical than the arraignment of one party by the other for doing this or for not doing that. Not many years pass before the arraignment returns upon the arraignors.

Therefore only the members of a political party that are bound to it by the consciousness of kind — that is, by class instinct and prejudice — can be depended on to vote its ticket under all vicissitudes. The men who join it from conviction or from interest will necessarily leave it from time to time, unless they are prepared to sacrifice their interests or to abjure their principles. Therefore also, while parties are relatively enduring, majorities are the most unstable products of human combination. In these facts we have also the explanation of the character-

[1] There are, of course, important exceptions to the rule that the agricultural population is Democratic. A large part of the farming population of New York State, for example, has always been counted as "solidly Republican." A sociological study of such exceptions would be a valuable investigation.

istic strength and weakness of each party. The strength of Democracy is in numbers. Its weakness is the disparity of its constituent classes — the extremes of culture and social position. The strength of Republicanism is the solid class-feeling of the commercial, capital-accumulating, middle rank of the population.

Second in importance only to the great political parties are the minor, or occasional, political parties, that work for the achievement of particular ends. Since by their very nature the great parties care nothing for principles or measures, principles and measures have to be forced upon them from without. Consequently, two or three parties of one idea apiece are always in the field. They seldom win elections, but they often win a hearing and concessions. They spring up suddenly, grow with astonishing rapidity, and as quickly melt away. Such were the Anti-Masonic party of 1831, the Liberty party of 1840 and the Free-Soil party of 1848, which were merged in the Republican party after 1860; the Know-nothing party of 1856, the Prohibition party of 1872, the Greenback party of 1876, and the People's party of 1892.

The evils of partisanship, with its greed of office and its indifference to the general welfare, have called into existence numerous associations to promote patriotism and to secure purity of administration. Such are the Civil Service Reform Association and its branches; the Good Government clubs, which should be efficient organs of municipal reform; and various occasional organizations like the Philadelphia Committee of One Hundred of 1880, and the New York Committee of Seventy of 1894.

Finally, there are innumerable associations to promote particular interests, to protect particular classes, or to secure special legislation. Some of them are permanently organized; most of them are ephemeral.

The functions of voluntary political organizations may be revolutionary or legal. In the nature of things revolution can be achieved only through voluntary association. If not so obvious, it is just as certain that a republican form of government can be maintained only through the tireless and infinitely varied activity of voluntary political associations that keep within the bounds of law. They initiate legislation, they criticise administration, they achieve reform. These are truths that writers on political science have been slow to apprehend. Every one understands that governments do not criticise and reform themselves. Not every one, however, understands that in modern times governments initiate but little legislation. The British ministry proposes a few important measures, so does the President of the United States, when he happens to be a forceful personality, and so do the governors of the commonwealths and the mayors of cities. But the vast majority of all bills originate in the counsels of voluntary associations, and are introduced in legislature, congress, or parliament, at the instigation of associations, whose agents watch them through every stage of their progress to final enactment or rejection. In short, without such associations there could be no such thing as a republic in the true sense of the word. The alternative is bureaucracy or absolute monarchy.

Of private associations that assume juristic functions not much is to be said. With a few exceptions they are lawless organizations that spring into existence in the absence of legally constituted courts, or when courts fail to do their full duty in protecting property and life. It is usually the lawless and violent element in the population that enters into the composition of illegal or non-legal juristic organizations. An exception, however, may be noted in the case of the Vigilance Committee of San Francisco, which was organized in 1851. Many of its

members were order-loving men, who found it necessary, in the absence of a properly constituted government, to resort to extraordinary means to suppress an intolerable lawlessness. The Ku Klux Klan, which spread in several southern states in 1866 and 1867, and which attempted by midnight executions to nullify the national legislation that had conferred political rights upon the freedmen, was to some extent composed of men who sincerely believed that the fabric of society would be destroyed unless the Southern conception of rights and proprieties could be maintained. Its methods, however, never received the general approval of the Southern people. The White Caps of Indiana and neighbouring states contain no elements of moral respectability, although their professed purpose is to enforce the social code of morality.

In their constitution private juristic associations are usually secret organizations, as befits their illegal purpose. It is quite possible, however, that in the course of time private juristic associations will be openly and legally organized to arbitrate disputes or to adjust pecuniary claims. In fact, voluntary boards of arbitration are now occasionally established, to deal with disputes of an essentially juristic character between employer and employed.

Private economic associations are, as a rule, composed of individuals of like abilities and training. In economic organization, less than elsewhere in society, does the consciousness of kind determine alliances; utility is the controlling principle. Yet even in economic organization the consciousness of kind has its influence. In the United States it is the cause of a phenomenon which occasions much uneasiness, namely, the refusal of white artisans, in both the North and the South, to work with negroes, and the practical exclusion of the negro from all mechanical trades. Consciousness of kind is the ground of the unionist's intense antipathy to "scabs," whom he pictures

in imagination very much as the Brahmin pictures the Pariah.[1] It also greatly complicates the problems of domestic service.

The categories of employer and employed do not usually enter into the composition of the same association. They are combined in industrial groups which unite two or more associations, as, for example, in a manufacturing group that includes a partnership or a corporation as the entrepreneur, and members of several trade-unions as employees.

The constitution of private economic associations takes the form of partnerships, corporations and miscellaneous associations not incorporated. Partnerships with an unlimited liability of each partner, and a limited capital, are adapted only to small enterprises. To the evolution of the corporation with its limited liability of the individual stockholder, its control of capital by the massing of individual accumulations, and its command of the services of men of superior business ability, we owe the gigantic industrial undertakings of modern times. "It is doubtful, indeed, if the insurance, banking, or transportation business required in our existing economic life could have been developed or could be maintained without the agency of our corporate system."[2] Unfortunately, there are no general statistics of corporations. No one knows how many have been chartered or how many are now in existence. In view of the enormous part which they play in the economic world, and of the rather generous interest which

[1] Some months after the great strike of 1895, I asked the conductor of a Brooklyn trolley car how to find my way to an unfamiliar street. He directed me politely, and, as the event proved, with admirable precision. Whereupon a man sitting next to me volunteered the information: "Excuse me, sir, he told you wrong. You see he don't know anything. He's only a d—d scab. He took a good man's place when the strike was on." The words, "You see he don't know anything," were spoken with an earnest naïveté, as if they were a self-evident truth from the Declaration of Independence.

[2] Charles Francis Adams in Shaler's "The United States of America," Vol. II., p. 192.

governments have lately taken in statistical inquiries, this is a curious fact. "For some reason or other," says Professor Roland P. Falkner, who recently attempted to investigate this subject,[1] "corporations as such have never sufficiently occupied public attention to become the subject of official investigation either in this country or in Europe." The numbers of particular classes of corporations, however, are known. The total number of railway corporations in the United States on June 30, 1893, was 1890.[2] There were 1926 fire, ocean-marine, and inland navigation and transportation insurance companies and fifty-nine life insurance companies of the first class reported as transacting business in this country on December 31, 1889.[3] In 1891 the national banks numbered 3677 and the savings banks 1011.[4] In 1893 the building and loan associations numbered 5838.[5]

Of unincorporated associations with economic functions the most important are the trusts and the labour organizations.

Practically every industry is controlled or affected by combinations that attempt to regulate production and prices. Some of these combinations are mere agreements, while others are somewhat elaborate organizations with power to impose strict conditions upon individual producers and to enforce penalties against disobedience. A committee of Congress, which investigated trusts in 1889, made no attempt to enumerate them "for the reason that new ones are constantly forming, and that old ones are constantly extending their relations so as to cover new branches of the business and invade new territories."

[1] "Statistics of Private Corporations," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*. New Series, No. 10, June, 1890, p. 67.

[2] Henry C. Adams, "Sixth Annual Report on the Statistics of Railways in the United States," p. 16.

[3] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part II., pp. 507, 508.

[4] Gannet, "The Building of a Nation," p. 221.

[5] "Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labour," p. 15.

Mr. Henry D. Lloyd's "partial list of trade combinations, or trusts, achieved or attempted, and of the commodities covered by them"[1] includes over one thousand names.

Among wage-earners' associations the American Federation of Labour is a good example of complex yet flexible and efficient organization. It includes eighty-one national and international trade associations, and they embrace 7182 local trade-unions with an aggregate membership of 610,200. In addition, 1500 local unions not belonging to any national association are affiliated with the Federation.[2] The Knights of Labour at their best estate in 1886 included about 160 district assemblies, nearly 9000 local assemblies, and 730,000 members.[3] The membership has since fallen away to less than 200,000.[4]

The study of the functions of private economic associations falls within the special social science of political economy. The functions include the production of goods in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, by means of industrial groups, which range in complexity from the combination of the individual employer and his workmen to the association of great corporations, acting as a unit, and their thousands of organized employees; the transportation and exchange of goods by means of railway, steamship, and express companies, and by mercantile partnerships and corporations; the equilibration of values through ordinary markets, through such special markets as produce and stock exchanges, and through banking organizations; the accumulation of capital and the provision against want by means of institutions for savings, insurance, and mutual aid; and, finally, economic aggression and defence, through the mechanism of trusts and trade-unions.

[1] "Wealth against Commonwealth," pp. 537–544.

[2] "The World Almanac," 1894, p. 78.

[3] Wright, "An Historical Sketch of the Knights of Labour," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. I., No. 2, January, 1887, p. 156.

[4] "The World Almanac," 1894, p. 78.

In the composition of private cultural associations there is an alliance of persons of like beliefs, tastes, and natures. It is usually the professed purpose of cultural association to make belief or taste the condition of membership, but this ideal is never realized. The consciousness of kind is always present to unite some whose beliefs differ and to sunder some whose beliefs agree. The constitution of cultural associations requires no special description. It takes the form either of corporations, or of unincorporated societies, secret or open. The functions of cultural associations are religious, philanthropic, scientific and educational, æsthetic and pleasurable.

The church as a voluntary organization may exist in a country like England that has an established religion, but it can attain its complete development only in a country where state and church are completely separated, as in the United States. In 1890 there were 143 religious denominations and 165,177 church organizations in the United States. The total number of communicants was 20,612,806.[1] The Methodist organizations numbered 51,489; the Baptist, 42,909; the Presbyterian, 13,476; the Roman Catholic, 10,276; and the Lutheran, 8595.[2] The Roman Catholics numbered 6,257,871 communicants; the Methodists, 4,589,284; the Baptists, 3,712,468; the Presbyterians, 1,278,332; and the Lutherans, 1,231,072.[3] Pennsylvania led all the states in the number of its church organizations, 10,175. Ohio was second, with 9345; Texas third, with 8766; Illinois fourth, with 8296; New York fifth, with 8237. New York, however, led in the number of communicants, with 2,171,822. Pennsylvania was second, with 1,726,640; Ohio third, with 1,215,409; Illinois fourth, with 1,202,588; Massachusetts fifth, with 942,751.[4] The negroes, north and south, have their own separate church organizations.

[1] "Compendium of the Eleventh Census," Part II., p. 261.
[2] Ibid., p. 262. [3] Ibid., p. 263. [4] Ibid., p. 263.

The religious population of the country is organized also in a bewildering number of special associations. These include the monastic orders and societies of the Roman Catholic Church, and the missionary, Christian Association, and Christian Endeavour societies, of the Protestant denominations. Since the founding of the New England Company in 1649 to convert the Indians of North America over 100 different missionary societies have been organized by Protestants.[1] Some of these are elaborately organized. The most perfect of them all, The Woman's Board of Foreign Missions, is a highly complex federation of local circles and county and state branches. The Young Men's Christian Association, founded at London in 1844, has spread throughout the world. In 1892 it included 846 local associations in the United Kingdom, 3361 in Europe, 1440 in America, 124 in Asia, 28 in Africa, and 29 in Oceania, and a total membership of 418,972.[2] The Young People's Society of Christian Endeavour, founded at Portland, Maine, in 1881, includes 25,000 local societies in America and Europe.[3]

To a great extent private philanthropic organizations have assumed that friendly, and, I am tempted to say with double meaning, that fostering care of the unfortunate which formerly was exercised by the church. They are as many and as varied as human ills, and no complete enumeration of them has ever been made. The Charity Organization Society of New York publishes a list of no less than 1624 flourishing in this one city.[4] Most of them are well endowed. Charity Organization societies, modelled upon the London society, which was founded in 1868, have been established in seventy-two cities and

[1] Bliss, "The Encyclopædia of Missions."

[2] "Chambers' Encyclopædia," New Edition, Vol. X.

[3] Francis E. Clark, President of the Society, in "Johnson's Universal Cyclopædia," New Edition, Vol. II.

[4] "New York Charities Directory," p. xxvii.

towns of the United States.[1] Their object is to coördinate charitable efforts and to convert them into something better than irresponsible almsgiving. The State Charities Aid Association of New York, which was organized in 1872, with legal authority to watch and report the conduct of the public charitable institutions of the state, is a model of efficient organization for bringing an intelligent and disinterested philanthropy to bear upon the administration of institutions that otherwise, as sad experience has proved, are at the mercy of political plunderers. The National Conference of Charities and Correction and the National Prison Congress are associations of students and practical workers in many branches of charity and reformation. University and other social settlements, modelled more or less closely after the Toynbee Hall experiment, which was begun in East London in 1885, are carrying sympathy, personal help, instruction, pleasure, and examples of rational living into the darkest slums of great cities.[2] Through these varied instrumentalities philanthropy, which once was little more than a giving of doles to beggars, is becoming a true cultural activity, developing whatever possibilities of good there may be in the defective and the destitute, and converting thoughtless givers into responsible moral beings.

Large as is the field occupied by government scientific bureaus, state universities, and the public schools, fully one half of all scientific and educational activity is carried on through private organizations; namely, the national

[1] Kellogg, "Charity Organization in the United States," Appendix A. "Proceedings of National Conference of Charities and Correction." Twentieth Annual Session.

[2] See Jane Addams and others, "Philanthropy and Social Progress"; Jane Addams and others, "Hull House Maps and Papers"; Woods, "English Social Movements," and the Annual Reports of the University Settlement Society of New York, the College Settlements Association, and the East Side House.

and local learned bodies, the private schools, and the denominational colleges. In the United States every branch of research, from physics, chemistry, and astronomy, to philology and folklore, is fostered by an association. A large majority of the 451 degree-conferring colleges and universities are private foundations, and the larger part of their $94,500,758 of productive funds has been given to them by individuals.[1]

Fraternal societies usually combine mutual aid with social pleasure, as do, for example, the Free Masons and the Odd Fellows. Associations for the promotion of art or music sometimes serve no other end; social clubs sometimes become active political organizations; but in general the chief objects of all these organizations are personal culture and social enjoyment. They are far too many and varied for description. They are not identified with any class, nationality, or race. The West-side New Yorker who thinks of clubs and musical societies as institutions that belong within two or three blocks of Fifth Avenue would be surprised were he to take a census of the similar organizations of the East-side. Of the 375 societies that participated in the demonstration for a liberal Sunday law in September, 1895, more than half were musical associations and social clubs.[2] Nor are such organizations peculiar to western civilization. The Rev. Justus Doolittle[3] describes five different kinds of clubs that flourish in the Flowery Kingdom. These are: the literary clubs, composed of eight or ten students each, some of undergraduates, some of graduates; the recreating clubs, composed of rich men of middle age, for drinking, card playing, and chess, during the sixth and seventh months; the wine clubs, composed of rich young men, for feasting, wine drinking, card playing, and the enjoy-

[1] See Annual Reports of Commissioner of Education.
[2] See list in *New York Times* of September 20, 1895.
[3] "Social Life of the Chinese," Vol. II., pp. 213–216.

ment of music; the old men's clubs, in which gambling is a favourite excitement; and the musical clubs, in which the music is helped out with tea and tobacco.

Certain generalizations may be derived from the foregoing description of the social constitution.

The analogy of the social constitution to the constitution of a biotic organism is real. Mr. Spencer's description of the political organization of society as a regulating system that corresponds to the cerebral nervous system of an animal, and of the industrial organization as a sustaining system that corresponds to an alimentary apparatus, is not fanciful.[1] The analogy is of limited scientific value, however, until it is supplemented by a close study of those features of social organization that are distinctive.

The most important of these has been disclosed in the discovery that governments and private organizations duplicate each other's functions. Though in the animal many vital organs are duplicated, there is never a complete duplication of the alimentary, the circulatory, or the nervous system. In the social constitution either public or private association can assume any social function at need. It is as if the cerebral nervous system on the one hand had the emergency power to organize from the body tissues a new alimentary and circulatory system, and the sympathetic nervous system on the other hand could, if necessary, assume the functions of the brain and spinal cord. Public and private associations have such emergency powers because, as has been shown, there is at all times much duplication of functions in every essential class of social services. In times of danger the government can operate fleets and railways, build bridges, manufacture goods, and transact financial operations on a vast

[1] "The Social Organism," *Westminster Review*, Vol. XVII., January, 1860; and "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., Part II., Chaps. II.–IX.

scale, because in times of security it often does such things on a small scale. In times of anarchy or revolution private associations can protect life and property, administer justice, and organize a provisional government, because in times of peace they initiate legislation and hold governments to their work.

This generalization is of practical no less than of scientific value. It is the one adequate principle by which to judge the pretensions of socialism and of individualism. The socialists are right when they say that if it were necessary or desirable the state could carry on all social undertakings through public agencies. The individualists are equally right when they say that society could exist and in a way could achieve its ends without authoritative governments. Socialists and individualists are both wrong when they suppose that either of these things will happen under a normal social evolution. The actual distribution of functions between public and private agencies is a varying one; it changes with changing circumstances. So long as conditions are normal, movements that tend on the one hand to increase public activity, or on the other hand to enlarge the opportunities for private initiative, are self-limiting. They are tendencies towards equilibrium. Whatever belittles the state or destroys popular faith in its power to perform any kind of social service, whatever impairs the popular habit of achieving ends by private initiative and voluntary organization, endangers society and prevents the full realization of its ends.

Another generalization from the description of the social constitution is that the various organizations of society are not only correlated, but are also subordinated, some to other organizations, and all to a general end. The supreme end of society in general is the protection and perfection of sentient life. The end of human society is the development of the rational and spiritual personality of its members. Only the cultural associations are

immediately concerned in this function. Educational institutions, religious, scientific, ethical, and æsthetic organizations, and polite society act for good or ill directly upon the individual. To these the economic, the legal, and the political organizations are, in a functional sense, subordinate; in a functional sense they exist for the sake of cultural organization and activity. The social mind has always perceived this truth, and by means of its sanctions has endeavoured to mould the social constitution into accordance with it. Associations and relationships are fostered or abolished with a view to cultural, no less than to protective, ends.

For both ends specialization and a division of labour are necessary. Therefore while society maintains the homogeneity of its composition, it is obliged to tolerate and to promote differentiation in its constitution. Psychologically, therefore, the social constitution is the precise opposite of the social composition; it is an alliance of the like and a non-toleration of the unlike in each simple association, supplemented by toleration and coördination of the unlike in complex association — that is, in the relations of each association to other associations and to society at large.

Book III

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY

CHAPTER I

ZOÖGENIC ASSOCIATION

If animal life in the primeval ages was not wholly different from animal life now, association had been quietly working its transforming results for millions of years before mankind appeared on the earth.

Genetic and congregate groupings had enlarged and diminished; they had flourished here and perished there, as the swaying of the earth in its orbit, the oscillations of its surface and the shifting of its air and ocean currents, had made one region bountiful, another desolate. Contact had pained, terrorized, repelled; it had delighted, fascinated, attracted. Unlikeness and likeness of kind had been distinguished. Communication of feelings and of simple ideas, by attitudes, tones, and gestures had been practised by millions of creatures. Attack and imitation had harmonized and assimilated; they had differentiated and sundered. Conflict had often resulted in the equilibrium of toleration. Mutual aid, the intoxication of play, companionship, and sympathy had become bonds of union in bands unnumbered. An elementary social consciousness had been developing, and probably the beginnings of tradition had appeared, in habits of hunting, fishing, and migration, and in the arts of nest building and dam building. Family relationships were established, and simple beginnings had been made in the division of labour and in functional association.

Is it possible to believe that these social acquisitions played no part in the differentiation and survival of animal

types? Is there not a fatal lack in the biological philosophy that ignores the social factor and attempts to account for variation through physiological processes only? Was not animal intelligence a selective agent that combined and recombined the factors of evolution? And was not association a factor in the development of intelligence?

How association modifies the natures of associated individuals has been shown.[1] It may be well now to recapitulate the exposition in the past tense and with exclusive reference to animal life, in order to bring out clearly the relation of association to the whole marvellous process of variation. All reconstruction of the past is inference, and the statements that follow are inferences merely. They are made dogmatic in form only for the sake of the simplicity that best reveals their probability.

The mental consequences of association were, first, an original development of native susceptibilities and powers, namely: 1, of the susceptibility to suggestion; 2, of the capability of imitation; 3, of antipathies; 4, of sympathies; 5, of the power of discrimination, and 6, of the power of coördination. They were, secondly, a considerable accumulation of knowledge. They were, thirdly, a further development of all acquisitions, powers, and susceptibilities, through endless combinations and reactions. Through suggestion and imitation all knowledge of the environment, of foods and of dangers, which was acquired by one soon became the possession of all. The peculiar skill of one in capturing or evading became in like manner the skill of all. Combined action in hunting and fishing and in defence was a constant discipline of antipathies and sympathies, and of powers of discrimination and of coördination.

These modifications reacted upon nerve and brain. Through nerve and brain they reacted further, physiologically and morphologically, upon the whole organism.

[1] *Ante*, p. 121 *sq.*

By every advance in association the bodily organism was necessarily modified in some degree to correspond to the development of feeling and intelligence.

Besides acting thus indirectly upon the physical system, association acted upon it directly; through superior nutrition and a relative security, through reproduction, and through natural and sexual selection.

The social animal usually enjoyed an ampler food-supply than the non-social animal. Through suggestion, imitation, and coöperation the group was able in most instances to find and to take possession of the better opportunities, and the individual that wandered alone was driven away from the feast of those in whose life he would not share.

At times, however, the population of a social group multiplied rapidly while food was abundant, and subsequently was unable to find adequate supplies. Starvation thereupon began its work on the weaker individuals, and left only the stronger as breeders. The larger then the group, the more thorough was the terrible but beneficial natural selection.

Again, in the larger groups sexual selection had the freer play, and it became more discriminating as association became closer. A feeble, unimportant process among sluggish creatures that mingled but little, it became a conspicuous factor in evolution among actively associating birds and mammals of keen intelligence that were passionately fond of play and companionship.

Yet again, the greater the variety of elements that were united in the demotic composition and the more perfect their intermingling through association, the greater was the plasticity and modifiability of the population and the greater therefore was its capacity for improvement.

Mutual aid, including all forms of coöperation, effected changes in the environment. In the fauna, dangerous species that were hostile to a powerful group were driven

from the neighbourhood or were destroyed. Others, becoming a food-supply, were exterminated throughout wide areas. Similar changes were produced in the flora. Extensive transformations were sometimes made in the inorganic environment, by constructive animals, as, for example, by village-building termites or by dam-building beavers. Still more extensive, and more important, was the network of paths and trails worn through the forest, and over mesa and plain, by migrating bands of gregarious mammals.

If environment, intermixture, selection, and organic adaptation were coöperating causes of variation, and if each of them was affected to a considerable extent by association, association was one of the great coöperating causes of the origin of species.

To attribute to social relations so important a part in the evolution of animal life, is possibly a radical proposition. But it is not as radical as one that remains to be made. Not only did association act upon those causes of variation that biologists have perceived, but it also contributed a cause which they have not adequately recognized as one that operated incessantly among the lower animals in the ages before man.

That cause was nothing less than conscious selection. It is not possible to doubt that for thousands of years before man existed, natural selection was everywhere supplemented by conscious choice, a direct product of association.

This, it must be confessed, is a bold assumption. But to deny it is to affirm an alternative too absurd for belief. It is to affirm that after consciousness and choice appeared in the animal creation, they did not react upon the processes of evolution. It is to affirm that sympathies and antipathies, consciousness of kind and mutual aid, did not guide the crossing of stocks or affect the stability of

environing conditions. Such propositions carry their own refutation.

From the moment that conscious association began, it was a combining agency among the factors of evolution. Among locomotive animals it was continually facilitating combinations of inheritance of a sort that were impossible to non-locomotive animals and to plants; it was making other combinations difficult, and yet others impossible. When variations had thus been brought about, they became confirmed in types or species only if the new varieties were shielded for a long time from influences that would further modify them. The protection that plants and non-locomotive animals had enjoyed was simply that of a relative inability to wander and intermingle. The power to move about, when it was acquired, destroyed all that security. What was it that then took the place of local attachment as a protective condition? There is no satisfactory answer other than that which is found in the facts of association. It was association that maintained the necessary isolation; that drew lines of separation through and through the animal kingdom; that excluded incongruous elements from each group; and that held congruous elements together in close interaction, until a type had become fixed.

Association, in short, was a chief cause of variation and of characterization. It created new varieties, and in them it reproduced, in ever-increasing strength, the instinct to associate

In the last consideration we pass from the problem of variation to that of survival.

The chief organic result of social life among animals, was a more perfect organization of the individual brain and nervous system, and, in consequence, a noteworthy transformation in the character of the struggle for existence. Thenceforward intelligence, as Mr. Wallace has

shown, counted for more than brute strength. If then it was association that developed intelligence, and with intelligence the power to coöperate, association was a chief cause of survival as well as of variation. Social life itself, however, developed with the progressive weeding out of unsocial creatures, which became a more easy prey to physical forces and living enemies. That some of the most powerful animals, the carnivora for example, are singularly unsocial and ferocious, is an apparent contradiction to this explanation. But it may be doubted whether the carnivora were always unsocial. It is at least possible that they are degenerates; and that in a more social life in former times, when their numbers were greater than they are now, they acquired the power and the cunning that made them able to live alone, and to maintain themselves against all foes. In isolation all sympathetic feelings have disappeared, and only the cruel side of their nature has developed.

In further proof of the influence of association upon survival we have the evidence afforded by existing animal life, which has been put together in M. Kropotkin's remarkable papers.[1] A few further citations from these must be given.

"The ant," says M. Kropotkin, "thrives without having any of the 'protective' features which cannot be dispensed with by animals living an isolated life. Its colour renders it conspicuous to its enemies, and the lofty nests of many species are conspicuous in the meadows and forests." The sting of a single individual is not formidable. Its eggs and larvæ are a dainty to many inhabitants of the forest. Yet ants are not much destroyed by birds, not even by ant-eaters, and are dreaded by most stronger insects.[2]

[1] Kropotkin's examples are drawn largely from that exhaustless source: Alfred Brehm's "Illustriertes Thierleben." I follow Kropotkin in my text and references, however, because it is his original interpretation of this material that is significant.

[2] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, p. 345.

The cranes usually hatch but two eggs at an incubation, but to maintain the species they do not need to rear a numerous offspring; their social habits, intelligence, and prudence enable them often to attain to a great age.[1]

In their societies parrots "find infinitely more protection than they possibly might find in any ideal development of beak and claw. Very few birds of prey or mammals dare attack any but the smaller species of parrots." "'It is most probable that the larger parrots succumb chiefly to old age rather than die from the claws of any enemies.'"[2]

Horses, "badly organized on the whole for resisting both their numerous enemies and the adverse conditions of climate, would soon have disappeared from the surface of the earth were it not for their sociable spirit. When a beast of prey approaches them, several studs unite at once; they repulse the beast and sometimes chase it: and neither the wolf nor the bear, not even the lion, can capture a horse or even a zebra as long as they are not detached from the herd. . . . And when a snowstorm rages in the steppes, each stud keeps close together, and repairs to a protected ravine. But if confidence disappears, or the group has been seized by panic, and disperses, the horses perish and the survivors are found after the storm half dying from fatigue."[3]

"That life in societies is the most powerful weapon in the struggle for life, taken in its widest sense, has been illustrated by several examples on the foregoing pages, and could be illustrated by any amount of evidence, if further evidence were required. Life in societies enables the feeblest insects, the feeblest birds, and the feeblest mammals to resist, or to protect themselves from the most terrible birds, and beasts of prey; it permits longevity; it enables the species to rear its progeny with the least waste

[1] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, p. 352.
[2] Ibid., p. 353.
[3] Ibid., pp. 706, 707.

of energy and to maintain its numbers albeit a very slow birth rate; it enables the gregarious animals to migrate in search of new abodes. Therefore, while fully admitting that force, swiftness, protective colours, cunningness, and endurance to hunger and cold, which are mentioned by Darwin and Wallace, are so many qualities making the individual, or the species, the fittest under certain circumstances, we maintain that under any circumstances sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life. Those species which willingly or unwillingly abandon it are doomed to decay; while those animals which know best how to combine have the greatest chances of survival and of further evolution, although they may be inferior to others in each of the faculties enumerated by Darwin and Wallace, save the intellectual faculty. The highest vertebrates, and especially mankind, are the best proof of this assertion. As to the intellectual faculty, while every Darwinist will agree with Darwin that it is the most powerful arm in the struggle for life, and the most powerful factor of further evolution, he also will admit that intelligence is an eminently social faculty. Language, imitation, and accumulated experience are so many elements of growing intelligence of which the unsociable animal is deprived. Therefore we find, at the top of each class of animals, the ants, the parrots, and the monkeys, all combining the greatest sociability with the highest development of intelligence. The fittest are thus the most sociable animals, and sociability appears as the chief factor of evolution, both directly, by securing the well-being of the species while diminishing the waste of energy, and indirectly, by favouring the growth of intelligence."[1]

On the whole we may accept M. Kropotkin's conclusion that society has been a more powerful aid than any other in the struggle for existence. But it has been so, not because of any mysterious power in itself, but because it

[1] Kropotkin, *loc. cit.*, p. 711.

has acted directly on the characters of the associated individuals, transforming them gradually, and by degrees developing mental power.

Thus throughout the ages before man association was zoögenic. It was causing variation and was determining survival. It was differentiating animal life into kinds and was bringing to a high perfection the kinds that were best equipped with a social nature, with habits of mutual aid, and with elementary forms of social organization.

In achieving all this, association was preparing the way for man and for human society. It was endowing a few varieties that were not yet hardened into species, with such mental capacities that from among them one could be selected for the highest destinies. It was so far developing the social instincts of others that they could become useful coöperators with man after he should have made himself the master of all lower species. If he had not been able to domesticate animals, man could never have achieved civilization. He could not have domesticated animals if they had not first acquired in association a teachable disposition and a high intelligence. The elephant, the horse, the ox, the sheep, the llama, the dog, — these have been man's faithful servants and these are the preëminently social animals. Thousands of years, perhaps millions of years, before man was born, the foundations of his empire were laid in the zoögenic associations of the humblest forms of conscious life.

CHAPTER II

ANTHROPOGENIC ASSOCIATION

THERE is no reason to doubt the continuity of animal and human society. The fact here referred to must not be confounded with the descent of man from some lower ancestor. The doctrine of descent rests on proofs that fall within the sciences of biology and geology. Sociology accepts their conclusion and inquires whether the earliest men were isolated pairs, descended perhaps from a single pair, or whether the transition from the animal to the human state was made by entire social groups. There is no evidence whatever for the theory of a single pair, or for any theory of numerous isolated pairs, the progenitors of different varieties of men. On the contrary, there is much evidence of another kind which raises insuperable difficulties against the acceptance of such views.

All the remains of primitive men show that they lived as savage men live now, in groups. The ape-like ancestor of man also must have been a social animal.[1] Is there any reason to suppose that between the social anthropoid and the social primitive man there was intercallated a pair living out of social relations and so far differing mentally and physically from all other creatures that any society with them was impossible? If there is, it would be as well to go back to the hypothesis of special creation; for the mental and physical differences that mark men off from other creatures are those that are created by social intercourse, and without society they could not have had a

[1] Darwin, "Descent of Man," p. 180.

natural genesis. Speech is the specific attainment that separates man from the brute and is the means to the development of his higher intellectual qualities. "Without the use of some language, however imperfect, it appears doubtful whether man's intellect could have risen to the standard implied by his dominant position at an early period."[1] Moreover, the patriarchal theory of the origin of society has been broken down at a dozen points, and with it have gone most of the preconceptions out of which the theory of a single pair was evolved.

We have three means of determining approximately the social characteristics of primitive men. One is a considerable body of biological and geological facts from which we may infer the nature of primitive man and the conditions under which he lived. A second is an increasing mass of archæological materials which reveal many things about the life of the first men that left positive traces of their existence. The third is a general parallelism between some features of primitive society and some features of the lowest societies of existing savages.

There are many reasons for assuming the parallelism. One is found in the fact that the beliefs and customs of civilized peoples contain many survivals of beliefs and practices that still exist in full force in savage communities. These indicate not only that civilized nations have developed from savagery, but that existing savage hordes are in a stage of arrested development, and therefore approximately in the condition of primitive men. Another reason for the assumption is afforded by the fact that the oldest remains of human workmanship show that paleolithic and neolithic men had the same arts that savage men have at the present time.

Nevertheless, no existing society can be classified as anthropogenic. None is as low in the scale of evolution as

[1] Darwin, "Descent of Man," p. 180.

primitive human society must have been, and none is wholly lacking in those beginnings of organization on clanship or tribal lines that entitle it to be classified as ethnogenic.

Moreover, the parallelism has certain important limitations which should always be remembered. Modern savage groups live in the relatively barren, inhospitable, inaccessible regions of the earth, into which they have been crowded by stronger peoples. It is practically certain that the first habitat of man was a bountiful and highly favoured area. These differences of circumstance would make important differences between the social, mental, and physical characteristics of the lowest modern men, and the men of primitive hordes. Modern savages are doubtless in some degree degenerate; enfeebled and on the way to extinction. Primitive men had no greater intelligence than modern savages have, and they had substantially the same ideas that savages have, although they were possibly in many ways more distinctly animal than savages are; but it is probable that primitive men were relatively well nourished, and that they lived in relatively large bands and evolved a relatively large total of energy for expenditure in the life struggle. These differences would affect the rate of social evolution rather than its forms and stages. For the study of the latter we may assume the parallelism with much confidence. Anthropological sociology, therefore, is a study of the societies of primitive men as inferentially reconstructed, and of existing savage communities as far as they can be supposed to afford data for an understanding of human origins.

Proofs are abundant that the natural food-supply conditioned social congregation among prehistoric men. Shell heaps like those of Tierra del Fuego left by early neolithic men are found "here and there all round the coasts of

the world."[1] On the coasts of Denmark some of these "kitchen middens" are nine hundred feet long, from one hundred to two hundred feet wide, and from three to five, occasionally even ten feet, in thickness.[2] The oldest positively identified remains of primitive man (the paleolithic implements and weapons found in the river drift and caverns of northwestern France and southern England) are mingled with the bones of animals that were used for food. The quantities of such remains indicate gatherings of considerable numbers at the rude feasts. Of archæological remains in general it may be said that they always imply human association and a direct connection of association with the food-supply.

The earliest association of men, however, must have been under conditions even simpler than those disclosed by the oldest artificial remains. The earliest men left no archæological remains; they had not yet advanced beyond the use of sticks and unchipped stones, — a fact to be remembered in all discussions of the antiquity of man. If no paleolithic remains earlier than the late quaternary period are found, it does not follow that man did not exist until the late quaternary. On the contrary, it is certain that, if flints were then chipped by men, earlier men had lived, who had not thought of chipping flints. Therefore the association of the earliest men, like that of many savage hordes to-day, must have been conditioned by the abundance and accessibility of the kinds of food that could be obtained by the hands aided only by stick or stone. The forest hordes of Brazil subsist on roots, bulbs and nuts, calabashes and beans, wild honey, birds' eggs, grubs from rotten wood, and insects. The earliest men must have lived in much the same way, but perhaps more bountifully, probably adding to their resources fish, shell fish, and easily captured animals.

[1] Tylor, "Anthropology," p. 207.

[2] Isaac Taylor, "Origin of the Aryans," p. 61.

The other physical conditions of the existence of primitive men could be certainly known only if we knew where, and in what geological period, man first appeared. Such evidences as we have go to confirm the opinion of Darwin, in which the able anti-Darwinian anthropologist, Quatrefages concurred,[1] that man was living in the tertiary period. They do not confirm Darwin's rather hesitating belief that the transition from brute to man took place entirely in Africa; much less do they confirm Quatrefages' belief that man originated in northern Asia.[2] They indicate rather that the transition was effected through many cumulative variations, crossings, and selections, some of which occurred in one region and some in another while the hominine species was distributed through a habitat that extended halfway around the globe.

The evidences for Darwin's belief in an African origin of man were these: "In each great region of the world the living mammals are closely related to the extinct species of the same region."[3] Man is related more nearly to the catarrhine apes of the Old World than to the platyrrhine monkeys of the New World. The living species most nearly related to man are the gorilla and the chimpanzee, both of which live in Africa. Two or three anthropomorphous apes, however, including the Dryopithecus of Lartet, nearly as large as a man, existed in Europe during the miocene age. "At the period and place, whenever and wherever it was, when man first lost his hairy covering, he probably inhabited a hot country; a circumstance favourable for the frugivorous diet on which, judging from analogy, he subsisted. We are far from knowing how long ago it was when man first diverged from the catarrhine stock; but it may have occurred at an epoch as remote as the eocene period; for that the higher apes have diverged

[1] Quatrefages, "The Human Species," and "The Pygmies," especially p. 186. [2] "The Pygmies," p. 186.

[3] Darwin, "Descent of Man," p. 155.

from the lower apes as early as the upper miocene period is shown by the existence of the Dryopithecus."[1]

The scientific objections to the conclusion that man's development from a lower type was accomplished wholly in Africa are many and serious.

An intensely hot and humid climate might have helped man to shed his hair, but it would have been extremely unfavourable to the physical and mental activity essential to a high cerebral development; while a genial, sub-tropical, lowland climate, passing into a cool and temperate climate in mountainous regions, would have been favourable in a high degree.

The distribution of the black races is apparently irreconcilable with any theory that would limit the primitive home of man to an area west of the Indian ocean and south of the Sahara. The dwarf blacks of the far East, which are best represented by the Mincopis of the Andaman islands, are in all probability a remnant of one of the earliest human stocks, and it seems to have been demonstrated that the black races moved from southeastern Asia westward, and not from Africa eastward.[2] Proof that in an earlier geological period an equatorial continent stretched eastward from Guinea to New Guinea[3] would not remove these difficulties.

Not less difficult to reconcile with the theory that man's first habitat was restricted to equatorial Africa is the distribution of the oldest remains of man and of the fossil remains of the anthropoid apes that most nearly resembled him. The grouping of these remains has strongly suggested the possibility that the human race began in western Europe. It was the evidence that man-like apes

[1] Darwin, "Descent of Man," p. 156.

[2] See Tylor, "Anthropology," pp. 87, 88, and Quatrefages, "The Pygmies," p. 51.

[3] The "Lemuria" of Haeckel; "The Natural History of Creation," Vol. I., p. 361. Cf. also Tylor, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

wandered through western Europe in miocene and later periods that disturbed Darwin's faith in his own conclusion on this question. The *Dryopithecus fontani*, in height about that of normal man and with teeth like those of the Australian, has been found in the upper valleys of the Garonne in France, and in Italy.[1] One species of catarrhine monkey still dwells on the Rock of Gibraltar. It was in Europe that the first discoveries of unquestionable remains of quaternary man were made, and no similar discoveries of quite equal value have been made elsewhere. "Whether it may be considered or not that Europe was a quarter of the globe inhabited by the earliest tribes of men, it so happens that remains found in Europe furnish at present the best proofs of man's antiquity," is the judgment of Tylor.[2] Paleolithic implements are found in the valleys of the Ouse and the Thames in England, in those of the Somme and the Garonne in France, and in that of the Tagus in Spain and Portugal.[3] The Neanderthal skull was found in 1857 in the valley of the Neander between Dusseldorf and Elberfeld.[4] A similar fragment was found in 1865 at Eguisheim, and some years later another was found at Brüx in Bohemia.[5]

An attempt to harmonize this European evidence with Darwin's view has been made by Dr. Brinton,[6] in the sug-

[1] Mortillet, "Le Préhistorique, antiquité de l'homme," p. 120, and Gaudry, "Le dryopithèque."

[2] Tylor, "Anthropology," p. 26.

[3] De Mortillet, *Materiaux pour l'histoire de l'homme*, Series I., Vol. I., 1865, p. 137; John Evans, "Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain," pp. 595, 616; Lubbock, "Prehistoric Times"; Dawkins, "Early Man in Britain," and "Cave Hunting," and Émile Cartailhac, "Les âges préhistoriques de l'Espagne et du Portugal," pp. 10–18.

[4] For Schaäfhausen's description of this skull see *Archiv für Anatomie*, 1858, p. 453. For Broca's demonstration that it is normal, and not, as Virchow and others argued, pathological, see *Bulletins de la société d'anthropologie de Paris*, Vol. IV., 1863, p. 322.

[5] Hovelacque et Hervé, "Précis d'anthropologie," p. 359.

[6] Brinton, "Races and Peoples," pp. 86–89.

gestion that the general tenor of the great naturalist's conclusion was merely "to the effect that man was first developed in the warm regions of the western or Atlantic portion of the Old World, somewhere within the present or ancient area of Africa, and not in Asia." So construed, the Africa of man's supposed origin is no longer the equatorial Africa south of the Sahara, but that vast ancient peninsula which included northern Africa and western Europe. In other words, it becomes not ancient Africa, but ancient Europe.

It is known that in the early tertiary period Europe and northern Africa were united, and that they were separated from equatorial Africa by shallow seas, where now are the Saharan desert, the eastern half of the Mediterranean sea, and the Euphrates valley.[1] Connecting the Atlantic and the Indian oceans, the Saharan sea thus divided the Old World into two continents,—a northern, which included northwestern Africa, western and southern Europe, and southern and eastern Asia, and a southern, which included the greater part of Africa. Arabia and Hindostan were islands. Northeastern Europe and northwestern Asia were submerged beneath the Northern Ocean. Scandinavia was an island. Western Europe was closely connected with America by way of England, Iceland, and Greenland, all of which enjoyed a sub-tropical climate. The northern continent has long been known among geologists by the perfectly descriptive term Eurasia. Dr. Brinton, influenced perhaps by the idea that Darwin's views must in some way be made to fit the evidences of man's antiquity in Europe, and influenced even more, perhaps, by studies of the historical distribution of the white race, has proposed to call the western peninsula Eurafrica.[2] This suggestion, how-

[1] Wallace, "The Geographical Distribution of Animals," Vol. I., pp. 38, 39; and E. Suess, "Das Antlitz der Erde," Bd. I., pp. 379, 380; and Huxley, "Physiography," p. 308.

[2] "Races and Peoples," p. 89.

ever, has the peculiarity, that while the name Eurafrica happily expresses a present fact of great importance, namely, the physiographic, botanical, zoölogical, and ethnological unity of Europe and northern Africa in modern times, — since they became geographically separated, and since northern and equatorial Africa became geographically united,— it has no meaning when carried back to tertiary times. In the tertiary period there was a Eurasia; there was no Eurafrica.

Nevertheless, it is right to conclude that if groups of the earliest men lived in Europe, the habitat of the species stretched south and east through what is northwestern Africa now, though it was not a part of Africa then. This conclusion from tertiary geography is supported by the coincidence of paleontology with archæology. The distribution of the anthropoid apes certainly extended south and eastward from western Europe. The Dryopithecus, it will be remembered, has been found in Italy. Paleolithic relics, so abundant in western Europe, are found also in the valleys of the Atlas, and in Tunesia.[1]

But if, on the strength of such evidence, we trace the primitive habitat of man and his immediate ancestry as far east as the point where the Tunesia and the Italy of to-day were joined in the curving southern coast of tertiary Europe, we cannot arbitrarily stop there and assume that the race was developed "somewhere within the present or ancient area of Africa, and not in Asia." The southern coast line of the northern continent continued unbroken along the southwestern base of the mountain chain that bounds on the northeast the valley of the Euphrates, the valley of the Tigris and the Persian gulf; thence along the Indian ocean; thence along the northwestern side of what is now the valley of the Indus; thence along the north-

[1] Lubbock, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. X., February, 1881, p. 318, and R. Collignon, *Bulletins de la société d'anthropologie de Paris*, Vol. IX., Series III., 1886, p. 676.

eastern side of what is now the valley of the Ganges; and thence, finally, southeastward, down the Malay peninsula, to Sumatra and Java. At the eastern extremity of this long belt the anthropoid apes still live in great numbers. At the eastern extremity also are found remnants of the undeveloped human races that most nearly resemble the man-like apes. Paleolithic implements are found above Madras in India, which was an off-shore island, and elsewhere in southern Asia.[1] These facts are surely sufficient to establish a possibility that simian man may have lived at the extreme Asian end also of a habitat that extended northwestward into Europe.

To these considerations must now be added that of the discovery, in the post-pliocene deposits of the island of Java, of remains which Dr. Dubois, who first described them, too hastily pronounced to be those of the type that was intermediate between the anthropoid apes and man, and to which accordingly he gave the name of *Pithecanthropus erectus*, which Haeckel in 1868 had proposed for the "missing link." These remains, which possibly are really those of a man of the Neanderthal type, consist of the roof of a skull, a femur, and a molar tooth. The cranial arch falls almost halfway between that of a chimpanzee and that of a well-developed man, while the cranial capacity is double that of the gorilla and approaches the physiological minimum in man. The thigh-bone has simian characteristics, but is in form and dimensions that of man.[2] This discovery makes the hypothesis of an eastern origin of the human species quite as strong as that of a western origin.

The reasoning so far employed, however, necessitates a return to tertiary Africa and an admission that the habitat

[1] Tylor, "Anthropology," p. 30.

[2] Dubois, "Pithecanthropus Erectus"; Marsh, *American Journal of Science*, Vol. XLIX., February, 1895, pp. 144–147; *The Nation*, January 17, 1895, pp. 52, 53, and February 7, 1895, p. 105; and Keith, "Pithecanthropus Erectus, a Brief Review of Human Fossil Remains," *Science Progress*, Vol. III., No. 17, July, 1895.

of the hominine species may have extended through the northern part of that continent also, along the southern side of the Saharan sea. At times during the upheaval of the Sahara and the subsidence of the Mediterranean basin, there undoubtedly were land bridges from one continent to the other. Africa is the home of the highest anthropoid apes now surviving,—the gorilla and the chimpanzee. Paleolithic flints are found in the Libyan desert, where vegetation was once luxuriant[1] and in the valley of the Nile.[2] The negrillos of the equatorial interior are apparently identical in race with the Mincopis of the Andaman islands and the negritos of the Philippines.

Little needs to be said about indications that seem to point to South Africa or to America or to northeastern Asia as man's birthplace. Paleolithic implements are found as far south as the Cape of Good Hope,[3] but there is no local evidence there to connect paleolithic man with indigenous anthropoid apes. In America no tailless catarrhine apes have been found, and the alleged discoveries there of quaternary man have not been verified. The authenticity of Abbott's "paleoliths" from the Trenton gravels and of Wright's from the Ohio valley is disputed.[4] Few if any paleolithic remains have been found in Scandinavia, Germany, Russia, or Siberia.[5] There are no catarrhine apes north of the Alps or of the Himalayas.

In view of all these facts it would seem that we should look for the habitat of man's immediate ancestors where a climate ranging from tropical through sub-tropical to

[1] Zittel, "Sur des silex taillés trouvés dans le désert Libyque," "Congrès internationale d'anthropologie et d'archéologie," 1874, p. 76.

[2] Petrie, "Ten Years' Digging in Egypt," p. 77.

[3] Gooch, "The Stone Age of South Africa," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. X., May, 1881.

[4] See the controversy in *Science*, Vol. XXI., 1893.

[5] Woldrich, "Ueber die Palaeolithische Zeit Mittel-Europas," *Correspondenz-Blatt der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie*, XX Jahr., 1889, pp. 110 *sq.*, and *Archiv für Anthropologie*, Bd. XVIII., 1889, p. 353.

temperate is known to have prevailed in the tertiary period; where the higher catarrhine apes are known to have existed; where the earliest remains of man are discovered; and from which the lowest races of men could have been distributed as we now find them. A region or zone that fulfils all of these requirements was not improbably the scene of man's development from a lower type. The regions which yield paleolithic remains, but which were not inhabited in miocene and later times by catarrhine apes, or which were unfavourable in climate, or which could not have been centres of dispersion, are probably the regions into which man first wandered from his primitive home. Regions in which no paleolithic remains are found were probably the last to be peopled.

When these rules are applied to the known facts, it appears that the habitat of the hominine species was probably a tropical and sub-tropical zone that reached halfway round the earth from Java northwestwardly to England. More exactly, it was the southwestern slopes and shores of the vast tertiary continent of Eurasia, the tertiary island of Hindostan, and the northern shore of tertiary Africa. From this zone man wandered first down the eastern coast of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope, while by way of Iceland and Greenland he pushed on into America.[1] Not until much later did he find his way through the Himalayas into northeastern Asia, and across the northern seas into Scandinavia.

It is contrary to popular ideas, doubtless, to conceive of the primitive habitat of the human species as an enormously long and narrow zone, rather than as a circumscribed valley or upland; but it is unnecessary to argue that popular ideas on this subject have never had any basis in scientific

[1] Differing as I do from Dr. Brinton in regard to the relations of early man to Asia and to Africa, I am glad to be able to agree with so learned and valued a friend in regard to the peopling of America. I think that he has disposed of the theory of a Mongolian origin of the red men. See "The American Race."

research. We know that in the age before man the higher apes were distributed throughout the length of the Indo-European zone that has been described. We know that quaternary man also, in his turn, was distributed throughout the same zone. Unless we are prepared to believe that a brain no better than a chimpanzee's was converted into a brain as good as the Tasmanian's or the Mincopi's more quickly than the brain of the savage of the German forests was converted into the brain of the modern European, we must admit the alternative that the type which was intermediate between ape and man existed long enough to spread likewise throughout the zone of the anthropoid apes and of the quaternary men. Unless we are prepared to believe that the acquisitions which constitute the superiority of man over the apes were made in ways that bore no resemblance to the ways by which were made the acquisitions that constitute the superiority of civilization over savagery, we must admit that no one small group of hominine anthropoids made all the human acquisitions and that no one place was a fostering environment to them all. Civilization has been achieved through innumerable minglings of peoples, mixtures of bloods, and blendings of traditions, by means of which the mental and physiological gains made by each group have been communicated to a thousand groups. There is no sufficient reason to doubt that the gains which converted the anthropoid into man were made, exchanged, and multiplied in a similar manner.

In a word, those gains, so marvellous in the aggregate, so insignificant perhaps in itemized detail were accumulated through a sociological process. Genetic and congregate groupings were combined, crossed, broken up, and again united, in endless variations of size and composition. At times small bands, dwelling long in secure, more or less isolated environments, and maintaining exclusiveness of association, developed distinctive traits. At other times, such bands, driven together, as bands of animals and

of savage men are driven together now by changes in the distribution of food, or by floods, fire, or the movements of enemies, were massed in enormous aggregations. In such disturbances of life unstable variations quickly perished; stable, helpful variations were communicated from each centre of origin to every horde and individual of the species. In this conception of a hominine species distributed throughout an extensive zone, in which were many local peculiarities of environment and many centres of association, but throughout which there was much migration and mingling, may perhaps be found combined the elements of essential truth in the two great opposing theories of monogenism and polygenism.[1]

If the conclusions hitherto reached in this work are true, it is necessary to believe that association, more extended, more intimate, more varied in its phases, than the association practised by inferior species, was the chief cause of the mental and moral development, and of the anatomical modifications that transformed a sub-human species into man. The inference that association was more intimate among man's immediate ancestors than among other mammalia is confirmed by a glance at the character of association among the highest animals and among the lowest men. In the animal world mutual aid attains its highest development among the social apes and monkeys. That it was somewhat further developed among the early cave-men is evident from the proofs of their successful warfare against such creatures as the mastodon and the cave-bear. The expenditure of surplus energy in play is carried further among the quadrumana than among other mammals, and the almost human affection of monkeys is too familiar to need description. Among the lowest men play has be-

[1] The doctrine of the text nevertheless is monogenism. For a résumé of polygenism see Hovelacque et Hervé, "Précis d'anthropologie," and Gumplowicz, "Der Rassenkampf."

come organized in games and festivities. If there was a transitional form between the quadrumana and mankind, there was unquestionably an intermediate development of association between the mutual aid and social pleasures of the quadrumana and the coöperation and festivity of men.

The development of association in intimacy, and above all, the development of festivity, converted the elementary language of animals into speech, which was thenceforward the foundation of human progress. Romanes has shown exactly what was the gulf to be bridged.[1] It is not true, as was held from Aristotle to Locke, and as many persons still believe, that the mental difference between man and lower animals lies in man's power of forming general ideas. Animals, too, can generalize. They can even express and communicate general ideas by means of tones and gestures, but they cannot name their abstract thoughts and then combine the names in propositions.

Ideas may be mere memories of percepts, simple, particular, and concrete. They may be compounds or complexes of simple ideas (and, as such, general), which, however, the conscious subject does not recognize as different from simple ideas, though they are very different in fact; they may be, in a word, the unperceived abstractions that Romanes has named recepts. Finally, they may be true concepts, that is to say, they may be the abstract ideas which the conscious subject himself distinguishes and recognizes as abstract, which he thinks of as abstract, and to which he gives names that enable him and others always to identify them as abstract. As examples of the power of animals to form the generic ideas that he calls recepts, Romanes mentions the discrimination shown by water-fowl that dive fearlessly from a great height into water, but descend lightly upon ice or land; the dog's association of hollow ground with water, and the habit that bears and elephants

[1] Romanes, "Mental Evolution in Man."

have of making currents in water to draw floating objects within reach.[1] These, and other examples in which Romanes' work abounds, show conclusively that intelligent animals have some power of generalization, but there is no proof that they ever make an abstract idea, as such, an object of contemplation.

Language, the system of signs by which simple ideas, recepts, and concepts are expressed, may consist of gestures, grimaces, and tones, of inarticulate utterances, of articulate sounds, or of articulate sounds, tones, and gestures in combination. The language of gesture and tone is the language of recepts; it is well developed among animals and is the natural language of children, mentally deficient adults, and savages. Articulation is a secondary language of recepts and the only adequate language of concepts. Talking birds, and mammals, use articulate sounds to some extent as a language of recepts.

The signs that constitute language, whether they are gestures, tones, or articulate sounds, acquire depth of meaning as they are successively made to express sensations, perceptions, simple ideas, recepts, and concepts. As graded by Romanes, they are: first, indicative, when they are merely expressive of a mental state, as when the parrot puts down its head to be scratched, or the dog begs for a bone; second, denotative, when they mark or designate but do not in strictness name particular objects, qualities, or actions, as when the parrot learns to call a particular dog Jack, thereby associating a verbal mark with an object, but without deliberately naming it; third, connotative, when they are extended by association (but still without deliberate naming) to many objects in a class, as when the parrot, having learned to call one dog Jack, afterwards calls any dog Jack, or as when the child, having learned to say star, calls a candle, a gas light, or any shining object, a star; fourth, denominative, when a connotative sign is

[1] Romanes, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 *sq.*

deliberately bestowed as a name, the sign itself having become an object of contemplation; fifth, predicative, when two denominative terms are brought into conceptual apposition, with the perfectly conscious intention to connote something of the one by means of the other. The predicative use of articulate signs is speech.

By means of these distinctions the line between the lower animals and man can be drawn with some approach to exactness. Animals use gesture, grimace, tone, utterance, and, to a slight extent, articulation, indicatively and denotatively; occasionally the most intelligent animals use vocal or other signs connotatively. They do not use signs of any kind denominatively, because they have not acquired the mental power to separate signs from the objects signified. Therefore they cannot use signs as movable types; they cannot use them predicatively. They can use the logic of recepts, but not the logic of concepts. They have language, but not speech.[1]

How did the signs of ideas become objects of contemplation, movable types, names; so converting receptual into conceptual thought, tone and gesture language into speech? This is the crucial question in the problem of the origin of human faculty. The true answer to it has been suggested, I think, by Dr. Donovan,[2] and less definitely by other investigators who have been led to examine the intimate association of speech and ideation with choral music.[3] "I think it will be found," says Dr. Donovan, "that the origin of speech was only possible through the aid of the psychological machinery which belonged to musical pleasure."[4] Enough evidence has been given in the chapter on

[1] Romanes, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[2] Donovan, "The Festal Origin of Human Speech," *Mind*, Vol. XVI., No. 3, October, 1891.

[3] Cf., *e.g.* Posnett, "Comparative Literature," Book II., Chap. II., on Early Choral Song, and Gummere's presentation of the communal theory of the origin of the ballad, in the introduction to his "Old English Ballads."

[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 499.

The Social Population to bear out his further assertions that communal spirit finds its first and rudest expression in bodily play excitement, and that in the earliest discovered forms this rude expression has already become the racial habit of festal celebration, the constant elements of which are bodily play movements in imitation of actions, rhythmic beating, some approach to song, and the social interest. The argument, therefore, is well founded, that under the mental exaltation of such occasions, rather than under any less stimulating circumstances, attention would be fixed upon vocal sounds used as signs, and the conclusion is warranted that it was under the stimulation of social excitement that signs were first distinguished in thought from the things signified, and so conventionalized as names, the movable types of speech.

From the moment that the hominine species began to practise speech, however feebly, however awkwardly, it began to develop a human nature. The term "human nature" has so long been associated with economic motives and with individualism, that it has acquired a perverted meaning. Human nature is not the unsocial, egoistic nature. Self-interest is not the distinctively human trait; it is a primordial animal trait, which man, an animal after all, still possesses and must cultivate if he would continue to live. Human nature is the preëminently social nature. Its primary factor is a consciousness of kind that is more profound, more inclusive, more discriminating, more varied in its colouring, than any consciousness of kind that is found among the lower animals. Its secondary factor is a differentiated volume of desire, strong, expansive, modifiable, to a degree that is unknown in any other species. The secondary factor is derived in part from the primary; the development of desire is in part a result of the development of the consciousness of kind. A high development of both factors was made possible by speech.

Speech developed the human phase of the consciousness of kind through both direct and indirect reactions.

Inasmuch as speech was a consequence of association, its direct reaction must have been upon association. Nothing ever had marked off one species from all other species so sharply as speech marked off the primitive man — for such at length he was when he had begun to speak — from all his rivals in the life struggle. Nothing else had been so obvious a ground of antipathies and sympathies. The reaction upon the consciousness of kind must necessarily have been immediate, direct, and profound.

Besides the direct reaction of speech upon the consciousness of kind, there was an indirect reaction, not less positive in character and further-reaching in its consequences. This was the nicer discrimination and the more exact classification of all actions, persons, and things that became possible when the denominative use of vocal signs converted the logic of recepts into the logic of concepts. With that conversion conceptual thought and the consciousness of kind began to act and react ceaselessly upon each other.

Speech developed human desire also by both direct and indirect reactions.

Its direct reaction was its persistent stimulation of curiosity. The great difference between desire as it exists in the lower animals and desire as it exists in man lies in a prodigious development in man of those components of desire which originate in his intellectual activities. All desire is made up of incipient motor impulses or of cravings to experience the contact of external stimuli. The primary elements of desire originate in the fundamental physiological processes of nutrition and reproduction. They are components of all the higher desires, but of themselves they could not develop indefinitely. The secondary elements of desire originate in the activity of the organs of preception and thought. They are cravings for

the excitement that accompanies the activity of the psychological apparatus. These cravings admit of indefinite multiplication. They admit of combination and recombination, with one another and with primary cravings, in endless variation of detail. It is their evolution which constitutes the progressive development of desire. Curiosity is the marginal development of intellectual desire. It is intellectual desire reaching out beyond its old limits, as a passion to examine new things and to pry into newly perceived relations. Therefore it is evident that the development of desire is effected through the evolution of curiosity, and the direct relation of desire to speech is clear; for, in the beginning, speech must have acted upon curiosity in the race, as now it acts upon curiosity in the child. It is when the child begins to apply names to things that his curiosity becomes insatiable. In the effort to discover whether or not the new object resembles anything that he has already classified and denominated, he examines it by every means known to him; by touch, taste, and sound, by pulling and twisting, by throwing, and pounding, and crushing, until for the time he has completely exhausted his powers of attention. In like manner, under the mental excitement of practising his newly acquired and wonderful faculty of speech, the primitive man, we may be sure, awakened to that intense interest in the qualities and relations of the objects that he was beginning to name, which, in his descendants, was to become the quenchless thirst for knowledge. When Adam had named the animals, it was too late to draw the line of investigation at the mystery of the tree of life and of the knowledge of good and evil.

The indirect reaction of speech upon desire was through its tendency to emphasize inequality, on the one hand, and to develop the consciousness of kind, on the other hand. The inequality which inevitably exists in every group of animals or of men, and which is due to the differ-

ences of heredity, nourishment, environment, and opportunity, had already become more pronounced among the highest sub-human species than it was among less developed species, as we know from the conspicuous part that leadership still plays among the gregarious mammalia. Upon such inequality speech could but have operated irresistibly to widen the distance between the clever and the dull, and to sharpen the perception of that distance in every mind. The possessor of powers of clear conceptual thought and of a clever tongue, became the most interesting object of distinction. At the same time, by means of his endowment of conceptual thought, he could put his distinction before his own mind as an object of thought. The wish to outdo his fellows, generated ages before in the contentions and imitations of animal groups, and strengthened by the courtship rivalries born of sexual selection, could now become a clearly conceived desire for distinction. In the breasts of his fellows, however, the deepening consciousness of kind could but fortify a belief that the distinction which one could achieve must be possible to all. The wish to emulate, born of habits of imitation that extended back through countless generations, thus became at length in their minds a consciously conceived desire, as clear and as powerful as the exceptional man's desire to excel. In the birth of those two desires, the desire to excel, and the desire to emulate, the long course of human progress began.

The evolution of human nature registered itself in man's physical organization; first in his brain and nervous system, and secondly in his whole bodily structure.

In the conceptions of evolution that became current after the publication of "The Descent of Man," the development of man was pictured as beginning in a physical transformation, continuing in a mental and moral development, and completing itself in an evolution of social

relations. Mr. Fiske converted these conceptions into a full-grown theory, in his familiar doctrine of the prolongation of infancy as the antecedent of social organization. His suggestion was, that the prolongation of infancy in man, by compelling the family to hold together for a relatively long time, prepared the way for a growth of social feelings, and therefore for social evolution.[1] This explanation has been generally accepted.

In view of the facts and arguments that I have presented thus far, Mr. Fiske's theory must be regarded, I think, as reversing the probable order of cause and effect. Social life enlarged and stimulated the mental life until it created speech and conceptual thought. With the aid of speech and conceptual thought association continued to develop mental activity at an ever-accelerating rate, until it became the supreme activity and the dominant interest of man. It was in this way that man's complex brain and nervous system were evolved. A slower development of the individual and a longer infancy necessarily resulted. The prolongation of infancy, in its turn, must necessarily have effected great changes in anatomy and physiology. A long period of helplessness, by delaying the use of arms and legs in ancestral ways, must have contributed to those changes that resulted in the upright position and the specialized use of the fore limbs. A relatively long period of lactation, with inability to use food requiring strength of jaw, must greatly have changed the facial angle and the expression of the countenance.[2]

[1] Fiske, "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy," Vol. II., pp. 340–344, 360–369.

[2] Almost simultaneously with the first publication of this hypothesis in the article on "Sociology" in volume seven of the new edition of Johnson's Universal Cyclopædia, Mr. Lester F. Ward published in the *American Anthropologist*, Vol. VIII., No. 3, July, 1895, a paper on the "Relation of Sociology to Anthropology," in which he suggested that man's erect posture "is chiefly due to brain development," p. 244, and that his psychological evolution is to be explained largely by association.

The reaction of mental activity upon bodily structure and appearance was not the same in all individuals or in all groups. Much less was it the same in all places, under different conditions of food and climate. Therefore the constant tendency to vary, which already had differentiated the animal kingdom into genera and species, continued to operate upon the human species. It began to differentiate mankind into varieties or races. Association, which through its domination of intermixture and crossing, had probably been a controlling factor in the differentiation of animal forms, was without doubt a yet more decisive factor in human differentiation, when conceptual thought had perfected the perception of differences and likenesses and had deepened the consciousness of kind.

From among the thousands of variations that must have been produced by the combined action of association, crossing, mental activity, and environment, natural selection very early picked out certain characteristics that were to become permanent elements in race differentia. Among these stable physical peculiarities were curly hair, elliptical in cross-section and straight hair, round in cross-section; dark skins and light skins; broad skulls and long skulls; low, broad faces and high, narrow faces; wide eye-orbits and narrow eye-orbits; narrow noses and broad flat noses; straight jaws and projecting jaws; broad pelvises and narrow pelvises.

We know that the present great racial types, such as the African black, the Asiatic yellow, and the European white, date from an extreme antiquity, but it is nevertheless certain that before they were established the physical differentia had been combined in every conceivable way. The truth of this assertion becomes instantly apparent when the physical peculiarities of existing races and sub-races are compared. Thus, for example, the African negro is

dolichocephalic[1] (skull long), prognathic (jaws projecting), and very black. The Swede also is dolichocephalic, but orthognathic (jaws straight) and very white. The Asiatic Mongolian is brachycephalic (skull broad), orthognathic, and yellow. The Dane also is brachycephalic, but prognathic and white.

It may have happened, however, that at a very early time several of the physical differentia were permanently combined in one strong, persistent race; that several others were combined in another, quite different, but not less persistent race; and that yet others, possibly, were combined in a third race, likewise stamped with enduring characteristics. After two or three such races had been evolved, derivative races might have sprung from their intermixture.

The view in favour with anthropologists at present is one in which the African negro, the Asiatic yellow, and the Caucasian white figure as the original types from which Tasmanians, Bushmen, Papuans, Malays, Redskins, Eskimo, Lapps, and Finns were derived. It was outlined by Professor Flower ten years ago[2] and it is the basis of Professor Topinard's theory of three human species.[3] A slight modification of this view, in which the white race appears as possibly a derivative from the negro and the yellow race, is held by many investigators and is thus stated by Taylor: "All these tests agree in exhibiting two extreme types—the African, with long heads, long

[1] Anthropologists compare skulls, eye-orbits, and pelvic forms, by means of an index figure, which is simply the ratio of the transverse diameter, or extreme breadth, to the longitudinal diameter, or extreme length. The index is obtained in decimal form, according to Broca's method, by dividing the breadth by the length and multiplying by 100. A dolichocephalic skull is one in which the breadth does not exceed $\frac{75}{100}$ of the length, that is, of which the index is not over 75. A skull with an index of 83, or more, is brachycephalic.

[2] Flower, Address before the Anthropological Institute, January 27, 1885, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XIV., p. 378, May, 1885

[3] Topinard, "Anthropology."

orbits, and flat hair; and the Mongolian, with round heads, round orbits, and round hair. The European type is intermediate — the head, the orbit, and the hair are oval."[1]

Merely as a characterization of the more conspicuous types of men that are now in existence, Canon Taylor's statement is true, and the outlines drawn by Professor Flower and Professor Topinard are more accurate than the pretentious classifications that multiply the number of underived types. But if it is assumed that the African negro and the Asiatic yellow are original races, which go back in purity to the first differentiation of the human species, or even that they are older than all other existing races, difficulties of explanation at once arise which, upon careful examination, will be found to be insuperable.

In the first place, such an assumption makes it necessary to characterize the Mincopis of the Andaman islands, the negritos of the Philippine islands, and the Eskimo of the North, as mixed races derived from a crossing of the negro and the yellow. The Mincopis and the negritos are black and woolly-haired but brachycephalic and comparatively orthognathic.[2] The Eskimo are highly dolichocephalic, like the negro, but they are white and straight-haired and in many other respects they conform to the Mongolian type. Yet probably all anthropologists would agree with Quatrefages that the Mincopis present a remarkable number of the characteristics of a pure race,[3] and would accept Tylor's statement that they "may be a remnant of a very early human stock, perhaps the best representatives of the primitive negro type, which has since altered in various points in its spread over its wide district of the world."[4]

[1] "The Origin of the Aryans," p. 65.

[2] Cf. Quatrefages, "The Pygmies," pp. 77, 78.

[3] *e.g.* The hair of the Mincopi is flatter in cross-section than that of the negro.

[4] Tylor, "Anthropology," pp. 88, 89.

In the second place, the assumption in question is self-destructive, because it could be true only if a primitive negro and a primitive yellow race made migrations through each other's habitats that would have been fatal to the purity of either race. I will state the proofs of this assertion.

A migrating race is a conquering race. In all migrations the males of the conquering race cross with the females of the conquered race, and not *vice versa*. Now it seems to be one of the well-established results of exact investigation in anthropology that in a mixed race the hair, colour, and eyes of the mother race tend to persist. In the course of his extended anthropometric examinations of the North American Indians, Dr. Boas has found that half-breeds almost invariably derive their hair and eyes from their Indian mothers.[1] On the other hand, observation of mixed races through many centuries has shown that the mental characteristics of a mixed race are likely to be derived from the conquering, or father race. It does not necessarily follow, that the cephalic type of the father race is transmitted with the paternal psychological type, yet the association of thought with the conformation of the skull is close enough to create a probability that the cephalic index of a mixed race is determined chiefly by that of the dominant father race. In strong support of such a probability is the well-established fact that whenever the dolichocephalic and the brachycephalic types are crossed, the result is not usually the production of a mean (mesocephalic) type.[2] In this, as in other features, the offspring of a mixed race obey the tendency, first demonstrated by Mr. Galton in his studies of heredity,[3] to revert to the parent types and not to form middle types.

[1] Boaz, "The Anthropology of the North American Indian," in "Memoirs of the International Congress of Anthropology," p. 40.

[2] Cf. Boas, *loc. cit.*, pp. 41, 47.

[3] Galton, "Natural Inheritance."

When these principles are applied to the problem of the origin of the Mincopis and other dwarf blacks at one extremity of man's primitive habitat and of the Eskimo at the other extremity, some interesting results appear. If the Mincopis and the negritos derived their woolly hair and black skins from a mother race, and if that race was the African negro; if they derived their broad heads from a father race, and if that race was the Asiatic yellow, then the negro was first on the ground in southern Asia, and was subsequently conquered and overrun by the yellow race. If the Eskimo derived their straight hair from a mother race, and if that race was the yellow; if they derived their long narrow heads from a father race, and if that race was the negro, then the yellow race was first on the ground in northwestern Europe, Iceland, or Greenland, and was subsequently conquered and overrun by the negro.

Consequently, if the negro and the yellow were primitive races, and if they originated respectively in equatorial Africa and in central Asia, each must have spread to the southeast and to the northwest; the negro first to the southeast and later to the northwest; the yellow first to the northwest and later to the southeast. Doubtless such a distribution has been assumed by many of the anthropologists who have thought of the negro and the yellow as the original races of man, but, as was shown earlier in this chapter, it is irreconcilable with our knowledge of the distribution of man and the higher quadrumana in the tertiary and quaternary periods.

If then, to take the alternative view, the negro race originated in southern Asia or in the Indian Archipelago, and if the yellow race originated in northwestern Europe, and if each sent forth migrating streams of population towards the other, it is extremely improbable that the streams which presently were diverted into central Africa and central Asia were pure races; especially in view of

the fact that under the circumstances supposed, conflict and mutual pressure would be the probable cause of diversion.

If, nevertheless, before the long-headed black men of the Southeast found their way through to the Northwest, a branch of their migrating column by any chance penetrated into equatorial Africa, and established itself there as a pure race, it was soon after pierced through by a second column that certainly was not a pure race, according to the hypothesis now under examination. The habitat of the true dolichocephalic negro is a belt that stretches irregularly across Africa, about five degrees north of the equator, except where the southern boundary dips south of the equator at the eastern end. South of this belt, in the Congo basin, have lived from immemorial antiquity the brachycephalic negrillos that are believed to be of the same race as the Mincopis and the negritos.

There is no way, therefore, to construe the facts of early migration so as to save the hypothesis that the dolichocephalic negroes are a pure, original race.

In the third place, if the dolichocephalic blacks and the brachycephalic yellow men are purer races than the brachycephalic blacks and the dolichocephalic Eskimo, the fact stands in hopeless contradiction to all the known effects of race admixture. The Eskimo are of short stature; the negrillos, the Mincopis, and the negritos are dwarfs. None of these races is prolific, none has ever shown much capacity for intellectual development, or for social organization. The true Mongolians, though a short race as compared with European whites or with Malays, are taller than the Eskimo; they are prolific and intellectual. The true negroes are tall, strong, prolific, highly imaginative, capable of intellectual progress, and socially organized in well-developed tribal systems. The remark often encountered in works on anthropology, that the negro is the lowest human type, is untrue of his men-

tal and social qualities, and, notwithstanding the large number of simian survivals in his anatomy, it is not true of his body as a whole, when height and cranial capacity are taken into account. Are we then to suppose that vigorous, relatively tall, prolific, and capable races are purer and older than feeble, dwarf, disappearing races? Such has not been the teaching of anthropologists hitherto, and it would be strange if they should abandon their belief that intermixture renews and increases vitality, just at the moment when exact investigation is confirming it. Dr. Boas' measurements and enumerations have shown conclusively that half-breeds are always taller than pure bloods, that half-breed women are more fertile than women of pure blood, and that half-breed children grow faster than pure-blooded children.[1]

The conjectural conclusions that can be drawn from the foregoing criticism may be formulated, I think, as follows:

First, there may have been two primitive races of man, one a dolichocephalic, woolly-haired, black race dwelling at the southeastern end of man's original zone, the other a brachycephalic, straight-haired, lighter race dwelling farther to the west and north. Each race may have invaded the other's territory and from the intermixture may have sprung the dolichocephalic, straight-haired light-skinned Eskimo, and the brachycephalic, woolly-haired negritos, Mincopis, and negrillos. The reasons for doubting that the Eskimo and the Mincopis were themselves the primitive races, and for accounting for them by a blending of earlier types, are, first, the fact that the dolichocephalic blacks of Australia and Tasmania may possibly be regarded as descended (though not without intermixture) from an indigenous dolichocephalic race, and second, that the brachycephalic dwarf whites of Lapland and Finland may probably be regarded as descendants of a primitive

[1] Boas, *loc. cit.*, p. 42.

brachycephalic race indigenous in northwestern Europe. It is probable, therefore, that the brachycephalic dwarf whites (Lapps and Finns), the dolichocephalic dwarf whites (Eskimo), and the brachycephalic dwarf blacks (negritos, Mincopis, and negrillos) are the oldest races now living.

Second, after the dwarf blacks had penetrated into equatorial Africa, they may have been overrun by the dolichocephalic race of Europe, when it was pushed south through Spain and Morocco by the on-moving ice of the glacial age. The admixture may have created the dolichocephalic, woolly-haired negro race. This supposition has at least the merit of being infinitely more probable than the counter-supposition that the negro race overran Europe, and bequeathed to the white man of to-day his sub-dolichocephalic index. It also harmonizes perfectly with the fact that the long-headed races of Africa dwell north of the brachycephalic and sub-brachycephalic races.

Third, a branch of the primitive brachycephalic white race pushing northeastward and eastward may have escaped intermixture for a time and may have made its way through Lapland and Finland, where dark and light remnants of it still live, thence through Russia, and, at length, into Asia, where, mingling with a dark population already greatly mixed and probably straight-haired that had pushed up from the southeast and southwest, it gave rise to the great Mongolian or yellow races.

Fourth, there may have been a primitive race of blue-eyed, red or yellow haired blondes, as Professor Topinard and others believe, which was early differentiated from other human stocks, in some region remote from the great highways of migration, — north of the Caucasus, perhaps, as tradition affirms, or in north central Europe, or even, as Dr. Brinton inclines to believe, in the fastnesses of the Atlas region of northwestern Africa.[1] If there was not such a primitive race, and if the white race is a product of

[1] "Races and Peoples," pp. 112, 117–120.

an intermixture of the primitive Finnic race with a dark race of the South, it is probable that its origin was comparatively late, when a reflex wave of migration swept back from the northwest towards the south and east. In this case one branch, bearing to the south, became the melanochroic, or dark white type, while another branch, keeping farther to the north, became the leuchrochroic and xanthochroic, or pale white and ruddy white types.

In any case, the white race of to-day is composite to the last degree, including, as it does, among its typical features, the broad head and the long head, the round eye-orbit and the narrow eye-orbit, the black iris and the blue iris, straight black hair, stiff curly black hair, wavy brown hair, curly red hair and straight red hair, straight light hair and wavy light hair.

All these conclusions however, let me earnestly warn the reader, are merely hypothetical; they are not at present the verified truths of science. Yet, as hypotheses, I print them; partly as suggestions to anthropological investigators, because I believe that they are a better explanation of the known facts than are the theories that are currently accepted and that are often taught dogmatically in the schools; partly because they serve well to show how amazingly complicated were the migrations and intermixtures, the associations and the dissociations, which produced the racial basis of modern social organization, — how enormous, in short, was the part that the social factor must have played in human evolution from the earliest days; and partly, finally, because I believe that further research will demonstrate that the negro and the yellow races, which evidently are destined to play an important rôle in future developments of the world's population, are not primitive races, too simple in their biological composition to be capable of further evolution, but are already highly composite races capable of progress.

The differentiation of races sharpened the distinctions that enter into the consciousness of kind, which became, in consequence, increasingly definite and clear. The segregation of races reacted upon the intensity of association within each race. The speech of each race consequently became more flexible and more precise. The individuals, also, of each race became increasingly sensitive to communicated modes of thought and feeling and therefore better able to share a common thought or a common feeling. The intermingling of races communicated to each local aggregation of men important acquisitions of knowledge that had been made by different races in different parts of the world, — acquisitions already enriched by ideas made possible by speech. Through the combination of all these results was evolved that highest product of anthropogenic association, the social mind. In the evolution of a common consciousness and of a common stock of ideas, the results of past association were now gathered up and conserved.

Among the common ideas that make up the content of the social mind, economic ideas must be regarded as fundamental. Their origin was in individual experiences of initial utility, which, as was admitted in an earlier chapter,[1] were antecedent to association. They were developed, however, only under the fostering of association. Through the evolution of curiosity in the manner that has been described, and under the spur of increasing desire, primitive human ideas of utility had doubtless been developed to a relatively high degree, if comparison is made with the ideas of utility of which the most intelligent animals are capable. The relation between satisfaction and its external causes had become a subject of intellectual interest, the consciousness of satisfaction had become a true subjective utility.[2] This relation had been investigated, too,

[1] *Ante*, p. 41. [2] See definition, p. 42.

in a relatively large number of instances. Many kinds of food had been tried, many devices for shelter had been learned, the suitability of many articles as means of adornment, and possibly even the fitness of various things to serve as an artificial protection to the body, had been discovered. Perhaps the difference between initial and marginal utility had been perceived. Probably the relation between utility and effort — subjective cost — had taken shape in conceptual thought, and, if so, subjective value also may have emerged in consciousness as a crude estimation of utilities in prospect. All such notions, relations, discoveries, when they were communicated and talked over, became permanent economic ideas in the social mind.

Only as they were so communicated and discussed until they became a common possession, were the primitive ideas of utility and value combined in a primitive conception of wealth. For desirable things are not wealth until they are appreciated by the community as well as by the individuals that first discover their desirable qualities. Economists imperfectly express this truth when they say that wealth consists of the useful things that can be exchanged, or that have value in exchange. Actual exchange is not necessary to convert the material means of satisfaction into wealth, but a general, or social, esteem is necessary. Such an esteem arose when men began consciously to compare their wants, their efforts, and their satisfactions, and when, by that common consent which is a product as much of emulation as of discussion, they began to arrange the means of satisfaction in a scale of desirableness. In those days of sharp alternations of feasting and starving, mere quantity of anything consumable impressed the imagination, and crude abundance was put first in the social esteem. To discover or to conquer abundance was to win distinction. Next in order were put the things that qualitatively or quantitatively served as marks of distinction, such as trophies, ornaments, and implements, and, finally

the things that appealed to new desires. The primitive idea of wealth, in fine, was not essentially different from the idea of wealth to-day. It was the notion of a socially esteemed abundance of things necessary for life, for social distinction, for emulation, and for the imitation of novelty. It expanded with the growth of inequality, which intensified the desires to excel and to emulate. Mr. Mallock is entirely right in his contention that without inequality there never would have been wealth in other things than the bare necessaries of life, and that probably there never would have been a real abundance of those.[1]

The remaining economic ideas of the primitive social mind were those that constituted the useful or productive arts. Discovery and invention were then, as they are now, the prime factors in economic production, but the discoveries made by primitive man were few and simple and his inventions did not get beyond the most elementary tools and processes. Professor Tylor remarks that it is not quite true that man is distinguished from animals by his use of tools, since some apes, and perhaps other animals, use the tools that are ready to hand in the form of clubs and stones, but that man alone improves these natural tools, and may therefore be called the tool-making animal.[2] But all of these simple discoveries, all of these simple inventions of tools and processes, were communicated, discussed, and imitated. They became a common possession; that was the important, the essential thing. All arts, we must remember, are phases of the social mind. We are so much in the habit of thinking of them in terms of art products that we forget that the arts themselves are groups of ideas and acquisitions of skill that exist only in the minds, muscles, and nerves of living men. The continuity of an art

[1] Mallock, "Social Equality."

[2] Tylor, "Anthropology" p. 183. For a well-supported argument that most of the primitive industrial inventions were made by women, see Mason, "Woman's Share in Primitive Culture."

depends on its being transmitted from mind to mind, and from hand to hand.

Habits of toleration had long been established when they became subjects of conceptual thought. Their origin, as was explained in the chapter on The Social Population, was in those conflicts that resulted in demonstrating a substantial equilibrium of strength. Toleration had begun in the lowest animal groups, and had been developed through countless experiences of aggression and revenge, by which the equilibrium of strength was tested. It had been further developed by coöperation, by mutual pleasure and sympathy, and by the discovery that the group might at any moment need the active services of all its members in defence, or in some other form of mutual aid. In a sense, perhaps, the habits of toleration were already rules when speech was acquired, but it is better to say that they became rules when they were named, and were conceptually thought about and discussed.

From the first, the ideas of toleration in the primitive social mind must have assorted themselves into those two classes that are still fundamental categories of legal thought; namely, notions of immunity of life, and notions of immunity of possession.

The conception of immunity of life was limited at first by an intense and narrow consciousness of kind. The primitive man could feel affection for an associate, could take pleasure in his companionship, could estimate the probable danger of offending him, and could appreciate the importance of his life to the band. For the stranger the primitive man could have no such feelings, and no sacredness could attach to the stranger's life. The man who slew the fellow-member of his band could count on the execration of all his associates. The man who suffered at the hands of a stranger could count on the aid of all his associates in pursuing and avenging.

The idea of possession, which originated in the instinctive assertion of ownership exhibited by animals, became in the primitive social mind the notion of property, or of property right, which is a product of two factors; namely, the assertion of possession on the part of the individual possessing, and the tolerance of his claim, or the acquiescence in it, on the part of the community. In primitive society property extended to simple personal belongings, to articles of adornment, to trophies of the chase or of war, and to tools and weapons. Probably gift-giving in recognition of bravery or capacity was an important factor in the evolution of the conception of property. Nothing could more clearly have been property than articles given by the community to its favourite leaders.

The germs of political ideas in the primitive social mind existed in notions of a common territory, of a common interest and defence, of a common leadership and allegiance, and of a common culture.

Nothing could be more untrue to fact than a division of ancient society from modern on the assumption that ancient society was based on the idea of kinship but not on that of territory, and that modern society is based on the idea of territory but not on that of kinship. Morgan, in asserting that mankind has developed but two plans of government, — which is not true; there have been three, — was careful to say that in the one "the government dealt with persons through their relations to a gens and tribe," and that in the other "the government dealt with persons through their relations to territory."[1] Literally construed, these two statements are accurate. At one time the mere administrative basis of government was gentile relationship; the mere administrative basis of government now is territory. But at all times human society itself, as distinguished from forms of government, has been unified by

[1] "Ancient Society," p. 62.

the idea of territory as well as by the idea of kinship. The lowest savage hordes have notions of rudely bounded "lands" which they may rightfully claim and defend,[1] and it is probable that these notions had their origin far back in prehistoric times.

The supreme common interests of primitive men were those of mutual aggression and mutual defence, and we may be sure that the habits of mutual aid in attack and defence which had been acquired in the animal stages of evolution, were well scrutinized by the primitive social mind; that they were denominated and discussed; and that the resulting notions of the conduct that would receive public approval in any given case, were soon combined into conceptions of loyalty and of solidarity.

Frequently leadership must have played an important part in critical situations, and have riveted the primitive man's attention upon differences of personal power and upon the relations of inferior to superior. He was forced to contemplate those simple forms of admiration and ceremony which the human race had inherited from an animal existence. He had not lost the uncritical wonder that lower creatures had always felt at unusual displays of power or brilliancy. Like animals, he still expressed his deference to those whom he admired or feared by attitudes of supplication, by acts of service, and by a surrender of possessions. In return for deference, he looked, as animals always had looked, for various benefits from the superior. In reflecting on these things, however, the primitive man did not at first analyze himself; he did not analyze his fellow-men. The child for a time thinks of himself as a concrete unity. The primitive man for a time thought of himself in the same way. Any difference between himself and another, therefore, was chiefly a difference of magnitude, of power. One was inferior and must admire, obey, follow, and ask favours; the other was superior and could

[1] Cf. Lumholtz, "Among Cannibals," p. 176.

command and guide, demand reverence and service, and bestow benefits.

These notions, converted into common possessions of the social mind, became ideas of a common property in the commanding personalities of the community; ideas of benefit and obligation in the relations of leader and follower; ideas of common forms of ceremony. These ideas bound men together when they thought of themselves as inferior and superior, as ideas of their common interest in defence and aggression bound them together when they thought of themselves as equal allies. In the crude notions of benefit and obligation were intellectual germs that were later to develop into a feudal plan of government,— the plan that Morgan overlooked, — which would have its administrative basis in personal allegiance to a chief or lord. From the ceremonial ideas were to be evolved those differentiated forms of command and obedience, of bounty and tribute, of exaction and service, of grace and homage, which are the substance of government of every sort.[1]

In the stock of common ideas on all the relations and interests of life, in the common forms of ceremonial, and in the speech which transmitted both ideas and ceremonial, the community had the elements of a common culture. When the social mind perceived these elements and reflected upon them, it thereby converted them into a culture in fact, a supreme interest to be diligently cherished. In this conception of a common culture appeared the germ of one of the most important of all political ideas.

A common culture depended on autogeny and its central fact of genetic aggregation. The conception of a common culture had as its chief element the idea of a community of speech, which, as a rule, could be identified with kinship. Therefore the conception of a common culture must have been closely associated with the conception of kinship.

[1] Spencer, "Ceremonial Institutions," "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. II., Part I.

These two conceptions were the intellectual germs from which that plan of government which made kinship its administrative basis was subsequently developed.

All of these political ideas of the primitive social mind — ideas, namely, of a common territory; of solidarity and loyalty; of leadership and allegiance; of kinship and a common culture — have been factors in every form of political organization that has been tried; but the idea of kinship was the first, the idea of allegiance was the second, and the idea of territory was the last, to be emphasized for administrative purposes.

Thus far the social mind was reflecting upon ideas that man shared with other species. They all pertained to those fundamental relations which a conscious organism holds to the tangible world of palpable creatures and material things.

But in the very process of reflecting upon its own ideas, the mind of man was beginning to look in upon itself and to apprehend phenomena of which the animal mind had never been conscious. It was beginning to have ideas of ideas; ideas of volition, life, and cause; ideas of the sources of those manifestations of power that had awakened wonder and fear. It was beginning to perceive an intangible world.

Now for the first time man analyzed himself. Ordinarily thought and body seemed to be inseparable. Ordinarily the bodies of other men seemed like his own; they acted like his own and responded so perfectly to his spoken or acted thought that in them also body and thought seemed to be a concrete whole. But he had seen them when they responded no more. It was as if something real, though impalpable and evasive, had departed with the breath. Were there then, after all, in every man two selves? It seemed almost as if there might be, and the longer the primitive man thought about this question and

talked about it with his comrades, the more probable to his mind did the affirmative answer become. His own experiences seemed to furnish the final proof. Had he not often in imaginative moods witnessed things not visible to the bodily eye? Had he not repeatedly in dreams wandered far into the forest, while his body lay motionless in sleep?

So in the individual and in the social mind was born at last the idea of the self, or personality, as a conscious life, soul, or spirit, dwelling in the body but distinct and separable from it.

From this conception it followed by primitive reasoning that whatever manifested life was personal and was actuated by motives like human motives. Conscious will was in everything that moved, or changed, and the will was prompted, like man's will, by appetite, curiosity, desire, friendliness, or malevolence. The world was a bewildering aggregation of conscious powers. Some of them were contemptible and man could abuse or use them; but others were terrible, swift, subtle, or mysterious in their action and filled the wondering human soul with mingled admiration and dread. The serpent that could run without legs, the turtle that could breathe air or live in water, the hawk that could see its prey from the sky, the plant that could heal or poison, the tornado, the lightning, and the sun — these were beings to be regarded with the awe, and to be propitiated with the ceremonial respect accorded to all-powerful men.

There was one class of phenomena in which a living self, ordinarily united with the body though separable from it, seemed to the primitive man to be already partly separated or in the act of separation. Walking in the sunlight, he always saw a shadow that moved as he moved or was motionless when he stood still, but which never completely detached itself from him. What could this be but a con-

scious self, belonging to the bodily self and usually merged in it, but capable of going away, to live alone? Looking in the pool, he saw the shadow self more distinctly, and it behaved as before. When he called aloud to his comrades, his voice came back from the mountain. His double then could be far away and invisible, and yet speak and preserve the identity of his proper tone.

Here were data for curious inferences. The shadow and the echo were parts of one's intangible self. Words, then, and names must be a part of the spiritual self, and to know a man's name must be to have a part of his essential personality in one's possession and therefore to have a mysterious control over him. This belief is found among savages in every quarter of the world to-day.[1] Possibly before it arose some one had traced with a stick the outlines of a shadow on the sand,[2] and rude drawings may have been used as written names. Whether so or not, the thought would arise that to have an image of any object conceived as personal, would be to possess an essential part of that object and to have its name. Words and images then were charms, in themselves, and mediately, as names. Through words and images one could come into subtle relations with the very spirit of another, could feel the stirrings of a spiritual life external to his own. The æsthetic sense was born. Here were the vital origins of writing and literature, and of all the plastic arts of expression.

Believing in a spirit separable from the body, the primitive man could no longer think of death as the end of conscious life. Death was but a prolonged and perhaps in some cases a permanent departure of the soul from its material home.

[1] Tylor, "Researches into the Early History of Mankind," Chap. VI., especially pp. 119–129.

[2] This is the ingenious explanation of the origin of drawing made by Miss Simcox; "Primitive Civilizations," Vol. I., p. 4.

Many strange occurrences convinced the beholder that spirits sometimes came back to bodies from which apparently they had gone forever, and that sometimes spirits went from one body to another. In coma the body might lie for days in a state indistinguishable from death. In epilepsy and in insanity the proper spirit of the victim was evidently not in him, or it was enthralled by a strange and probably malevolent spirit. To this day the ignorant believe that an insane person is "possessed," and in our common forms of speech we have such expressions as "he is not in his right mind" and "he is out of his head."

The belief in ghosts or surviving spirits of the dead that could sometimes come back to their proper bodies, but that oftener wandered through the air, entering now into one person or object and now into another, became a rooted conviction of the entire human race. The world became peopled with ghosts, and the spirits of all human persons, animals, plants, and things became interchangeable with ghosts, and with one another. It was necessary for man to propitiate not only the living, both human and non-human, who were powerful, but also the ghosts of the powerful. It was necessary to propitiate not only ghosts, but also the living; for ghosts might be within them. There was as yet, therefore, no differentiation of ancestral ghosts from other spirits. All beings and things were bound together by a commingling of spirits that inspired astonishment and fear.[1]

All spirits, nevertheless, fell into two great classes, — the friendly and the unfriendly, the good and the evil.

[1] I believe that all interpretations of religion which start from the assumption that fetichism, animal worship, nature worship, or ancestor worship was a primitive form from which all other forms were derived, are destined to be overthrown. The earliest beliefs were a jumble of ideas, and it was long before the elements of the different kinds of religion were discriminated. The latest studies of Aryan religions among others confirm this view. See Hopkins, "The Religions of India," p. 147.

By a course of reasoning from the interchangeability of spirits and from the identification of names and images with spiritual personalities, the primitive social mind arrived at extremely important beliefs about the relation of the community and of individuals to particular classes of objects. Observations of children and savages indicate that primitive man closely imitated the lower animals both in his pleasures and in his more serious pursuits, and that, in naming persons and things and in reasoning about them, he was guided by fanciful analogies, or by odd, accidental, or trivial associations. It is the universal custom of savages to name individuals from animals and other natural objects, as well as from personal peculiarities.[1] Nicknaming is practised everywhere by savages as by children, and tricks of imitation, fancied resemblances, or accidental associations afford the suggestions.[2] Assuming that primitive men for generations had named and nicknamed themselves from natural objects and had decorated themselves with such trophies of the chase as feathers, beaks, horns, claws, or even entire heads or skins, we can see that but one conclusion was possible when they thought about the relation of such facts to their conceptions of spirits. A man who found himself named from the eagle necessarily believed that he shared the spirit of the eagle in a peculiarly intimate and permanent way, and he therefore felt with all eagles a close spiritual kinship. From this belief to the conclusion that the eagles would protect him in many mysterious ways, and that he must refrain from injuring any eagle as he would refrain from injuring a human associate, was an easy transition in his simple thought. The eagle became his medicine or totem.[3]

[1] Grey, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 228.

[2] McLennan, "Worship of Animals and Plants," *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. VI., October and November, 1869, and Vol. VII., February, 1870; Lang, "Custom and Myth," pp. 261, 262, 269; Spencer, "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., p. 367.

[3] See definition, *ante*, p. 158.

This conclusion once reached, naming would have a new significance. Naming would be the creation of a spiritual kinship that would determine a child's weal or woe in every circumstance of life. Extreme dread would be felt of incurring such a responsibility without supernatural guidance, and of how the guidance was sought we have many indications in surviving savage customs. For example, in parts of the world so widely separated as Samoa and the isthmus of Tehuantepec it was formerly the practice when a birth was expected for relatives to draw and erase on the ground figures of animals, one after another, and the one that remained when the infant appeared became the child's totem.[1] Luck determined the matter, but luck was governed by the spirits. The North American Indian boy usually took as his medicine the first animal of which he dreamed during the long and solitary fast that he observed at puberty.[2]

The bond between one's self and one's totemic allies could be made stronger yet, according to primitive ideas, by permanently marking an image or sign of the totem on one's body. If, in connection with hunting and with pantomimic amusements, the imitation of animal forms had already extended to the breaking and pulling of teeth, the cutting and twisting of hair, and other mutilations which are common among savages, and if some practice in outline drawing had been acquired, the systematic development of masking, scarring, and tattooing as totemistic devices, would now naturally follow. Thenceforth every individual would possess not only in his name, but in mutilations of his body, and in the figures cut, pricked, or burned into his skin, an enduring identification of himself with protecting spiritual powers.

[1] Turner, "Nineteen Years in Polynesia," p. 17; Bancroft, "The Native Races of the Pacific States," Vol. I., p. 661. Cf. Frazer, "Totemism," p. 55.

[2] Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 54; and Catlin, "North American Indians," Vol. I., p. 36.

In all this curious mental evolution there had evidently been taking place a strange extension of the consciousness of kind. A man's intimate fellows were no longer only the human comrades of his own band and speech. Creatures of another species, even of the vegetable world, might be nearer to him, and more like his essential self, than the nearest human friends. All men marked as he was marked, and therefore related to his totem, were necessarily his comrades, though they came from distant lands. All creatures that were friendly to his totem or to his totemic fellow were necessarily friendly to him; all that were hostile to his totem or to his totemic fellow were hostile also to him. All related spirits that protected his totemic fellow, his totem, and himself were good spirits. All stranger spirits were bad spirits. Society, like thought, had crossed the bound that separated the intangible from the tangible. The community thenceforth consisted of both visible and invisible members, and its bonds of union were not only political, but also religious.

The six groups of ideas that together represented all the interests of primitive human life, transmitted from generation to generation, and slowly enlarged and enriched with increasing knowledge, became the three great primary and the three great secondary traditions of the social mind; namely, the economic, juridical, and political, and the personal, æsthetic, and religious. By means of these traditions new knowledge, as it was acquired, was interpreted and assimilated. To a very slight extent, no doubt, old ideas and new were wrought into faiths, codes, and policies. Totemism at least was a faith, rules of toleration were an elementary code, and alliance was a policy. To a yet slighter extent the traditions and certain modes of feeling and of conduct were combined in social values, such as those of racial and social types, loyalty and other bonds of cohesion, territory, heroes, totems, arts, and ceremonies.

The elements of tradition were further blended in the beginnings of those traditions of history, at first mere legends of migration and adventure, which, in combination with race and language, were to influence military and political groupings in the later evolution of society.

The dispersion and intermixture of stocks which had created unlike races had created also unlike forms of speech. For a time, doubtless, race and language were closely identified, but from the earliest differentiations of either race or language some confusion, resulting from migration and intermixture, was inevitable. As time went on and mankind, increasing in numbers, became more and more heterogeneous, race and language tended more and more to separate. A race often spoke more than one tongue. Each language united men of more than one race.

Language and tradition, on the contrary, tended always towards close union. Community of speech necessarily carried with it community of culture, and, to some extent, community of history. Mankind was thus differentiated into culture divisions, as into races. The great culture divisions of the present time were produced long after existing races were evolved from the intermixture of earlier races, and are therefore of late origin.[1] The Malayo-Polynesian languages and traditions, for example, unite, in one easily distinguished culture, groups of men that belong to several different mixed races. The same is true of the Bantu languages and traditions of South Africa, of the aboriginal languages and traditions of America, and of the languages and traditions of central and northern Asia. Most of all is it true of the great families of languages and traditions known as Hamitic, Semitic, and Aryan or Indo-European. Still, in all of these culture divisions there unquestionably survive characteristic elements that go back to primitive differentiations.

[1] Cf. Lefèvre, "Les races et les langues."

For many years after the rise of comparative philology, both philology and history were perverted by an uncritical assumption of the identity of race with language, and it is not strange that distinguished scholars have been disposed to set aside the conception of race as being little more than a figment of the imagination.[1] The facts nevertheless, if we knew them all, could hardly justify the conclusion that race and language are often entirely sundered. On the contrary, we can more safely assume that identity of language and cultural tradition tends always to create identity of race. Men and women of the same speech and language intermarry. While, therefore, Renan, Darmesteter, Professor Sayce, and others are quite right in maintaining that such a phenomenon as the Aryan speech, or as the Jewish faith, is a fact of tradition rather than of race, it is also true that, with exceptions too few to notice, men of the Aryan speech, or men of the Jewish or of any other great tradition, are to a large extent of one blood. These divisions of mankind, in which there is a partial identification of race and language within the unity of a cultural tradition, have played an important part in history and should be designated by a term that distinguishes them from races in the strict physical sense and yet does not ignore the racial element. They may very well be called the culture races.

The effects of association among primitive men and their immediate ancestors were thus of the most radical character. The animal mind was transformed into the human mind; the animal body into the human body. These transformations placed man so far beyond the effective competition of other creatures that he thenceforth subdued them and his physical environment in a measure to his own uses. The centre of transformation was the mental and moral

[1] Renan, "Le judaïsme comme race et comme religion"; Darmesteter, "Race and Tradition," in "Selected Essays"; and Sayce, "The Races of the Old Testament," pp. 10 *sq.*

life. By means of his psychical evolution, his physical development was accomplished and mental and physical evolution together were the means of supremacy. The turning-point in mental evolution was the genesis of speech, and the resulting power of abstract thought. Ideas unknown to the animal mind appeared then in consciousness and became a permanent possession. Together these acquisitions — speech, ideas of wealth, of toleration, and of combination; of personality, spirit, and worship, of tradition, and of social values — constituted the human mind, in distinction from the animal mind. To create the human mind was the great work of anthropogenic association.

CHAPTER III

ETHNOGENIC ASSOCIATION

HUMAN society truly begins when social consciousness and tradition are so far developed that all social relations exist not only objectively, as habits of association, but also subjectively, in the thought, feeling, and purpose of the associated individuals. It is this self-conscious phase that distinguishes human from animal communities. For when the society exists in idea, no less than in habits of association, the idea begins to react upon all the objective relations. The social idea, at first only a perception or a conception, becomes an ideal, which the community endeavours to realize. From this time on the forms of association and of associated activity, determined in part by direct physical causation, are determined in part by the social mind.

In the earliest and simplest forms of human society, the social constitution is not differentiated from the social composition. For some purposes the group as a whole is the coöperating body. For other purposes the coöperating body is some component group. There is no division of labour except that which is incidental to the composition of self-sufficing, self-perpetuating social groups, like the family and the horde. At a later time, however, the social constitution is differentiated within itself and is to a great extent separated from the social composition.

Therefore, through a long succession of periods, the action of the social mind upon social structure is primarily a moulding of the social composition. Or when it acts directly upon the social constitution, it is yet greatly mod-

ifying the social composition. Working conjointly with unconscious forces, it is creating definite forms of the family, the tribe, and the nation. Only when the ethnos is established does the social mind begin to act directly on the social constitution, and thereby to organize and to develop the demos.

It follows, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, that a study of social composition is nearly coextensive with ethnogenic sociology and that ethnogenic sociology is mainly a study of the evolution of the social composition, though incidentally it is necessary to observe many associated developments of the social constitution.

The most important and at the same time the most difficult sociological problems of ethnogenic association are those of the early forms of the family and of the relation of the family to the origins of the clan and the tribe. They all centre in the theory of the clan. If we can discover the origin of the clan and make clear its relations to the family and to the tribe, we shall explain all that is most characteristic in the organization of tribal society.

In examining these problems, we must remember the distinction between (1) modes of intercourse and aid which generate the various relations that make up the social composition and the social constitution, and (2) the social composition and constitution themselves, which are those relatively permanent forms of intercourse and aid which the social mind has approved of, and which natural selection has then confirmed. Thus though transient relations of the sexes may be an important factor in the phenomena of population, they do not create the family as a unit of social composition, nor do momentary activities of coöperation or temporary divisions of labour create the social constitution.

This discrimination will greatly simplify the problem of the primitive family. If, for example, it should be shown

that in primitive communities the relations of the sexes closely approached promiscuous intercourse, that fact would not prove that there were no true family relations in primitive communities, nor would the existence of definite family relations prove that outside of these there was no sexual intercourse.

There are four possible explanations of the origin of the metronymic tribe. It might be assumed that clans are older than tribes, and that tribes originate from clans by integration. This assumption has often been made by ethnologists without any distinct idea of its difficult implications. Secondly, it might be assumed that a single undifferentiated horde grows to tribal dimensions and presently becomes differentiated into clans. Thirdly, it might be assumed that each of a number of neighbouring hordes becomes differentiated into clan organizations, each of which, through the wife-stealing exogamy of the hordes, is in time represented in every horde, and that by war or by some other pressure these now heterogeneous hordes are at length compacted into a tribe, which is thus necessarily constituted of all the clans represented in all the hordes. Finally it might be assumed that each horde in a cluster or group of hordes becomes practically a clan by retaining a majority of all members of that clan and by including with them only a few individuals of other clans, and that such clan-hordes presently draw together into a tribal organization.

Reflection will show that the real difficulty presented by either of these assumptions is that of reconciling the facts of clan exogamy, female kinship, and residence.

Few writers have seen how difficult the problem really is. Thus to some it has seemed comparatively easy to explain the clan as a horde transformed by combination with other hordes into a section of a tribe. This view is substantially the same as that which regards clans as older than tribes and accounts for tribes as aggregations of clans.

But this view is irreconcilable with clan exogamy. Evidently if a man is obliged to take a wife from some other clan than his own, no clan can exist apart from other clans and no horde can be composed exclusively of members of one clan.

It might, however, be claimed that although a horde cannot be composed exclusively of persons belonging to one clan, a majority of its members can be of one clan, and the remainder may belong to many different clans. For all practical purposes of society and government therefore, a horde could be a clan, and such clan-hordes could easily come into existence, the moment that several hordes, though not united in a tribe, lived in proximity and developed the practice of always obtaining wives from each other. Many facts point to the existence of such groups before tribes were formed; for example, in the American Indian tribe it was usual for each clan to have a chief.

This practical identity of horde and clan would be possible in a group of metronymic and exogamous hordes, if the man always went to live in the horde and clan of his wife. It would be possible also in a group of patronymic hordes in which the man habitually remained in the horde of his birth and brought his wife to live with him. But it would be impossible in exogamous hordes where the wife followed the residence of her husband, but in which the relationship was none the less metronymic.

This last case presents the real difficulty. Such hordes exist. We should expect them to become, or to find that they always have been, either without clans or with as many clans as have been drawn on for wives, since the wife would always be of a different clan from that of her husband, and children would follow the clan of the mother. Under these conditions could there be a local group of considerable dimensions, in which a single clan might include half or more of the members of the group?

At the very beginning of clan organization, for a single generation, such a state of affairs would be possible. A horde could be made up exclusively of brothers and sisters. The brothers would bring wives to the camp, obtaining them from several different hordes. The wives would represent many different clans, but the husbands and their sisters would be a preponderating clan. Presently, however, the sisters would be taken in marriage and conveyed to other hordes. The clan would now be reduced to the related husbands. They would have offspring, but the offspring would not follow the paternal clan. With the death of the fathers the paternal clan would absolutely disappear, and in place of it there would be several new clans, — those of the mothers, — and these thenceforth would constitute the horde.

Complications like these make it evident that the problems of social composition should be studied comparatively, as incidents of the process of social evolution as a whole. Needless difficulties have crept into the theories of the family, the clan, and the tribe, because each social relation has been studied too much by itself. True specialization can be followed successfully only step by step with generalization. We shall get a distorted or an altogether wrong view of the genesis of family and clan unless we study them in their relations to all other aspects of social organization.

Accordingly, in the pages that follow, social evolution as a whole will be viewed in its successive ethnogenic stages. The long and sometimes devious line of development will be traced, first, through the ethnogenic societies of the first class,[1] namely, the small neighbouring hordes not yet combined in tribes; secondly, through the metronymic societies of the second and third classes; and thirdly, through the patronymic societies of the second and third classes. But while the general or organic view must domi-

[1] *Ante*, pp. 157, 158.

nate, the problems of the family, clan, and tribe chiefly will occupy attention in the investigations of each stage.

When a region that is too poor to support a large population, nevertheless affords food for several hordes within an area not too wide to be easily traversed, various forms of intercourse appear. Much of the intercourse is quarrelsome, some of it is friendly. Usually there is a medley of fighting and hospitality; but sometimes enmity is of the extreme degree that is associated with a confirmed practice of wife-stealing, and sometimes friendliness is so great that, as happens among the Eskimo, individuals or families go at any time to live in a neighbouring camp, and the actual food-supply is the only limit of hospitality. If there is any degree of friendliness, and if the conditions of climate and topography are favourable, periodical festivities bring the hordes together in large gatherings.[1] Such contact heightens emotional and mental power and develops language. It clarifies the social consciousness and enlarges the social idea. It amplifies tradition and lays a foundation for permanent coöperation.

As one immediate result of festivity genetic relationships become complicated Whatever the form of the family in savage life, the restraints upon sexual indulgence are frequently broken down.[2] The festival occasions especially become carnivals of lasciviousness. Incidentally there is a considerable interchange of both men and women among the neighbouring hordes. Whether friendly festivals alternate with quarrels and petty wars in which women are stolen from the vanquished horde, or whether men wander from camp to camp attaching themselves now to

[1] Lumholtz, "Among Cannibals," p. 240.

[2] Ibid., p. 124; also *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, New Series, Vol. II., 1863, pp. 35, 42, and Vol. III., p. 230. For testimony to similar practices among a tribal folk so highly organized as the Santals, see Sherwill, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. XX., 1851, p. 554.

one and now to another, or whether, as Mitchell and others have witnessed in Australia,[1] the women of a horde defeated in a fight voluntarily go over to the victors, the result is an increased heterogeneity in the demotic composition of each horde, and the relationship that is due to birth extends to persons of different hordes. On the whole, demotic heterogeneity improves the physical and mental type. Moreover, through heredity the individuals of all the hordes tend towards homogeneity of type, thereby possibly removing one ground of hostility.

An increasing personal inequality, which becomes a more and more conspicuous social fact, is another important consequence of periodical festivities. The winners in the feats of strength and skill acquire distinction not only among their own kindred but among the men of other hordes. Clever men and old men who have accumulated stores of knowledge and tradition become distinguished for wisdom. Such inequality is the foundation of leadership and of that useful subordination in mutual aid which depends on voluntary deference.

Extended intercourse is also favourable to coördination through mutual understanding. Under pleasurable excitement, or rivalry, or common danger, each member of a crowd may so far share the thoughts and feelings of his fellows that considerable coöperation is possible. Coöperation of this kind, as well as coöperation under natural leadership, is often observed among the lowest savages.

These forms of mutual aid are often consciously purposive; but the coöperation is temporary and is not organized. Thus among the Australian Blackfellows, the occasional gatherings are for hunting, war, and feasting, all in one. The same group of persons carries on one common activity to-day, another common activity to-morrow.

On these simple forms of intercourse and mutual aid the social mind acts by acquiescence, approval, and selection,

[1] "Journal of Expedition into New South Wales," Vol. I., p. 314.

and thus creates the more permanent relationships of the social composition and the social constitution.

When the once universal belief that the earliest human family was patriarchal in type broke down in the face of accumulating evidence that primitive relationships were traced through mothers instead of through fathers, and that, even now, the social organization of many tribal communities is metronymic,[1] opinion swung far to the opposite extreme. Theories of a primitive communism in women,[2] of a general promiscuity[3] incompatible with any sort of family life, of consanguine families[4] formed by unions of brothers and sisters, and other theories equally radical, found ready acceptance. Further investigation and more mature criticism have shown that communistic and patriarchal theories are equally untenable as explanations of primitive society.[5] Extreme freedom in sexual relations does not prove the one theory, for freedom may coexist with definite forms of family organization, as it does among the Innuit,[6] the Todas,[7] the Khonds,[8] as it did among the Tahitians[9] and as it undoubtedly did once

[1] *Ante*, p. 158; Westermarck, "The History of Human Marriage," p. 97; and Frazer, "Totemism," pp. 69, 70.

[2] Lubbock, "The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man," Chap. III.

[3] Bachofen, "Das Mutterrecht," pp. xix, xx, 10; ibid., "Antiquarische Briefe," pp. 20 *sq.*; McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," pp. 92–95; Post, "Die Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der Urzeit," pp. 16 *sq.*

[4] Morgan, "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family," p. 12; "Ancient Society," pp. 384 *sq.*, pp. 401 *sq.*

[5] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chaps. IV., V., VI.

[6] Ross, "A Voyage of Discovery," p. 133; and Reclus, "Primitive Folk," p. 32.

[7] Shortt, in *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, New Series, Vol. VII., 1869, p. 240; and Metz, "Die Volkstämme der Nilagiri's," p. 24.

[8] Macpherson, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. VII., p. 182.

[9] Wallis, in "Hawkesworth's Voyages," Vol. I., p. 261; Moerenhout, "Voyage aux iles du grand Océan," Vol. I., pp. 484–503; and Letourneau, "La sociologie d'après l'ethnographie," p. 57.

among the Aryan peoples.[1] Paternal headship of the family does not prove the other theory, for headship may be lax or of short duration. Men may habitually desert their own and invade each other's domestic circles.

There are no means of certainly determining the character of the primitive human family. The geological record does not reveal it, and, as has already been pointed out, we cannot be sure that the lowest savage societies of the present day exactly reproduce all the features of primitive communities.[2] Living in environments more favourable than those of the lowest hordes of to-day, primitive men were probably often massed in relatively large bands, and their sexual relations may therefore have been even more irregular than are those of any existing horde. But there is at least a reasonable presumption that the family of primitive man was an intermediate development between the family of the highest animals and that of the lowest living men.[3] If so, it was a simple pairing family easily dissolved, and perhaps rarely lasting for life.

From the lowest to the highest animals there is a steady approach towards relatively definite family relations.[4]

In the lowest existing societies of human beings the commonest marriage is a temporary monogamy. Usually the husband sooner or later deserts the wife to take another[5] or he exchanges wives with some one else, but at any given moment the population is disposed for the most part in monogamous groups.[6]

If the husband deserts his family, the children, dependent on the mother and her male relatives, take the

[1] Hopkins, "The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XIII., 1888, p. 118.

[2] *Ante*, p. 210.

[3] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 15, and 50.

[4] *Ante*, pp. 154, 155, and Westermarck, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–14.

[5] *Ante*, p. 155, and Bonwick, "Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians," p. 73.

[6] *Ante*, p. 155.

mother name. This circumstance is the explanation of an apparent contradiction of facts to which attention was called in the controversy between Maine and the assailants of his patriarchal theory. Maine relied on the fact of male jealousy, made much of by Darwin, to prove that the primitive family was under paternal power and that promiscuous sexual relations could never have been general.[1] McLennan[2] and others relied on descent through mothers to prove that the paternal family was of late origin. The truth would seem to be that the primitive family may have been founded on masculine power and that descent may nevertheless have been reckoned through women.

Wherever the conditions of life are so hard that the husband and father must help to support the family,[3] or where, for any other reason, the family holds together until children are grown, and in the meantime is under the father's power, it is likely to be patronymic. There are hordes in which descent is reckoned through fathers. It is so reckoned among many Eskimo of Greenland,[4] possibly among the Fuegians,[5] and possibly also among some hordes of the Brazilian[6] forests. In these cases the environment is such that families dependent on woman's efforts alone would soon perish. This is true especially of the Innuit, whose chief source of food and clothing is the walrus, obtained only by dangerous effort, for which women in general are unfit. Natural selection has therefore preserved the type in which men actively aid in economic effort and support the family until children are able

[1] "Early Law and Custom," Chap. VII.

[2] "The Patriarchal Theory."

[3] Cf. Ferrero, "The Problem of Woman from a Bio-Sociological Point of View"; *The Monist*, Vol. IV., No. 2, January, 1894.

[4] Crantz, "The History of Greenland," Vol. I., p. 176.

[5] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 105, and Hyades, *Bulletins d'anthropologie de Paris*, Vol. X., Series IV., 1887, p. 333. It is necessary to say "possibly" because the statements of observers are conflicting.

[6] Starcke, "The Primitive Family," p. 41.

to care for themselves. In the tropical forests of the Andaman islands, which are dry and healthy and afford an abundance of food, a woman and her infant child can find subsistence without the husband's help, and it is therefore not remarkable that marriage among the Mincopis is commonly dissolved as soon as the child is weaned.[1]

It seems to be an economic condition then which, in the lowest communities, determines the duration of marriage and possibly also the line of descent, through mothers or through fathers. Consequently the stability of the family increases as the division of labour between the sexes becomes perfect. This primary differentiation of employments is the condition precedent to any progress from the lowest savagery towards a better state of life. It originates in the different physical natures of male and female and in the conditions of a primitive existence. Savage life is a series of petty wars; at all times the community must be ready to meet its foes. During the best years of life, women are by child-bearing unfitted for fighting or hunting. As these activities must be undertaken by the men, the women must do the drudgery, as far as their strength permits. Not only must they attend to domestic duties, keep the fire, do the cooking, and provide such simple manufactured articles as mats and fishing-nets; but they must also actively assist in procuring any food that is within their reach, and on the march they must become beasts of burden, lugging, besides their babies, the utensils and supplies. This latter practice is universal among savages, and the necessity of it is so obvious that the women themselves defend it. The men must be free to fight at any instant or to meet any surprise. To load themselves with other burdens than their weapons might be to sacrifice the lives of all. It therefore seems quite wrong to conclude that women in savage life are always

[1] Belcher (from Notes by St. John), *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, New Series, Vol. V., 1867, p. 45.

slaves, and men their tyrannical masters. Certainly their condition is wretched, but at the outset it is made so more by the social conditions than by masculine will and power. There is plenty of evidence to show that so far from being slaves, the women of those low societies that are organized on the basis of kin and retain descent in the female line, are on a substantial public and private equality with the men. The more important woman's industry becomes to man and man's protection to woman, the more he cares for the simple comforts that she provides, and the more dependent she is on his assistance in adding to the food-supply by hunting, or in doing tasks beyond her strength, such, for example, as hut and canoe building, so much the more enduring is the family relation in savage communities.

Whether descent is counted through mothers or through fathers, the family group in the savage horde is usually exogamous. Though the practice of taking own sisters as wives is not unknown,[1] it is exceptional. The abhorrence of incest is probably an instinctive inheritance from a prehuman ancestry; the higher animals generally avoid close interbreeding. The instinct was doubtless produced by the stimulating effect of novelty upon sexual desire, supplemented by natural selection.[2] Strictly speaking, the instinct is one against the mating of nest- or house-mates, whether they are relatives or not, and it does not prevent the mating of near kin if they happen to have been reared apart.[3] It becomes an abhorrence of the mating of near kindred, as such, only after much knowledge has been acquired and after the powers of reflective thought have been further developed than they often are in savagery.

[1] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIV. Cf. also Owen, *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, New Series, Vol. II., 1863, pp. 35, 42.

[2] Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XIII., XIV., XV.

[3] Ibid., *op. cit.*, pp. 320–334.

When hordes are brought into contact, the simple pairing family, based on the forms of courtship that prevail among animals, is commonly altered in one of two alternate ways, and its relations to the horde are correspondingly changed. In the pairing family that is based on courtship, the relations of the sexes are substantially those of equality.[1] In savage life this seems to be possible only when a man chooses a woman of his own band, as is the custom among the Veddahs.[2] In the family that results from the intercourse of independent hordes either the husband or the wife becomes subordinate. If the hordes are friendly, a man often leaves his own horde to attach himself to a neighbouring group. Finding there a woman to his liking, he lives with her among her own people. Under these circumstances he has practically no authority over wife and children, because the wife and mother can always appeal to her brethren, who take her part. The husband has to live with her on sufferance. This form of the family is known among ethnologists as *beena* marriage,[3] the name given to it in Ceylon, where it prevails extensively. It is found also in other widely separated parts of the world, for example among the Arawaks of Guiana[4] and the Dyaks of Borneo.[5] The wife and children in *beena* marriage always belong to the horde of the wife. If the husband chooses to go back to his own people, he must leave his family and property unless he can get them away as plunder, as Jacob did when he left Laban.[6] Such relationships were observed by Lieutenant Peary's party in Greenland in 1891. Among the northern Greenlanders

[1] See Fielding, "Burmese Women," *Blackwood's Magazine*, Vol. CLVII., No. 5, May, 1895, p. 776, especially p. 778.

[2] Sirr, "Ceylon and the Cingalese," Vol. II., p. 218.

[3] McLennan, "The Patriarchal Theory," pp. 42 *sq.*; Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia," pp. 69, 71, 106, 156; and Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[4] Brett, "The Indian Tribes of Guiana," p. 101.

[5] St. John, "Life in the Forests of the Far East," Vol. I., pp. 50, 52.

[6] Genesis xxxi. 18–21.

a man often leaves his family in one settlement and goes to another, where he contracts a new marriage. Some years later he may decide to return to his former home. He then leaves the new family and, on rejoining the horde where he had formerly lived, he usually rejoins his former wife and children.[1]

If, on the other hand, neighbouring hordes are more or less hostile, the stealing of women is always one of the chief causes of feud, and marriage by capture is a prevalent form.[2] In this case the wife is at the mercy of her captor and his associates. He regards her as property and treats her with severity. Yet it does not necessarily follow that her children are claimed by the husband or that they take his name. In various parts of the world where marriage by capture prevails, the union is a temporary affair. Divorce is the customary sequel. In these cases the woman and her children may still be held as property by the horde of her captor, as was the custom of the Tasmanians,[3] or they may return to the horde of the mother, as is customary among the Caribs.[4] In the latter case there may be a continual returning of women and their children to the mother group, and children then are always regarded as belonging to the mother's kindred.

If either *beena* marriage or marriage by capture becomes habitual, the horde, like the household, becomes practically exogamous. There may be no strict rule of exogamy, there may be no penalties attaching to endogamy, but in actual practice marriage within the horde becomes more and more exceptional.

[1] I am indebted for these particulars to Professor Angelo Heilprin, who commanded the first Peary relief expedition.

[2] See McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," "Primitive Marriage"; Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVII.; Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia," pp. 80 *sq.*

[3] Bonwick, "Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians," p. 74.

[4] Waitz, "Anthropologie der Naturvölker," Bd. III., p. 383; and Brett, "The Indian Tribes of Guiana," p. 354.

Given now the exogamy of the household and of the horde, the conditions exist for an evolution of the clan from the family, and, under certain circumstances, for the practical identification of the clan with the horde.

That the original nucleus of the totemic kindred was a group of actual brothers and sisters constituting a household, can hardly be doubted. Brothers and sisters by blood are a natural economic and defensive group, spontaneously aiding each other in obtaining food and in redressing wrongs inflicted by other groups. It is therefore most natural that among primitive peoples generally the relation of brotherhood and sisterhood is more sacred than any other. Yet, at a time so early in the development of social relations that we can hardly hope to discover the origin of the practice, natural brotherhoods were often by expulsion and adoption converted into semi-artificial fraternities. Adoption, indeed, was practised by animals long before human life began. The adoption of motherless chickens may be witnessed in any farm-yard. Orphan monkeys are adopted and carefully guarded by other monkeys, both males and females,[1] and Darwin, on the authority of Brehm, tells of a baboon with a heart so big that she adopted not only young monkeys of other species, but also puppies and kittens.[2]

When the animistic stage of culture is reached, the relation of brotherhood and sisterhood, whether natural or artificial, acquires a peculiar sanctity through the belief that men are akin to supernatural beings. Each individual believes that the relationship between himself and his totem is as real as the relationship between himself and his human brother.[3] This belief reacts upon his conception of the human relationship. "My brother or sister," he reasons, "being akin to me, is necessarily akin to my totem. I,

[1] Darwin, "Descent of Man," p. 70.
[2] Ibid.
[3] *Ante*, pp. 250-252.

being akin to my brother or to my sister, am necessarily akin to his or to her totem." Under the influence of such ideas, in the course of time it must happen that the household group, regarding itself as a supernatural unit, will have its collective or household totem in addition to the individual totems of its members. How naturally this may come to pass, is seen when it is remembered that the individual totem is commonly determined by luck.[1] Often it will happen that several members of the same household will individually have the same totem, which will therefore, just because of such luck, be regarded as the special household guardian.

The totemistic sanction reacts, of course, upon all the practices of the fraternal group. Adoption becomes a sacred ceremony; the adopted member has to submit to totemistic marking or mutilation. To expel is to deliver the offender over to the wrath of malignant spirits. If the circle is exogamous, the totem, having sanctioned the practice, may be offended by any deviation from it. Therefore incest, at first abhorred as unnatural, is now abhorred as sin.

These totemistic notions have further consequences of great importance. From time to time the members of a household circle encounter strangers who happen to be marked with the household's totemic signs. To the savage mind such strangers are totemic brothers or sisters and every rule of the household applies to them. They must share its protection, they come within its prohibition of marriage. Controlled by such beliefs, the men of a fraternal circle who do not take their own sisters as wives will not take their adopted or totemic sisters or the sisters of their adopted or totemic brothers, because in a totemic sense they too are of the household kin.

Thus the natural brotherhood and sisterhood widens and becomes more and more artificial. For a long period each

[1] See *ante*, p. 251.

succeeding generation of uterine and adopted brothers and sisters may have its own totemic deity, but at last the time comes when, under the influence of the mother and her relatives, and through reasoning that they are descended from the mother's totemic deity, the circle of brothers and sisters begins to adhere to the mother totem instead of adopting a new one. From that moment the totemistic circle begins to enlarge by the natural process of birth, and to assume new characteristics. In the second generation it necessarily includes not only brothers and sisters, but also mothers, daughters and sons, uncles and aunts, nephews, nieces, and cousins. Moreover, since kinship is reckoned through mothers but not through fathers, the circle can claim and can include only the children born of its daughters. Children of sons are excluded as belonging to the kindreds of their mothers. The rules of feud and exogamy, which through totemism were extended to adopted members of the household brotherhood, are now in like manner and by like reasoning extended to all members of this wider and yet more artificial organization. The kindred has at length become a clan.

The totemic clan transforms the horde. Each horde may contain fragments of several clans or it may consist mainly of members of one clan.

By migrations of individuals from horde to horde, by *beena* marriage, and by wife-stealing, the membership of each totemic kindred tends to distribute itself through all the neighbouring hordes. Each horde, therefore, consists of members of many clans. This is the observed fact in Australia.[1]

It is possible, however, for the membership of a horde to consist mainly of the members of a single clan. It has been shown that with descent reckoned through mothers the clan can practically be identified with the horde if

[1] Starcke, "The Primitive Family," pp. 24, 25, 26.

men follow the residence of the wives as in *beena* marriage. The difficult case to account for, it was pointed out, is that which is presented by a practical identity of clan and horde when descent is through mothers and the wife follows the residence of the husband, as she must when marriage is by capture or by purchase.

There is one way in which the difficulty disappears. The captured wife may be regarded as inferior to a sister and the sister may be the housekeeper. Divorce may be as frequent as marriage, and women with infant children may habitually return to the camps of their brethren from which they were stolen. Even when children remain for many years in the residences of their fathers, they may ultimately go to the horde of their maternal uncles and aunts. By this means the horde of the mother group, which would otherwise disappear under the practice of wife-stealing and maternal descent, may constantly be recruited and may be kept intact.

In such ways as these a group of neighbouring hordes may be transformed into clans and be prepared for integration into a tribe consolidated of exogamous metronymic clans.

A cluster of hordes partially or almost wholly transformed into enatic clans becomes a metronymic tribe under conditions that force the hordes into close and permanent union. The condition may be the pressure of enemies. The Andaman hordes, usually living apart, show a good degree of power to combine in defensive coöperation for resistance to a common enemy.[1] Or the conditions may be physical. Flood, fire, drought, shelter in winter, or changes in the distribution of food-supplies, may compel hordes to live in closer proximity than was formerly their wont. Or, finally, friendliness of intercourse may increase

[1] Heathcote, in *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, New Series, Vol. II., 1863, p. 46.

to such an extent that, if the environment is adequate for the subsistence of a larger community by means of primitive forms of industry, the hordes may draw more closely together for the purpose of satisfying the desire for companionship.

In either case it is, strictly speaking, a further development of congregation which constitutes the fact of social integration. In addition to the intercourse of individuals, which has long existed between members of different hordes, there is now a close congregation and a permanent intercourse of the hordes as units.

The transformation of a cluster of hordes into a true tribe may occur quickly, under stress of unusual pressure, but there is no reason to suppose that this has often happened. A gradual integration, so quietly accomplished that no one could tell where the independence of the hordes ended and the unification of the tribe was completed, has doubtless been the normal phenomenon.

But it must not be supposed that all metronymic tribes have originated in the consolidation of related hordes that have long lived near each other. Alien hordes may be forced into proximity and finally into close union.

The presumption that tribal societies are thus products of congregation not less than of genetic aggregation is supported by direct evidence. In contemporaneous tribal societies, the intermingling of more or less unlike and once independent elements by migration, war, conquest, slavery, and woman-stealing has been continuous. Historical materials prove that similar conditions determined the genesis of the tribally organized communities that in earlier times developed into civilized states.

The congregation that creates tribal societies is, however, of the primary form. It has been shown that primary congregation is a drawing together of groups that belong to the same racial stock; as, for example, groups belonging to the Algonquin or the Iroquois race of Amer-

ica. Such groups, though they may for generations have been so dispersed that they have regarded each other as strangers, have yet remained within the same geographical area of characterization; they have retained similar forms of culture; and their likenesses of speech indicate that they have descended from a common ancestral stock[1] which found its way into their area of characterization at a remote and usually unknown period. But they are not usually, if, indeed, ever, in any case of historical record, descended from a single ancestral family, so recent that the genealogies can be traced. Tradition often affirms such an ancestry, but other facts show that the tradition is a mythical explanation of the alliance or coöperation.

In the further evolution of the metronymic tribe and later of the metronymic folk, and of the patronymic tribe and folk, the phenomena are primarily those of the evolution and the establishment of forms of social composition. Associated with this evolution are further developments of the social mind and the beginnings of an evolution of the social constitution.

At this stage of development it is possible to see exactly how the social constitution arises. It is differentiated from the social composition and for a considerable time, that is, until ethnogenic passes into civic and demogenic association, it is not separated from the social composition. Thus the household is nearly, but not quite, identical with the natural family. The household is the family organized as an economic group, and as such it may adopt persons not of the family blood. The clan again is connected with the household by ties of blood, yet it is both more and less than an enlarged household. It is, in like manner, never quite separated from the horde, since practically the horde as a

[1] While likenesses of language do not always indicate identity of stock (*ante*, pp. 253–254), they must do so if the groups exhibiting them have not been in contact.

component of the tribe is nearly, but not quite, identical with the clan. The clan subdivision of the tribal camp, regarded as a local subdivision, always contains members of other clans.

Within the tribe, the family — the unitary group in social composition — and the household — the smallest purposive association in the social constitution — become increasingly definite and increasingly coherent. The family becomes monogamous, polyandrian, or polygynous, according to the varying success of the household organization as an economic association. The monogamous form must be regarded as the mean type between two extremes, from which there may be variation in either direction.[1] Extreme poverty entails infanticide and polyandry. For example, in Tibet, the land of polyandry, it is in the impoverished sedentary population that there is but one wife for several men. The relatively well-to-do nomads are monogamous.[2] Prosperity fosters polygyny. Tribes that dwell in regions where nature offers superabundant supplies of food, like central Africa and Polynesia, are invariably polygynous. Polygyny has been the practice of not less than forty American Indian tribes.[3]

Economic activity is organized in the household. In the metronymic tribe the household is commonly under the direction of a woman whose responsibilities are often great. There were American Indian tribes in which the family of woman, husband, and children lived in a small wigwam by itself. In others, however, the Indian household consisted of from five to twenty families occupying a common lodge, or long house, as it was called among the

[1] Cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

[2] Deniker, *Revue d'anthropologie*, Vol. VII., Series II., 1884, p. 358. See also McLennan, "Studies in Ancient History," pp. 89 *sq.*, and Letournea, "The Evolution of Marriage," pp. 86 *sq.*

[3] See Letourneau, "The Evolution of Marriage," pp. 125 *sq.*

Iroquois. Through the middle of the long house, from end to end, extended a passageway, on each side of which apartments were partitioned off, one for each family. A row of fires, built on the ground, occupied the middle space, one for each two or four families. Within the house they lived from common stores. The food obtained by any member of the household on hunting or fishing expeditions and all that was raised by cultivation of the soil was made a common stock.[1] Over this communal household a matron presided, looking after its whole domestic economy, organizing and superintending its labour. First of all it was her duty to see that the squaws cultivated the land allotted to the household. Says Major Powell, speaking of the Wyandottes: "The heads of households are responsible for the cultivation of the tract, and should this duty be neglected the council of the gens calls the responsible parties to account."[2] In the next place she saw that the bucks supplied fish and game, and she usually had no trouble in enforcing her orders. "It was woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too shiftless to do his share of the providing. No matter how many children or whatever goods he might have in the house, he might at any time be ordered to pick up his blanket and budge." Finally, it was the matron's duty to look after the distribution of the common stores. "After the single daily meal was cooked at the several fires, the matron was summoned, and it was her duty to divide the food, from the kettle, to the several families according to their respective needs."[3]

The arrangements here described were those of well-organized tribes like the Senecas and the Wyandottes, but the same system, with slight variations of detail, was found

[1] Morgan, "Houses and House Life of the American Aborigines," p. 64.

[2] Powell, "Wyandotte Government," "First Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology," 1879–80.

[3] Morgan, "Houses and House Life of the American Aborigines," p. 65.

among all tribes but the very lowest, from the Columbia river on the north to the Gulf of Mexico on the south. More or less modified, it has been the usual system of domestic economy in metronymic tribes.

Step by step with the family tradition and with the economic tradition the artistic tradition also is developed in the household. Each household may have its special craft and skill. A writer on the social life of Zuñi has given an interesting example. As a usual thing, each family makes its own pottery, yet in different families differences of workmanship have given rise to specialties in production. "One household had a special reputation for making fine *ollas*, another for small ware, another for figures of animals, and one woman was famed for making very nice turtles."[1] Differences of physical strength and energy, of mental scope, and of quickness and taste, all play a part in this specialization of skill, which at a later time becomes the foundation of the division of labour by vocations.

A general oversight of the households of a metronymic tribe is exercised by the clan. It is the clan that enforces rights and duties. It interprets the marriage regulations and the rules governing adoption, and compels families to conform to them. It is often an important property-holding group. The land of a tribe is first apportioned among its clans and is then by the clans allotted to the several households for purposes of cultivation.

The cultivation of each household tract is communal. Coöperation takes the form that used to be known in New England and elsewhere as the bee. In the early days of New England when the farmer had important work on hand, such as a raising or a corn-husking, his wife prepared an abundance of good things to eat and he liberally provided rum or cider. Then he invited his neighbours to

[1] Baxter, "The Father of the Pueblos," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. LXV., June, 1882, p. 83.

lend a hand, and between feasting and drinking the work was done. The bee was the earliest form of direct coöperation on a considerable scale that appeared in human affairs. It was the means by which all large enterprises were achieved among the American aborigines. The housemother sent her brother or her son to the forest for game or to the stream for fish. She then invited all the able-bodied women of the clan to assist in sowing or in reaping her allotment of ground. When the work was done, a feast was given.[1] The occasional work of the men was managed as field-cultivation by the squaws. By means of the bee the men built the larger canoes, provided the heavier material for the houses, built the tribal council-house, and erected the stockade about the village. In house-building men and women worked together; men did the heavier preliminary work and left to the women the lighter details of completion. All work that engaged the members of more than one household was strictly regulated by the clan.

The clan regulates also the indirect coöperation through trade. The North American Indians were inveterate traders. Shells and shell ornaments which must have been taken there from the shores of the Gulf of Mexico have been found in Wisconsin. Red-pipe stone ornaments and pipes that could have come only from Minnesota have been found in New Jersey. Shell beads that were brought from the Pacific coast have been found in the Mississippi valley. Obsidian arrowheads from Oregon or the far Southwest have now and then been found east of the Alleghanies. Copper weapons and implements made in the Lake Superior region have been found in several eastern states.

Trade has its origin in war or feud, and for this reason it is to the savage mind a subject for public regulation. Frequent seizures of weapons, food, and useful implements, in the days before tribes were organized, made each horde

[1] Powell, "Wyandotte Government."

familiar with the products of distant places and suggested the advantages of exchange. The first step in peaceful exchange is the giving of presents, an act that grows directly out of hostilities. It is one of the most widely prevalent customs of savage communities.[1] The horde or tribe that dreads to encounter its hostile neighbour in actual combat seeks to propitiate it by sending presents of those things that a successful enemy would seize. The transition from this form of propitiation to exchange for its own sake is easy, but the fiction of present-giving is long retained. Articles which a community is willing to part with are taken to some spot on the border of its territory and are left there in the expectation that they will be taken and that other articles will be left in their place.[2] If the transaction is thought to be of some importance, ambassadors are sent with the goods. The negotiations that then take place are but a disguised combat. The representatives of the stronger party get the best of the bargain. Their barter is partly trade and partly plunder. The barter of the weaker party is partly trade and partly tribute.

These primitive forms of trade were doubtless often practised by clan-hordes before they were combined in tribes. Simple hordes trade in such ways now. Consequently after tribes were formed, trade between clans of the same tribe may have continued. Trade between the different clans of an American Indian tribe was, in fact, a common practice.[3] When in these ways the habit of barter had been formed, trade between households and individuals of the same clan was sure to follow. Much in-

[1] Cf. Spencer, "The Principles of Sociology," Part IV., Chap. IV.

[2] Tennent, "Ceylon," Vol. II., p. 440; Knox, "An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon," p. 123; and Lander, "Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger," Vol. III., p. 161. Cf. also Maine, "Village Communities," pp. 191–193.

[3] Dorsey, "Osage Traditions," "Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology," 1884–85, p. 379.

dividual trading has always existed in metronymic tribes. The clan becomes the chief regulator of all trading transactions; naturally, because it has always been itself to some extent a trader; and necessarily, because it has jurisdiction over all personal relations.

Besides enforcing the customary rules of marriage and adoption, apportioning land, and regulating communal industry and trade, the clan interposes its authority in all serious personal quarrels and in feuds. Private vengeance within the clan it does not tolerate. Vengeance upon an offender of some other clan it often encourages. Sometimes, however, the exact terms upon which a feud shall be terminated are amicably arranged between two clans.

If there are no phratries, the clan adds to all these functions the direction of common amusements and religious observances.

Thus in the clan a distinct, differentiated, and important juridical tradition is evolved. To a great extent the interpretation of this tradition is made by the sachems, who are usually chosen on account of their age and superior wisdom. In the course of time, therefore, the sachems become a quasi-juridical class.

In the evolution of the metronymic tribe it sometimes happens that a clan, becoming large and unwieldy, divides into sub-clans. Presently the sub-clans become independent clans. In such a case they call themselves brother-clans, and bind themselves together as a phratry. The phratry then becomes the representative of all those interests of the original clan that continue to be common interests of the new clans. For a long time marriage continues to be forbidden between members of the same phratry, although they may now be of different clans. This prohibition, however, gradually disappears. Leaving to the clan most of its original jurisdiction and activities, the phratry develops social and religious functions, and

the superior juristic function of jurisdiction in capital cases.

When a tribe has two or more phratries, they generally play against one another in their sports, and bet against each other upon the results of the game. In the Seneca Iroquois tribe there were two phratries. In their ball games each put forward its six or ten best men. Before the game commenced, articles of personal property were put up by members of the contending phratries assembled on opposite sides of the field. The stakes were deposited with keepers; the game was played with spirit and was watched with eagerness.[1]

When a murder has been committed, the clan of the victim meets in council and takes measures to avenge the deed. The clan of the criminal also holds a council and tries to bring about a condonation of the crime. If, however, the slayer and the slain belong to different phratries as well as to different clans, the clan of the criminal may call upon its brother-clans to assist in bringing about the condonation. In this case the final negotiations take place between phratries.[2]

As the special guardian of the religious tradition, the phratry bears an important part in the funerals of distinguished members of the tribe. In the Seneca tribe "the phrators of the decedent in a body were the mourners, and the members of the opposite phratry conducted the ceremonies."[3] It is in direct connection with the organization of the phratry and by its authority that the religious secret societies and medicine lodges are organized. The medicine men of the phratry became a differentiated religious class.

While thus the household is essentially an economic

[1] Morgan, "League of the Iroquois," p. 294.
[2] Morgan, "Ancient Society," p. 94.
[3] Ibid., pp. 95, 96.

organization, the clan essentially a juridical organization, and the phratry essentially a religious organization, the tribe is a military organization. It has been formed for military purposes; the consolidation of clan-hordes has been in most cases a result of conflict. When tribes so formed are organized by clans and phratries, their conflicts assume the character of war.

The military organization of the tribe grows directly out of primitive modes of conflict and is well adapted to develop individual valour and successful leadership. Individual initiative is carefully preserved. In the Indian tribe any brave might call for volunteers from among his clansmen to follow him on the war-path. He announced his project by giving a war-dance. "If he succeeded in forming a company, which would consist of such persons as joined him in the dance, they departed immediately, while enthusiasm was at its height."[1] If the expedition was successful, its leader might hope to be invested with dignity as a war chief of his clan. The war party was thus a voluntary purposive association within the clan, as the secret religious society was within the phratry.

Together the war chiefs of the clans constitute another very important purposive association, — the council of the tribe. In some tribes the council elects a head chief. The council is not a governing body in the usual sense of the term. It does not attempt to interfere in the affairs of the clan or the phratry. Its concern is with the relations of the tribe to other tribes and with all military plans. In these it is supreme. Within the council of the tribe, therefore, a military tradition is developed.

Thus the metronymic tribe has a very well organized constitution, which, however, is not wholly differentiated from the social composition. In fact, it is but incidental and subordinate to the social composition. The heads of

[1] Morgan, "Ancient Society," pp. 117, 118.

households and the sachems of clans are representatives of the kinship idea. Other functionaries are in one way or another closely identified with the metronymic bond. Finally, the tribal constitution that has been described prepares the tribe to become a component in a larger aggregate, — the folk. It makes possible the next step in composition.

Tribes enlarging in numbers may subdivide. In such cases members of each clan are assigned to each new tribe. The same clans, therefore, run through all the tribes.[1] Thus bound together by clan lines, speaking dialects of one language, and preserving a tradition of a common lineage, such tribes become an enatic or metronymic folk through a further development of the social mind.

The social memory and perception, already developed in earlier stages of social evolution, grow into social reason and self-consciousness. The relations of tribes and clans become a subject of deliberate reflection. Coördination has been hitherto through accident, imitation, habit, and leadership. The possibility of a further coördination through rational comprehension, arrived at through discussion, is perceived. When, therefore, the ethnic and linguistic unity of several tribes is thus supplemented by a self-conscious psychic unity, the conditions are ready for the next great step in social composition, and also for a further evolution of the social constitution.

Having common enemies of different ethnic stocks, these tribes may form a great military-political purposive association, a confederation.[2] The head chiefs of tribes may become the council of the confederacy, or the latter may include lesser chieftains elected by the clans of the tribes. The confederacy may have also an elected head chief or chiefs.

[1] Morgan, "Ancient Society," pp. 133, 134.
[2] Ibid., pp. 122 *sq.*

Within the council of the confederacy, and, more generally, in the confederacy, sovereignty arises and the true political tradition is evolved.

For the object of the confederation is twofold. It is first, undoubtedly, to create a more extensive organization for military defence and aggression. Another object, however, is quite as important. It is seen that hostilities between related tribes are a dissipation of strength that should be saved for resistance to common enemies. At an earlier time, individual vengeance has been a source of weakness in clan-horde and tribe. This has been prevented in a good degree by the growth of juridical customs in the clan. It is now perceived that the juristic means of dealing with conflicting interests might be extended, on the basis of clanship relations, to the disputes arising between tribes. The attempt to accomplish such an extension simultaneously with social and military consolidation is the beginning of political action, which may be defined as the combination of juristic and military functions, internal regulation and external adjustment, under one authority. The assumption of authority over military and civil affairs, the conversion of customary into positive law, and the extension of the sphere and application of legal rules by the self-conscious social reason is the beginning of sovereignty.

A change from metronymic to patronymic relationship and social organization may occur at any stage in social evolution. It may take place in horde-clans, or it may not be completed until after the organization of the metronymic folk by confederation.

The first step in the transition seems to be the practice of obtaining wives by capture. So long as husbands live with their wives' kindred, in *beena* marriage, children are naturally claimed by the mother-clan and take its name. Quite as naturally the children of a captured wife belong

to the kin of the father as long as he chooses to keep them and their mother, and if he cares enough for them to hold them as his property until their maturity, they take his name. This direct relation between patronymic kinship and marriage by capture is recognized by all writers. Professor Tylor[1] has described communities in which the transition from the metronymic to the patronymic system is now taking place under the influence of capture. In some of the Malayan tribes of the Babar archipelago "the men usually follow the women and live in their houses, and the children belong to the wife's family. A man may marry as many as seven wives, who all remain in the houses of their kindred. But sometimes wives are obtained by robbery, and are carried off to their husband's clans. The children then follow the father and take the father's name. In the Kisar and Wetar islands also, the maternal system prevails, but it is passing into the paternal system by capture, which brings wife and children under the husband's control."[2]

A similar state of things formerly existed in Arabia and is described by Robertson Smith. The earlier marriages of the desert tribes were *beena* or *mot'a* arrangements. *Mot'a* marriage was a temporary connection in which the woman entertained her suitor in her own domicile as long as she liked and then dismissed him, to take another, all with the acquiescence of her kinsmen, and without loss of reputation. *Beena* and *mot'a* marriages were gradually superseded by *ba'al* marriages, in which, as the name signifies, the husband was the woman's lord or owner. *Ba'al* marriages originated in capture. "There is," says Smith, "abundant evidence that the ancient Arabs practised marriage by capture. And we see that the type of marriage so constituted is altogether different from those unions

[1] Tylor, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII., p. 261.

[2] Riedel, "De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua," p. 351, and cf. pp. 415, 448.

of which the *mat'a* is a survival, and kinship through women the necessary accompaniment. In the one case the woman chooses and dismisses her husband at will, in the other she has lost the right to dispose of her person and so the right of divorce lies only with the husband; in the one case the woman receives the husband in her own tent, among her own people, in the other she is brought home to his tent and people; in the one case the children are brought up under the protection of the mother's kin and are of her blood, in the other they remain with the father's kin and are of his blood." [1]

Separation of husband and wife from the kindred of the wife, if brought about in some other way than by wife capture, may nevertheless have the same consequences. Major Powell, writing of actual instances of change from metronymic to patronymic kinship among the American Indians, says: "It would seem from such opportunities as I have had to collect facts in the field that hunting and other parties are frequently organized in such a manner that the male members of a clan-group proceed together in company with their wives and children. Under such circumstances the control of the family necessarily falls into the hands of the husbands and fathers. This happens among Pueblo Indians, a matriarchal people with female descent whose clans, in consequence of the scarcity of water for irrigation in their desert region, are obliged to separate widely for the cultivation of lands at a distance from the central pueblo. The result is that the control of families and the training of children are temporarily taken out of the hands of their own kin on the mother's side, and with the acquisition of cattle in these new homes comes the tendency to settle there permanently." [2]

Neither marriage by capture, however, nor any other sep-

[1] "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia," pp. 74, 75.

[2] Letter quoted by Tylor, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII., February, 1889, p. 258.

aration of the wife and husband from the wife's kindred, can of itself effect the change of kinship. It is necessary that the husband shall not only get possession of his wife and her children, but also keep possession of them. If he abandons them or sends them back to the mother-clan, no patronymic kinship can be established. Therefore, besides the mere capture of the wife, a motive for keeping her and for retaining possession of her children is necessary. This motive may come into existence at an early stage in social evolution if the horde is intelligent enough to foresee the advantage of strengthening its fighting force by rearing boys. In the stage of tribal organization when war is more systematic and the labour of women in field cultivation is useful, captured women and their children may be so valuable to the tribe that a man's kinsmen may put pressure on him to retain possession of a family that he has tired of and would turn away. The motive to retain possession of offspring attains its maximum strength, however, only with the appearance of forms of industry that engage the interest and effort of men and are taken possession of by them. Such industries give value to the labour of sons. Under favouring circumstances, therefore, men who find that their industrial functions have become more important than those of the women naturally assert ownership over the largest possible number of able-bodied assistants. This may happen in the hunting stage if the hunting is arduous. In most parts of the world, however, it has followed the domestication of animals. Affording a food-supply immeasurably superior to any before known and an opportunity to accumulate wealth, herding becomes an industry important enough to awaken the masculine ambition. The desire is born to multiply herds and herdsmen and to transmit property to sons.

As the value of women and children increases, and as industry in some measure diverts attention from war, marriage by purchase gradually succeeds marriage by capture.

Purchase gives the husband even greater authority over the wife than he secures by capture, since his right to a purchased wife cannot be denied by her kinsmen. They wholly surrender her and she can cherish no hope of restoration to them. In parts of Africa "Families are more or less willing — for value received — to give a man a wife to take, or let him take his beenah wife, to his own people. The contract, in this case, usually transfers to the husband the woman and her offspring; it is this which is bargained for; and where this has not been bought and paid for, even when the woman has been allowed to live with the husband in his own village, we find that the children may be claimed by her family. If payment has not been made, the woman's family have not, to use the current phrase, 'given her up.' Here a contract which carries away children, with their mother, from the mother's family is seen to be the sole basis of the father's right to his children." [1]

The husband's authority is further increased by religion. It often happens that the totemic beliefs of metronymic tribal communities present a serious obstacle to the plan of descent through fathers. Children belong by birth to the totem of the mother. The totems of mother and father may be hostile, and to count children as socially of the clan of the father while they are religiously of the clan of the mother is to create a confusion intolerable to the savage mind. By the expedient of adopting the captured or purchased wife into the clan and totem of the husband, the difficulty is overcome. Children are then in every sense of the kindred of the father. Among the Guinea negroes, who are now in a state of transition from metronymic to patronymic kinship, a chief's principal wife and her children must be of the clan and totem of her kinsman by blood, but the husband may purchase a slave or a friendless girl and by consecrating her to his bossum, or god, may

[1] McLennan, "The Patriarchal Theory," p. 320.

make her of his kin and faith. The bossum wife and her children are under the husband's control, and it is the bossum wife who is sacrificed at the chief's death, that her spirit may follow his.[1]

Finally, the wandering life and the comparative isolation of the herdsman's family, which separate him not only from the wife's kindred, but for long periods also from his own kindred, are favourable to the complete establishment of the father's power over his small community.

Paternal authority has momentous reactions upon religion. Animals and plants of mysterious powers, forces of nature, and the spirits of departed men have all been worshipped. Some of these have seemed to bring better luck than others, and, through a selective process, such have become tribal deities.[2] Clansmen have always believed that they are descended from their totemic gods. When, therefore, descent begins to be reckoned through males, changes in the religious system are inevitable. The male head of a family group is now the type of authority and power. So regarded in life, he is so regarded also in death. While the household may continue to regard natural objects and forces and miscellaneous spirits with superstitious feelings, they entertain for the soul of the departed founder of the house the stronger feeling of veneration. They think of the ancestral spirit as their protector in the land of shades. To the ancestral spirit, therefore, they pay their principal devotions. Thus without entirely displacing other religious observances, ancestor-worship necessarily becomes the dominant faith.

Ancestor-worship is still the household cult of China and Japan. Many traces of it remain in the desert tribes of Arabia. All of the historical Semitic peoples were

[1] McLennan, "The Patriarchal Theory," pp. 235, 236.

[2] See Payne, "History of the New World called America," pp. 389 *sq.*

ancestor-worshippers in their days of tribal organization.[1] The Aryans were ancestor-worshippers when they first appeared on the shores of the Mediterranean, and among the Romans this religion of the household hearth disappeared only with the triumph of Christianity.

The Aryan worship of the dead was a simple and beautiful piety.[2] It was believed that the soul had need of a dwelling-place and of food and drink. The soul that had no tomb must wander forever as a homeless spirit, and instead of being a protecting power it must become a malevolent ghost. To secure its repose its body must be reverently buried. Wine must be poured and food placed upon the tomb. "I pour upon the earth of the tomb," says Iphigenia, "the milk of mountain heifers, libations of wine, and the honey of yellow bees; for it is with these that we rejoice the dead."[3] The family tomb was generally near the house and not far from the door, that the sons, when they entered, and when they left their dwelling might always meet their fathers, and might always address them an invocation.[4] Within the house was the altar, on which burned the sacred fire. It was supposed to be frequented by the spirits of the household dead, and there, as at the tomb, libations were poured and offerings of food were burned. The fire was extinguished only when the entire family had perished.

Ancestor-worship reacts upon domestic life and upon the structure of clan and tribe. The family, rich in flocks and herds, becoming more and more conscious of the importance of property, and believing intensely in its ancestral faith, becomes a religious-proprietary family. Marriage is arranged with reference to the transmission

[1] See Robertson Smith, "The Religion of the Semites."
[2] See Fustel de Coulanges, "The Ancient City," Book I.
[3] Euripides, "Iphigenia in Tauris," 162.
[4] Ibid., "Helena," 1162–1168.

of property and of the priestly office to sons, and to the preservation of the integrity and continuity of the family group. None but a son can properly perform the rites of the ancestral tomb. Therefore, if a man hopes to pass an unperturbed existence in the spirit world, after the cares of life are over, he must make sure of legitimate male offspring. Adultery, which might have been condoned in the metronymic family, has now become an offence not only against the husband, but also against the entire family community, living and dead, against the social order, and the gods, — a crime and a sin. Barrenness, which might have been regarded as a blessing in a half-famished polyandrian horde, has become the most terrible of misfortunes, since it brings to an end not only the family but also the religious rites. The faithless conduct of a son also may be fatal to all the household interests.

These considerations cannot fail to confirm, with all the sanctions of religion, the authority of the father, and to establish the solidarity of the household group. It is but a natural consequence of them all that the father has the power of life and death over wife and children, that he can divorce the wife at will, or, if she fail to bear sons, can take a second wife. Naturally also the paternal authority is asserted to arrange the marriages of sons.

These changes in family organization carry corresponding changes into the clan. The jural tradition becomes agnatic. Ancestor-worship also gives a more distinctly religious character to the clan. The gentiles preserve the tradition of the worship of their eponymous ancestor, they maintain his tomb, and unite there in periodical sacrifices. Under the influence of male descent and ancestor worship clan headships and tribal chieftainships tend to become hereditary in certain families. In metronymic society the office that cannot descend to a son often descends to a nephew, whom the electors prefer to any other candidate on account of his relationship to one who was suc-

cessful as councillor or leader. In the ancestor-worshipping patronymic group there always is a strong belief that the son of a great man is his most suitable successor in office, because it is thought that the spirit of the father watches over the son's doings and aids him with supernatural guidance.

All these changes are favourable to social integration. Descent through fathers tends to bring about a close identification of the clan with the horde or village, because the wife follows the residence of the husband. All the men of a village may be of one clan and all clansmen may dwell together in one village. Hereditary chieftaincy is favourable to authority, and the religious system of ancestor-worship unites not only the living, but also the living and the dead, in a perfect continuity of tradition and custom.

The patronymic tribe in which chieftainship has become hereditary soon begins to undergo changes of organization. The bond of personal allegiance is strengthened; the bond of kinship is weakened. At any given moment the change may be imperceptible, but, in the course of time, it is discovered that the tribal system has become strangely modified by a barbaric feudalism.

Rank and dignity, even when conferred by the suffrages of kindred or of political equals, are almost always associated, as effect or as cause, with wealth. The successful chieftain receives from his followers a large share of the booty of conquest. With the riches thus obtained he binds to himself those followers who will most faithfully minister to his ambitions. Here are the primitive forms of *commendatio* and *beneficium*.

So long as wealth consists only of implements and weapons, game, skins, small stores of grain, baskets and beads, and so long as relationships are metronymic, a chieftain's wealth, though it may be relatively large, can hardly

become a source of formidable power. When, however, a tribe has become rich in cattle, and masculine power has become firmly established through patronymic kinship and ancestor-worship, the case is wholly different. Under these circumstances clan and tribal chieftains are often descendants of chieftains. The families in which the blood of distinguished chieftains runs are already looked upon as noble and society is cleaving into ranks. The chief inherits his father's herds. On every ceremonial occasion he receives presents of cattle from the tribe. He levies fines and confiscations, which are paid in kine. At every opportunity he organizes excursions to steal cattle from neighbouring tribes. Among privileges he obtains from the tribesmen the right to pasture his increasing herds on the outlying border of the tribal domain. Judged by barbarian standards, his wealth is vast, and the disparity between his estate and that of a simple tribesman becomes ever greater. Dispensing favours and enriching favourites, he is soon able to control formidable bands of retainers. Exactly this condition of affairs may be witnessed at the present time among the Kaffirs of South Africa. The retainers of a Kaffir chief serve him for cattle. "His retinue, court, or whatever it is to be called, consists of men from all parts of the tribe, the young, the clever, and the brave, who come to do court service for a time, that they may obtain cattle to furnish them with the means of procuring wives, arms, or other objects of desire." [1]

The successive steps by which feudal relations are created in patronymic tribal society are clearly shown in that remarkable body of ancient law, the Brehon law of Ireland. (At the earliest period which the Brehon laws disclose the power of the tribal chiefs is rapidly growing, and a chief is before all things else a rich man.[2] His wealth is

[1] Dugmore, "Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs," p. 27, quoted by Maine, "Early History of Institutions," p. 143.

[2] "Early History of Institutions," p. 133.

not in land, but in sheep and cattle. The Brehon law tract called Cain-Aigillne prescribes that the head of a tribe shall be, among other things, "the most wealthy," "the most powerful to oppose, the most steadfast to sue for profits and to be sued for losses." [1]

These laws further show that through the acquisition of wealth the way to chieftainship is always open. The wealthy freeman who is striving to become a chief is called a bo-aire or cow-nobleman. "He is, to begin with, simply a peasant who has grown rich in cattle, probably through obtaining the use of large portions of tribe land." [2]

Service of the chief is the first step towards such possessions. As companions and personal followers of a chief already wealthy in herds, the bo-aires receive portions of his stock. The chief also extends his right of pasturage in the outlying waste to his retainers, whose own herds rapidly increase in numbers.

One other element necessary to the growth of their power is a large number of men whom the bo-aires themselves can secure as dependents. These are at hand in the broken or ruined men who are known in every Irish tribe as fuidhuirs.

At first the class of fuidhuirs is composed of outcasts from the clans, men who have sinned against tribal custom, and who can no longer claim the protection of their kinsmen. The numbers of the fuidhuirs are multiplied, however, by inter-tribal wars, whereby tribes are broken up and scattered. Such ruined men the bo-aire easily gathers about him on the tribal waste land as a band of lawless cow-boys, ready at any moment to follow him on marauding expeditions. The final step is to use these lawless bands in committing depredations on weaker tribes and in stealing their cattle. Deprived of all possessions, conquered tribes

[1] "Early History of Institutions," p. 134.
[2] Ibid., p. 135.

can then subsist only by borrowing stock back from the arrogant cow-noblemen, who thus become receivers of regular tributes and rents.

Thus, from the moment that wealth becomes an important social element its tendency to differentiate the tribal population is manifest. All historical peoples probably passed through the stage of rude feudalism which the Brehon laws describe.[1] It is disclosed in the pages of the "Odyssey" as the social order of the Greeks of the Homeric period. Tacitus witnessed its beginnings among the Germans, of whom he says, "it is the custom of the states by voluntary and individual contribution to bestow on the chiefs a present of cattle or of grain, which, accepted as a compliment, supplies their wants."[2] The Saxons, after their conquest of England, were entering upon the first stage of that later agricultural feudalism, which developed the essential principles of pastoral feudalism into a gigantic system. The ceorl who could acquire five hides of land became a thane. The thanes were the immediate companions of the king, — his comitatus, and from their first appearance in English history they took rank above the earlier nobility of Saxon eorls, who were descended from ancient tribal chiefs. Thus the thanes as a nobility of the newly rich corresponded to the cow-noblemen of an earlier time.

Under the pressure of a common danger or inspired by a common ambition, patronymic tribes of the same racial stock, dwelling within a territory of geographical unity, unite in military confederations that are more coherent, more formidable, and more stable than the strongest of metronymic confederations. A patronymic confederation is a folk or people, and it may develop into a great civil state. The

[1] Cf. Hopkins, "The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India," *loc. cit.*, p. 82.

[2] "Germania," c. 15.

Egyptians, the Chaldeans, the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, the Saxons, the Franks, the Germans, and the Slavs were tribally organized peoples, which, by subsequent growth and integration, developed into national states. Each of those peoples began its ethnical career in an environment of such extent and of such geographical unity as to make the growth of a single society of large numbers and of considerable dispersion easily possible, and of such varied productiveness as to stimulate desire, inventiveness, and activity. It cannot be supposed that the territory occupied by any of those peoples was populated by descendants of a single small horde. It is more probable that the ethnical unity was the result of an assimilation of many diverse tribal elements which, attracted by a superior environment, came together in the course of their wanderings. Geographical unity and natural wealth, therefore, were the antecedents of ethnical unity, and congregation was the basis of association.

In patronymic even more than in metronymic societies, however, tradition insists that the tribes are descended from a common ancestry so recent that it can be traced. The truth seems to be that usually the tribes are of the same racial stock, but that they had become scattered and in some degree unlike before they confederated. Proof of the conquest and absorption of groups that had not been accounted brethren, is found in contracts or covenants of adoption or alliance. Uncivilized men do not covenant with brethren. They covenant with strangers, who thereby, through the operation of a legal fiction, become brethren. For example, the contract or covenant of the Hebrew tribes with Jahweh indicates that Jahweh was not originally the god of all the Hebrews. If he was the adopted god of some of the tribes, they must have amalgamated with a mountain tribe or tribes whose god he was in fact. In general then, tribal societies are formed by the co-working of genetic aggregation with a congregation of remotely related hordes,

which have been dispersed within a common area of characterization.[1]

When patronymic tribes confederate and form the ethnic nation, the agnatic principle and ancestor-worship, combined with political and military conditions, confer great authority upon the head chief of the confederation. He becomes a military leader, a religious leader or priest, and a supreme judge, all in one. The chief, in a word, becomes a king.

With the achievement of confederation and the establishment of kingship, ethnogenic evolution is completed. A gentile folk or ethnos has come into existence. Its further development, if evolution be not arrested at this point, carries it into the new conditions of civic life and demogenic progress.

[1] Gumplowicz's error, "Der Rassenkampf," consists in his failure to distinguish between the slightly heterogeneous or practically homogeneous groups described above, and extremely heterogeneous groups. A true ethnical society is formed by the integration of groups that are racially alike.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOGENIC ASSOCIATION

It has been shown that in ethnical society, the social constitution is subordinate to the social composition. The chief characteristic of societies that have passed beyond the ethnogenic stage is a thorough subordination of the social composition to the social constitution. All such societies are civil associations — civilizations.

Societies of this character are demogenic. They generate and incorporate great populations, which tend to become democratic in spirit and organization.

In societies of this grade, therefore, must be included all ancient and modern commonwealths and national states in which civic association has superseded an ethnic or gentile organization, and in which the permanent occupation of a definite territory, and the active exploitation of resources by a highly organized industry, have resulted in a growth of great populations — ranging from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of individuals; such commonwealths, for example, as Egypt, B.C. 2806–2782; Babylonia, B.C. 2000; Athens, B.C. 450; and Germany, France, Italy, England, and the United States A.D. 1896.

Civil societies in their evolution pass through three great stages of progress. The most ancient civilizations, of Egypt and Babylonia, did not get beyond the first stage; Greece did not complete the second, and Rome did not quite reach the third. The modern nations have fully entered upon the third. These stages of civili-

zation do not correspond to such distinct types of society as are the metronymic and the patronymic forms of ethnical society, yet the difference between them is not merely chronological: it is a difference of character and of structure.

In its earliest stage the civil society has little or no friendly communication with any other society of similar development. It is continually obliged to defend itself against an almost world-wide barbarism, or against a rival state. The energies of the population are given first to the establishment of political unity, military organization, and security; only secondarily, if at all, to the legal organization of minor forms of association within the social constitution, and to the systematic pursuit of economic prosperity.

When political unity and a degree of security have been achieved, the energies of the people must find new outlets and new forms of expression. They break through the coercive restrictions hitherto imposed by military policy, and win both intellectual and personal freedom. Criticism is turned upon the social organization. It is seen that the possibility of uniting stability and continuity with liberty and progress lies in the development of law. The state in its political character enters upon the stage of constitutional development, and there is a great multiplication of subordinate associations. There is a thorough differentiation of the social constitution in its minor parts.

Athens splendidly developed the critical and philosophical features of the second stage of civilization, but she failed in legal construction. Rome exhibited great practical talent in legal construction, but she failed to maintain a healthy spirit of criticism. Liberty and spontaneity of life were sacrificed to administrative mechanism.

Neither Greece nor Rome, therefore, accomplished the task of the second stage of civilization; much less did they go forward to a third. They failed because, like

Egypt and Babylonia, they were unstable civilizations. Their superior wealth was a continual temptation to the barbarians of the outer world, by whom at length they were overwhelmed.

But the Germanic nations, simultaneously prepared for civilization by their own inherent development, and by long contact with Rome, entered upon their political evolution under precisely opposite conditions. They simultaneously grew into statehood in an environment of civilization which for ages had lain between them and the more remote barbarism of central Africa and central Asia, and on the partial ruins of the western extension of that civilization they built. For this reason modern civilization is stable.

Growing side by side, and too nearly equal in power for any one of them to hope to maintain supremacy over any other, the modern western nations passed through the first stage of civilization, — the stage of political integration and of a rough effective organization of a central governing power, — with less suppression of the minor interests of life than occurred in Egypt and in the East.

The second stage, in turn, was no partial evolution as it was in Greece and in Rome. The Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the English Revolution, the Eighteenth Century Aufklärung, the American Revolution and the French Revolution, the free trade movement in England, and the German liberal movement of 1848, were but so many phases of a thorough criticism and reconstruction of the social constitution on lines of legality, liberty, and free association.

It is not to be supposed that in the life of any nation or family of nations these two stages have ever been absolutely distinct. There has been much overlapping. Italy and Germany attained to national unity only in recent years, long after they had been profoundly affected by the general liberal movement, and after other European states had

passed through the stage of constitutional reconstruction. Even in these instances, however, the true sequence is the one that has been described. United Germany and United Italy had only entered on their civil life when their political consolidation was accomplished. The problems of constitutional organization and liberty had still to be faced, and not yet have they all been solved.

In general, however, the western nations are now a world community of powerful, unified, independent states in which the great major work of political and social organization is accomplished, and in which liberty is guaranteed by law. Savagery and barbarism without are no longer formidable, and, while international wars are always possible, and from time to time are actual, the normal state of international affairs is one of peace. Energy is expending itself, therefore, in new directions. These nations have entered upon a third stage of civilization, — the economic and ethical. They are absorbing themselves in industry, in amassing wealth and in discovering its uses, in popular education, and, more and more, in the task of realizing the life possibilities of the masses of the people.

Philosophical historians have not failed to observe types and stages of civilization. In its analyses and explanations of these, sociology becomes a philosophy of history. The important thing is to make classes that are significant, and that correspond to actual stages of evolution. Three of the groupings or classifications that have been made hitherto, namely, those of Hegel, Comte, and Mr. Spencer, are of interest to compare with the one that I have given above.

In Hegel's philosophy of history[1] human development is conceived as a process of self-realization. Step by step, man comes to a knowledge of himself as a self-conscious and self-determining being and as a constituent in a universe which is an organic whole. But this progress is not

[1] "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte."

intellectual only. The sphere of man's freedom also is widened. His activity finds an ever larger realm. History, therefore, has been a progress in the consciousness of freedom. It began when spiritual consciousness and aspiration dawned upon man. At first freedom was thought of as abstract and universal, and it was therefore conceived as existing only in one person. That one was God in heaven or the monarch upon earth. This stage of history was worked out in the oriental world. In the Grecian world an advance was made. Freedom was no longer ascribed solely to one. Some were free, many ~~could be~~ free, but not all. The slave remained. Rome carried the work of Greece somewhat further, embodying the substance of freedom in the formal law of personal ~~rights~~. "Finally, with the Germanic world, and under the inspiration of Christianity, we come to the age of full maturity, whose mission is to comprehend and carry out the truth that freedom is the birthright of all men." [1]

Noble and true, as far as it goes, though this conception of the philosophy of history is, it fails to recognize one half of the phenomena, namely, the structural changes in society. It shows us the serial phenomena only, and these only on the subjective side.

Comte believed that he had discovered the law of history in a progressive development of humanity through two preparatory stages of thought into a third and final stage.[2] The first stage was the theological, in which the human mind interpreted all causation in terms of the direct activity of a god or gods in works of creation or providence. Every event was a direct intervention of deity. There could be no science as long as men so understood the world, and no material or moral progress. Mankind was childish, superstitious, and hero-worshipping. The

[1] Morris, "Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History," p. 136.

[2] "Cours de philosophie positive," Vol. IV., p. 653, and Martineau, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," Vol. II., pp. 131 *sq.*

second stage was the metaphysical. No longer believing in the miraculous, men sought to interpret the world in terms of principles, abstractions, entities. So doing, they lost themselves in fruitless speculations. The human mind was emancipated, but it wasted its energies in impossible questionings of what is essentially unknowable. The third stage is the positive or scientific. Speculation gives place to observation, experiment, induction, generalization. Men find that the world of knowable truth is quite large enough to absorb all their time and strength. Building on solid foundations of fact, they learn secrets of nature that enable them to master the material, and many of the moral, conditions of life. The world enters upon a career of progress.

It will be seen that Comte found the law of history in a merely intellectual progress.[1] He did not, with Hegel, rise to the conception of a progressive evolution of the whole personality of man, and he failed, as Hegel failed, to perceive that society itself undergoes a progressive differentiation and integration of structure, corresponding to changes in human nature.

Mr. Spencer, impatient with the metaphysics of Hegel, and with the superficiality of Comte, has undertaken to construct a philosophy of progress, based on observation and induction.[2] He explains the evolution of society in terms of differentiation of structure and then concludes that the structure is of one of two types according to the character of the habitual activities of the society.

In Mr. Spencer's view, the military power usually becomes so important in the process of nation-making that it shapes the whole political organization. From this time the future character of the society and of its various institutions is determined by the form that the leading activi-

[1] Cf. Condorcet, "Progrès de l'esprit humain."

[2] "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., Part II., Chap. X., §§ 256-271, and Vol. II., Part V., Chaps. XVII. and XVIII.

ties habitually assume. If the military activities are continued after they have accomplished their proper work of integration, the society undergoes what Mr. Spencer has called the process of regimentation, and minute supervision extends to every department of affairs. Social ranks are sharply defined, perhaps even become castes. The industrial system is subordinated to the regulating system, voluntary enterprise is discouraged, or even repressed, and personal freedom disappears. Counter-tendencies appear if the military activities subside. Industrial development is as conspicuous in its turn as the military organization was before. Personal freedom increases, and the civil power becomes paramount. A complex organization of voluntary enterprise, working through freely formed associations, carries on a multitude of social functions.

Mr. Spencer's philosophy thus supplies something that both Comte and Hegel omitted, but it falls far short of completeness, and his main generalization is not accurate.

For, as we have seen, the character of a society is determined by the unalterable conditions that confront it at each stage of its development. In the age of integration, or nation-making, a society must be military, with such consequences as Mr. Spencer observes. At a later time, the free type of organization is created by the liberation of energies and by the resulting criticism and protestantism that follow the completion of the first great task of civilization. And only when the free forms of organization within the protection of law have been achieved, does a great industrial development become possible. Industrialism is not the cause, it is an effect of freedom.

Therefore we cannot say that there are military and industrial types of society, as if, in any stage of its development, a society might be either military or industrial, and as if, among coexisting societies in the same period of growth, some might be industrial and others military. At the beginning of its civil evolution a society is necessarily

organized for military activity. In the final stage of its evolution it is predominantly industrial. These, then, are stages or periods of social evolution in civil societies. Between them lies a stage that Mr. Spencer's classification fails to recognize, — the liberal-constitutional, or the liberal-legal, in which the energies of the military age are transformed into the activities of an industrial age.

While a true philosophy of history must thus recognize stages of civilization that are unmistakably stages of social evolution, it nevertheless must also insist that the evolution involves a process of intellectual progress as Comte affirmed, and of expanding personal freedom as Hegel affirmed. As much as this I have already said directly and by implication in my many declarations that the function of society is the evolution of personality, and that demogenic association is democratic in its tendencies. It is therefore necessary to inquire how subjective development in the individual, and changes in the structure and activity of society, are related.

And here an interesting discovery is made. In the chapter on The Social Mind, and again in the chapter on Anthropogenic Association, it was shown that there are three fundamental social traditions; namely, the economic, the legal, and the political. Of these the economic tradition is primary, — it is the earliest, — while the political is the latest, in the order of evolution.

But in the present account of the three stages of civilization, civil society is represented as perfecting first its political organization, then its legal constitution, and finally its industrial organization, thus reversing the order of the genesis of the traditions.

The explanation is this: When society, building on elementary economic and legal traditions, arrives at political development, it throws all its energy for a time into the work of perfecting its political life, to the comparative neglect of its legal and economic life. There is neces-

sarily a concentration of creative effort upon the state until it is a strong and coherent structure, within which the other elements of social life can be developed.

But when political integration has been accomplished, society throws its energies back upon its earlier interests, to develop them and to raise other parts of the social organization to an equality of strength and importance with the political. Freedom and the legal organization of relations are first achieved, and then, finally, the economic activities receive attention.

So the order of development of the major social traditions reverses the order of their genesis. The same thing is true of the secondary traditions; namely, the personal, or animistic, the æsthetic, and the religious. These appear when there is enough energy in society left over from the main struggle for existence to develop some minor sides of life.

When society enters with all its might upon political development, to the neglect of the other two fundamental traditions, it has by no means perfected the earliest of the secondary traditions. In so far as it busies itself with intangible concerns, the human mind is chiefly interested in religion and the rude phases of creative art. While conquering territory and organizing the state, mankind in its leisure hours gives itself up to simple enjoyments, and in explanation of the world it accepts with unquestioning faith the traditions of the supernatural. This is the age of the epic in poetry, of the massive and heroic in architecture and plastic art, of the miraculous in belief, and of the ceremonious in worship. The state, in its fresh exuberance of power, is the chief patron of amusements and of art endeavours. Holding itself responsible for religion also, it is theocratic. The age of nation-making is thus also the age of religion-making, and the age in which the primal, heroic side of the æsthetic tradition is developed.

In the second stage the human mind has advanced to the critical and philosophical position, and in the state the need is felt for liberty within the guarantees of law. Consequently, in this stage, evolution perfects the intermediate traditions in both the primary and the secondary classes; it elaborates law and completes the æsthetic tradition by developing its critical side. Finally, in the third stage humanity has worked back to the economic and the personal interests. It throws itself with zeal into the utilitarian concerns of life and at the same time it again raises the question, What is life, what is the human soul, and what its destiny?

The order of the development of the tertiary traditions — the traditions of conceptual thought — is different. In the religious-political age the human mind is theological. In the critical and legal age it is metaphysical. Only in the economic and spiritual age is it scientific.

Such, then, is the complete philosophy of history. Society develops its political life and then works back through law to its economic foundations; it organizes worship and then works back through æsthetics to the tradition of personality; it constructs its theological belief and then goes forward to metaphysics and at length to science. This order is followed not only because it is the natural order of the psychological development of the community, but also because at every step the traditions that are developed together naturally supplement each other. The heroic-æsthetic, the devout religious, and the theological traditions powerfully strengthen the state in its formative days. Only the critical spirit and the metaphysical mind can accomplish the task of social reorganization on legal foundations. It is well for the historical jurist to show that the conception of "natural rights" is a metaphysical abstraction, without form and void, but he should not forget that it was only because men believed with all their souls in natural rights as veritable entities that they were able

to create a body of constitutional law. Finally, it is out of the economic evolution that we get a true ethical evolution and a development of science, and only as we do get both ethics and science can the economic evolution continue to the full achievement of its possibilities.

The stages of civilization accordingly are: the military and religious; the liberal-legal; and the economic and ethical.

The ethnic society that has become partly feudalized and has reached the stage of confederation and kingship, is facing conditions that will further transform its organization. It is increasing in wealth and in population, and it must resort to systematic agriculture. But the rapid evolution of energy that is taking place is followed by expenditures in lawlessness and restlessness. The semi-feudal chiefs and their retainers are by no means willing to settle down to agricultural life. To conquer and plunder, and to compel a conquered population to do agricultural labour, is a more attractive programme.

Accordingly, we find that patronymic tribal confederacies seldom establish themselves in agricultural industry on the territory where they originate. They enter upon a career of migration and conquest. Such was the history of the nomad tribes that overran Egypt; of the Assyrian tribes that overran the Akkadians; of the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Latins, and the Germans.

If the enterprise is successful, and an alien people is subjugated, the conquered territory becomes the permanent home of the conquerors.

The first effect of conquest is secondary congregation and a more varied demotic composition.

The secondary congregation in the evolution of tribal societies is one that brings aggregations of racially related groups into such contact with populations of a different

race or sub-race that social and demotic amalgamation are inevitable. The evidences are inexhaustible that the great historical peoples were created by the superposition of races or sub-races.

Mr. Petrie's discoveries in Egypt[1] show that the valley of the Nile was occupied by prehistoric peoples before its invasion by tribes which, after conquering the earlier population, created a national state. At Medum two different modes of burial preserve side by side the customs of an aboriginal and a conquering race.[2] The latter buried its dead at full length and put in the tomb some provision for the body, such as food and head-rests. The aborigines put no food-vessels or other objects in the tomb, and they placed the body in a contracted position with the thighs bent square with the body and the heels drawn up, and with the head always to the north and facing the east. The valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris, Palestine and Asia Minor, were from the earliest times meeting and mingling places of races. Among the peoples that occupied Palestine before the Hebrew conquest,[3] were Amorites of the Kelto-Lybian or blonde stock of the white race, Phœnicians or Canaanites of the Hamitic stock, and many groups of the Semitic stock. Farther to the northwest, in Asia Minor, a like primitive population of commingled Kelto-Lybian, Hamitic, and Semitic stocks was overrun at an early period by conquering warrior tribes of the Mediterranean stock, Lycians, Lydians, Phrygians, and Carians,[4] who came across the Hellespont from Thrace. In Greece the Hellenic tribes superposed themselves upon a primitive population of Pelasgians; in Italy the Latin and the Sabine tribes overran the Etruscans and the Umbrians.

[1] "Ten Years' Digging in Egypt."

[2] Petrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 145, 146.

[3] Sayce, "Races of the Old Testament," p. 174.

[4] Ramsay, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. IX., 1889, p. 350 *sq.*, endorsed by Gardner, "New Chapters in Greek History," pp. 30–32.

In England within the historic period Saxons and Danes have been superposed upon Celts, and Normans upon Saxons and Danes. And back of these conquests and comminglings there were throughout Europe in prehistoric times successive overflowings of population by population, of which evidences survive in stone and bronze implements, burial barrows, and skulls.

The commingling of ethnical elements by congregate association in a favourable region does not end with a mere intercourse of groups that have come into contact. They intermarry. The congregation and the genetic aggregation become inextricably mingled. Ancient and modern examples from every part of the world show not only that groups of the same stock that become socially integrated accept intermarriage as one of the implied consequences, but also that conquering tribes seldom exterminate the conquered. The women especially are saved, and as slaves, concubines, or wives bear children of mixed blood. How large a proportion of the total population of a state may have had this origin in ancient times is indicated in the command to the Israelites on the eve of battle with the Midianites: "Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him. But all the women children that have not known man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves,"[1] and by the subsequent record that "the prey over and above the booty which the men of war took" included "thirty and two thousand persons in all, of the women that had not known man by lying with him."[2]

The demotic composition also that comes into existence while the intermingling and amalgamation of elements is going on, is extensive and complex as compared with that seen in savage hordes. The completion of the process and the final amalgamation create ethnical types.

[1] Numbers xxxi. 17, 18.
[2] Ibid., 32–35.

That the great waves of Celtic and Teutonic migration across Europe did not supplant one stock by another, but resulted in the creation of new nationalities of mixed blood, is a proposition now too well established to need further demonstration. M. Broca found, when investigating the subject of stature, that nineteen-twentieths of the whole population of France present, in various degrees, the characteristics of mixed races.[1] The English race is perhaps as interesting an example as any. Twenty-five years ago Huxley showed how enduring has been the strain of the black-haired, black-eyed race that inhabited the island before the arrival of the true Aryan Celts.[2] Those dark people were not the first human occupants of Britain; but the river-gravel men of the older stone age were driven south by the glacial ice, and left little, if any, trace. With the men of the newer stone age, who were short as well as dark-complexioned and black-haired, the case was different. Careful measurements made throughout the United Kingdom prove that the type survives not only in the black Celts of Scotland and Ireland, and in the dark inhabitants of Lincolnshire and Yorkshire, but also in many isolated groups elsewhere. The subsequent invaders were first the true Celts, a light-haired race, then the Romans, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans. The Roman occupation left little physiological trace.

It is admitted on all sides that the Saxon and Norman bloods were well mingled. Controversy has turned on the question of the intermixture of Saxons and Danes with the conquered Britons. The extermination theory has had distinguished advocates among the historians. Their view, however, is an impossible one to the ethnographer. Had the Anglo-Saxons exterminated or driven out the earlier and darker half-Celtic population, the

[1] Quoted by Topinard, "Anthropology," p. 371.

[2] "The Forefathers of the English People," in *Nature*, Vol. L, No. 20, March 17, 1870, p. 514.

people of England at the present day would be, as Mr. Grant Allen says, "without exception as light-haired and blue-eyed as in the fairest parts of Norway and Sweden."[1] The fact, however, is that in modern England, dark, curly hair, and black eyes are to be found in half of the existing population. The conquering English never really penetrated into Wales and Cornwall, and the population in those two districts still consists almost entirely of the mixed dark race which is now commonly known as Celtic, in contradistinction to the lighter Teutonic Anglo-Saxon type. Cumberland, Westmoreland, and the greater part of Lancashire, though afterwards partially settled by the Northmen, likewise escaped the Anglo-Saxon colonization. In Devon, Somerset, and Dorset, as well as along the Welsh border in Hertfordshire, Worcestershire, Shropshire, and Cheshire, the invading English appear to have formed a mere sprinkling of a superior class among a large mass of servile Welsh cultivators. And even in the most thoroughly Teutonized counties of Britain, such as Kent, Sussex, Lincolnshire, and Yorkshire, abundant traces of a yet unswamped dark element may be found. Everywhere, in fact, — even in the most English portions of England, — a British race which is not English survives in considerable numbers.[2]

This description of the English population shows that amalgamation never becomes so complete that population is absolutely homogeneous. In one place one of the original elements predominates, in another place other elements prevail. All possible intermediate shades between the original extremes may exist simultaneously.

When a tribally organized people has established itself upon a conquered territory and has begun to amalgamate with a subject race, an active development of the political phases of the social mind begins.

[1] "Common Sense Science," p. 174.

[2] Ibid., pp. 174, 175.

Sovereignty assumes a more definite form and a more positive character. Embodied in the council of a metronymic confederacy, sovereignty could hardly appear to free tribesmen as a power to compel obedience. Embodied in the hereditary king of a patronymic people, it could be thought of as a right to command. Even then, however, it could be regarded only as a semi-divine authority over the people; and not as an authority inherent in the people. But when by united action an entire people imposes its rule upon a subjugated race, sovereignty is revealed in its true character as the supreme expression of the social will, — as a law-making and obedience-compelling power, to which every member of the state contributes his individual authority and his might.

It is at this stage, then, that sovereignty begins to react vigorously upon the whole organization of society. The social mind, which has long reflected upon social relations, has hitherto expressed its approval and its disapproval through the ancient customs of the clan and the tribe Now it begins to convert its judgments into formal decrees. Compelled by the contact of a ruling and a subject population to face new problems of organization, it begins systematically to review the social system, as it has hitherto reviewed the conduct of individuals, and to say explicitly what relations will be tolerated. Thus the relations that are expressly authorized and sanctioned are converted into positive institutions.

Sovereignty necessarily acts through the social constitution, especially through the organs of government. It is for this reason that the social constitution presently becomes superior to the social composition.

The first institutions, accordingly, are those of government and religion, — the kingship and the priesthood. As at this time religious, military, and political functions are united in the king, there is no separation of church and state; the state is theocratic.

At this stage, however, the social constitution is not separated from the social or from the demotic composition. Therefore, in converting the organs of government into positive institutions, the sovereign will of the state necessarily converts confederacy, tribe, clan, and family also into institutions. For a time sovereignty accepts and sanctions the forms of these organizations that have been established by custom. It accepts and sanctions also the established distinctions of rank. When a confederated folk that has become feudal and monarchical takes possession of a conquered territory, it is already differentiated into royal, noble, free, and servile families. These distinctions of the social composition are now made the basis of the hierarchy of power, authority, and service in the social constitution. This identity of the social composition with the social constitution long persists.

The conquerors nevertheless, notwithstanding great differences of rank among themselves, remain sharply separated in social function from the conquered. There is an identity of the social constitution with the composition of the population, which is not soon destroyed. The conquerors become a religious, military, and political class, and the conquered an industrial class. As the ruling class possesses the soil and forces the subject population to cultivate it, there is no separation of the industrial from the political organization of the community. The institutional organization of government therefore makes it necessary to convert industrial relations into a third group of positive institutions; namely, those of property and of slavery, or serfdom.

Thus the conquerors reserve to themselves the privilege of organizing and conducting the societies that have directive functions and those that are concerned with intellectual interests. They organize the state and the church; they alone belong to the society of pleasure. The conquered are the industrial society, ever hewing the wood

and drawing the water for the house of the god of the conqueror. The bondsmen of one time, however, may be the rulers of another, but not usually in the same state. Israel made bricks for Pharaoh, and when the children of Israel were waxen strong they put the Canaanites to task work, but the bricks were made by the Nile, and the Canaanites were not Pharaohs.

Conquest has played so large a part in social evolution, and the merging of purposive association with ethnical segregation has been so common, that certain sociologists[1] have refused to admit that a community may become highly organized in any other way. They deny that the larger division of labour can establish itself in an ethnically homogeneous group. Many facts already noted are opposed to this sweeping generalization. Social complexity is a product of many things besides conquest.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in all existing human societies except the highest and the lowest, the purposive organization is only partially separated from the ethnical composition. It must also be admitted as one of the most certain facts of history, that the most highly organized existing societies are composed in part of elements that have survived successive waves of conquest, in part of those that were once conquering forces but were afterwards subjugated, and in part of elements that won and maintained supremacy. In fact, for many generations the principle of ethnical subordination was seen in every part of the purposive organization. It is only in advanced stages of the development of highly organized communities that the differentiation of the social constitution from the social composition is so nearly complete that all the ethnical elements may make their way into any part of the purposive association. The social disabilities of the negro, and the social, legal, and political

[1] Gumplowicz especially, see "Der Rassenkampf," Part IV., and "Grundriss der Sociologie," Part III.

disabilities of the Indian, show how far from perfect is the differentiation in our own nation, even now.

The conversion of social relations into definite institutions increases the general efficiency of the social organization. Life and property are made more secure than they were in nomadic days. Population and wealth increase.

The differentiation of town from rural life now begins. The local agricultural group at this time is a village community, and the social organization of the country population in general is manorial in form. The soil is periodically apportioned among clansmen, but the cultivators are servile. They no longer own as clans or tribes, — as individuals they never have owned — the land that they till. They render service and pay tribute to a lord.[1]

Cities in the modern sense of the word do not yet exist. There are no centres of dense population. But there are centres of worship and defence; sacred places to which men gather from near and far to make periodical sacrifices to their tribal deities. These homes of the gods are fortified; the people flee to them in times of danger. They are centres of administration and justice, for here kings and judges hold their court. In the course of time tribal chiefs and elders, priests and military leaders, establish their permanent homes in these holy places.[2] Garrisons of soldiers are permanently stationed near them. Artisans and labourers are brought to them to care for the temple, to build the fortifications, and to manufacture weapons, armour, and clothing for the soldiery.

The currents of trade begin now to flow steadily towards these centres of religious and social life. The periodical

[1] See Gomme, "The Village Community"; Maine, "Village Communities"; and the works of Von Nasse, Von Maurer, Seebohm, de Laveleye, Fustel de Coulanges, Kovalevsky, Andrews, and Vinogradoff.

[2] See Fustel de Coulanges, "La cité antique," and Hopkins, "The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste in Ancient India," *loc. cit.*, p. 77.

festivals and sacrifices afford opportunities for exchange. A brisk barter is carried on by the assembled clansmen; cattle, corn, and fruits, metal work and woven fabrics, armour and utensils, salt, spices, and gums, wines and oils, incense and perfumes, pass from owner to owner. The religious festival becomes a great fair and market.

Little by little the intervals between the periodical fairs are shortened. The population that has gathered about the religious and military nucleus steadily increases. Local manufactures are multiplied and trade becomes an every-day affair.

The division of labour between city and country, which Adam Smith describes as the fundamental industrial differentiation,[1] is now fully established. Agricultural produce is regularly brought to town for the subsistence of the urban population, and the wares that are most often purchased by countrymen are regularly manufactured for sale. Considerable accumulations of free capital in such concrete forms as cattle, grain, implements, and stores of manufactured goods, have by this time been made. Some one commodity has been exchanged so much more frequently than any other that men can always be sure that with it they can purchase any commodity which they may desire. Whatever this specially well-known and highly valued commodity may be, — whether oxen or grain, salt, iron, copper, beads, or shells, — it is a true medium of exchange, and, as soon as by a common though tacit consent it is everywhere accepted in discharge of debts, it is a true money. The appearance of money is followed by the development of a merchant class, which could not sooner have come into existence, because the merchant must have the means to purchase all kinds of wares and must be able to hold them in stock; he must therefore be able to offer in payment that which will be universally acceptable. From this time forth the artisan and the husbandman no

[1] "The Wealth of Nations," Book III., Chap. I.

longer deal directly with one another. Each sells to the merchant and buys from him, and the merchant class be comes a principal element in the town population.

Industry and commerce further weaken the ancient tribal bonds already impaired by feudalism. To the centres of trade come men of alien tribes in search of economic gain, as they did in Greece, where, as early as the time of Lycurgus, there was already a steady immigration from the Mediterranean islands and from the Ionian settlements of the eastern coast. An old order of social relations is crumbling; a new order is about to arise.

Unattached to the tribes with which they have cast their fortunes, but acquiring wealth and power, the miscellaneous elements of the town population demand juristic and political rights. Persons of distinction may get themselves adopted into a clan or may secure the admission of their own clan into a tribe, but these privileges are not generally accorded. It is evident that some other than the gentile basis must be found for the organization of the state. The institution-making power of sovereignty is compelled to deal with a wholly novel problem.

Commercial rights are granted with but little hesitation. The foreign-born are allowed, as they were at Rome, the full protection of the local law in all affairs of trade. But between the *jus commercii* and the *jus connubii* there is an abyss. To permit the alien to marry into a local clan is to admit the wife to the worship of strange gods and is ultimately, no doubt, to intrust to strangers the solemn sacrifices to the city's dead. This is too serious an innovation to be contemplated until the revolutionary pressure becomes irresistible.

Irresistible, however, it does become, and that inevitably. The trading class presently outnumbers the older population and greatly surpasses it in wealth. It becomes clear that the unorganized but prosperous multitude cannot

permanently be exempted from the duty of supporting and of defending the state, and that, unless it is in some manner incorporated in the body politic, it can overthrow the city which has sheltered it. It becomes evident to all that the ancestral gods whose worship has been kept pure by the restrictions of the marriage laws are now in danger of a violent destruction. The altars at which none but kindred may worship may yet be overthrown by strangers.

But how to incorporate in a tribal state a heterogeneous multitude of unrelated men, is a question which the practical politician, with his unfailing instinct for exhausting every wrong device before trying the obviously right one, does not immediately answer. In the successive attempts of Athens and of Rome to reorganize the commonwealth, the various plans that were tried had all the characteristics of ingeniously devised inventions. All were suggested, nevertheless, by the forms through which social evolution had passed or was passing. At Athens, for example, there was, first of all, the attempt which is associated with the name of the legendary hero Theseus, to organize society by classes, namely, the well-born, the husbandmen, and the artisans. The principal offices in the civil administration and in the priesthood were assigned to the well-born, the Eupatridæ, who were simply clan and tribal chieftains. The evident intention was to unite the chiefs by class-feeling, and thus, by an antagonistic class-feeling, to unite the husbandmen and in like manner the artisans, and so to break down gentile lines of division. It was an attempt to destroy utterly the tribal system in the interest of the feudal system. It inevitably failed because it antagonized the conservative instincts of a majority of the voters. Next was made the attempt attributed to Solon, to organize society on a basis of property and military service. In this plan at Athens, as afterwards at Rome, all freemen, though not connected with any clan, were enrolled in the

army and were given a certain voice in public affairs. This scheme also failed because it left the line of demarcation between the tribal and the miscellaneous population as sharp as ever. Not until the time of Cleisthenes was it seen that the most simple and obvious of all possible plans was the only practicable one. Whatever may be true in the spiritual vineyard, in politics new wine must be put into old bottles or the public will distrust the brand. The attempt to break down tribal lines was then given over. Clans and tribes had long been localized. Each claimed jurisdiction within definite territorial limits. Within each territorial subdivision were both clansmen and strangers The state simply decreed that all men who lived within the boundaries of any local subdivision of a tribal domain should be enrolled as members of the local community which dwelt there; that all who dwelt within the domain of any tribe should be enrolled as members of that tribe. Kinship might still be traced by those who cared about it. Every one could retain his clan-name and his religious rites according to ancestral custom,[1] and citizens of aristocratic descent in fact continued to describe themselves by their gentile names, although they still added the names of their demes.[2] Thus a perfect organization of the state was at last accomplished with the least possible shock to ancient prejudices. In name and form the ancient system remained. Its substance, even, remained for social and religious purposes, but for political purposes its content was entirely changed.

Thus at length the gentile is converted into the civil organization of society. Civic association, irrespective of kinship, becomes the basis of political coöperation. Gradually tribal lines are more or less artificially re-drawn, and at length it is forgotten that local boundaries ever marked tribal domains and that village names were once the names

[1] Aristotle, "The Constitution of Athens," Chap. XXI.

[2] *e.g.* Hipparchus, son of Charmus, of Colyttus, Ibid., Chap. XXII.

of clans. The tribal confederacy has become the territorial state.

It is not to be supposed, however, that the creation of the territorial state obliterates the thought of an ethnic unity. It only subordinates it to a higher ideal, in which the conception of territorial unity is given a more important place than it has hitherto held.[1] The state still consciously strives to secure the ethnic unity of its population, but the attempt is not now to preserve the purity of an ancient blood. It is rather to perfect the new ethnic unity that is to emerge from the blending of many elements. The consciousness of kind has broadened. The possibilities of assimilation are perceived. It is realized that men who have identified their interests with those of an ancient race, who have learned its language and have adopted its religion, may, by these means, become identified with it in spirit, and ultimately, through intermarriage, may become united with it in blood. Through the influence of this idea the fiction of adoption is preserved in the law of naturalization and the *jus sanguinis* long remains as the law of nationality.[2]

Animated by its enlarged ideas of ethnic and territorial unity, the state enters upon the realization of a positive policy. It endeavours to bring under one sovereignty all related peoples that speak allied languages and that have like interests. It endeavours to bring under one administration all fragments of territory that together form a natural whole for purposes of commerce, social intercourse, and military defence. It attempts, in short, to establish a scientific frontier.

To accomplish this purpose it enters upon a career of

[1] Cf. Burgess, "Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law," Vol. I., pp. 1–4.

[2] Cf. Munroe Smith, "Nationality, Law of," in Lalor's Cyclopædia of Political Science.

aggression which necessitates a perfect internal cohesion. Every interest is in some degree sacrificed to military discipline. Religion, which has long been a medley of ancestral faiths, becomes national and organic. Family, gentile, and local gods are thoroughly subordinated to the national god, who is represented by the king and a centralized priesthood. The national religion therefore, by its sanctions, upholds the authority of the central administration. Divine qualities are imputed to the king and he is encouraged to assert arbitrary powers.

Under these influences political integration goes irresistibly forward. The stronger absorb the weaker states, until the resulting civil societies become doubly and trebly compound.[1] Moreover, conquest does not end when the scientific frontier has been established. Ambition overleaps its proper bounds. One after another, visions of universal empire arise, before the eyes of Rameses and of Sargon, of Cyrus and of Alexander, of Cæsar and of Charlemagne. Distant peoples that can never be an integral part of the conquering nation are subjugated in mere wantonness of power, and are compelled to pay tribute, which flows in broadening streams of wealth to enrich the capital city. Material splendour rewards the military success. Palaces and temples are its monuments. Statues and tablets record the deeds of its heroes.

Such are the achievements of the nation-making age,[2] of the military-religious period of social evolution. They contribute to civilization two of its essential elements; namely, security of property and of life, and a masterful creative activity of the human spirit, expressing itself in political and religious organization and in a rude but massive and enduring art. A third element is contributed only by the criticism and philosophy that are born in the next great stage of progress.

[1] Spencer, "The Principles of Sociology," Vol. I., §§ 256, 257.

[2] Cf. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics," Chaps. III. and IV.

The directions in which energy expends itself when political integration has been accomplished and a good degree of security has been achieved, have been determined by the social activities of the military stage.

Military expeditions, conquest, slavery, and trade have broadened the range of experience, have widened the mental horizon, and have increased the complexity of the demotic composition. Ezekiel's magnificent description of the commerce of Tyre[1] reveals an intermingling of nationalities in the ancient world that, in its amazing complexity, is exceeded only in the greatest cities of modern times.

Such admixtures of ethnical elements result in progress. In the chapters on Zoögenic and Anthropogenic Association, it was shown that the crossing of varieties that are not too unlike is often beneficial. Mixed races, after natural selection has eliminated their weaklings, are taller, stronger, more prolific, and more adaptable than pure races. Anthropologists differ in regard to the limits within which cross-breeding is advantageous. Prichard's opinion[2] that hybrid offspring are equally prolific whether their parent stocks are similar or most dissimilar races is still held by many investigators. The consensus of the best judgment on this subject, however, supports the conclusion of J. C. Nott, that two resembling races produce fertile offspring, but that when very unlike races are crossed the offspring show an inherent tendency to sterility when kept apart from parent stocks.[3] This is the belief of Vogt[4] and of Professor Broca.[5] On one point there is no dispute. Crossing creates physiological plasticity and variability. It is for this reason, indeed, that some hybrid races lack

[1] Ezekiel, xxvii.

[2] "Natural History of Man," p. 18.

[3] Nott and Gliddon, "Types of Mankind," p. 397.

[4] "Lectures on Man," p. 421.

[5] "Phenomena of Hybridity in Genus Homo," p. 60.

stability. Most of the ethnical elements that have mingled in civil societies have been sufficiently unlike to ensure plasticity and individual vigour, and not so different as to impair the stability or the fertility of the resulting stock.

Of more importance than physical plasticity, however, is the mental plasticity of civil populations. The intercourse of nations has created a critical and catholic mental type in which conscious adjustment prevails over automatism.[1] Many physiologists have held that the tendency of nervous development is towards automatic action, and that the human being therefore tends to become a mechanism adjusted to its conditions. Guyau points out that the social environment is ever changing, and that it is therefore impossible for humanity to become a conscious automaton. It is more likely, he thinks, that natural selection favours those who have the greatest power of making conscious adjustments to changing conditions.

In the plastic consciousness of an alert and versatile population, the investigating, critical, and philosophical spirit arises. Discovery is pursued for its own sake; and geography, history, and science become serious intellectual interests. The result is that, as different communities and different stages of culture are compared, dissatisfaction with existing conditions is felt and the idea of a possible improvement is conceived. Protestantism in the large sense of the word begins to be influential and the now fully self-conscious community undertakes its own reorganization and advancement.

While the critical phase of mental evolution characterizes all civil societies at a certain stage, it does so in very unequal degrees. Some societies, having made a measure of progress, have become stationary; others remain merely modifiable; a few continue to be inherently progressive. These inequalities are explained by selection. Survival

[1] Guyau, "Éducation et héredité," Chap. IX.

and selection confirm the variability and the growing power of some societies, the modifiability of others, and the rigidity of others. They fix the type of each nationality and of each community.[1] Types of society result. England, Germany, and the United States are inherently progressive nations. Ireland and the Slavonic provinces of Austria and of Turkey are modifiable, Spain and the French provinces of Canada are arrested, or stationary, societies.

A continual sifting goes on.[2] Young men of energy and determination hasten from meagre opportunities and social stagnation to improve their condition where resources are more abundant and the population is more active. By this means, as well as by the birth rate, the predominance of the young and vigorous in progressive communities is increased.

The community, however, reacts upon the individual. The influence of natural selection in favouring those who conform to the dominant characteristics of the society in which they are born is quite as important as its effect in developing those that are adapted to a physical environment. Selection may exclude, suppress, or modify those who show too much variability. A man whose appearance or whose mental and moral qualities are objectionable to his fellows finds fewer economic opportunities and, other things being equal, stands less chance of leaving offspring than one who conforms to the dominant spirit. It makes a great difference, therefore, whether the prevailing feeling in a community is favourable to enterprise or to a hopeless conservatism. One community desires change, it admires enterprise; another cares only to keep things as they are. Even in the local communities of the same commonwealth these differences may be seen. Selection favours the vari-

[1] Bagehot, "Physics and Politics."

[2] Cf. "The Nature and Conduct of Political Majorities," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VII., No. 1, March, 1892, pp. 127, 128, and Longstaff, "Studies in Statistics," Chap. VII.

able type in one, the unmodifiable type in another. The discipline of early life creates progressive habits in one place, and non-progressive habits in another.[1]

Thus natural selection operates not only to favour enterprising individuals in the progressive community, and to sort out the enterprising individuals from communities that are unprogressive, but it operates also on the double personality of each individual. Every man is complex, containing within himself both progressive and conservative tendencies. If the spirit of the community in which he lives is progressive, the progressive tendencies in his nature are stimulated, and the conservative tendencies are atrophied.

Furthermore, those individuals are developed whose talents are in demand, and in the same individual the group of talents that is of immediate service is brought to a relative perfection. One period favours the soldier, another the business man, another the poet, another the man of science. If a genius is born in a conservative community, either he seeks a more congenial social environment elsewhere or his genius is crushed before it becomes strong enough to assert itself. If he is born when men care nothing for the things in which he might excel, he never realizes the possibilities of his nature.

When, therefore, a mode of feeling becomes dominant, selection intensifies it. Selection has produced the American spirit, with its desire for change, its love of experiment, and its respect for enterprise. There is a continual weeding out of unenterprising elements. In like manner, the cities are more enterprising, and more varying, than the rural communities, and this difference between city and country has been increasing for many years.

It may be interesting to inquire whether a race that has been subordinated, but has not been incorporated by its conquerors, does not become increasingly conservative.

[1] Cf. Bagehot, "Physics and Politics," p. 6.

The prevailing feeling in such a race is one of hostility to the manners and laws of the dominant race. Young men who favour the adoption of new customs are frowned upon, and all opportunities go to those who support conservative practices. These phenomena may still be seen among the North American Indians.

The possible degree of association, with all that it implies, is greater in one race than in another, just as it is greater in one part of the same national community than in another. In the same race or in the same national stock it varies also with changing conditions.

It is sometimes said that we ought not to assert that the lower races have not the capacity for social evolution, because we do not know what they could do if they had opportunity. They have been in existence, however, much longer than the European races, and have accomplished immeasurably less. We are, therefore, warranted in saying that they have not the same inherent abilities.

When higher and lower races come in contact, it is necessary for the higher in many ways to sustain the lower; otherwise it would be impossible for two very different races to live together. Unfortunately, however, the same amount of educational effort does not yield equal results when applied to different stocks.

There is no evidence that the now extinct Tasmanians had the ability to rise. They were exterminated so easily that they evidently had neither power of resistance nor any adaptability. Another race with little capacity for improvement is the surviving North American Indian. Though intellectually superior to the negro, the Indian has shown less ability than the negro to adapt himself to new conditions. The negro is plastic. He yields easily to environing influences. Deprived of the support of stronger races, he still relapses into savagery, but kept in contact with the whites, he readily takes the external

impress of civilization, and there is reason to hope that he will yet acquire a measure of its spirit.

A truly progressive type, then, must have not only plasticity, but also strength of character to make independent advances, and, without outside help, to hold an advantage when it has been gained. This combination of qualities has in modern times been found only in the nations of northern and western Europe and in their colonies. All things considered, England has been the most progressive nation of history, combining in a rare degree adaptability and variability with resolution and strength.

The nation that has become protestant and progressive has to face the task of achieving a social organization that shall maintain unity and stability and yet shall guarantee liberty.

From the comparative study of religions, laws, and polities, two guiding ideas have sprung. One is the notion of a *jus gentium*, — a customary law that in its essential rules is the same in all nations. Each nation in its infancy has regarded itself as a peculiar people. It has cherished its law as a body of unique and unequalled wisdom. When, therefore, after it has subjugated alien peoples and has annexed their lands, and has discovered that their systems of law differ only in form and detail from its own, its conception of the nature of law necessarily undergoes a profound change. It finds itself obliged to think of law as made up more of general than of peculiar principles. It begins to think of certain principles as universally true, and to identify them with the nature of society. It observes, moreover, that the universal rules of customary law are independent of the forms of government, and it begins to regard them, therefore, as of superior authority, and to believe that governments should themselves be governed by the universally accepted rules of right.

The other guiding idea is that of a *jus naturæ*, and it is so closely related to the notion of a *jus gentium* as often to be identified with it. Both historically and philosophically, however, the *jus naturæ* is distinct. The *jus gentium* is objective; it is a body of actually sanctioned rules, actually operative in many different states. The *jus naturæ* is subjective and speculative. It is the result of a philosophical attempt to find the rational grounds of moral conduct. It is a set of ideal rules that reason approves of, or, as Cicero says, it "is the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands those things that ought to be done and prohibits those that ought not to be." [1]

From this conception of ideal law to an idealized conception of the *jus gentium* the transition is easy, and the two conceptions are often confounded, as they are by Gaius, when he says that "whatever natural reason has decreed amongst men is cherished equally by all nations, and is called the *jus gentium*, as if all nations employed it;" [2] and as they are many centuries later by Jeremy Taylor, when he writes that "the law of nature is the universal law of the world, or the law of mankind concerning common necessities, to which we are inclined by nature, invited by consent, prompted by reason, but is bound upon us only by the command of God." [3]

From such ideas the inference follows that the people rather than their governments are the creators of substantive law, and that the people, as rational moral beings, ought to hold themselves and their governments to the obedience of that "highest law" which "was born in all the ages before any law was written or state was formed," [4] which began to be "at the same moment with the mind of God." [5]

[1] "De Legibus," I. 6.
[2] "Institutes," I. 1.
[3] "Ductor Dubitantium," Book II., Chap. I., Rule 1.
[4] Cicero, "De Legibus," I. 6. [5] Ibid., II. 4.

Prolonged reflection upon these conclusions yields fruit at length in discussion, and sooner or later public interest in them is thoroughly aroused. A legal constitution of society is seen to be possible. The demand becomes insistent that governments shall cease to exercise arbitrary powers, and that liberty of thought and action within the limits prescribed by reason shall be guaranteed to every individual. It is unnecessary to tell here the story of the rebellions and the revolutions through which the demand has been enforced. If events take their natural course, the normal outcome is everywhere the same. Charters and guarantees are wrested from kings, whose divine right has ceased to inspire fear. Little by little, legislation is interwoven with precedent, and the strong fabric of constitutional law is wrought. The powers of governments are limited, and their duties are defined. Freedom of contract also is established as the legal basis of the minor relations of life.

From this time forth, voluntary organization, under the authority and the protection of law, can assume endless varieties of form and function. The social constitution differentiates and redifferentiates, until it becomes a structure of exceeding complexity, delicately adapted to the service of an enterprising and progressive people. It becomes more and more distinct from the social composition. The church is separated from the organization of the state, and is made subject to the political sovereign. There is a rapid development of a free, decentralized, industrial organization. The minor forms of coöperative association are multiplied, and the division of labour is perfected.

The voluntary type of organization reacts favourably upon personal liberty. Many facts point to the generalization that freedom of membership increases with the extension and the specialization of association. Exclusiveness is difficult to maintain when several organi-

zations, that have similar objects in view, compete for approval and support. It is therefore difficult for an association to extend its membership by acts of conscious policy, or to devote itself strictly to a specific work, if it attaches non-essential or distasteful conditions to membership. The histories of political parties, of religious denominations, and of labour organizations abound in confirmations of this rule. If, on the other hand, without actively seeking membership, an association enlarges, the growth of numbers increases the diversity of experiences and of ideas, and ensures catholicity. There is much inherent democracy in mere numbers.

It must not be supposed, however, that under the most favourable circumstances perfect freedom of membership and flexibility of plan can be established in every part of the social constitution. The inertia of society is great; and in every society there is an enormous mass of "survivals," — of ancient forms and venerable prejudices. Much of the purposive organization of any community is old; it is a heritage from many generations. It has become rigid, and its administration is mechanical. There are other organizations of later origin that are still flexible; they are still undergoing change. If we could ascertain what proportion of the entire social constitution of a nation is old and rigid, what is new and flexible, we should have an index of the vitality of the community, and should know the degree of its success in adjusting itself to new conditions, perhaps to larger opportunities. In the United States, for example, the organizations devoted to the extension of business enterprises and organizations for promoting political, moral, philanthropic, and educational reforms are collectively a larger part of the social constitution than they are in any other nation. They are so large a part, indeed, that it is evident that our social constitution has not yet begun to assume its final form. Sociologically, as in years, we are yet a young

people, and the future is one of indefinite possibilities, and perhaps of many surprises. The scientific significance of these facts is their indication that the immediate future of a community which has a fixed social constitution can be predicted, while that of a community which has a flexible and changing constitution is uncertain.

While the development of liberalism ensures the flexibility of the social constitution, and thereby makes social organization a more efficient instrument for achieving the objects of life, its influence upon the social composition is to some extent disintegrating.

The religious-proprietary family, which was evolved in the later stages of ethnogenic evolution, flourished unimpaired throughout the earlier stages of civil development. Marriages were not governed altogether by individual preference. Religious, economic, and social considerations were of great weight. The consent of parents and often that of other relatives was necessary; for the supreme object of every union was to perpetuate a family, a patrimony, and a faith. Liberalism, substituting contract for custom, introduces new conceptions of the marriage relation. Individual preferences receive a consideration heretofore denied them. Romantic love begins to play a large part in marriage plans. The authority of the parent, and still more the authority of the family in its integrity, is weakened. The marriage relation itself ceases to be regarded as a sacrament; it becomes a legal relation, a contract. It begins to be thought of as a means of individual pleasure or advantage, and the duty of transmitting an unimpaired estate and of maintaining the integrity of a family ceases to be a supreme consideration. The religious-proprietary family thus becomes the romantic family, which is a much less stable institution.[1]

Liberalism impairs also the cohesion of the federal state.

[1] Cf. Pearson, "National Life and Character," Chap. V.

The conception of contract as the true basis of all social relations suggests the thought that contract, or covenant, was the original ground of federal union. The solidarity of interests, the identity of blood, the unity of language and tradition, that lay back of the covenant, and were its *raison d'être*, are forgotten. The right of secession is avowed, and it finds many able defenders. So long as interests remain harmonious, no immediate harm results from these beliefs, but they are dangerous, and if from any cause a commonwealth becomes embittered they may quickly be converted into a justification of rebellion.

Over against all weaknesses and dangers, however, there stand to the credit of liberalism the enormous economic and ethical advantages that it contributes to the sum of human possessions. Liberalism alone makes possible the gigantic industrial achievements of the third stage of civilization. While the evolution of a liberal social constitution is a consequence of commerce among other forms of international intercourse, it is antecedent to a high economic development. Adam Smith was right in his analysis: Division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, but wealth is limited by the division of labour.

When the most urgent problems of constitutional government have been solved, men turn their attention seriously to the task of improving their material condition, and give themselves earnestly to industrial affairs. Now for the first time, natural resources are systematically surveyed, and technical processes are diligently studied. Invention busies itself with making the practically unlimited energies of nature do useful work for man, and a new thing appears under the sun, — a marvellous mechanism that is more delicate than the human hand and more adequate than armies of slaves; a mechanism through which the sun that man in his days of ignorance worshipped is made to do man's labour; to forge his iron, to weave his

cloth, to stamp his gold, to grind his corn, to propel his ships, and to record his thought. Skill, strength, fidelity, foresight, enterprise, and knowledge are combined in an industrial organization of the community that is not less complicated than the material machinery which it guides. Through these agencies nature yields up a bounty of which former ages never dreamed. Riches are acquired by thousands, and the most substantial comforts of life by millions.

The increase of wealth is followed by a far more rapid growth of population than any that occurred in the earlier stages of social evolution. Birth-rates may not rise, but death-rates greatly diminish, and nations begin to double their numbers in a generation. Society has become in the highest degree demogenic.

A general advance in material well-being and a gradual elevation of the standard of living, then a growth of population until it becomes increasingly difficult to raise the plane of living,[1] then another era of economic progress,— this rhythm seems to be the form of the demogenic process. The whole theory of population needs reëxamination in the light of this thought. Invention may for a time ensure such an abundant production of the bare necessaries of life that subsistence, in this narrow sense of the word, is put far in advance of population. It would be radically wrong, however, to conclude that the Malthusian philosophy is therefore untrue. Subsistence is more than necessary food, and invention is rhythmical, — it alternately flourishes and declines. The subsistence that is of economic and sociological significance is the amount of material wealth that is necessary to raise the general plane of living, generation after generation. During the ebb of

[1] By "plane of living," I mean an objective fact — an actual possession and enjoyment of certain comforts and luxuries — in distinction from the subjective fact that is properly called a "standard of living." See *ante*, p. 145.

invention population continues to increase until there is a real pressure upon subsistence, in this larger sense of the word Two results follow. One is that preponderating influence of youth to which Comte rightly attached importance as a true cause of progress.[1] The other is an intense competition that sharpens the wits of the successful and eliminates the unsuccessful. Invention has its day again. and industrial progress begins anew.

The statement of the Malthusian law therefore must include both a clause recognizing man's desire to improve his material condition, and a limiting clause, like that which is always included in the formula of the diminishing returns from land. So long as agricultural methods and machinery are improving, land may yield increasing returns; but *in any given state of industry and the arts* increasing applications of labour and capital beyond a certain limit fail to bring forth proportional rewards. In like manner the corrected Malthusian formula is: In any given state of industry and the arts population tends to increase faster than it is possible to raise the general plane of living. Or, to put it in the technical phraseology of the latest economics: As long as industry is kinetic (as it can be only under the régime of private initiative and free competition), a population may indefinitely increase while indefinitely bettering its material condition, and the prophets of a socialistic millennium may sneer at Malthus; but when industry is static, as socialism would make it forever, the full rigour of the Malthusian law must be felt, and socialism must prove to be only the negative complement of the perpetual-motion delusion.

A sufficient proof of Malthusianism as thus stated is found in recent phenomena which have been strangely interpreted by anti-Malthusian writers. Where civilization is most highly developed, as, for example, in France and in New England, the birth-rate has decreased. The

[1] "Cours de philosophie positive," Vol. IV., pp. 636, 637.

studies of Professor Levasseur,[1] M. Dumont,[2] Miss Brownell,[3] and others have established the truth of Mr. Spencer's generalization that the birth-rate diminishes as the rate of individual evolution increases.[4] The lowering of the birth-rate is caused in part by physiological changes, as is shown by the coincidence of low birth-rates with high rates of death from nervous diseases.[5] Primarily, however, the cause is psychological; there is a deliberate prevention of births. The "preventive check" to the growth of population has come into general use. That writers of ability should discover in this fact a disproof of the Malthusian theory[6] is certainly remarkable. They might as rationally claim that it is disproved by famine. When an entire population voluntarily diminishes its birth-rate, it gives indubitable proof that it severely feels the pressure of its natural tendency to increase faster than it is possible to raise the general plane of living.[7]

The growth of wealth and of numbers and the greater tension of life increase the heterogeneity of civil populations, and establish complex relations between the different race elements and the different strata of population on the one hand, and the division of labour in the social constitution on the other hand. The demotic composition becomes more varied, the differences of vitality and of

[1] "La population française."

[2] "Dépopulation et civilisation."

[3] "The Significance of a Decreasing Birth-rate," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. V., No. 1, July, 1894.

[4] "The Theory of Population deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," *Westminster Review*, Vol. I., No. 2, 1852; and "The Principles of Biology," Vol. II., Part VI.

[5] Brownell, *op. cit.*

[6] For example Nitti, "La popolazione e il sistema sociale."

[7] Among recent contributions to the Malthusian discussion, see especially Patten, "The Law of Population restated," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X., No. 1, March, 1895, and in the same number of the same journal Professor Hadley's review of Nitti.

ability become greater, and there appears a tendency to identify each race element, each degree of vitality, and each grade of ability with a definite place in the social organization.

Different nations, possessing unequal natural advantages, and enjoying unequal degrees of constitutional liberty, are unequally prosperous, and their citizens, free now to seek their economic and political well-being in any part of the world, migrate more readily than in any former age. In fact, so sensitive have they become to every change in industrial conditions that the increase and decrease of migration is as regular as the rise and fall of prices. Moreover, the thousands of migrating men seek not only those parts of the world where their labour is likely to be best rewarded, but they seek also those places in the industrial organization in which the greatest returns are offered for the work which they know how to perform. Here, however, the economic causation is greatly complicated with the influence of the consciousness of kind.

If, in the United States for example, each incoming nationality were distributed by purely economic motives throughout all occupations and organizations, its influence as a disturbing factor in social development would be slight. It is because each nationality shows a strong tendency to mass itself, geographically, politically, and industrially, that we have a serious immigration problem.

For many years the democratic proclivities of the Irish in the Atlantic coast states, and the republican prejudices of the Ohio valley Germans, have been relied upon with reasonable certainty by the politicians. In religion the segregation is even more pronounced. It is shown not only by the familiar association of certain nationalities with Romanism and of others with Protestantism, but also by the less familiar lines of separation within the same faith; such as may now be seen in certain New England

and northwestern towns, where the Irish, French Canadian, and Polish Roman Catholic church organizations are distinct, and are frequently jealous of each other.

In choosing their occupations, the American people as a whole, both native- and foreign-born, prefer agriculture.[1] Their second choice is professional and personal services; their third is manufacturing, mechanical, and mining industries; and their fourth is trade and transportation. The native-born choose their pursuits in the same order but with a yet stronger preference for agriculture. Upon comparing the choices of the foreign-born by nationalities, it is found that only the Scandinavians have the same preferences as the native-born. The Germans and the immigrants from Great Britain, including the Welsh and the Scotch, agree in their choices, which are: first, manufacturing, mechanical, and mining occupations; second, agriculture; third, professional and personal services; and fourth, trade and transportation. The Irish go first into personal services; secondly, into manufacturing and mining pursuits; thirdly, into agriculture; and fourthly, into trade and transportation. But if allowance for domestic servants is made, the order stands: first, manufacturing and mining pursuits; second, personal services; third, agriculture; and fourth, trade and transportation. This is the order of preference shown by the French Canadians also, and by the statistical group called "all other countries."

Some of the smaller segregations are yet more interesting. For example, the Germans have practically displaced other nationalities in the crafts of the baker, the butcher, the cabinet maker, the cigar maker, the cooper, the leather currier, the marble and stone cutter, the mason and the tailor.[2] The special statistics of the Jewish population

[1] See Mayo-Smith, "The Influence of Immigration on the United States of America," p. 68.

[2] Ibid., pp. 71, 72.

obtained by the Eleventh Census disclose in that race an overwhelming preference for the pursuits that are the fourth choice of all other nationalities. Of the total 18,115 males of Hebrew race reported as having some definite occupation, 14,525 were engaged in commercial occupations, of some kind; only 383 were employed in agriculture, and only 84 were labourers.

The advancing specialization of industrial and social functions multiplies the inequalities of vitality throughout all distributions of the population. The foreign-born, who by their change of residence have in general bettered their condition, have a relatively high birth-rate; but on account of an imperfect adaptation to new conditions of life, the death-rate of their children is high. Older elements in the population have a death-rate that by contrast is low, and a birth-rate that also is low. In the geographical distribution of population those groups that are participating in the highest civilization and that are ambitious to raise their plane of living, but whose resources are not expanding and whose industrial methods are not rapidly improving, have a low birth-rate and a low death-rate. Such groups compose, for example, the populations of the valleys of the Loire and the Garonne in France,[1] and the populations of New England and the middle states in the United States. Such groups as the populations of Ille-et-Vilaine and Basses-Pyrénées in France, which still lead a relatively simple life, and such groups as the populations of the northwestern commonwealths of the United States, which are yet exploiting new resources by improving methods, have the high vitality which is expressed by the coincidence of a high birth-rate with a low death-rate.[2] In the distribution of population by occupations, the contrasts are yet more marked. The textile and clothing industries, many chemical industries, cutlery grinding, and

[1] Levasseur, "La population française," Vol. II., pp. 27, 160.

[2] Ibid.

typesetting rapidly consume vitality. Many railroad employees are victims of nervous diseases. Agriculture, lumbering, mining, and fishing, on the contrary, are in a high degree favourable to vitality; the people engaged in these pursuits have relatively high birth-rates, and relatively low death-rates from other than accidental causes.

Differences of ability even more than differences of vitality are increased by demogenic evolution. From the three personality classes are developed three psychical ranks. The first rank is identical with the first personality class; it consists of those individuals that have more than average intellectual ability. The second psychical rank coincides with the ablest half of the second personality class. It includes all normally endowed individuals that have ability enough to conduct business undertakings on a modest scale and therefore to maintain their economic independence. The third rank includes the less competent half of the second and the entire third personality class. These differences of ability correspond closely to differences of social function, and roughly to differences of economic condition. The first psychical rank does the directive work of society, in politics, business, the professions, science, and art. The middle rank is mentally and morally independent, and is critical rather than originative and directive. It accepts the advice and leadership of the first rank, but in its own way, applying or modifying with self-confident judgment. The third rank does the closely directed work, and without some supervision would be almost helpless. Economically the correspondence is not so close. The first psychical rank includes most of the very wealthy, but also some of the poor and many of those who are in merely comfortable circumstances. The people of the second rank enjoy the rewards of thrift. In the aggregate, they own a great part of the property of the commonwealth. The third rank is poor.

The demographic relations thus far described are yet further combined. The vitality ranks and the psychical ranks are not independent of one another. The second psychical rank coincides with the first vitality, and the first psychical with the second vitality rank. The first psychical rank, however, is descended from the first vitality rank, and the third vitality rank is in part descended from the first psychical rank. Finally, the first vitality and second psychical rank is composed largely of the rural, while the remaining ranks consist largely of the city population.

We owe the theory of the population system mainly to the labours of Dr. George Hansen.[1] The first vitality rank Dr. Hansen identifies with a rural land-owning population, including both gentlemen and peasant proprietors. Leading a healthy life, and so far assured of a comfortable subsistence as to be relatively free from anxiety about the future, the land-owning population has a superabundant vitality and multiplies in something like the geometrical progression of the earlier Malthusian formula. The increase swells the population of the towns; there is an endless procession of ambitious youth from rural homes to city desks. The energetic force their way into business and the professions, and so also do many determined individuals from the working classes who succeed in the fierce struggle to rise in life. Competition becomes intense; only the strongest maintain their footing and withstand the wear and tear. The unsuccessful sink into the third vitality rank, which, like the second, is directly fed also from the country, since men and women who have not the ability or the desire to become independent land-owners, although they may not expect to get into business, even as small tradesmen, flock to the cities, nevertheless, as artisans, common labourers, and servants.

Thus, according to Dr. Hansen, land-owning and country

[1] See "Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen."

occupations on the one hand, and the intense competition of business and professional life in the towns on the other hand, are the causes of a ceaseless movement of population, the stages of which constitute a well-marked demotic system. The land-owning population is the great seed-bed of society. The business and professional classes are the selected and transplanted plants, whose flowering in wealth, learning, culture, and manners is the choicest product of civilization, which, however, is bought at the cost of a relative sterility. The working classes are composed of the stunted and the defeated. The level of the vitality and of the psychical rank to which they belong is kept down by the loss of their best individual members, who struggle up to independent positions, and by accessions of the unsuccessful from the second vitality rank.

This description of the demographic system is approximately correct, but only approximately. Statistics confirm it in part; but Dr. Hansen has confused many things that ought to be discriminated. In Europe and in America the towns are growing rapidly at the expense of the country, but this does not prove that the city population is only a later stage in the vital development of the country population. It therefore does not prove that the second and third vitality ranks, which are identical with the city population, are only later stages in the development of a first vitality rank, which is identical with the rural population. To prove such propositions, it would be necessary to show that city death-rates actually exceed city birth-rates, so that without rural immigration the urban population would steadily diminish. If statistics showed this relation, there would be no escape from the conclusion that vitality ranks, in so far as they correspond to the separation of urban from rural dwellers, are not more independent genealogically than they are politically or industrially. What is in fact shown is that the natural increase of the city population is slower than the natural increase of the entire popu-

lation. To some extent, therefore, the urban population is a later stage in the vital movement of the country population; to some extent it is a later stage in the vital movement of the town population itself. Moreover, the two elements are of course not separated. They are continually uniting in marriage, so that, to a very considerable degree, the whole town population is directly or indirectly of rural descent. Therefore while we cannot say that the second and third vitality ranks are only later stages in the development of the first rank, if we assume an identity of the first vitality rank with the rural population, and of the second and third ranks with the town population, we can say that the three ranks are vitally connected. The second and third ranks are largely dependent on the first rank, which is independent of them. The third rank is largely dependent on the second, which is much less dependent on the third, though not wholly independent of it.

The assumption, however, of complete identity between the first vitality rank and a land-owning and land-working population, will not bear close examination; much less will the further assumption of identity between the town population and the second and third vitality ranks. Dr. Hansen would not pretend that the identity is perfect; but he makes too little allowance for the overlappings and cross-classifications. The land-owner must not be too sharply separated from the capitalist. In the first vitality rank are business and professional families that own no land, and working families that own neither land nor capital. Many land-owning country families, again, are in the second and third vitality ranks. Besides it is not true that the directors of affairs and the intellectual classes generally are found only in towns, or that the towns only have the manual workers. The actual relations, then, are complicated, yet the groupings and the progressive movements from group to group are, on the whole, such as to constitute a system.

The gradations and the distributions of population that result in the evolution of a demotic system, result also in a democratic development of the social mind. The population rank that earns wages by manual labour confronts the rank that directs activity and accumulates wealth. The wage-earners are well acquainted with one important fact of history. They know that the commercial class once demanded and obtained a share in the political power that had been monopolized by the well-born. They have seen how governments have been used to shape economic conditions and to control the distribution of wealth, and they reason that the labourer must share in the law-making power before he can hope to share largely in the results of economic progress. They observe that the suffrage has been associated with property-owning and with the payment of direct taxes, and accordingly they demand an unrestricted manhood suffrage. The demand is effective because it is backed by the promise of votes to the party that will grant the franchise, just as the demand of the merchants in the thirteenth century was effective because it was backed by the offer of revenues to the king. Now one party and now another enlarges the electorate by extending the franchise to a particular section of the working class, as the English Tories, for example, have extended it to the town-artisans, and the English Liberals to the agricultural labourers, and as both of the great parties in the United States have extended it, the one to immigrant labourers and the other to emancipated slaves.

Democracy thus established in the electorate soon democratizes the conception of the functions of the state. The demand is next made that the government shall be developed into a gigantic agency for the improvement of the working masses. The state is called upon to assume vast educational and sanitary responsibilities. At the same time an increasingly insistent demand is heard for systems of taxation that will throw the cost of public

undertakings upon the well-to-do. When Lassalle in 1862 included the abolition of indirect taxation in his workingman's programme, there were few indications of popular interest in that subject, and subsequently the support of the protective policy by many workingmen in Europe and in the United States raised a doubt as to whether Lassalle had not misread the democratic mind. Recently, however, the single tax movement, many experiments in progressive taxation, and the growing scepticism of wage-earners about the benefits of protection, have demonstrated Lassalle's insight.

These ideas and purposes are not confined to the wage-earning classes. Both the ideas and the purposes appeal, as the mention of Lassalle's name reminds us, to many of the wealthy and the learned, who believe that essential justice can be realized only in a social democracy. Adopted and defended by men of culture, democratic ideas gradually transform public opinion and shape the popular ideals.

The differentiation of the urban from the rural population is sharpened at some points by democracy. In the long run, however, democracy tends to establish an intellectual solidarity of the country and the town, and thereby contributes to an important development of the social constitution; a development in which the economic division of labour between the country and the town, which has existed for centuries, is supplemented by a division of social functions. The country produces population, energy, and original ideas, — the raw materials of social life, — as it produces food and the raw materials of manufactures. The city combines ideas and thus forms the social mind. In exchange for the streams of fresh life that pour in upon it from farm and village, it sends forth to every rural community, and even to the isolated homestead, stimulating currents of thought and of moral enthusiasm. It quickens

social instincts and awakens interests in men and women whose lives were else monotonous and hard. It raises their standards and puts before them formulated policies for their consideration. Genius is rarely born in the town. The world's great faiths have germinated in the desert, or among mountain heights. Its great policies have been suggested by unsophisticated men. It owes its great discoveries and its immortal creations to those who have lived with nature and with simple folk; but the creation and the discovery, the policy and the faith, have lifted and transformed the race only when they have subsequently been fashioned by the mind, and have been charged with power from the heart of the multitude.

Material and intellectual progress is not an unmixed good. Progress costs not only effort but also suffering. Every discovery and every invention destroys some business and throws wage-earners out of employment. Every development in social organization breaks up long-established relations. Moreover, these costs of progress are for the most part borne vicariously. The beneficiaries of new methods or of new arrangements themselves rarely suffer the distress that is caused by the destruction of the old order. Some of those that are displaced by social or industrial changes quickly find their way into new positions. Others have no power of adaptation. They sink to a lower plane of living and never recover from their misfortunes.

The cost of progress takes also the form of a moral and physiological degeneration, which is caused by excessive activity and the over-stimulation of ambition. The greater the rate of progress, the heavier does this cost become) the faster the march, the larger is the number of the exhausted who fall by the way. Progress, like every other form of motion in the universe, starts reactions against itself.

Degeneration manifests itself in the protean forms of suicide, insanity, crime. and vice. which most abound in the highest civilizations, where the tension of life is extreme, and in those places from which civilization has ebbed and from which population has been drained, leaving a discouraged remnant to struggle against deteriorating conditions.

In Europe the two marked centres where the rate of suicide is always high are Paris and the kingdom of Saxony. As the distance from these centres increases, the rate of suicide grows less.[1] In all the countries of Europe, except Norway, suicide has been increasing since the beginning of this intensely active century. In France the number of suicides in a million inhabitants more than trebled between 1827 and 1875; in Prussia it more than doubled.[2] In England it rose from 62 in 1830 to 85 in 1891.[3] In Massachusetts the proportion was 69 to a million of population in 1851–55 and 90.9 in 1881–85.[4]

The statistics of insanity are imperfect, but there is no doubt that insanity has greatly increased within a generation and is still increasing, and that it is most prevalent where life is intense or hard. In the North Atlantic division of the United States there were enumerated in 1890, 2385 insane persons in each one million inhabitants; in the Western division, 1878; in the North Central division, 1647; and in the South Central division, only 959. Allowance must be made for the larger number of unenumerated deranged persons in some sections than in others, but this does not account for the whole difference.[5] The

[1] Mayo-Smith, "Statistics and Sociology," p. 243, and Morselli, "Suicide," pp. 44, 132, 181.

[2] Morselli, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 21.

[3] Ibid., p. 26, and Mayo-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

[4] Davis R. Dewey, "Statistics of Suicide in New England," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, New Series, Nos. 18, 19, June–September, 1892.

[5] Compendium of the Eleventh Census, Part II., p. 133.

high rate of insanity in the lonely farming districts of the United States, when rightly interpreted, confirms the foregoing generalization. The isolated farmer and his family have begun to be affected by the strain of modern life in a deplorable way. They are no longer ignorant of the luxuries of the towns and a simple manner of life no longer satisfies them. The house must be remodelled and refurnished; the table must be varied; clothing must be "in style," and the horses, carriages, and harnesses must be more costly. The impossibility of maintaining this scale of expense under existing agricultural conditions embitters life, and finally, in many cases, destroys the mental balance.

That crime, vagabondage, drunkenness, and other forms of vice increase with the multiplication of those failures in the life-struggle that are attributable to industrial changes, redistributions of population, and a feverish activity, is a conclusion that is amply supported by statistical investigation. Like insanity, crime occurs most frequently in densely populated towns on the one hand, and on the other hand in partially deserted rural districts. Murder is a phenomenon of both the frontier life of an advancing population and of the declining civilization in its rear; it is preëminently the crime of the new town and of the decaying town.[1] Theft, forgery, embezzlement, and offences against public order are crimes of the great cities. Crimes of all kinds are least frequent in prosperous agricultural communities and in thriving towns of moderate size, where the relation of income to the standard of living is such that the life-struggle is not severe.[2]

Degeneracy in the population is inevitably followed by

[1] See Cook, "Murders in Massachusetts," *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, New Series, No. 23, September, 1893.

[2] For a fuller discussion of the costs of progress, the reader is referred to "The Ethics of Social Progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. III., No. 2, January, 1893.

degeneration in both the social composition and the social constitution.

The unstable organization of the romantic family offers little resistance to the disintegrating influence of morbid emotion and insane ambition. When the duty of maintaining a family tradition is no longer acknowledged, when religion has ceased to be an element in domestic life, when children have become unwelcome, and marriage is viewed as a convenience or a pleasure, legal obstacles to its dissolution will not long be tolerated by a community of irritable, sentimental, and egoistic men and women who have found life disappointing. A clamour for more liberal divorce laws is sure to be made. Divorces have been rapidly multiplying throughout Europe and the United States during the past thirty years.[1]

Degeneration in the social constitution manifests itself chiefly in the disintegration of the city.[2] In the city are all the startling contrasts of civilization. The enormous disparity of wealth in which a highly organized industry has resulted is here revealed to every eye. Knowledge and culture that are the perfect fruit of all human progress until now live face to face with brutish ignorance. Into this dangerous combination of conditions enters the demoralizing factor of personal degeneration. Many of the rich, though happily not a majority, surrender themselves to the mad struggle to get money that they know not how to use, to achieve notoriety even though it may be scandalous, to accomplish anything if only it surpasses everything that has hitherto been imagined. Consumed with a sense of their own importance, the degenerates of this class become more and more exclusive. Living at the centre of the throbbing life of humanity, they affect to

[1] See Wright, "A Report on Marriage and Divorce in the United States, 1867 to 1886, including an Appendix relating to Marriage and Divorce in Certain Countries in Europe."

[2] Cf. Izoulet, "La cité moderne."

ignore its passions, its sorrows, and its joys. They seek to cut themselves off from all part in a work-a-day world. They deny their civic obligations and stand aloof from politics, as from something fit only for the dirty.

On the other hand, many of the poor, though happily not a majority, give ear to anarchism, or seek comfort in the socialistic dream of a world where labour time-checks would buy everything save that, the love of which is said to be the root of evil. They withdraw themselves as far as possible from contact with the rich, and cherish the hope of organizing the proletariat into an irresistible force, and of taking possession of all the organs of government.

Thus is civilization menaced by dangers perhaps as grave as those that overshadowed it at the beginning. It was threatened then by the barbarism beyond its walls. To-day it is threatened by the savagery within its gates.

The limitations and the reactions of progress arrest public attention, sympathy for the unfortunate is quickened by the spectacle of misery in the midst of splendour, and the conscience of society begins to demand that systematic efforts shall be made to mitigate suffering and thus to minimize the dangers that threaten the social order. Private philanthropy vies with legislation in attempts to diminish poverty and crime, and ultimately in attempts to improve the general life-conditions of the masses. Much of this endeavour is sentimental, and not a little of it is mischievous. Gradually, however, the intelligence of the community is enlisted, and philanthropic passion is in a measure brought under the direction of reason, and so is made more efficient for good. The social mind begins to undergo a profound moral experience; it begins to develop an ethical character. But for this awakening of the moral reason dissolution would undo the work of social evolution. Only the rational ethical consciousness can maintain social cohesion in a progressive democracy.

To achieve its purpose of diminishing the costs of progress, the ethical consciousness of society must accomplish many moral reforms in social activities, and these must be facilitated by some constructive changes in social organization.

There is no radical cure for degeneration but in a pure and sane family life, which disciplines the welcome and untainted child in the robust virtue of self-control, and in an unswerving allegiance to duty. Here and there a family of the ethical type may at present be discovered. The ethical family differs as much from the romantic family, as the romantic family differs from the religious-proprietary family. To perpetuate a patrimony and a faith, the religious-proprietary family sacrificed the inclinations of individuals. To gratify the amatory preferences of individuals, the romantic family has sacrificed patrimony and tradition; of late, it has even gone to the extremity of sacrificing children. The ethical family sacrifices individual feelings only when they conflict with right reason or moral obligation, but then it sacrifices them without hesitation. It regards a genuine love as the most sacred thing in the world except duty, but duty it places first, and in the list of imperative duties it includes the bearing and right training of children by the vigorous and intelligent portion of the population.

The true ethical family is established, therefore, only by the marriage of a man and woman who, in all sincerity, believe that their union is justified by a concurrence of four things, namely; an unmistakable affection, compounded about equally of passion, admiration, and respect; physical fitness for parenthood; ability to maintain a respectable and pleasant home; and a high sense of the privilege and the duty of transmitting their qualities and their culture to their children.

The ethical family, in short, subordinates all lesser considerations to the development and the perpetuation of

that rational personality which is the supreme end for which society in its entirety exists. The ethical family does all that the other types of the family at their best have done, and much more besides. It transmits a patrimony and a name; it offers satisfaction to affection; and, in addition, it consciously selects, cultivates, and transmits the fairer fruits of a rational civilization.

The ethical spirit, working upon the social constitution, seeks to improve the forms of voluntary coöperation and the organs of government. The possibilities, both of free contract and of authority, are more carefully studied. Society becomes more reflectively self-conscious, more rationally volitional.

The worst mistake that political philosophers have made has been their unqualified approval or condemnation of the rule of *laisser faire*. No sounder rule of practical conduct can be followed as long as we are contemplating the possibility of restraining the spontaneous activity of mature and normal men; no worse rule could be devised for governing our conduct towards the immature and the degenerate. So long as an imperfect family life throws upon the community thousands of defective and untrained human beings, who are poorly equipped for the life-struggle, it is necessary that they shall be not only tenderly assisted when they suffer, and restrained when they do mischief, but that they shall also be disciplined. Neither through schools nor through reformatories can society in its collective capacity impart the training which a home of the best type can give, but the limits of possibility have not yet been reached by the educational agencies of either the state or voluntary philanthropic bodies. The disciplinary organs of the social constitution are as yet very imperfect, and an ethical public opinion will necessarily be concentrated upon the problem of improving them. Already attention is being given as never before to the care of neglected and

dependent children, and to the disciplinary functions of charitable and penal institutions.

All this means that society will ultimately grow into the ethical type, and that the ethical type will demonstrate its superior strength and its fitness to survive.

Mr. Spencer's classification of societies as military or industrial recognizes the effects of habitual pursuits down to the time when the work of nation-making has been accomplished and the industrial type of society has been permanently established. But industrial society itself may present such widely different characteristics that we may legitimately distinguish two great sub-types, and may make an important generalization in regard to them. Mr. Spencer himself has more than hinted at it, in his various allusions to the approaching time when men will recognize that work is for life and life not for work.[1] The habitual activities of the industrial society may be predominantly of the wealth-getting kind or they may be in a large measure of intellectual and moral kinds. The character of the society will vary as the dominant interests and occupations vary.

From such indications as a few societies have already afforded, and from such further indications as are now thrusting themselves upon observation in parts of Europe and America, it may be inferred that in a community whose life is a tireless pursuit of materialistic ends — in which money-getting is the sum of success — there will be a sharp separation of the successful from the unsuccessful classes, and an exploitation of the poor by the rich as wanton and as merciless as was any exploitation of the weak by the strong in societies of the military character. In such a society the tools of the wealthy will command office and power. Even the laws will favour the prosperous

[1] See especially the address on "The Americans," at the New York banquet.

and will weigh heavily on those whose struggle is against hope. The mercenary spirit will corrupt judgment and religion alike. The magistrates of the nation will judge for a consideration, the priests thereof will teach for hire, the prophets thereof will divine for money, the princes thereof will be companions of thieves; every one loving gifts and following after rewards.

This is an extreme picture. We may hope that in no society will the quest of gold so completely subvert the mental and the moral life, the enjoyment of beauty, and the love of truth as to separate absolutely the wealthy from the poor, or to throw government and the moulding of institutions wholly into the hands of those who control the material means of existence. Yet that a plutocratic spirit is a real cause of social disintegration, is beyond reasonable doubt. It played its unworthy part in the fall of the Roman Empire and in the ruin of the mediæval republics. It seriously menaces the future of our own free institutions.

The results of activities predominantly moral and intellectual have been occasionally seen. In the simple democracies of colonial America, and of the early western migration beyond the Alleghanies, there was a virile moral life that kept all other interests in a reasonable subordination. The men of those days could defend themselves on occasion, but they were wholly devoid of ambition to found a strong military power. They could toil and could endure hardship in the production of material wealth, but they knew how to use their wealth, when it had been honestly gained, in the promotion of other ends. Not the factory and the mart, but the church, the common school, and the freemen's meeting, were the real centres of social activity. The topics of discussion were not the prices of stocks and the interest of bonds, but the rights of man and the problems of destiny.

In such communities there may be — in the earlier

American life there always were — differences of social position; but there can be no permanent separation of class from class. There can be no systematic exploitation of the weak by the strong, or of the poor by the well-to-do. Every man will be in some degree his brother's keeper. Laws will be framed for the conservation of moral order and civil liberty, not for the creation of monopoly in the names of franchise and protection. The ideas of equal rights and of common interests will be fundamental in the scheme of public policy. The ideal of happiness will seek its realization in the health and comfort and honest pleasure of the many, in the enlarging life and growing manhood of the people, in sympathy, and in sensitiveness to truth and beauty — not in idleness or in ostentation. It was the rare fortune of the American people that in its formative days the quick moral life of such communities left a deep impress on the larger life of the nation. The impress has not been effaced, but the clear lines of its beauty have been broken and confused.

The data have now been presented for determining and for interpreting the fact of progress.

The conception of progress has undergone many changes. The fact of progress is often denied. The interpretations offered by those who admit the fact are various.

As elements of the popular notion of progress, we have the thought of an increasing economic prosperity, — material abundance, physical well-being; the thought also of an evolution of social structure and functions; and, most important of all, the idea of a developing human personality. Thus Mr. John S. Mackenzie says[1] that the well-being of mankind "consists of three main elements," namely, "(1) the subjugation of nature, (2) the perfection of social machinery, and (3) personal development," and that "true progress must include them all." This conception is justified by scientific analysis.

[1] An "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 297.

The fact of progress can be questioned only by those who would deny that an increase of physical power and of material resources is rightfully called progress. Bagehot[1] has stated the problem in scientific terms by inquiring what might be meant by the phrase "verifiable progress," and within what limits progress is verifiable. He points out that all men find a proof of progress in the ability of one nation to sustain itself against all assaults, and to conquer others. This is a progress in physical power that admits of no dispute.

In like manner, it must be admitted that in modern times the great western nations have subdued nature by understanding her processes and by turning her energies to human advantage. This fact is not only verifiable, but the verification is made quantitative by means of statistical comparisons of increasing supplies of means of communication, and of the growth of capital. The amount of wheat, rye, meat, cotton, and wool, *per capita*, increases from decade to decade, and it cannot be denied that to lessen the awful sufferings from starvation and cold, from which, until recent years, the world was never even comparatively free, is an advance in human well-being.

The truth that has been less clearly seen is that these admissions about material improvement by implication concede the whole question of progress under all its aspects. Brute force does not create material well-being or enable nations to subdue man and nature. Material advancement and power to subjugate enemies implies psychical development, both intellectual and moral. They imply the growth of scientific knowledge and thought, a process which, it is no longer necessary to contend, calls into activity every power of the mind, from accurate perception to creative imagination. They imply increasing discipline in coöperation, increasing forethought for the future, and present self-denial. They imply increasing faith in mankind, and

[1] "Physics and Politics."

exactness in keeping agreements. The vast fabric of modern industry and commerce rests on credit, and credit is based on the trustworthiness of man. In whatever light we look at it, the assumption that we can have material betterment without the mental and moral elements of progress is absurd. The total psychical life of a conquering nation is greater than that of the conquered. The total psychical life of a great industrial people which feeds the nations that live on the verge of starvation is immeasurably greater than is that of the peoples that are fed.[1]

The two great factors into which the psychical progress of mankind may be resolved have been variously estimated by different sociologists. Comte interpreted progress in terms of the growth of reason. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Fiske, following the teaching of Adam Smith, regard the growth of sympathy as the essential thing.

Subjectively, progress is an expansion of both the moral and the mental life.[2] Objectively, the result of expanding reason and enlarging sympathy is a multiplication of social relationships. In one of its social aspects progress is the growth of the relative importance of free association as compared with that of relationships that are created and maintained by force. This, as M. Fouillée has contended,[3] is the significance of the doctrine of the social contract. Society does not begin in contract, but an association held together by bonds of agreement is the social ideal. Thus Rousseau takes pains to say that he writes of men as they are, and of laws as they ought to be.[4] When he talks of a life according to nature, he means by "nature" what Aristotle meant, — the nature or the characteristics of the developed man. His "Social Contract" describes an ideal;

[1] Cf. De Greef, "Introduction à la sociologie," deuxième partie.

[2] Cf. Guyau, "L'art au point de vue sociologique," and "Éducation et hérédité."

[3] "La science sociale contemporaine." Cf. also De Greef, "Introduction à la sociologie."

[4] "Contrat social," liv. I., par. 1.

it does not record a history. Moreover, — and this is the essential point, — when he says that society originates in contract, he at the same time denies the name society to a group of men who have not yet brought their relations to a contract basis. To quote his exact words, "c'est si l'on veut, une agrégation, mais non pas une association." [1] In other words, his doctrine is that society, *properly so called*, originates in contract.

But none of these phases of progress is an interpretation of progress, though each of them in its turn has been offered as an interpretation by some writer. The ultimate nature of progress must be sought in the most general phenomena that can be described as progressive.

Objectively viewed, progress is an increasing intercourse, a multiplication of relationships, an advance in material well-being, a growth of population, and an evolution of rational conduct. It is a final display in the grand metamorphosis of universal evolution. It is a series of transformations of energy, and its ultimate nature therefore is found in a peculiarity of the transformations. As a physical process, progress is the increasing conversion of modes of energy that are not accompanied by psychical manifestations, into modes of energy that are accompanied by psychical phenomena of increasing complexity.

Subjectively, progress is the expansion of the consciousness of kind. The growth of sympathy and the evolution of reason are secondary phenomena; they are effects of the development of the consciousness of kind. In human society, that special consciousness of kind which marks off the subdivisions of races was at first limited to the family and the horde. Presently it expanded sufficiently to include the adopted members of a semi-artificial clan. Then it became comprehensive enough to include many related clans in the conception of a tribe, and at last broad enough to include many related tribes in the conception of a folk.

[1] Chap. V.

This conception introduced the final development of ethnogenic evolution, and the evolution of the consciousness of kind assumed a new phase. The contact of heterogeneous elements in the population and their struggle with one another for social supremacy suggested the thought of an ideal and future unity of kind, to be realized through the gradual assimilation of heterogeneous elements by means of a common speech, a common civic interest, and a common aspiration. Demogenic evolution began.

The successive world-empires of Persia, Macedonia, and Rome prepared the way for the Christian conception of universal brotherhood. So long as this conception was nothing more than an esoteric affirmation that all men are brothers, because they are children of one Father, it made but little impression upon the social mind; but when by the genius of St. Paul it was converted into an ideal, into the doctrine that all men through a spiritual renewing may become brothers, the new faith underwent a transformation like that which converted the ethnic into the civic conception of the state, and Christianity became the most tremendous power in history. Gradually it has been realizing its ideal, until, to-day, a Christian philanthropy and a Christian missionary enterprise, rapidly outgrowing the esoteric sentimentalism of their youth, and devoting themselves to the diffusion of knowledge, to the improvement of conditions, and to the upbuilding of character, are uniting the classes and the races of men in a spiritual humanity.

Book IV

SOCIAL PROCESS, LAW AND CAUSE

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL PROCESS: PHYSICAL

In descriptive and historical sociology the processes of social evolution have been incidentally studied, but always in their relation to social products, which have been the chief objects of investigation. It is necessary now to fix attention on the social process itself, with the purpose of discovering laws of social causation.

Specifically this study is an examination of the interaction of physical forces and psychical motives. It has been shown that the social population is distributed in accordance with physical conditions.[1] Primarily the social units are held together by the food-supply. Born, driven, or attracted into local contiguity, in the absence of some dispersive force they remain together because of mere inertia. The original causes of aggregation and of dispersion, then, are physical forces. But the secondary causes of social phenomena are conscious motives and are products of social life itself.

It is necessary therefore to study first the physical process in social phenomena. It must be studied abstractly; attention must be given to the process rather than to its products. Then the psychical process must be studied in the same way. Finally, the complicated interaction of the two processes must be observed.

Social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution. All social energy is transmuted physical energy. The conversion of physical into social energy is inevitable, and it

[1] *Ante*, p. 82.

necessarily occasions those orderly changes in groupings and relationships that constitute development. Or, if the statement may be made in slightly different terms, the original causes of social evolution are the processes of physical equilibration, which are seen in the integration of matter with the dissipation of motion, or in the integration of motion with the disintegration of matter.

Mr. Spencer has demonstrated that the postulate of all physical philosophy is the affirmation of the persistence of force. We can neither prove nor disprove that matter is indestructible, that motion is continuous, that something cannot become nothing, or nothing something; but in all our thinking we assume these truths; they are necessities of thought. We cannot prove that the cosmic uniformities called laws of nature are absolute, or, to use Mr. Spencer's term, that the relations among forces are persistent; but we can prove that, if we assert the violability of natural law, we do in fact affirm that something has come of nothing, or that nothing has become something. If, for example, we affirm any deviation from the law of gravitation, we assert either that a force which was acting has disappeared in nothingness, or that a counteracting force, which did not before exist, has come into being. Or, if we say that a force that acts in one way to-day may act in another way to-morrow, or that elements that have combined in a given product once may at some time combine in a different product, — all other forces and elements remaining the same, — we are again denying all difference between something and nothing.

If, then, matter and energy are indestructible, as we are compelled by the conditions of our thinking to believe, it follows that until all the forces of the universe are in perfect equilibrium there must be ceaseless redistributions of matter and motion in space. Portions of matter must change from place to place, and from combination to combination; energy must pass from mode to mode.

Furthermore, it follows that the redistribution of matter and motion necessarily takes the form of an integration of matter, consequent upon an escape of its contained motion, as, for example, in the contraction of molten metal with the radiation of its heat; or it takes the form of an accumulation of motion and a dispersion of matter, as, for example, in the conversion of water into steam. Whenever there is an aggregate of matter in which the contained motion is greater than that in the surrounding space, the process is necessarily an escape of motion and an integration of matter. It is so far a process of evolution.

These generalizations — of the persistence of force, the universal process of equilibration, and the physical necessity of evolution — have not been successfully assailed. They commend themselves to clear thinking the moment their terms are understood.

These generalizations are as true of the social population as they are of inorganic matter.

The energy of a population is never more than momentarily equal to the active and latent energies of the world about it. Consequently there is a continual interchange of matter and energy between a population and its environment. Inorganic forces are converted into organic and social energies, social energies are reconverted into physical forces.

All the energy expended in the growth and activity of a population is derived from the physical world. It is physical energy. Here let me explain what I mean by social energy. Throughout this work society has been regarded as essentially a phenomenon of thought and feeling. Now thought and feeling, merely as states of consciousness, are not energy. Apart from energy, however, they can do nothing. They can manifest themselves in external action only through the physical energy of nerve and muscle. Therefore all that is *done* in society,

or by society, whether consciously or otherwise, is accomplished by physical energy. Neither in society nor elsewhere is there any other kind of energy. Accordingly if we speak of psychical energy, we use for convenience a term that can denote nothing more than a special form of physical energy; namely, the nervous energy that is directly associated with consciousness. Briefly then, although social phenomena are for the most part conscious phenomena, there is no social activity that is not physical activity.

Social phenomena then depend on the transformation and the equivalence of physical energies. The quantity and the intensity of social activity are proportional to the energy taken from the environment by the social body and transmuted into organic phenomena.[1]

This law may be resolved into specific generalizations which may be briefly enumerated.

Density of population depends on the quantity of food produced. The beginnings of social evolution, as was shown in the chapter on The Social Population, are always to be found in a bountiful environment. Moreover, density of population follows abundance of food, whether the supplies are obtained from the soil directly, or indirectly, in exchange for manufactures; and other things being equal, the activity and the progress of society depend, within limits, on the density of the population.

A sparse population, scattered over a poor soil, can carry on production only by primitive methods and on a small scale. It can have only the most rudimentary division of labour; it cannot have manufacturing industries, or good roads, or a rapid interchange of intelligence; all of which, together with a highly developed industrial organization and a perfect utilization of capital, are possible to the populations that are relatively dense.

A highly developed political life, too, is found only where population is compact. Civil liberty means discus-

[1] Spencer, "First Principles," § 72.

sion, and discussion is dependent on the frequent meeting of considerable bodies of men who have varied interests and who look at life from different points of view. Movements for the increase of popular freedom have usually started in towns. The American Revolution and the anti-slavery agitation were as peculiarly products of town life as are socialism, nationalism, and the single tax agitation to-day.

Education, religion, art, science, and literature are all dependent on a certain density of population. Schools, universities, churches, the daily newspaper, great publishing houses, libraries, and museums come only when the population per square mile is expressed by more than one unit, and their decay is one of the first symptoms that population is declining. Long before the desertion of the country villages in several of our eastern states had begun to attract the attention of economists, the decline of the schools and the churches was observed with solicitude by educators and by the religious press.

Population being given and other things remaining the same, social activity varies with the harvests.

Certain social phenomena follow good and bad times with astonishing regularity. Among these are the marriage-rate, the birth-rate, and the death-rate.

For example, in Bavaria the years from 1840 to 1845 were years of quiet prosperity. The marriages of those years were 29,500; 29,463; 29,356; 29,490; 29,373. In 1846–47 business was depressed and the marriages sank to 28,331. With returning prosperity the number rose to 30,000. Another hard year came in 1853–54 and the number sank to 26,939. The modification of the marriage laws in 1862 raised it to 40,000 and with further changes in the laws it rose in 1869 to 60,000. The Franco-Prussian War brought it down to 40,707 in 1871. The cessation of the war restored it to 52,045.[1]

[1] Mayo-Smith, "Statistics and Economics," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Vol. III., Nos. 4 and 5, September and November, 1888, pp. 53–54. Cf. also "Statistics and Sociology," p. 100.

This phenomenon has been carefully studied, and the German statistician, Hermann, has formulated the law that the number of marriages in any period expresses the expectation of economic prosperity prevailing at that time, and expresses this the more plainly the greater the economic freedom of the country.

The birth-rate rises in years of prosperity and the death-rate falls. Professor Mayo-Smith, summarizing statistical results on these points, says: "It is pretty clearly established that dearness of food, hard times, and wars have an influence in depressing the birth-rate. In Germany, the years 1847 and 1854, following the scarcity years of 1846 and 1853, had a very low number of births. Those following the panic of 1873 showed a gradually decreasing birth-rate in most of the countries of Europe, due doubtless to the less number of marriages. The effect of the war of 1870–71 was noticed in Germany. In Prussia the average birth-rate for the years 1865 to 1878 was 37.8 pro mille. . . . Immediately after the war there was a revival of the birth-rate (in 1872 it was 39.7), making good the depression of the previous year." [1]

Scarcity of food, hard times, and wars affect the death-rate. This relation was shown by the increased number of deaths after 1846 in Ireland, after 1853 in Germany, and after 1870–71 in France. "It will generally be found that the death-rate begins to increase the year after the bad times, — sometimes during the same year." [2]

Other things being equal, harvests depend on the amount of physical energy utilized by society in agricultural operations. Every substitution of the forces of nature for human strength increases the total production of food.

Population and harvests remaining the same, social

[1] "Statistics and Economics," p. 49, and cf. "Statistics and Sociology," p. 74.

[2] "Statistics and Economics," p. 63, and "Statistics and Sociology," p. 137.

activity depends on the amount of physical energy utilized otherwise than in producing food. How enormously have political, religious, and educational activities been multiplied by steam and electricity!

It is a corollary from the persistence of force that, when matter passes from place to place, its motion must be in the line of least resistance or of greatest traction. In the redistributions of matter and energy within the social population and between the environment and population, this law is perfectly exemplified.

Social activity follows the line of least resistance. Population is relatively dense in warm climates. Colonization follows coast lines and river valleys. Expanding states respect the territory of strong rivals and encroach upon the domain of the weak.

Wherever an economic opportunity has been opened, there swarms of men have gathered, and there they have stayed until diminishing returns have driven them on to yet newer openings. If in imagination we could picture the distribution of humanity, we should see it in constant motion, but here the moving thousands would be widely scattered and there densely aggregated.[1]

The concentration of population in cities is but another exemplification of the same law; for the cities, on the whole, afford the greatest opportunities for employment. "Certain forces of attraction," says Mr. Courtney, "are seen to be always in operation, drawing life away from where it came into existence to expend its activity elsewhere. As it matures it moves from a birth-place to a work-place."[2] So throughout the present century humanity has been moving from its quiet birth- and nurture-places in the country, to the turbulent centres of industry, trade, and professional endeavour.

[1] Courtney, "The Swarming of Men," *Nineteenth Century*, No. CXXXIII., March, 1888. [2] Ibid.

The line of least resistance also determines occupations, the course of exchanges, the lines of communication and the movements of labour and capital, legislative and administrative policy, and the direction of religious, scientific, and educational movements. Finally it tends to keep social activities in their original channels.[1]

Another consequence of the persistence of force is that action and reaction are necessarily equal, and therefore a yet further consequence is, that motion is necessarily rhythmical.

Social activities are periodic. Harvests and food-supplies are alternately abundant and meagre. Exchanges, in fairs and markets, are rhythmical, and the balance of international trade is ever changing; prices rise and fall.[2] Industrial depressions alternate with periods of industrial prosperity. The tide of immigration rises and falls. War and peace, conservatism and liberalism, alternate. Religion, morals, philosophy, science, literature, art, and fashion are all subject to the law of rhythm.

In the redistribution of matter and motion between society and its environment, either there is a greater increase of mass than of motion in the population, and the change is on the whole one of social integration, or there is a greater dissipation of matter than of energy, and the change is on the whole one of social dissolution. Either population encroaches on the environment or the environment encroaches on the population.

A tendency to dispersion exists when, concurrently with a multiplication of numbers, and an increase of individual energy, industry fails to secure increasing returns.

Usually this tendency does not become powerful enough to overcome inertia until the group is large. Until then, therefore, the group holds together and is subject to any influences that tend to establish further integration.

[1] "First Principles," § 80. [2] Ibid., § 85.

If in any mass of matter the process of integration is prolonged, it is but the beginning of a series of inevitable physical changes which become more and more complicated. The mass necessarily undergoes differentiation and its differentiated parts necessarily undergo segregation.

Since the units of matter in the integrating mass are in different positions, they cannot be equally affected by the escaping motion. Unlike exposure to like forces, or like exposure to unlike forces, or both, must change the character and the arrangements of the units. The result is differentiation.[1]

When different kinds and arrangements of units have been produced, like units that are exposed to the same or like forces are affected in like ways. Their similarity becomes more marked, and they are drawn together. The result is segregation.[2]

Unlike exposures of different parts of the social aggregate to environing forces result in social differentiation.[3]

The multiplication of effects results in numerous secondary differentiations which increase the heterogeneity.[4]

So far as the units of the social aggregate are equally exposed to the same conditions, they are modified in like ways. The result is a segregation of like units, — a secondary integration within the larger integration that is the primary phase of social evolution, — and an increasing definiteness of the differentiated parts into which the aggregate has been divided.[5]

The external conditions of climate and food, for example, group like natures together Racial likenesses bring together men of like mental and moral qualities, and so constitute the basis of nationality; and like national types, when they have been separated, tend to reunite. Men of

[1] "First Principles."
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., § 122.
[4] Ibid., § 161.
[5] Ibid., §§ 134 and 168.

like qualities are brought together also by occupation. There is a segregation of politicians, priests, professional men, literary men, actors and artists, mechanics and labourers. Various sub-groupings result in the formation of political parties, religious sects, and social cliques.

This law is strikingly exemplified in the distribution of immigrants. Germans spread westward from New York and Pennsylvania to Illinois and Iowa. Four-fifths of the whole German immigration is found in the northern central division of the United States. The Irish remain in the East, along the coast from New York to Maine. The Swedes and the Norwegians seek homes in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois, while the great stream of Italian immigration sets steadily southward to the Argentine Republic, which apparently is destined to be as distinctly an American Italy as New England has been an American Britain.[1]

These different ethnical groups remain for a long time distinct. From a comparison of the parent nativity of different ethnical groups in the United States, the census office in 1880 deduced the rule that, wherever large numbers of both sexes of any nationality are found together, there is very little marriage of one nationality with another. In New York City, for example, Germans marry Germans, Irish marry Irish, and Italians marry Italians, and the same thing may be affirmed of all large cities. The customs, traditions, religious beliefs, and even the languages of the immigrants are showing a stronger tendency to persist here in the New World, and to modify our social and political life, than was formerly believed to be possible.[2]

It is evident that so long as integration continues, the internal energy of the mass has not wholly disappeared.

[1] Mayo-Smith, "The Influence of Immigration on the United States of America," p. 49.

[2] Ibid., pp. 81–85.

Furthermore, in no aggregation is the dissipation of motion and the integration of matter wholly unaccompanied by the counter process; some matter is lost from time to time, and some energy is absorbed. This is a conspicuous part of the process of evolution in organic bodies.

This internal motion causes further complications of the evolutionary process. In consequence of the rearrangements of matter that are taking place, the internal motion itself undergoes a redistribution within the mass. Thus there is a further multiplication of effects; there are new differentiations and new segregations; and there is an increasing definiteness of both differentiation and segregation.[1]

In the social population, more than in any other mass of matter, is motion simultaneously lost and absorbed. Therefore a social population is more mobile and more plastic than any other aggregation, and secondary redistributions of matter and motion are more frequent and more complicated in society than elsewhere. Social evolution is in the highest degree compound.

The segregation due to climate makes the zones of population increasingly definite.[2] Men of like speech and of similar racial characteristics draw together within definite territories. Segregations due to vocation become definite class distinctions. The ruling, the priestly, the literary, the merchant, the artisan, and the labouring classes do not become blended as societies grow older. They become more sharply defined. Any social reform that hopes for the interblending of classes is foredoomed to failure.

Accompanying the structural changes of society are parallel changes of function. The redistributions of matter are attended by similar redistributions of the retained

[1] "First Principles."

[2] Cf. Orgeas, "La pathologie des races humaines," and Pearson, "National Life and Character."

motion. The social functions, like the social structure, increase in cohesion, heterogeneity, and definiteness.

At the beginning the economic, political, and religious activities of society are incoherent. There is no connection between one man's work and another's. There is no organized combination of efforts in hunting, fighting, or worship. At a later time there are elaborate combinations in each of these modes of human activity. At the outset all work in the same way, all think and worship in the same way; but subsequently every possible method of work, every possible plan of government, every shade of belief and manner of worship, appears. At first activity is little controlled by definiteness of purpose. Continuity of effort and nice adjustments of means to ends characterize business and political life and ecclesiastical endeavour.[1]

Compound evolution is a moving equilibrium. A certain balance in the differentiated parts is maintained which gives to them a certain static stability, though by the simultaneous loss and gain of matter and the constant redistribution of their contained energy they are essentially in a *kinetic* condition, undergoing constant changes of size, form, composition, and of mutual relations.

A high degree of evolution therefore is possible only if a net loss of motion and an integration of matter takes place slowly, since the slower the change the greater the possible number of redistributions of contained motion, and consequently the greater the number and the greater the definiteness of the resulting differentiations and segregations.

All social activities tend to equilibrium, but for an indefinite period it may be a moving equilibrium.[2]

A high degree of evolution can be attained by any society only if the motion lost is but slightly in excess of the motion

[1] "First Principles," § 144.

[2] Ibid., § 175.

gained, so that the evolutionary process goes on slowly. Rapid growth and quickly accomplished reforms are necessarily unsound, incomplete, and disappointing.

As all motion is rhythmical, an aggregation that both loses and gains energy will at one time lose more than it gains and at another time gain more than it loses. For a while society experiences evolutionary changes, and then for a while disintegrating changes predominate. Among the disintegrated elements a reëvolution may begin to be followed in time by another dissolution.[1]

[1] "First Principles," § 178.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL PROCESS: PSYCHICAL

If the cohesion of a population is maintained by the process of physical evolution, true association begins in the birth of the consciousness of kind, which presently grows into the love of companionship.

The association of men may be an association mainly of presence or mainly of activity. There is seldom an association of presence that is not also in some degree an association in activity, and there can be little association in activity without some association of presence. Yet either presence or activity will be the relatively important fact.

Association of presence has its ground in feeling. The craving for companionship is one of the elementary sociological forces. Although the chief phenomena of human society are those of associated activity, the mere association of presence has played a strangely important part in human progress. "The ostensible end of an association," as Mr. Leslie Stephen reminds us, "is often the least part of its value for us. We really love it because it supplies us with a means of cultivating certain emotions and of enjoying the society of our fellows; and it would be an entirely inadequate account of the whole statement if we regarded it as simply the means of attaining that pleasure which has given the pretext for its formation." [1]

We have but to reflect on the attachment to inanimate objects, that springs from long association with them, to become conscious of the tremendous power of human

[1] "Science of Ethics," p. 114.

presence in our mental and moral life. No experience is more familiar than the unrest that is due to the absence of a comrade from his accustomed place. We are, therefore, not likely to overestimate the importance of the association of presence as a conservative factor in social life. Often it is the bond of family union after romantic days are passed, and the struggle to get children started in the world is over. It is an essential factor in the wider social relations of mutual acquaintance and friendship. It is always a strong, though unnoticed, bond in clan and tribal life. Common activity may be at a low ebb, but in hours and days of idleness the association of presence remains. And from immemorial time it has been one of the most deeply mysterious and awe-inspiring elements in public worship.

Yet it is the association of activity that is not only the mightier fact in social evolution, but also the one that accounts for much that would otherwise be inexplicable in the phenomena of the association of presence. It is because the association of presence carries with it the lingering memories of associated activity and the consciousness that it may again, at any moment, become the association of activity, that it is of such consequence.

When the instinct of association has been created, a population is no longer held together only by physical conditions. The social units are so adjusted to social relations that they find their chief pleasure in them and desire to maintain and to perfect them.

Held together in social relations, men modify each other's natures. Intellect and conscious personality are developed. This evolution of human nature is the function of society.

The psychical results of association have a consensus. They are fused in an organic unity. That unity is the personality, the self, that gathers up the impressions of

sense, the waves of feeling, the images, the cognitions, and the habits of will, which constitute the shifting phenomena of mental life, and blends them in a self-conscious whole, which, as a unifying power, acts more and more effectively in modification or in control of each specific phase of will or thought. "The self is a connecting, relating activity, and hence is a real unity, one which unites into a whole all the various elements and members of our knowledge. In association and in attention it is the activity of mind which associates and which attends, and thus only does our mental life become significant in its products. The self is consequently the bond of unity. There is no member of our psychical life, no object of knowledge, which is not such because the self has acted upon it, and made it what it is." [1]

Professor Dewey states clearly one side of the phenomena of personality, but he ignores or misconceives another. Personality is a unity, but it is not indivisible or undecomposable. It is more powerful than any of its conscious states and it normally controls them, but its control is analogous to the control of a meeting over the individuals that compose it. Indeed, it is beginning to be admitted as a truth of psychology, that psychology must draw conceptions from sociology, as sociology must draw them from psychology. Studies of hypnotism and of pathological states of the will show that the self-conscious personality is composite. It is a resultant of many forces, which are of varying persistency and strength. As its factors change and shift, increase or diminish in intensity, combine and recombine, personality changes in tone or in character. It is one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow. The limits of variation are narrow, however, in normal health; they are wide when the physiological balance is disturbed.[2]

[1] John Dewey, "Psychology," p. 242.

[2] The normal variation is greater in women than in men; unless regu-

"The unity of the ego," then, to quote the admirable summing up of M. Ribot,[1] "in a psychological sense, is therefore the cohesion, during a given time, of a certain number of clear states of consciousness, accompanied by others less clear, and by a multitude of physiological states, which, without being accompanied by consciousness like the others, yet operate as much and even more than the former. Unity, in fact, means coördination."

I shall now undertake to show that this "unity of the ego" is a sociological no less than a biological product. Most of the psychologists who have recognized the composite nature of personality have come to their conclusions from the physiological side. Thus M. Ribot, continuing the paragraph quoted above, says: "The conclusion of the whole matter is that the consensus of the consciousness being subordinate to the consensus of the organism, the problem of the unity of the ego is, in its final form, a biological problem, and it is for biology to explain, if it can, the genesis of organisms and the solidarity of their parts; the psychological explanation can come only then." This is true, but it is not the whole truth. Biology cannot explain the genesis of an organism without resorting to social facts, since natural selection and survival imply coexistent individuals and their action and reaction upon one another. Much less can it explain the organic basis of mental unity without help from sociological interpretations.

Already we have seen that each of the various phases of mental life is a product of social evolution. Therefore it is by society that those components of the physical organism that are associated with mental life are stamped with individuality. Can we suppose, then, that their organic coördination has any other than a sociological genesis?

larly recurrent mental and moral changes are to be classed as pathological. This is a disputed point. See Icard, "La femme pendant la période menstruelle, étude de psychologie morbide et de médecine légale."

[1] "Diseases of Personality," p. 157.

What but the social medium is it that blends the component elements of personality? What but the social medium, acting on countless generations, determines which factors shall survive in consciousness and which shall perish; which forces shall be strong and which weak, which combinations shall have that relatively stable equilibrium, that perfect fusion, harmony, or unity, which we recognize as well-poised character; and what other combinations shall be incapable of perfect synthesis, because the elements are incongruous, and compose a character that is essentially unstable?

No other than this sociological explanation is possible. So far as the problem is one of heredity, it is evident that social conditions determine, in the first place, what elements shall combine through sexual union in the birth of new individuals — that is, what possibilities of variation shall exist — and in the second place, what new types shall survive. So far as the problem is one of the modification of the organism within the brief span of individual life, it is certain that social conditions determine for each individual what elements of his personality shall be played upon by the influences that strengthen or weaken; what suggestions shall consciously or unconsciously give direction to his thought, quality to his feeling, and so, at length, determination to his will. In this last thought, perhaps, is the key to a true philosophy of education, as M. Guyau has contended.[1]

Personality is not a merely passive consensus of mental states. Though composite in its origin, and decomposable, it is a unity while it persists, and an active unity. It reacts on all its emotional and intellectual factors. In every sensation and perception, in every act of attention and of reasoning, in every phase of feeling, personality, the unified resultant of all past and present feeling, is

[1] "Éducation et hérédité."

itself a factor, making every process of thought and feeling something peculiar and incommunicable. This reaction of the coördinated whole upon the parts is especially distinctive of the psychology of man; it differentiates his conscious life from the conscious life of lower animals.[1]

The synthesis of passive and active phases of personality is the phenomenon of internal, or psychical, determination. Personality is a consensus, but a living one. Its states are determined, but they are determined mainly through the mental processes themselves, and through character, which is the product of all that now is and ever has been in the mind itself.

Psychical determination is still called "self-determination" in many books on psychology. "Self-determination," however, is a term to juggle with, and for that reason every scientific psychologist ought to detest it. Psychical determination has antecedents in the external world, of which it never becomes independent. This is true, whether the external world is a reality transcending knowledge, or only an order of perception. Most of the external antecedents of internal changes, however, are remote rather than immediate. Each new impression of the external world upon the mind is made through the medium of thousands of internal results of previous impressions. The internal process, therefore, is different from the external process. It therefore reacts upon the external process, and we have those two apparently contradictory views of the world, which are reflected by science and by art. Science regards things as determined in all respects by the consensus of outward things. Art, morals, and religion regard things and persons as spontaneously acting from inward impulse.

Both views are true. Things and persons are determined from without, but they react also upon their surroundings. It is therefore conceivable that an individual

[1] Cf. Vignoli, "Myth and Science," pp. 22, 23.

mind might be so perfectly adapted to the conditions of existence that it would always desire to do exactly those things which in the cosmic order it would be compelled to do. Such potential harmony is still spoken of by the psychologists of "self-determination" as "the reconciliation of freedom with necessity." This, however, is another bit of jugglery. Freedom and necessity cannot be "reconciled," though there may be an agreement of purpose with necessity.

Psychical determination, then, is simply determination through one's conscious activity. It is the free exercise of will — not the exercise of free will — in so far as volition is the expression of one's own mental constitution, — from hereditary tendency and present sensation, up to reason and conscience. It is the result of internal or psychical as distinguished from external and physical necessity.[1]

Psychical determination, as thus defined, is a phase of evolution that is neither more nor less mysterious than other modes of the interaction of organism and environment. In their simpler forms the mental correlations, organized as sensations and instincts, enable their possessor to gain advantage from the few relatively simple external conditions and objects on which the mere continuation of life depends. They make him in a degree the master of his fate, by enabling him both to avoid destructive agents and to put himself into relation with agents that can minister to his necessities. To those more complex correlations of the external world that are not yet represented in the mental structure, there is, of course, no adjustment; to come in their way is destruction; and within the organism itself there is no means of avoiding them. In relation to them, the individual is the sport of chance.

[1] Cf. James, "Psychology"; Ribot, "Diseases of the Will"; Hodgson, "Free Will: an Analysis," *Mind*, No. LXII., April, 1891, pp. 161 *sq.*; and especially the admirable statement by Royce, *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. VI., No. 1, October, 1895, p. 115.

Mental life, therefore, has the distinguishing characteristic that, as it expands, it acquires control over its own destiny and over the physical organism in which it exists. In their higher and more complex forms which are organized as intelligence, sympathy, and justice, mental correlations correspond to a vast range of external conditions; and in their highest coördination they may represent every law and process of the knowable world. Thus man becomes aware of every influence that can affect his existence, of every means of escaping from what might harm him, and of deriving benefit from all that can aid him. Whether or not he secures these advantages and becomes a free being, controlling his destiny within himself, depends on the degree to which the higher mental processes control volition. This degree is the measure of personality. Only the man in whom the re-representative[1] thoughts and feelings are sovereign — whose lower propensities are brought into strict subordination to the higher, and are indulged only by permission or command of the higher — is in a scientific sense a perfect personality.

The evolution of personality is a result to which we are not indifferent. It is accompanied by feelings of pain or pleasure. There is no growth without some disintegration, some breaking up of the old relations, that the new and larger relations may be made possible, and this is painful. But life itself, spontaneous activity, expansion of opportunity, and increase of power, — these are pleasurable, and the more perfect the organism, the larger and fuller the life, the greater is the pleasure.[2] Moreover, this pleasure is of the kind that does not bring with it reactions

[1] Spencer, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., § 480.

[2] Cf. Spencer, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. I., Part II., Chap. IX.; Ward, "Dynamic Sociology," Vol. II., p. 151 *sq.*; and Marshall, "Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics," pp. 269 *sq.*

against itself, as do the pleasures of excess. It stimulates; it enhances the capacity for pleasure. Personality, then, experiencing and including in itself all the satisfactions of its own activity and growth, is normally accompanied by a cumulative happiness.

To understand the nature of cumulative happiness it is necessary to remember that pleasure has a twofold root. We find pleasure in spontaneous activity; we are subjects of pleasurable sensations when in certain ways and within certain degrees we are acted upon.

Some of the most perplexing problems of ethics and psychology would be simplified if they were stated in terms of this familiar truth. Intuitionalists tell us that pleasure-seeking is essential evil, and the source of moral wrong. Pleasure, they say, is no test, or measure, or verification, of right. To choose the pleasurable may be to violate every obligation; to choose the path of duty may be to encounter suffering. Utilitarians, on the other hand, admitting that duty and pleasure do not always coincide, argue that they coincide usually, or in the long run. Suffering is evil in itself; pleasure is good in itself. Suffering, as an incident of duty, is justifiable only on the presumption that the way of duty leads to a larger and completer pleasure. That which has pain for its normal end cannot be duty. The very proposition is a contradiction in terms.

If we look more closely, however, we find that the intuitionalists habitually think of the pleasure that immediately accompanies activity and of the pains that come later, in remoter consequences reacting upon the person who, in activity, had found momentary satisfaction. The utilitarians, on the contrary, think of the remoter pleasure and the present pain. The pleasure in their scheme is that of being acted upon; their pain is the pain of effort. A youth, for example, spends his nights in gambling. The momentary pleasure is keen, the subsequent sorrow of

disgrace is overwhelming. The intuitionalist calls him a pleasure-seeker and pronounces pleasure-seeking sinful. The utilitarian says that he is no true pleasure-seeker at all, and calls him a fool for not knowing what true pleasure is. Yet both are right.

What we call "pleasure-seeking," in the language of every-day life, is not a "seeking," but a yielding, to the intoxication of the pleasure that accompanies a spontaneous activity of our powers. It is nearly or quite dissociated from any thought of consequences, of being in turn acted upon by the outcome of our deeds. The pleasures of appetite and of passion are of this kind, as are those also of rivalry.

What we call "utility," on the other hand, is usually a pleasure of being acted upon by some external person or thing in consequence of some act that we have performed, not for the sake of its immediate pleasurableness, but solely for the sake of the remoter consequence, or reaction. The pleasures of wealth and reputation are typical of utilities.

These distinctions are fundamental. All utilitarian effort, I repeat, grows out of the pleasures and pains that are associated with the reactions of our activities, and not immediately with the activities themselves. Something better than utilitarian effort grows out of the immediate pleasure of spontaneous activity.

For the pleasures that moral consciousness condemns are not the only pleasures of this class, as the intuitionalists know. They have simply chosen to call the pleasures that they approve of by another name. The pleasures of activity are more intense, they are richer and deeper than the passive pleasures of being acted upon. The pleasures of sense are the least of the pleasures of activity. All the rational "joy of a right understanding," all personal love, friendship, and devotion, all gladness of self-sacrifice, are satisfactions that are immediately and inseparably con-

nected with conscious activity itself, apart from any anticipated pleasurableness or painfulness of the reaction. Reverence, love, the giving of one's self for another, and creative effort in all its forms are activities that are recognized as good in themselves, and that would be recognized as good if existence were at once to cease and no reaction whatever were to follow.

Are we then to conclude that this immediate experience of joy is the sufficient guide of life? For a few individuals it may be; for the race it is not. Left to itself, intuition becomes fanaticism; activity becomes intoxication, and its reaction kills. True soberness of judgment is rarely maintained save through the practice of a calm calculation of utility. That only is the perfect life in which action is good in itself, and its reaction also is happy because life-serving. It is the function of utilitarian ethics to determine the connections between conduct and its reactions, and to make clear the lines of duty thereby indicated. It is the function of sociology to show that true happiness is necessarily cumulative, and that, in the organic evolution of personality and of its social medium, the increase of happiness is assured.

Let now the fact of psychical determination be combined with the fact of cumulative happiness. The result is a larger synthesis, which is nothing less than a conscious policy, and a factor in social evolution. Knowing that personality depends on conditions that are established only by association, and knowing that we have the power to react on our environment, we seek to increase our satisfactions by perfecting our social relations. Thus the social function, the evolution of personality, reacts on social cohesion and structure. Accidental association is supplemented by an association that is volitional in its origin and in its conduct.

Volitional association is not to be identified with pur

posive association or contrasted with autogenous society. Purposive association is of course volitional, but so also to a great extent is autogenous society. Volitional association must be contrasted with an accidental association. When, however, accidental association is often repeated, a volitional association develops from it, and only then is there a true organic society. The union of the sexes, which autogenous society presupposes, is volitional association in its primordial form. In the lowest savage groups there is occasionally a brief volitional association of many individuals for some momentary object. And, finally, in highly developed societies, it is after all by volitional association that the great fabric is held together. Men born into social relations do not readily break from them. The bonds of traditional belief that so firmly hold primitive men within a narrow round of task and ritual, are permanently loosened only by reflective thought. The evolution of reflective thought, however, is one of the inevitable results of social growth, and, when reflection has become in a measure the habit of all men, it is turned upon every relation of social life. If then, in their maturity, men continue unrebelliously to live in membership of the social body into which they were born and in which they have been reared, it is because they will to do so.

Volitional association is not always voluntary on the part of all the individuals that are associated. The superior will of one person may constrain the inferior wills of many. Coercion plays in social evolution a part scarcely less important than that of voluntary association. It is not necessary, however, to remember this distinction in the further analysis of volitional association. The phases of association that are now to be described are exhibited by both the coercive and the voluntary forms.

The association of activity has its ground in volition. Many men simultaneously will to do the same thing and to

coöperate in the act. The forms of the association of activity are innumerable. Domestic and public, industrial and military, deliberative and recreative, devotional and festive, philanthropic and criminal, scientific and artistic, educational and reactionary, — these are but a few broadly descriptive terms under each of which may be grouped an endless variety of coöperative activities. By far the greater part of the phenomena called "sociological," whether they be tribal or national, economic or political, religious, educational, or merely pleasurable, may be included under the one descriptive general term, — the association of activity.

The simplest coördinations of social activity are automatic; each individual acts without conscious reference to the acts of others. Such coördinations are nothing more than simultaneous performances of like acts. They are brought about by external conditions, the simplest of which are physical. The husbandmen of a rural village, as together they plough in the spring, and together go forth as reapers in autumn, but follow the seasons of seed-time and harvest. More complex conditions are created by social evolution. The market wagons that move along suburban roads in early morning conform to the diurnal rhythm of life in the awakening city.

The interpretation of simultaneous action is, of course, found in the psychological fact that mental changes and relations correspond to external relations. When exposed to the same conditions, associated men receive like impressions; and to the extent that they are similarly affected by their common circumstances they form like purposes, which result in common action.

In a higher type of associated action, each individual acts with conscious reference to the like acts of others. This is the beginning of a coördination through the social self-consciousness.

The coördination of consciously associated action, like

that of unconcerted action, follows necessarily from psychological laws. In the account of imitation it was explained why unreflecting men impulsively follow any example.[1] Imitation, as was shown, not only creates habits, forms, and types; it also produces violent outbursts of united action and great social movements. A mental impulse is communicated from individual to individual and gathers momentum in its progress, until thousands are borne onward by it in crusades and pilgrimages for which it might be difficult to find a rational excuse.

Imitation, however, is conscious coördination in its most indefinite and transient form.

A more definite coördination results from individual superiority of intellect to plan and of will to execute. In consequence of the relations of parenthood and sonship, every individual has both the instinct to rule and the instinct to obey. Therefore among individuals unequal in personal power there is coördination through leadership. Hence follows the possibility of slavery and serfdom, no less than the possibility of voluntary allegiance. Directive intelligence, combined with arbitrary power, creates the one; combined with a strong but not arbitrary character, it creates the other.

The prevalent impression that rulership among men is maintained by the brute strength of the rulers is, on the whole, wrong.

The real source of a ruler's power to aggrandize himself at the expense of the ruled is always found in their voluntary deference and self-taxation. The natural instinct of men that are conscious of their dependence on leadership is to give to those that already have; to make obeisance and to do homage. It is impossible to find a savage tribe that does not voluntarily load its chief with presents, voluntarily toil to build his house, and voluntarily submit to every kind of privation in order that the great man may

[1] *Ante*, p. 110, and cf. Bagehot's "Physics and Politics."

be comfortable. In civil states the bane of both political and industrial democracy is the unreasoning faith of the commonplace many in the adroit and daring few who can suggest and lead. Furthermore, as Adam Smith says: "Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks and the order of society. Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good-will." "That kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public convenience may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine of nature." [1]

Leadership takes two forms. One is executive ability; it is the immediate power over men that is exemplified in the military chief and in the employer of labour. The other is a superior insight into things that are mysterious to the common mind; it gives ascendency over belief and feeling; it is seen in the medicine man, the priest, the prophet, the man of science, the philosopher, and the teacher. The union of these two elements of leadership is seen in the highest type of the statesman.

The third and perfect type of conscious coördination is effected by the highest mental processes; namely, those of intellectual and sympathetic comprehension. The resulting coöperation is concerted action. While on its physical side life is an adjustment of internal relations to external relations, on its conscious side it is much more than an adjustment. It is a comprehension by each mind of some portion of the thought and feeling of all other minds. In this phenomenon lies the possibility of a perfect social coördination without the sacrifice of individual freedom.

[1] "The Theory of Moral Sentiments," pp. 88, 89. Smith's account of the personal distinction of Louis XIV. (p. 91) is suggestive. Bagehot elaborates the idea in his treatment of the crown in "The English Constitution."

Agreement in thought and feeling becomes the ground of a substantial unity of purpose. The group of associated persons becomes a community.

Coördination is closely related to other phases of association that may be described as degree of intimacy and degree of definiteness. Intimacy may be either physical or mental, or it may be both. So far as physical crowding results from conditions of industry and wealth-distribution over which individuals have little personal control, it does not fall within a study of volitional association; but so far as it is a consequence of deliberate choice, it is a phenomenon of volitional association and has a serious significance in its relations to certain social ills. Most of the communistic schemes proposed since Fourier's day have involved a physical intimacy in the association of daily life that has been so far distasteful as to prevent the general adoption of arrangements that offer economic advantages over the individual household. Different nationalities, however, regard these arrangements with different feelings. The Frenchman often likes them; the Englishman and the American yield to them only under necessity and become accustomed to them slowly. The earliest distributions of the farming population in America illustrate the same reluctance to live too much with one's neighbours. The first settlements were made in villages; but when emigration from these began, it was the self-sufficing farm homestead, and not the compact farm village of the Old World, that for a time became characteristic of our rural population.

In older communities, however, where crowding has been produced by economic conditions, an acquired fondness for intimate association with fellow-beings may become pathological through an impairment of physical and moral vigour. It is extremely difficult, for example, to divert the tenement-house population of city slums to wholesome

rural environments, even when definite occupation and good wages are promised.

When the physical crowding of wage-earners in factory towns and city tenements has once been effected by economic causes, a secondary sociological factor enters into the feelings of the well-to-do and intensifies their own dislike of close association in daily life. It has become a mark of class differences. It therefore happens that just when land becomes most valuable, and the need of more room, light, and air for the multitude most imperative, the wealthy attach the greatest importance to the ownership of separate homes in city and country and to laying field to field in enlargement of their country estates.

Mental intimacy may vary to a considerable extent independently of physical propinquity. It consists in an active interchange of thought and feeling. It may exist between persons widely separated in space, and it depends therefore on association of activity, while physical intimacy is a phase of association of presence. Mental intimacy varies to a considerable extent with race and nationality. The Tahitians and Samoans in the South Pacific Ocean are described as more sociable than the more intellectual Fijians. The Eskimo are more fond of social intercourse than are the red men; the negroes than the Bushmen, Hottentots, and Kaffirs; the Irish and Germans than the English. In the same society intimacy varies with purposive association, with class characteristics, and with town and country residence.

We should have an inadequate idea of social phenomena if we observed only the facts of association. In all association there are latent forces of dissociation, which at any moment may become active, destroying the bonds that hold the social groups together, and dispersing the elements of social activity for reunion in new relations. The dissolution of assemblies and corporations, the dis-

banding of armies, the desertion of cities once teeming with restless populations, heresy and schism, rebellion and secession, have not been less conspicuous or less fateful than the slowly evolved associations that they have destroyed. These dissociations that always limit association are psychologically analogous to the process by which the individual mind in perception rejects some elements of sensation and in reasoning rejects some elements of perception. A community of feeling or an intellectual agreement is destroyed when social groups are sundered. Thus limited by latent or by active dissociation, the extent of association is seen to be a sociological fact of the utmost significance. Association of great extent means either that the bonds of thought and feeling are many and strong, or that the purpose of the association is strictly limited to a single definite object. If from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 individuals hold together in a strongly united political society, innumerable spiritual bonds have become marvellously interwoven. Yet in a particular work, as, for example, in relieving a district that has been ravaged by famine, thousands of individuals of different nationalities, beliefs, and interests may coöperate with no other bonds of union than a common knowledge and a momentary sympathy.

The extent of association varies also with social organization. Extent conditions the structure, but structure in turn conditions the extent of association. On the one hand, a small group cannot be minutely subdivided; it cannot show a great variety of social relations. On the other hand, a large association cannot hold together unless it develops structure. The simple structure that is seen in the subordination of a nearly homogeneous horde to the coercive rule of a chief may suffice, but, if it does, the vigorous harshness of his rule must increase and the machinery of administration must become more complicated as his subjects multiply. The extension of voluntary asso-

ciation may be a direct consequence of complexity if it is due to the confederation of many small associations that have similar purposes. Modern industrial associations have grown mainly by this process. But, whether compounded or not, the voluntary association must differentiate as it enlarges. Inequality must appear and the many must be organized by the few.

The strength of the social motives that is measured by th. extent, is measured also by the permanence of association. The acquaintance that ends with a railway journey and the friendship that strengthens through life, are types of innumerable phenomena of conscious association. The marriage that lasts but a few months and that which the poet celebrates as "untouched by any shade of years"; the political coöperation that ends with a battle of boomerangs; and the English state, stronger after a thousand years than in the days of Plantagenet or Stuart, — these are but examples at random of the contrasts that continually meet the student who undertakes to observe the degrees of social cohesion. He finds them never twice the same. Association is ever growing stronger or weaker. If stronger, it is because the consciousness of kind is becoming both deeper and more comprehensive; because knowledge is ripening and thought is becoming more catholic; because the purposes of men are becoming more serious, and their ideals nobler. No nation that has lowered its aspirations or discouraged the spirit of inquiry has grown stronger through the centuries.

A better social organization reacts on social function. The increased cohesion and the coördinated action are helpful in the struggle for existence; the combination and the coördination of effects contribute to personal development. The most definite forms of volitional association are positive institutions, or forms of associated activity that are authorized and are moulded by sovereignty.

Opinions have differed concerning the value of authoritative institutions to the individual personality. One view is ably presented by Mr. Daniel Greenleaf Thompson,[1] who thinks that institutions dwarf personality. He would have their activity greatly diminished and would leave the widest possible opportunity to the individual.

It is true that the development of the individual depends on wide opportunities for self-activity. An institutional life, so ordered that authority crushes liberty, is fatal to the full development of rational life. But on the other hand, liberty itself and the whole development of personality presuppose certain beliefs and obediences. All of that inner determining power which is characteristic of personality, implies certain beliefs in regard to the world wherein man finds himself, and certain obediences, corresponding to the beliefs. Nor are these enough. If the highest qualities of human personality are to appear, or even if that liberty on which personal growth depends is to exist, there must be some stability and some continuity in human life, and, besides the elementary security that the simplest association affords, there must be some systematic restraint of brutality and some systematic regulation of social relations. Beliefs and obediences must take outward form in custom and law, which must be administered and enforced. Without government either those individuals in whom exist some germs of higher thought and feeling are overcome by force or their energies are diverted from intellectual and moral progress to the work of self-defence.[2] We cannot imagine the reasoning powers of a Newton, the creative genius of a Shakespeare or of a Beethoven, or the fidelity of a Lincoln, in a community where life was so uncertain, and its interests were so disconnected, as to destroy all opportunity for reflection and to afford no promise of reward for steadfastness of purpose.

[1] Cf. "The Problem of Evil."

[2] Cf. Fiske, "The Destiny of Man."

All experience has shown that it is only in institutional life that the needful combination of stability, continuity, and liberty is secured. In human history there has been no other political liberty than constitutional liberty. There has been no individual freedom but under government and law.[1] Moreover, it is not easy to see how, apart from institutions, the continuity of what is best in tradition — the common law, art, and science — could have been maintained for many generations in the larger societies. Indeed, historically it has been only after functional association has become institutional that there has been a sufficient continuity and variety of experience to create positive science, fine art, and ethics. Only after liberal institutions have been established for the purpose of comparing the experiences, the beliefs, the knowledge, and the practice of different societies, can science grow into a critical and positive philosophy; can religion develop from tribal worship into a deep and reverent consciousness of the transcendent relations of personality; or can ethics grow out of morals, or fine art out of the arts of recreation.

Institutions thus combine the results of the contact of the mind of one society with that of another. Without institutions societies would still modify one another, but there would be no enduring products of their intercourse. Institutions are the organs that conserve what is best in the past of the human race, while to the individual they offer fields of ever-widening activity.

Whether institutional or not, however, the social life and the social mind must be embodied in articulate form. The mature man is moulded into individuality not through deliberate exercises of mind and will, undertaken for their effects, but through the daily struggle to fulfil the duties that pertain to his position in an organized community.

[1] Cf. Burgess, "Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law," and Lieber, "Civil Liberty and Self-Government."

In a word, the medium in which the highest development of personality is possible, is a society that has a specialized constitution, and that presents many degrees of composition. The individual must have a definite part in the division of labour, and in the common life of the nation, the local community, and the family.

Whether his daily duty identifies him with productive industry, or with directive functions, or with the extension of knowledge, or with the spiritualization of life, the individual is affected by all of these interests if there is no derangement of the social organization. The division of labour may have its evil side, but those economic writers are mistaken who see only an economic gain in the division of labour, and deny that it can be morally and mentally beneficial to individuals. The division of labour gives a definite aim to life. It ensures a definite discipline and that minute thoroughness which every investigator knows is one of the essential conditions of a rational mental habit. At the same time it releases men from their tasks to enjoy more hours of leisure than they could otherwise command.

Moreover, the economic side of the division of labour is not that unmoral or non-intellectual thing that it has too often been represented to be. The struggle to rise in the world is the means by which the strongest and many of the best of human traits are produced. Failure in this struggle, after it has been begun, is very nearly a total failure in life. The great moralists and philosophers of all ages have recognized that poverty is as destructive of intellectual and moral freedom as is luxury.[1] The simplicity that they have commended and the luxury that they have condemned are relative. As society becomes complex and cosmopolitan, the range of intellectual interests, of æsthetic pleasures, and of philanthropic opportunity is widened, and a greater amount of wealth is necessary to a

[1] Cf. Plato, "The Republic."

perfect personal development. Besides, with multiplying forms of wealth, the necessity of making rational choices and combinations becomes ever more imperative and more difficult, and thus a continuous intellectual and moral discipline is maintained.[1]

Furthermore, it is neither the life of humanity in its vast entirety nor the life of unorganized masses of men, that chiefly develops the individual. He is developed by the life of definite groups, in which he shares the common interest. The ideals and aspirations of the nation, which awaken the enthusiasm of patriotism; the common interests of the city or commune, in which one feels the pride of citizenship, — these have always been necessary to perfect character, and without them there has been neither literature nor art. As for the family life, however its form may change from time to time, some definiteness and continuity of home life, and therefore of the relations between man and woman and between parents and children, are indispensable to the development of human nature in its completeness. It is these relationships that create forethought, that soften dispositions, that suggest self-sacrifice, that pass on the acquirements of one generation to the generations that come after.

Thus, so far as volitional association has to be accounted for by a *raison d'être*, it has a complete explanation in its reactions upon the ethical and mental phases of individual life. Volitional association is functional in maintaining the conditions necessary to the highest personal evolution.

Since the tendencies towards both cohesion and dispersion are persistent, the social system simultaneously exhibits phenomena of combination and of competition, of communism and of individualism. Neither order of phe-

[1] Cf. Patten, "Economic Causes of Moral Progress," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. III., No. 2, September, 1892.

nomena can ever exclude the other, but at any given time one or the other order may be ascendant and there may be a rhythm of alternating ascendency of combination or competition, communism or individualism.

The individual, therefore, is not prior to society or society to the individual. Community is not precedent to competition or competition to community. From the first, competition and community, society and the individual, have been coördinate. Society and the individual have always been acting and reacting upon each other; competition and community have always been limiting each other.

The mutual modification of social units is chiefly through their mental and moral natures. The psychical phenomenon is here prior to secondary physical phenomena. Each individual consciousness becomes adjusted to the social state. Each begins to require companionship, and each to comprehend some portion of the consciousness of others. Presently all individuals, to some extent, think, feel, and will alike, and each consciousness becomes a microcosm of the social system in all its activities.

The physical side of these modifications is their organization in brain and nerve structure, and in muscular habits and aptitudes. By means of this physical organization, in coöperation with the other essential factors of language, literature, and art, the social system is conserved, and is transmitted from generation to generation.

Thus the modification of social units by one another, the modification of society by its units and the modification of the units by society are always organic phenomena; they are processes of psychological assimilation and biological evolution. Social evolution, therefore, is a reciprocal adjustment of external and internal relations.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL LAW AND CAUSE

WHAT now are the laws of the social process, and what is the ultimate nature of social causation?

Since society is essentially a psychical phenomenon that is conditioned by a physical process, the strictly sociological laws are, first, laws of the psychical process, and, second, laws of the limitation of the psychical by the physical process. Volition acts upon the social process through impulse and imitation, and, consciously, through rational choice. The laws of the volitional process therefore are laws of imitation and of social choice. The laws of limitation by the physical process are laws of selection and survival.

There are two great laws of imitation, which have been formulated by M. Tarde. In the absence of interferences, imitations spread in a geometrical progression.[1] If a new example is copied by a single individual, there are immediately two example centres. If each is again copied by a single individual, there are four example centres, and if each of these is copied by a single individual, the example centres become eight. It is the geometrical progression of imitation that accounts for the extreme rapidity with which new words, new fashions, fads, panics, and revolutions sometimes spread. The second law of imitation was mentioned in the account of the forms of association.[2]

[1] "Les lois de l'imitation," p. 18. [2] *Ante*, p. 111.

Imitations are refracted by their media.[1] Words, customs, laws, religions, and institutions are modified as they pass from race to race and from age to age.

The laws of rational social choice are unchanging relations between the groupings of social values and the forms of social conduct. The grouping of social values is the antecedent, the form of social conduct is the consequent. Given a certain combination of social values, a particular kind of social conduct will follow if it is determined by rational choice.

In order to understand the groupings of social values, it is necessary to recur to the process by which subjective values of any kind arise in individual minds, and especially to note certain steps that have not received attention in studies of economic values, but which have importance for the theory of ethical and social values.

In all choice the mind contemplates two or more of its own states, or two or more experiences, activities, methods, rules, plans, conditions, or objects, and finds itself regarding them with unequal degrees of desire, and with unequal degrees of approval. Desire is feeling; approval is a judgment; it is a recognition that the experience, the object, or the act under consideration possesses an element or a quality that is deemed important, or that it conforms to a standard or to a test. The choice is completed when one of the conflicting objects or courses is taken or is allowed, to the exclusion of all others.

Comparing our experiences of choice, we discover that we do not always approve of what we desire and do not always allow or take that thing or that course of which we approve. True choice is determined by approval, or at least it occurs after approval has been contemplated, even though judgment is finally overcome by antagonistic desire. The laws of rational social choice pertain only to

[1] Tarde, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

phenomena in which approval is a factor. Volition in which desire is the sole motive is but impulsive or imitative.

Generalizing our experiences of choice, we call good those states, experiences, things, and acts that we approve of, and those states, experiences, things, and acts that we disapprove of we call bad. This is only another way of saying that goodness is an abstraction from the various states of mind and qualities of acts and of things that we approve of when we pass judgment upon them.

So many states of mind, so many objects, and so many acts lack some important element or quality, or fall below our standards, and so often the standards themselves are raised by the discovery that we can attain higher degrees of excellence than we have known hitherto, that our conception of goodness is converted into an ideal, which we endeavour to realize. The ideal varies, and different states and qualities that are approved of are more or less esteemed as character and intelligence develop. Realization of the ideal good implies an adaptation of means to ends. According to their intelligence, men correctly or incorrectly estimate the efficiency of means, and, according to their judgments of the importance and the efficiency of a means, have they a greater or less degree of esteem for it.

In the analysis of economic value I have shown that subjective value in the economic sense is a degree of esteem.[1] Similar reasoning would justify the assertion that subjective value, in both the ethical and the sociological senses also, is a degree of esteem. As all subjective values are included in these three categories, we may combine our definitions in the generalization that a degree of esteem for any state of mind or for any quality that is approved of and considered good, or for any quality that is regarded as an essential element in the ideal good, or for any thing, act, or relation that is a means to the attainment of an

[1] See *ante*, pp. 43, 44.

ideal good, is a subjective value. It is an economic value if the approved state of mind is one of satisfaction attained through the appeasing of want by a material means, or through a physical agency, or if the object valued is a physical means of satisfying a want. It is an ethical value if the approved state of mind is one of internal harmony, or if the means is a deed or a course of conduct. It is a social value if the thing valued is a social kind, type, characteristic, or condition, or if the means is a social element, relation, activity, or possession, which is conducive to a social good.

The science of ethics examines critically the elements that enter into the conception of goodness and the criteria that are applied to experiences, objects, actions, and relations, in order that it may arrive at a true notion of the ideal good. Sociology must examine them historically and inductively, — in their evolutionary aspect, — as a part of its study of the process of social choice.

Elements and criteria of the ideal good are of two widely contrasted kinds. Some are subjective; they are states of mind or qualities of conduct or character that are regarded as inherently excellent. Others are objective; they are relations of adaptation to an external world. Pleasure, for example, is a subjective element of the ideal good; survival is an objective criterion. Systems of ethics have been ruined by a failure to separate the subjective from the objective elements and criteria. Sociology must not repeat the error.

The original element in any subjective value is either a state of mind which is accepted as good, or a subjective criterion of goodness. If, for example, pleasure is pronounced good, either the pleasurableness of the mental state or the pleasure-giving efficiency of the thing or act under consideration is the original ground of the degree of esteem in which it is held. Afterwards an objective test also may be applied, and the judgment of value may be

modified, as it is when a particular kind of pleasure-giving conduct is found to be unfavourable to survival. The application of the objective tests, however, depends on a much higher development of intelligence than the application of the subjective tests. The individuals, for example, that know what effect a particular course of conduct has on health and survival are fewer than those who know what effect it has upon the sum total of a day's pleasure. Consequently in the development of social values and in the determination of social choice, the subjective grounds are more efficient than the objective criteria. Therefore in the attempt to discover the laws of social choice, it is necessary first to inquire what subjective elements of goodness enter into social values.

In the chapter on The Social Mind it was shown that the object of supreme social value in each community is the kind or type of its population; that, for example, the American supremely values the American type, the Englishman, the English, the Frenchman, the French, and the German, the German type. It was shown also that to some extent the several characteristics of the type are separately valued; or, in more precise scientific terms, that the value of the type is largely imputed to some one or more of its characteristics.

To a community that has become reflectively intelligent, the characteristics of its own type to which value is chiefly imputed are those qualities of the population that are accepted as subjective elements and criteria of goodness: in every community the ruling criteria of goodness are derived from its own typical qualities, and it is impossible for any community to think that its own traits and its own conduct do not in some measure realize its conception of the ideal good.

When men begin to distinguish between their judgments and their desires, the subjective element and criterion of goodness that first wins approval is power. This is pri-

marily due to the fact that life itself is activity and a mode of conflict. The deepest instincts are those of activity. It is secondarily due to the high ratio of effort to reward in the early stages of organic and social evolution. To succeed in the struggle for existence, an individual or a community must be strong and alert. Life is beset by dangers, and war is continual. These conditions react on all the mental processes. Whatever displays power awes the imagination and compels admiration. Whatever is obtained only by means of power is coveted, and power to obtain is admired and applauded. Presently mental and moral as well as physical power win admiration; fortitude and self-control are approved as courage is. From these qualities the conception of virtue is derived. Virtue is manly power in all its myriad forms of action and repression, of daring and of self-control. Virtue, then, in this original meaning of the word, is the first subjective element of goodness to receive recognition, and the first subjective criterion of conduct and character. In the development of ethical philosophy this phase of thought finds expression in Stoicism.

Presently, however, it is discovered that virtue does not always have pleasurable reactions. Forceful conduct may be pleasurable at the moment, but it may exhaust. Courage may be rash; self-control may be excessive and stupid. These considerations can have no practical results as long as the life-struggle is hard and perilous. Gradually, however, the conditions of existence are ameliorated. The consolidation of tribes and states is followed by long periods of peace and security, and an improving economic production increases the ratio of reward to effort.[1] Is virtue,

[1] Professor Patten's account of this stage of evolution as a transition from a pain economy to a pleasure economy is compact of original and suggestive thought which, I sincerely hope, may be the beginning of a transition from the platitudinous ethical discussions of recent years to a hard-headed, scientific study of ethical phenomena. I regret to say, however, that I am unable to regard Professor Patten's terms as accurately

men then begin to ask, the only good, — the only criterion that should be applied? Should not the reactions of conduct be considered? Is it rational to suppose that pain is the normal result of effort? Is it not rational to assume that the normal result is pleasure? Without becoming less virtuous, should not the virtuous man study the reactions of his conduct, and, so far as possible, choose courses that promise happiness rather than misery? The answer made is affirmative. Happiness is the second subjective element of good to be recognized, and utility becomes, next after virtue, the criterion of conduct. In the development of ethical philosophy, this phase of thought finds expression in Epicureanism.

Then soon it is perceived that in the attempt to make happiness an element in the ideal good, and utility a criterion of conduct, men exaggerate the pleasure of the moment. They sacrifice a future pleasure to an inferior pleasure of the hour; they commit excess. By such practical errors they impair virtue and disintegrate character. It is seen that if pleasure is to be regarded as an element of goodness, the pleasure of life as a whole must be considered, the pleasure from the exercise of each power must be subordinated to a total pleasure. The total pleasure, in turn, must be consistent with the normal exercise of each power. Virtue, as well as pleasure, must be considered. Character as a whole, as well as pleasure as a whole, must

descriptive. That stage which he calls a pain economy is precisely the one in which the race enjoys most intensely one kind of pleasure, namely, the pleasure of activity, of power; the pleasure it fails to get is that of reaction, of utility (see *ante*, p. 385). The stage that he calls a pleasure economy is one in which the delights of spontaneous activity are greatly curtailed by various restrictions and by the conversion of an exciting military life into prosaic industry, but in which utilities, the pleasures of reaction, are greatly increased. The two stages, therefore, are respectively an effort economy and a reward economy. I suspect that Professor Patten's wrong choice of terms is in part attributable to his mistaken assumption that social relations originated among conquered creatures that were driven by strong enemies into poor environments.

be respected. And, since man is social and is dependent on his fellows for a large part of his pleasure, the pleasure of each individual must be such as is consistent with the pleasure of many individuals, and, in the ideal, with the pleasure of all. In short, the wholeness of pleasure, the wholeness of character, the wholeness of power, must be considered. Integrity,[1] therefore, is the third subjective element of the ideal good to receive recognition, and the third criterion of character. In the development of ethical philosophy, this phase of thought finds expression in Puritanism.

Even integrity, however, may be narrow. The organization of virtues and utilities in conduct and character may be regarded as final. Against finality, soul and reason rebel. They seek expansion of life. The mind will not be satisfied in its quest of truth until it comprehends the world. The soul will not cease to extend its sympathies until sympathy includes all men in the fellowship of good-will. The active powers of our nature chafe until they can expend themselves in any channel; until they can essay any achievement. Self-realization, therefore, is the fourth and final subjective element of goodness to receive recognition, and the final criterion of the conduct of life. In the development of ethical philosophy, this phase of thought finds expression in a humanistic idealism.

Thus the ideal good is seen to be a composite thing. It is not virtue only, or pleasure only, not integrity only, or self-realization only; it is the synthesis of all these things. The ideal good is the rational happiness that is compounded of virtue and pleasure, of integrity and the continuing expansion of life.

In these principles the first law of social choice is discovered.

A community continually endeavours to perfect its type

[1] In the etymological sense of the word.

in accordance with the prevailing conception of an ideal good. This conception varies from time to time, with the evolution or the disintegration of society, and with changes in the composition of the population. In every community that has yet existed in this world the imperfectly developed minds are a majority; the highly developed minds are a small minority. A majority of minds therefore are dominated by the earlier and lower ideals. Nevertheless, as social evolution continues, the proportion of highly developed minds that accept the highest ideals increases. Consequently the first law of social choice may be stated as follows:

In all social choice the most influential ideal is that of personal force, or of virtue in the original sense; the second in influence is the hedonistic or utilitarian ideal; the third is integrity; the least influential is the ideal of self-realization; but if mental and moral evolution continues, the higher ideals must become increasingly influential.

The inductive verification of this law is found in the most familiar facts of practical politics and legislation. The forceful man is always the popular idol, and it makes strangely little difference to the admiring multitude whether his force is the physical prowess of the prize-fighter, or the moral courage of a reformer. The crowd will always sacrifice utility and integrity to exult in a display of power. The politician whose economic blunders and whose indifference to honesty are known to all can keep his hold on the popular suffrage if he is forceful as a personality; or the advocate of a just and wise policy that is at first unpopular can usually carry it through if he is a man of brilliant daring or of dogged resolution.

Next to the popular hero-worship the practical politician and legislator always respects the popular pleasures and economies. He knows that he must have a remarkably good cause and a doughty champion before he can venture with hope of success upon any policy, however wise and

right it may be when judged by the highest ideal standards, if it interferes with any popular enjoyment, or affects business or property.

This first law of social choice is the law of preferences among ends to be achieved. The remaining laws are laws of combination and of the choice of means.

In making subjective valuations for practical purposes we cannot estimate each element and each means of goodness by itself alone; we can do that only in theory, — for the sake of analysis. In real life we have to ask how each element of goodness will combine with others to make up an integral ideal good. In choosing our pleasures, for example, we have to modify some indulgences so that they will combine well with others, or, failing to do that, we have to sacrifice some pleasures altogether. As a rule, many moderate pleasures that combine well, each heightening the others, will make up a larger total of satisfaction than a few pleasures, each of which is intense. It is necessary, therefore, to correct each subjective value, as individually considered, by reference to its probable relation to other values.

Again, in subjective valuations immediate good is not necessarily the only element considered. Further corrections may be made for the future good and ill that must result from the choice contemplated, including reactions on the personality, the self-development, and the self-activity of the chooser.

As soon as the individual has acquired the intellectual power to make such corrections, he attempts to bring his subjective values into a consistent whole; but the composition of the whole, and his success in making it harmonious throughout, depends very much upon his own experiences. If his experiences have been of few kinds and each has been often repeated, his consciousness has become identified with a total of subjective values that is

thoroughly consistent, as far as it goes, but that is very simple in its make-up. His few pleasures, for example, are relatively intense, and he pursues each further than he would if they were varied.

Suppose, now, that some new element or new mode of good is introduced into his life, for example, a new pleasure more intense than any that he has hitherto enjoyed, or that suddenly he sees opened to him possibilities of many new modes of good which, however, are more or less incompatible with those to which he has been accustomed. His group of subjective values becomes at once larger and more complex than it was before, but also less well-organized. A long time will elapse before the readjustment is made. It will involve many sacrifices and self-denials. Meanwhile, the chances are that he will choose crudely and in a radical fashion. He will substitute oftener than he will combine. He will destroy when he might conserve. He will go wholly over to the new way of life, enjoying as before a few modes of experience intensely instead of learning that he might get a greater total of satisfaction from a large number of less intense experiences harmoniously put together.[1]

Let these principles now be applied to a population. It is usual to speak of the elements, modes, and means of good collectively as interests. A population map of a country may be made, showing the distribution of the people according to their interests. In one region will be discovered a marked predominance of those who have lived for generations in a circumscribed way,—the people of narrow experiences and of few interests. In another region will

[1] For the most complete discussion of the utilitarian aspect of these principles, the reader should consult the writings of Professor Patten; especially "The Consumption of Wealth," "The Theory of Dynamic Economics," and "The Economic Causes of Moral Progress," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. III., No. 2, September, 1892.

be discovered large numbers of those who have suddenly found themselves face to face with possibilities of which they had not dreamed. Elsewhere will be discovered those who have so long enjoyed varied experiences and have cultivated manifold interests that their subjective values make up totals which are highly complex and yet, at the same time, harmonious. Can predictions be made as to how the people of these different regions will choose, select, or decide in their industry, their law-making, their educational and religious undertakings, and their organization of institutions? Beyond any doubt, prediction is possible, and the law of the social choice of combinations and of means can be formulated as follows:

A population that has but a few interests, which however are harmoniously combined, will be conservative in its choices. A population that has varied interests which are as yet inharmoniously combined will be radical in its choices. Only the population that has many, varied, and harmoniously combined interests will be consistently progressive in its choices.

Abundant verifications of this law are found in politics, legislation, religion, and custom. The northern commonwealths of the United States have a more diversified industry and social life and a more harmonious combination of old and new interests than the commonwealths of the South. In accordance with these differences, progress in the North is more uniform than in the South. The South is in general more conservative in its social traditions, its customs, its religious beliefs, and its legislation than the North. When, however, it is compelled to depart from the old ways or to make a place for new interests, it proceeds in a radical fashion unknown in the North. Tillmanism in South Carolina is a sufficient illustration of my meaning. As between the eastern and western states of the North, progress is much less uniform in the West than in the East. The West, with its imperfect combination of old and new

interests, is a land of radical experiments in legislation and of violent reactions.

Perhaps the best of all exemplifications of the law is the distribution of political majorities in France. The strongholds of conservatism are in Brittany and in the departments north of the Pyrenees. The centres of radicalism are in the interior, where mining and manufacturing industries have sprung up in sharp contrast to the ancient pastoral and agricultural occupations, and have brought new elements and conflicts into the population. Moderate republicanism is found chiefly in the departments of the Rhine and of the southeast, where for centuries social and intellectual life has been diversified by the intermingling of nationalities and by the interchange of ideas between nations.

If such are the laws of social choice, what determines the persistence of choices? The present social arrangements are survivals. Thousands of different arrangements have disappeared because their usefulness to man was transient or slight. They did not profit the tribes or peoples that used them sufficiently to save either peoples or institutions from extinction. The social arrangements that live as a part of the life of virile communities are arrangements that make communities virile. Directly or indirectly they help to make a better social man, keener in mind and more adept in coöperation. But among all possible social choices in law and institution-making, which will bring these results? What choices, merely as choices, will natural selection prefer?

The answer that sociology gives is very certain. The law is unmistakable. Those subjective values will survive which are component parts in a total, or whole, of subjective values that is becoming ever more complex through the inclusion of new interests, and, at the same time, more thoroughly harmonious and coherent.

This law does not express a psychical process, as does the law of social choices. It formulates objective, physical conditions to which choice must in the long run conform. When once the conditions are clearly perceived, the law becomes entirely comprehensible.

Society, like the individual, must adjust itself to a physical and organic environment. Its pleasures, laws, and institutions must be a part of the adjustment, and consistent with it as a whole. The environment, however, is no constant or unchanging group of relations. It is undergoing ceaseless evolution, though the changes are often too slow to be perceptible at the moment. It is becoming more and more diversified through differentiation. Society may increase the diversification, but cannot prevent it.[1] It cannot make the conditions to which life must adapt itself more simple. On the contrary, life itself must become more complex by adaptation to more complex conditions, or it must cease. This, then, is the reason why tastes must become more varied. It is the reason why pleasures must be many, and must contribute to one another, each heightening, softening, or colouring the others, until all are like musical notes in accord. It is the reason, further, why our principal and familiar enjoyments must not be so intense, individually, as to exclude those weaker, rarer, and more refined pleasures that are necessary constituents in a perfect whole of maximum satisfaction. A species or a com-

[1] One phase of this ceaseless differentiation of the environment is strikingly shown by Leslie Stephen, "Ethics and the Struggle for Existence," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. LXIV., No. 2, August, 1893, in his searching criticism of Huxley's contention in the famous Romanes lecture that ethical progress consists in successfully "combating" the cosmic process. Natural selection implies not only an equilibration of physical and vital energies, but also a moving equilibrium among species and varieties in their relations to each other. The survival of the fittest has never involved the general extinction of the weaker species. If it had, the stronger species also, which are in many ways dependent on the weaker, would have perished. Therefore species have multiplied and differentiated, and the organic environment of each species has become more and more diversified.

munity that has varied tastes will obtain more and better food and will have a more varied experience than one that has but few tastes. A community or a class that delights in many harmonious pleasures has, on the whole, more chances in life than one which is satisfied with a few intense pleasures. And finally, only those habits, customs, and institutions that fit into nature's scheme of diversification will endure.[1] Therefore it is in the physical nature of things that ultra-conservative and ultra-radical social choices must in the long run be terminated, and that only the moderately but constantly progressive choices can continue.

In short, while artificial selection, or social choice, is governed by subjective value, survival is governed by organic and subjective utility.[2] This very important truth is one reason for observing the distinction[3] between subjective utility and subjective value.

In illustration and verification of the law of survival, I will recall the later steps in the evolution of the family. These show how inexorably the form of the family is determined at each step by the necessity of adaptation to complicating conditions, and they also show why only the ethical family will survive.

The religious-proprietary family was, among other things, the social organ of worship and of property. New forms of religion, new organs for the accumulation of capital, and the passion for personal liberty made necessary a change in the family system. The religious-proprietary family, as such, came to an end.

Two possibilities were offered in its stead. One was an irregular union of the sexes. If the irregular union was

[1] Professor Patten's "Theory of Social Forces" is the most thorough study of the conditions of survival and progress that has yet been made, but it errs, as I think, in representing the natural environment as "static."

[2] By organic utility I mean that well-being of the organism which is the physical basis of subjective utility.

[3] *Ante*, p. 44.

childless, the genealogical line of the men and women who preferred such relations to legal marriage came to an end. If there were children, they as a rule received either no care and perished, or received public care which was so inadequate that many of them perished. Therefore the irregular union tended to extinction and left the perpetuation of the race mainly to those who believed in legal marriage and who taught their principles to their children. The possibility for these was the romantic family. Although based on preference and contract, this form of the family was relatively stable as long as women were economically dependent and divorce was difficult. Changing industrial conditions, however, and a more complex social life presently brought about a large measure of economic independence for women, and easy divorce. The romantic family became unstable.

This time three possibilities were offered, and all have been tried. Irregular unions have again been formed, but, as before, they have necessarily tended to extinction. Legal union terminating in divorce has been tried, but this form also tends to extinction. It is more likely than the stable marriage to be childless, or, if children are born, they are likely either to inherit unstable characters from their unstable parents or to grow up without discipline; and, in their maturity, they are more likely than the offspring of stable marriages to contract irregular unions instead of stable marriages and so to bring their genealogical line to an end. The third possibility is the stable marriage of affection and duty, of which two forms are offered. If the relation is entered upon for the personal benefit of the husband and wife only, there may be no children and this family, like its predecessors, becomes extinct. If, however, the family is established with the purpose and in the expectation of transmitting to children and to a distant posterity a sound physical heredity and the mental and moral results of civilization, it must survive. For the children of families of

this type will usually have the qualities that will enable them both to hold their own in the struggle for existence, and to perpetuate the social forms which are their heritage.

Are we then to conclude that, in the last analysis, social causation is an objective or physical process, notwithstanding the important part that has been assigned to volition? If the question is the metaphysical inquiry whether mind is merely a manifestation of matter, the sociologist as such has no opinion to offer. As a sociologist he is not concerned with that troublesome puzzle. If, however, it is the question whether the volitional process in society is conditioned by the physical, and is in no way independent, or underived, the sociologist must make an affirmative reply.

The part played by the volitional factors in social evolution is so conspicuous that a student who approaches the problem from one side only can easily fall into the habit of thinking of them as underived, independent causes, and out of this unscientific habit many misconceptions have grown. The sociologist deals with phenomena of volition at every step. In fact, as we have seen, they are central points, about which all the other phases of social change are grouped. More than this; the sociologist deals not only with causes that are not merely physical, but also with many that are not merely psychical. They are as much more complex than the merely psychical as the psychical are more complex than the merely physical. They are sociological—products of social evolution itself—and the true sociologist wastes no time on attempts to explain all that is human by environment apart from history.

The real question, therefore, is not on the existence or the importance of volitional and of distinctively sociological causes. It is whether these are underived from simpler phenomena than themselves, and are undetermined by processes of the physical and organic world. To this question the answer of sociology is an unqualified negative. Soci-

ology is a product of those new conceptions of nature — natural causation and natural law — that have grown up in scientific minds in connection with doctrines of evolution and the conservation of energy.[1] These conceptions, as the working hypotheses of physical and organic science, are totally unlike those old metempirical notions that made natural law an entity, endowed it with omnipotence, and set it up in a world of men and things to govern them. Natural laws are simply unchanging relations among forces, be they physical, psychical, or social. A natural cause is simply one that is at the same time an effect. In the universe as known to science there are no independent, unrelated, uncaused causes. By natural causation, therefore, the scientific man means a process in which every cause is itself an effect of antecedent causes; in which every action is at the same time a reaction. Nature is but the totality of related things, in which every change has been caused by antecedent change and will itself cause subsequent change, and in which, among all changes, there are relations of coexistence and sequence that are themselves unchanging.

In this mighty but exquisite system man is indeed a variable, but not an independent variable. He is a function of innumerable variables. In a world of endless change he acts upon that world, but only because he is of that world. His volition is a true cause, but only because it is a true effect. Therefore, while affirming the reality of sociological forces that are distinctly different from merely biological and from merely physical forces, the sociologist is careful to add that they are different only as products are different from factors, only as protoplasm is different from certain quantities of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon; only as an organism and its coördinated activities

[1] Conceptions not all found even in so recent a work as Mill's "Logic," but set forth clearly by Lewes in "Problems of Life and Mind," First Series.

are different from a group of nucleated cells having activities that are unrelated. Perceiving that society is an organization that acts in definite ways upon its members, he looks beyond the superficial aspect and finds that all social action is in fact a reaction, and, as such, is definitely limited and conditioned. He finds nowhere a social force that has not been evolved in a physical-organic process, or one that is not at every moment conditioned by physical facts. He sees in constant operation that marvellous product of individual wills, the collective or group will, in which Austin found the source of political sovereignty; but he sees also, what no jurist before Darwin's day could have seen, how inexorably the sovereign will is conditioned by natural selection. The group, like the individual, can will, but what it wills is determined by conditions that man did not create, and whether the group continues to will this or that depends on whether the thing willed conduces to social survival.

It is in this truth that the sociologist discerns the essential significance of the much-befogged doctrine of natural rights. Natural rights, as the term was once understood, have gone to the limbo of outworn creeds; not so those natural norms of positive right that sociology is just beginning to disclose. Legal rights are rights sanctioned by the law-making power; moral rights are rules of right sanctioned by the conscience of the community; natural rights are socially necessary norms of right, enforced by natural selection in the sphere of social relations; and in the long run there can be neither legal nor moral rights that are not grounded in natural rights as thus defined.

I am not trying here to rehabilitate an old idea in a new phraseology. I reject the old idea, and with it that use of the word "natural," imposed on political philosophy by Rousseau, which identifies the "natural" exclusively with the "primitive." This use is now banished from biology and psychology, but it is inexcusably retained in the

political sciences by many economists and jurists, as if "natural" were a word of no broader meaning than "natal." In scientific nomenclature "natural" has become much more nearly identical with "normal." In its absolute scientific sense the natural is that which exists in virtue of its part in a cosmic system of mutually determining activities; hence, in a relative and narrower sense it is that which is, on the whole, in harmony with the conditions of its existence. The unnatural is on the way to dissolution or extinction.

If the social will is conditioned by natural selection, not less is the power to convert will into deed conditioned by the conservation of energy. Enormous as is the social energy, it is always a definite quantity. Every unit of it has been taken up from the physical environment, and no changes of form can increase the amount. What is used in one way is absolutely withdrawn from other modes of expenditure. If the available energy of the environment is wasted or in any way diminished, the social activity also must diminish. The evolution of new relationships of conscious association, and the accompanying development of personality, will be checked.

Thus the definition of sociology, as an explanation of social phenomena in terms of natural causation, becomes somewhat more explicit. Specifically, sociology is an interpretation of social phenomena in terms of psychical activity, organic adjustment, natural selection, and the conservation of energy. As such, it may be less than a demonstrative science, if the experimental sciences be taken as the standard; but we cannot admit that it is only a descriptive science, as is contended by those French sociologists who hold closely to the philosophy of Comte.[1] It is strictly an explanatory science, fortifying induction by deduction, and referring effects to veritable causes.

[1] See especially M. de Roberty, "La sociologie," Chap. II.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE AND END OF SOCIETY

THE final question remains. What is the nature of this concrete group of phenomena that we have been studying? To what class of natural objects does it belong? Is it, as Mr. Spencer and others have said, an organism?

Certainly it is not a physical organism. Its parts, if parts it has, are psychical relations. They are held together not by material bonds, but by comprehension, sympathy, and interest. If society is an organism at all, it must be described as physio-psychic — as a psychical organism essentially, but with a physical basis. The reader who has followed these pages thus far, however, will be disposed to agree, I think, that a society is more than an organism — that it is something as much higher and more complex than an organism as an organism is higher and more complex than inorganic matter. A society is an *organization*, partly a product of unconscious evolution, partly a result of conscious planning. An organization is a complex of psychical relations. Like an organism, however, it may exhibit every phase of evolution — of differentiation with increasing cohesion or unity.

Like an organism, too, an organization may have a function. The function of society is to develop conscious life and to create human personality; to that end it now exists. It is conscious association with his fellows that develops man's moral nature. To the exchange of thought and feeling all literature and philosophy, all religious con-

sciousness and public polity, are due, and it is the reaction of literature and philosophy, of worship and polity, on the mind of each new generation that develops its type of personality. Accordingly, we may say that the function of social organization, which the sociologist must always keep in view, is the evolution of personality through ever higher stages until it attains to the ideal that we name humanity.

Therefore, at every step the sociological task is the double one, — to know how social relations are evolved, and how they react on the development of personality.[1] In other words, one object of sociology is to learn all that can be learned about the creation of the social man. The bearing of this learning upon the studies of the economist and the political theorist will be understood by all who have followed the recent progress of political philosophy. The "economic man" of the Ricardians still lives and has his useful work to do; notwithstanding our scientific Iagos, who aver that they have looked upon the world these four times seven years, and have never yet "found man that knew how to love himself." Not so the natural man of Hobbes, whose singular state, as described in the "Leviathan," "was a condition of war of every one against every one," but who nevertheless "covenanted" with his neighbour. That whole class of ideas, and all the theories built upon them, in which man was lifted out of his social relations,— in which the individual was conceived as an uncompromising egoist, existing before society and reluctantly joining a social combination, — are giving way before a sounder knowledge. Instead of those notions, a conception of man as essentially and naturally social, as created by his social relationships and existing as man only in

[1] The work of interpreting thought, morals, art, and religion from the sociological point of view had been hopefully begun by the lamented M. Guyau. His "L'Art au point de vue sociologique" and "Éducation et hérédité, étude sociologique" are especially suggestive.

virtue of them, will be the starting-point of the political theorizing of coming years.

A social being, the normally organized man returns to society with usury the gifts wherewith he has been by society endowed; and this truth will be the starting-point of the ethical teaching of coming years. Personality cannot live within itself to perish with the individual life. It goes forth into the everlasting life of man. And so, little by little, age by age, society, which has created man, is by man transformed. Of supreme importance in this work is the influence of those few transcendent minds whose genius pierces the unknown; of those pioneers of thought and conduct who dare to stand alone in untrodden ways; of those devoted lovers of their kind who, often in obloquy and pain, reveal the possibilities of a spiritual life. It is chiefly through these that the mass of humanity is lifted in some small degree above the plane of physical necessity into the freer air of liberty and light. This is the way of life that Browning has so truthfully described:

> ". . . Already you include
> The multitude; then let the multitude
> Include yourself; and the result were new:
> Themselves before, the multitude turn you.
> This were to live and move and have, in them,
> Your being, and secure a diadem
> You should transmit (because no cycle yearns
> Beyond itself, but on itself returns)
> When, the full sphere in wane, the world o'erlaid
> Long since with you, shall have in turn obeyed
> Some orb still prouder, some displayer, still
> More potent than the last, of human will,
> And some new king depose the old." [1]

[1] "Sordello," Book V.

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